Supreme Court of Canada **Appeal Heard:** March 19, 2024

Judgment Rendered: December 20, 2024 Docket: 40602 Between: Commission des droits de la personne et des droits de la jeunesse — Appellant and Directrice de la protection de la jeunesse du CISSS A — Respondent — and — Attorney General of Quebec, A, B, X, Canadian Civil Liberties Association and British Columbia Civil Liberties Association — Interveners Official English Translation Coram: Wagner C.J. and Karakatsanis, Côté, Rowe, Martin, Kasirer, Jamal, O'Bonsawin and Moreau JJ. Reasons for Judgment: (paras. 1 to 122)

Wagner C.J. (Karakatsanis, Côté, Rowe, Martin, Kasirer, Jamal, O'Bonsawin and Moreau JJ. concurring) > Note: This document is subject to editorial revision before its reproduction in final form in the Canada Supreme Court Reports. --- Indexed as: Quebec (Commission des droits de la personne et des droits de la jeunesse) v. Directrice de la protection de la jeunesse du CISSS A 2024 SCC 43 File No.: 40602. 2024: March 19; 2024: December 20. Present: Wagner C.J. and Karakatsanis, Côté, Rowe, Martin, Kasirer, Jamal, O'Bonsawin and Moreau JJ. ON APPEAL FROM THE COURT OF APPEAL FOR QUEBEC --- ## Headnote Status of persons — Child protection — Encroachment upon child's rights — Corrective powers of tribunal — Tribunal declaring that young person's rights had been encroached upon in context of social intervention — Tribunal ordering corrective measures — Director of youth protection challenging measures on ground that they did not relate directly to young person's situation referred to tribunal — Scope of corrective powers conferred on Youth Division of Court of Québec in cases of encroachment upon child's rights — Youth Protection Act, CQLR, c. P‑34.1, s. 91 para. 4. In the context of social intervention, a young person and her parents filed an application with the Youth Division of the Court of Québec ("tribunal") for a declaration of encroachment upon rights under s. 91 para. 4 of the Youth Protection Act ("YPA"). That provision states that where "the tribunal concludes that the rights of a child in difficulty have been wronged by persons, bodies or institutions, it may order the situation to be corrected". The tribunal identified four situations that had encroached upon the young person's rights, and it recommended and ordered a series of corrective measures. Four of these measures were challenged by the director of youth protection for the Centre intégré de santé et de services sociaux A ("DYP"), who took the view that they went beyond the corrective powers conferred on the tribunal by s. 91 para. 4 of the YPA because they did not relate directly to the young person's situation. To begin with, as regards the first two measures, the tribunal ordered that the youth workers, educators and intervention officers who worked in the individualized treatment units be able to receive specific training on mental health and that these units be able to obtain support from a healthcare professional specializing in mental health. Next, as regards the other two measures, the tribunal ordered the Centre intégré de santé et de services sociaux A ("CISSS A") to implement a protocol within a reasonable time period to set out the steps to be taken when a child spits during an intervention and to adapt all isolation rooms so that they were safer and their walls were covered with a material that prevented injury. The Superior Court allowed the DYP's appeal in part, holding that the four impugned orders exceeded the powers conferred on the tribunal by the legislature because they applied to children other than the one whose situation had been referred to the tribunal. The Superior Court varied the impugned orders so that they applied specifically to the young person's situation and they named her expressly. The decision was subsequently appealed by the young person, by her parents and by the Commission des droits de la personne et des droits de la jeunesse. That commission had intervened for the first time before the Superior Court to argue that s. 91 para. 4 gives the tribunal broad corrective powers allowing it to make general orders not specifically intended to correct the situation experienced by the child before it. Like the Superior Court judge, the majority of the Court of Appeal found that the four impugned orders were general in nature, went beyond the situation of the child who was the subject of the proceedings and therefore had to be narrowed. However, the majority of the Court of Appeal varied two of the impugned measures, as varied by the Superior Court, so that they were ordered against the DYP rather than the CISSS A. Held: The appeal should be allowed in part. The legislature intended to confer on the tribunal the corrective powers needed to ensure the fullest protection of the interests and rights of the child whose situation has been referred to it, that is, protection that applies to both the present and the future and that takes account of the circumstances at the source of the encroachment upon rights as well as the impact of the encroachment on the child's psychological and physical state. The tribunal may order corrective measures whose purpose is to put an end to the situation of encroachment where it is still encroaching upon the child's rights, to remedy the psychological or physical consequences for the child resulting from the encroachment upon rights, and to prevent the recurrence of the situation of encroachment for the child. A preventive corrective measure may be ordered only if the child whose rights have been encroached upon is at risk of being subjected to the situation of encroachment again, if the corrective measure can effectively help to prevent the recurrence of the situation of encroachment and if the measure is related to the protection of the interests and rights of the child whose situation has been referred to the tribunal. The YPA must be given a large and liberal interpretation that will ensure the attainment of its object and the carrying out of its provisions according to their true intent, meaning and spirit. Every provision of the YPA must also be interpreted in accordance with the Charter of human rights and freedoms, while bearing in mind the Convention on the Rights of the Child ("CRC"). The starting point in any interpretive exercise is the text of the provision. In the absence of statutory definitions, what should be focused on is the grammatical and ordinary meaning of the text, that is, the natural meaning that appears when the provision is simply read through as a whole. In this case, consideration of the grammatical and ordinary meaning of the phrase "the situation to be corrected" in s. 91 para. 4 leads to the conclusion that the legislature intended to grant the tribunal corrective powers that allow it to redress a situation, to restore order or the normal state of affairs. However, this consideration does not make it possible to say with certainty which situation is in question. Furthermore, consideration of the grammatical and ordinary meaning of the phrase is of little assistance in determining whether the legislature's intention in granting the tribunal the corrective powers set out in s. 91 para. 4 was that, in exercising them, the tribunal concern itself exclusively with protecting the rights and interests of the child whose situation has been referred to it, or whether the legislature also intended that the tribunal concern itself with protecting the rights and interests of all other children who, though not the subject of the proceedings, are or may find themselves in the same situation as the child before the tribunal. An analysis of the scheme of the YPA suggests that the legislature did not intend the tribunal to be able to order corrective measures aimed in whole or in part at protecting the rights and interests of children whose situations have not been referred to it but who may find themselves in the same situation of encroachment as the child before it. The tribunal's mandate is to render justice in an individualized and particularized manner on the basis of the interests and rights of the child whose situation has been referred to it. With a view to ensuring functional complementarity between social intervention and judicial intervention, the tribunal must make decisions that are in the interest of the child and that respect the child's rights, the ultimate goal being to limit any danger to the child's security and development, but also to prevent abuse. The fact that the tribunal is called upon to render justice in an individualized and particularized manner on the basis of a single child's situation is also clear from all of the provisions relating to the tribunal's jurisdiction. No provision of the YPA reveals an intention to depart from this logic of individualized and particularized justice that runs throughout the YPA when it comes to encroachment upon rights. The legislature did not intend to grant the tribunal powers going beyond those required to carry out the mandate assigned to it. This conclusion is also supported by the fact that other actors have been given a mandate to examine the system as a whole, to identify its shortcomings and to reform it. The proper functioning of the youth protection system depends on the actions of a range of political, social and legal actors that have been given roles, responsibilities and powers that are both distinct and complementary. There is nothing to suggest that, under the wide‑ranging reform of the YPA, the tribunal's mandate has been broadened to allow it to take a critical look at systemic issues in child protection and to order corrective measures to reform the system for the benefit of children whose situations have not been referred to it. The legislative history of s. 91 para. 4 and of other related provisions concerning encroachment upon rights confirms what the scheme of the YPA already reveals: the tribunal can deal with the situation of only one child at a time. Moreover, there is nothing to suggest that the legislature intended to authorize the tribunal to order corrective measures that would apply to children whose situations have not been referred to it but who may find themselves in the same situation of encroachment as the child before it. The legislature's decision to omit the words "encroaching upon the rights of the young person" within the phrase "the situation to be corrected" in s. 91 para. 4 should not be interpreted as a broadening of the tribunal's power to order corrective measures to protect the interests and rights of children whose situations have not been referred to it. The YPA establishes a scheme whose purpose is to protect the interests and rights of children whose security or development is in danger, thereby helping to implement Canada's obligations under the CRC in domestic law. The CRC weighs in favour of interpreting s. 91 para. 4 in a large and liberal manner so that the tribunal will have all the corrective powers it needs to ensure that the child whose rights have been encroached upon has the fullest and most effective protection possible. However, there is no indication that, in order to comply with the CRC, provincial and territorial legislatures must, in cases of encroachment upon rights, give courts or tribunals the mandate and powers they need to concern themselves with protecting the interests and rights of more than one child at a time. States parties to the CRC possess a margin of discretion in determining what measures are appropriate to promote the best interests of the child and to protect the child's rights. In the case of social and judicial intervention, the legislature had in mind that this fundamental purpose of protecting the children who are the most vulnerable in society would be attained through the cumulative effect of individualized and particularized interventions aimed at protecting the interests and rights of one child at a time. The recourse for a declaration of encroachment upon rights is one of the legal tools put in place by the legislature to achieve this purpose. The corrective powers conferred on the tribunal by s. 91 para. 4 must therefore be interpreted in a large and liberal manner to ensure the attainment of this purpose, which is clearly affirmed in the Charter of human rights and freedoms. The various types of corrective measures that can be ordered must be conceived of generously to ensure the fullest possible protection for the child whose rights have been encroached upon. Over and above correcting the situation at the source of the encroachment upon rights, the tribunal must also be able to order preventive corrective measures that will follow the child through the system to ensure that the child is adequately protected in the future. At least three validity criteria govern the exercise of the tribunal's power to order preventive corrective measures under s. 91 para. 4. These criteria are based on the limits built into this enabling provision. First, for a preventive corrective measure to be ordered, the child whose situation has been referred to the tribunal must be at risk of being subjected to the situation of encroachment again. This criterion will generally be met where the child is still the subject of intervention under the YPA. Second, the preventive corrective measure ordered must be able to effectively help to prevent the recurrence of the situation of encroachment. Once the source of the encroachment upon rights is identified, the tribunal will be able to consider one or more corrective measures that could effectively help to prevent the recurrence of the situation of encroachment. These measures will logically focus on one or more of the circumstances shown by the evidence to be at the source of the encroachment. The wide range of corrective measures that can effectively help to prevent the recurrence of the situation of encroachment will, however, be narrowed once account is taken of an additional criterion: any preventive corrective measure must, third, be related to preventing the recurrence of the situation of encroachment for the child whose situation has been referred to the tribunal. This requirement flows from the legislative intent discerned from s. 91 para. 4 of the YPA. The corrective measure must therefore be primarily intended to protect the interests and rights of the child whose situation has been referred to the tribunal. The corrective measure must be related to events experienced by the child in environments where the child has spent or might spend time, on the basis of the evidence and the context. The tribunal must confine itself to ordering a corrective measure that reflects the risk of harm faced by the child, as shown by the evidence. That being said, the order, to be valid, does not necessarily have to expressly name the child whose situation has been referred to the tribunal. To effectively protect the child whose rights have been encroached upon, the preventive corrective measures will sometimes have to be broad in scope. At least two types of measures can be contemplated. First, the tribunal may order a corrective measure specifically directed at persons, bodies or institutions that, in light of the evidence, could potentially contribute to the recurrence of the encroachment upon the child's rights. Second, the tribunal may order a measure that will follow the child through the system, either as an alternative to or in addition to the first type of measure, in light of the evidence in the record, the circumstances of the case and the need to protect the child for the future. Broad corrective measures will generally have the advantage of protecting the interests and rights of many other children in an indirect and incidental manner, but this is of no relevance in determining whether the measures were validly imposed. A preventive corrective measure related to the interests and rights of the child whose situation has been referred to the tribunal may very well have positive indirect and incidental consequences for a large number of children. There is nothing to prevent the tribunal from ordering a corrective measure to eliminate a systemic or institutional practice, provided that the three validity criteria are met. Lastly, the magnitude of the budgetary impact of the corrective measure is not in itself a criterion for the validity of the order. Such a validity criterion has no basis in the YPA, and its application would entail considerable practical difficulties, adding another barrier to access to justice in the youth protection system. Where rights have been encroached upon, the tribunal has a power to make recommendations that it derives from the text, scheme and object of the YPA. When the circumstances do not lend themselves to stating a conclusion in the form of an order, the tribunal can still make a non‑binding recommendation anchored in the evidence concerning the encroachment upon the rights of the child whose situation has been referred to it. This power to make recommendations is to be exercised with caution and allows the tribunal to point out the existence of a problem relating to an encroachment upon the child's rights and to encourage the authorities to address it. The recommendation must be based on the situation of encroachment experienced by the child, as shown by the evidence. In this case, the four corrective measures challenged by the DYP were ordered to prevent abusive or inadequate restraint and isolation measures from being used again, where it was established that the young person was at risk of being subjected to the identified situations of encroachment again. As regards the first two orders, the tribunal erred by not limiting the scope of these measures so that they were related to preventing the recurrence of the situation of encroachment for the young person. Nothing in the evidence adduced supported the conclusion that such broad orders were necessary to protect the young person's interests and rights in the future. The Superior Court properly intervened to narrow the scope of these orders so that they were related to the protection of the young person's interests and rights. As for the third order, the tribunal exceeded its powers by ordering the CISSS A to implement a protocol that set out the steps to be taken when a child spits during an intervention. The order as worded was not related to preventing the recurrence of the situation of encroachment for the young person. In light of the findings of fact, the order should have been directed at the rehabilitation centres for young persons with adjustment problems ("RCYPAPs") of the CISSS A and at any other RCYPAP that would be responsible for the young person. The order should also have been made against the DYP. Finally, as regards the fourth order, which required that the isolation rooms be made safer, this corrective measure was not sufficiently anchored in the evidence and the context. The order should have been varied to direct the DYP, and not the CISSS A, to have at least one isolation room, covered with a material that prevented injury, available for the young person at all times in units A and B of the CISSS A and in the other RCYPAP units to which she would be entrusted. Other alternative orders were also available and acceptable and could therefore have been made. However, since the young person is no longer the subject of social intervention under the YPA and never will be again given that she is now an adult, no order will be made. --- ## Cases Cited Referred to: Protection de la jeunesse – 123979, 2012 QCCA 1483, [2012] R.J.Q. 1603; Rizzo & Rizzo Shoes Ltd. (Re), [1998] 1 S.C.R. 27; Bell ExpressVu Limited Partnership v. Rex, 2002 SCC 42, [2002] 2 S.C.R. 559; La Presse inc. v. Quebec, 2023 SCC 22; R. v. Breault, 2023 SCC 9; MediaQMI inc. v. 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For the respondent: Audrey Boctor, Julie Langlois, Vanessa Ntaganda and Mélanie Poulin. For the intervener the Attorney General of Quebec: Éric Cantin and Mario Normandin. For the interveners A and B: Stéphane Pouliot and Gabrielle Gallio. For the intervener X: Charlotte Vanier Perras. For the intervener the Canadian Civil Liberties Association: Karine Joizil and Simon Bouthillier. For the intervener the British Columbia Civil Liberties Association: Vincent Larochelle. --- English version of the judgment of the Court delivered by ## The Chief Justice — --- ## TABLE OF CONTENTS | Section | Paragraph | |---------|-----------| | I. Overview | 1 | | II. Factual Background | 5 | | III. Procedural and Judicial History | 6 | |     A. Court of Québec, 2019 QCCQ 3916 | 6 | |     B. Quebec Superior Court, 2021 QCCS 2251 | 9 | |     C. Quebec Court of Appeal, 2022 QCCA 1653 | 11 | |         (1) Majority Reasons | 11 | |         (2) Concurring Reasons | 14 | | IV. Issues | 17 | | V. Analysis | 23 | |     A. Judicial Intervention in Cases of Encroachment Upon Rights: Scope of the Corrective Powers Conferred on the Tribunal Under Section 91 Paragraph 4 of the YPA | 23 | |         (1) Principles That Must Guide the Interpretive Exercise | 23 | |         (2) Interpretation of Section 91 Paragraph 4 of the YPA | 28 | |             (a) Text | 30 | |                 (i) The Verb "Correct" (" Corriger ") | 30 | |                 (ii) The Words "the Situation" (" la Situation ") | 33 | |                 (iii) Conclusion | 36 | |             (b) Scheme of the YPA | 37 | |                 (i) The Tribunal's Mandate Is To Render Justice in an Individualized and Particularized Manner on the Basis of the Interests and Rights of the Child Whose Situation Has Been Referred to It | 38 | |                 (ii) Other Actors Are Responsible for Looking at the System as a Whole and Reforming It | 43 | |                 (iii) Conclusion on the Tribunal's Role | 50 | |             (c) Legislative History | 52 | |             (d) CRC | 61 | |             (e) Object of the Provision | 64 | |             (f) Conclusion | 71 | |         (3) Criteria for the Validity of Corrective Measures Ordered for Preventive Purposes | 78 | |             (a) The Child Must Be at Risk of Being Subjected to the Situation of Encroachment Again | 79 | |             (b) The Corrective Measures Must Be Able to Effectively Help to Prevent the Recurrence of the Situation of Encroachment | 81 | |             (c) The Corrective Measures Ordered Must Be Related to the Protection of the Interests and Rights of the Child Whose Situation Has Been Referred to the Tribunal | 87 | |             (d) The Budgetary Impact of the Corrective Measure Is Not a Criterion for the Validity of the Order | 93 | |             (e) Conclusion | 95 | |         (4) Review of the Orders | 98 | |             (a) Orders Directed at the Individualized Treatment Units | 101 | |             (b) Orders Directed at the CISSS A | 105 | |         (5) Tribunal's Power To Make Recommendations | 111 | |     B. Right of the CISSS A To Be Heard or Duly Called | 117 | | VI. Disposition | 122 | --- ## I. Overview [ 1 ] The very idea of a child's rights being encroached upon in the context of social intervention under the Youth Protection Act, CQLR, c. P‑34.1 ("YPA"),[^1] provokes indignation. At such a time, the child is in an extremely vulnerable position. The child may have been sexually, physically or psychologically abused, have been neglected or abandoned, or have serious mental health or behavioural disorders. As author Laurence Ricard notes, encroachment upon the rights of such a child in the course of social intervention seems, in this context, [translation] "like twisting a knife in the wound": How can it be explained that intervention by the youth protection system may add to the harm already suffered by a child even though the primary mission of this system is to protect them? ("Un regard sur la notion de lésion de droits en matière de protection de la jeunesse" (2021), 62 C. de D. 605, at p. 608; see also YPA, s. 2). This case illustrates, however, how difficult it can be for those involved with a child in the course of intervention under the YPA to prevent such encroachments upon rights from happening or recurring, given that the causes of these encroachments are often numerous and complex. [ 2 ] This appeal provides an opportunity for this Court to consider the corrective powers conferred by the legislature on the Youth Division of the Court of Québec ("tribunal") where persons, bodies or institutions have encroached upon a child's rights in the course of social intervention. The tribunal's power to intervene in this regard derives from s. 91 para. 4 of the YPA, which states that where "the tribunal concludes that the rights of a child in difficulty have been wronged by persons, bodies or institutions, it may order the situation to be corrected". [ 3 ] This laconic provision gives the tribunal broad powers that have at times been compared to superintending and reforming powers in the interest of the child and at times been likened to the remedial powers of courts where there has been a violation of fundamental rights. However, the exact contours of these powers remain unclear and are a subject of debate. The present case therefore affords an occasion to circumscribe their scope. [ 4 ] First, the Court must interpret the passage in s. 91 para. 4 stating that the tribunal may order "the situation to be corrected". More specifically, it must be determined whether the legislature intended that the tribunal be able to order corrective measures only to prevent the recurrence of a situation of encroachment for the child whose rights were encroached upon, or whether it intended that the tribunal also be able to order corrective measures to prevent the same situation of encroachment from occurring for any other child who might be faced with it. Second, the Court must consider a question relating to respect for the right of the Centre intégré de santé et de services sociaux A ("CISSS A") to be heard or duly called. The Court is being asked to determine whether, in the circumstances, the tribunal could make orders against the CISSS A. --- ## II. Factual Background [ 5 ] On January 17, 2018, the tribunal ordered that a young person, the intervener X, be placed in a rehabilitation centre for young persons with adjustment problems ("RCYPAP") because her security and development were in danger within the meaning of the YPA (2018 QCCQ 10492). Pursuant to that order, the young person was placed in various RCYPAP units and was also hospitalized for certain periods. During her stays in the units, the young person's rights were repeatedly encroached upon, a fact not disputed by the respondent, the director of youth protection for the CISSS A ("DYP"). Since the tribunal's judgment summarized below clearly lays out the facts that led to the encroachments upon rights and since these facts are not in dispute, I see no need to recount them again here in detail. --- ## III. Procedural and Judicial History ### A. Court of Québec, 2019 QCCQ 3916 [ 6 ] The issue of encroachment upon rights arose before the tribunal in the context of an application by the DYP for the review and extension of the order made in January 2018. In connection with that application, the young person and her parents, respectively, filed an application for a declaration of encroachment upon rights under s. 91 para. 4 of the YPA. [ 7 ] The tribunal allowed in part the application for the review and extension of the order of January 2018, after finding that the young person's security and development were still in danger. In deciding the applications for a declaration of encroachment upon rights, the tribunal identified four situations that had encroached upon the young person's rights: the unjustified and unduly long suspension of psychological counselling, in violation of an order made on January 17, 2018; an educator's unjustified refusal to allow the young person, who had run away from her family home, to take refuge at the RCYPAP to which she had been entrusted, and the inadequate support subsequently offered to her when she reported that she had been sexually assaulted after running away; the fact that the young person's medical record was poorly kept, and the lack of care and follow‑up for more than two weeks when she had injuries to her hands; and the imposition of abusive or inadequate restraint and isolation measures. [ 8 ] The tribunal recommended and ordered a series of corrective measures. Four of them were later challenged by the DYP, who took the view that they went beyond the corrective powers conferred on the tribunal by s. 91 para. 4 of the YPA because they did not relate directly to the young person's situation. The four corrective measures in question were worded as follows: [translation] AS CORRECTIVE MEASURES: [340] ORDERS that the youth workers, educators and intervention officers who work in the individualized treatment units be able to receive specific training on mental health and report back to the Commission des droits de la personne et des droits de la jeunesse; [341] ORDERS that the individualized treatment units be able to obtain support from a healthcare professional specializing in mental health and report back to the Commission des droits de la personne et des droits de la jeunesse; [345] ORDERS that the Centre intégré de santé et de services sociaux A implement a protocol within a reasonable time period that sets out the steps to be taken when a child spits during an intervention and report back to the Commission des droits de la personne et des droits de la jeunesse; [346] ORDERS that the Centre intégré de santé et de services sociaux A adapt all isolation rooms so that they are safer and their walls are covered with a material that prevents injury; ### B. Quebec Superior Court, 2021 QCCS 2251 [ 9 ] The appellant, the Commission des droits de la personne et des droits de la jeunesse ("CDPDJ"), intervened for the first time before the Superior Court to argue that s. 91 para. 4 of the YPA gives the tribunal broad corrective powers allowing it [translation] "to make general orders . . . not specifically intended to correct the situation experienced by the child, but rather by children who may experience the same situation" (para. 19). [ 10 ] The Superior Court judge allowed the DYP's appeal in part. With regard to the applicable standard for intervention, he found that the question at issue was a question of law, in respect of which the court could intervene unreservedly if an error had been made. Relying mainly on the Quebec Court of Appeal's decision in Protection de la jeunesse – 123979, 2012 QCCA 1483, [2012] R.J.Q. 1603, he then held that the four impugned orders exceeded the powers conferred on the tribunal by the legislature because they applied to children other than the one whose situation had been referred to the tribunal. On completing his analysis, he decided to vary the impugned orders so that they applied specifically to the young person's situation and they named her expressly. The Superior Court judge's decision was subsequently appealed by the CDPDJ, by the young person and by her parents, the interveners A and B. ### C. Quebec Court of Appeal, 2022 QCCA 1653 #### (1) Majority Reasons [ 11 ] Like the Superior Court judge, the majority of the Court of Appeal found that the four impugned orders were [translation] "general in nature" (para. 78), went "beyond [the] situation" of the child who was the subject of the proceedings (para. 80) and therefore had to be narrowed. However, the majority was of the view that the orders set out at paras. 345‑46 could not be made against the CISSS A because the latter was not formally a party to the proceedings at first instance. The majority accordingly allowed the appeal in part for the sole purpose of correcting the orders set out at paras. 345‑46 of the tribunal's judgment, which had previously been varied by the Superior Court judge, so that the orders were directed at the DYP and not the CISSS A (paras. 2 and 82‑83). [ 12 ] According to the majority, the issue was [translation] "[w]hether section 91 in fine allows [the tribunal] to order institutions or public bodies to take measures that require assigning a portion of their available funds to a specific purpose" (para. 70). This was therefore a question of law that the majority answered in the negative. In the majority's view, only a [translation] "clear and explicit" legal rule allows courts to order an allocation of public funds for specific purposes, and s. 91 in fine of the YPA does not fit this definition (para. 67; see also para. 68). This means that the tribunal does not have, under this section, a [translation] "general power of intervention or review of the decisions that institutions or bodies are required to make about their operations, organization, or premises" (para. 75). [ 13 ] The majority concluded that the corrective measures had therefore to be narrowed to ensure that the orders related specifically to the young person's situation. It accordingly upheld most of the Superior Court judge's decision. However, the majority varied two of the impugned measures, as varied by the Superior Court, so that they were ordered against the DYP rather than the CISSS A (para. 83). The majority found that orders could not be made against the CISSS A because it was not formally a party to the proceedings at first instance. #### (2) Concurring Reasons [ 14 ] The concurring judge agreed with the majority that the orders could not be made against the CISSS A because it was not formally a party to the proceedings at first instance. [ 15 ] However, she disagreed with the majority's approach. In her view, the majority erred in holding that orders must be limited to situations that involve an allocation of public funds, and that a "clear and explicit" legal rule is required to make such an order. She would instead have applied the three‑part test articulated in Protection de la jeunesse – 123979, namely that orders must be (1) related to the situation of the child; (2) within the powers of the party against whom the order is made; and (3) reasonably related to preventing the risk of recurrence. [ 16 ] Applying this test, the concurring judge would not have narrowed the scope of the order to implement a protocol but would have limited the order for adaptation of the isolation rooms to units A and B rather than all CISSS A units (paras. 115, 135 and 140). --- ## IV. Issues [ 17 ] This appeal raises two main issues: (1) What is the scope of the corrective powers conferred on the tribunal by s. 91 para. 4 of the YPA? (2) Could the tribunal make orders against the CISSS A, which was not a named party to the proceedings at first instance? [ 18 ] The CDPDJ maintains that the tribunal has broad corrective powers under s. 91 para. 4 that permit it to make orders of a general nature going beyond the situation of the child before it. It argues that these powers are analogous to the remedial powers of courts under human rights legislation. [ 19 ] The respondent DYP takes the position that the corrective powers of the tribunal are limited to orders that relate specifically to the child whose situation has been referred to it. [ 20 ] The interveners raise various related arguments. The Attorney General of Quebec submits that the tribunal's powers cannot authorize orders that, in effect, compel an allocation of public funds. Interveners A and B argue that the tribunal may make orders of broad application provided those orders are grounded in the child's specific situation. Intervener X (the young person) supports the CDPDJ's position. The Canadian Civil Liberties Association and the British Columbia Civil Liberties Association support broader corrective powers in light of fundamental rights considerations. [ 21 ] On the question of the right to be heard, the CDPDJ maintains that the CISSS A was not prejudiced by the omission to join it as a party. Interveners A and B go further, arguing that the CISSS A was effectively a party through the DYP and that the expression "director of youth protection" was sufficient to designate the CISSS A. [ 22 ] With regard to the question of the CISSS A's right to be heard or duly called (art. 17 para. 1 C.C.P.), the appellant has not satisfied me that there is reason to intervene to restore the orders so as to direct them, as the tribunal did, against the CISSS A. --- ## V. Analysis ### A. Judicial Intervention in Cases of Encroachment Upon Rights: Scope of the Corrective Powers Conferred on the Tribunal Under Section 91 Paragraph 4 of the YPA #### (1) Principles That Must Guide the Interpretive Exercise [ 23 ] It is well settled that "the words of an Act are to be read in their entire context and in their grammatical and ordinary sense harmoniously with the scheme of the Act, the object of the Act, and the intention of Parliament" (E. A. Driedger, Construction of Statutes (2nd ed. 1983), at p. 87, quoted in Rizzo & Rizzo Shoes Ltd. (Re), [1998] 1 S.C.R. 27, at para. 21; Bell ExpressVu Limited Partnership v. Rex, 2002 SCC 42, [2002] 2 S.C.R. 559, at para. 26; La Presse inc. v. Quebec, 2023 SCC 22, at para. 22). [ 24 ] In this case, it is important to highlight a few principles that guide the interpretation of s. 91 para. 4 of the YPA. First, the YPA must be given a large and liberal interpretation that will ensure the attainment of its object and the carrying out of its provisions according to their true intent, meaning and spirit (see Interpretation Act, CQLR, c. I‑16, s. 41; Protection de la jeunesse – 123979, at para. 21). However, just as the text must be considered in light of the context and object, the object of a statute and that of a provision must be considered with close attention always being paid to the text of the statute, which remains the anchor of the interpretive exercise. The text specifies, among other things, the means chosen by the legislature to achieve its purposes. These means "may disclose qualifications to primary purposes, and this is why the text remains the focus of interpretation" (M. Mancini"The Purpose Error in the Modern Approach to Statutory Interpretation" (2022), 59 Alta. L. Rev. 919, at p. 927; see also pp. 930‑31). In other words, they may "tell an interpreter just how far a legislature wanted to go in achieving some more abstract goal" (p. 927). As this Court recently noted, an interpreter must "interpret the 'text through which the legislature seeks to achieve [its] objective', because 'the goal of the interpretative exercise is to find harmony between the words of the statute and the intended objective . . .'" (R. v. Breault, 2023 SCC 9, at para. 26, quoting MediaQMI inc. v. Kamel, 2021 SCC 23, [2021] 1 S.C.R. 899, at para. 39; see also Quebec (Attorney General) v. 9147‑0732 Québec inc., 2020 SCC 32, [2020] 3 S.C.R. 426, at para. 10). [ 25 ] Second, every provision of the YPA must be interpreted in accordance with the Charter of human rights and freedoms, CQLR, c. C‑12 ("Quebec Charter"), which is a source of fundamental law. It is especially important to bear in mind s. 39 of the Quebec Charter, which enshrines the right of every child "to the protection, security and attention that his parents or the persons acting in their stead are capable of providing". While this Court has already stated in obiter, in a case that concerned neither the YPA nor the normative scope of s. 39, that this provision "do[es] not directly implicate the state at all" (Gosselin v. Quebec (Attorney General), 2002 SCC 84, [2002] 4 S.C.R. 429, at para. 89), it is clear that this section applies when the state, through a director of youth protection, exercises attributes of parental authority (see, e.g., YPA, s. 91 para. 1(n); Civil Code of Québec, arts. 186 and 199). There is also no doubt that this section is relevant in interpreting the YPA's provisions, including provisions like s. 91 para. 4 that may affect the state's rights and obligations. Indeed, since 2022, the legislature has expressly referred to s. 39 of the Quebec Charter in the preamble to the YPA, which only confirms the interpretive value of this provision in explaining the object and purport of any provision of the YPA (see Interpretation Act, s. 40 para. 1; Quebec Charter, s. 53; Quebec (Commission des normes, de l'équité, de la santé et de la sécurité du travail) v. Caron, 2018 SCC 3, [2018] 1 S.C.R. 35, at paras. 32‑33, quoting Quebec (Commission des droits de la personne et des droits de la jeunesse) v. Communauté urbaine de Montréal, 2004 SCC 30, [2004] 1 S.C.R. 789, at para. 20). [ 26 ] Third, in the interpretation of any provision of the YPA, it is important to bear in mind the Convention on the Rights of the Child, Can. T.S. 1992 No. 3 ("CRC"), which was ratified by Canada on December 13, 1991, and by which Quebec declared itself to be bound through an order in council (see Décret 1676‑91, (1992) 124 G.O. II, 51; YPA, preamble (ad. 2022, c. 11, s. 1)). In keeping with the presumption of conformity, the YPA must be interpreted in a manner consistent with Canada's obligations under the CRC, insofar as the text allows. While the interpretive weight of this international instrument is undeniable, I note that the analysis must remain focused on the legislature's intention and not on the obligational content of the treaty. It is imperative to interpret first and foremost "what the legislature (federally and provincially) has enacted" rather than subordinating the result of this exercise to what the federal executive has agreed to internationally or to the international treaties by which a provincial executive has declared its intention to be bound through an order in council. This is a matter of respect for the principle of separation of powers (Society of Composers, Authors and Music Publishers of Canada v. Entertainment Software Association, 2022 SCC 30, at para. 48; see also paras. 45‑47; Kazemi Estate v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 2014 SCC 62, [2014] 3 S.C.R. 176, at para. 60; R. v. Hape, 2007 SCC 26, [2007] 2 S.C.R. 292, at paras. 53‑54; Michel v. Graydon, 2020 SCC 24, [2020] 2 S.C.R. 763, at para. 103, per Martin J., concurring; P.‑A. Côté and M. Devinat, Interprétation des lois (5th ed. 2021), at paras. 1301‑7). [ 27 ] Finally, I note that, in the interpretation of a provision like s. 91 para. 4, which authorizes a statutory tribunal to exercise certain powers, the principle of separation of powers does not automatically limit the scope of the powers conferred on that tribunal by the legislature. Rather, the principle of separation of powers requires that full effect be given to the legislature's intention as revealed by the interpretation of this enabling provision under the modern approach to interpretation. There is no rule whereby the legislature is presumed to intend to limit the powers it confers on a statutory tribunal on the basis of the magnitude of the budgetary impact of their exercise (see Ontario v. Criminal Lawyers' Association of Ontario, 2013 SCC 43, [2013] 3 S.C.R. 3, at paras. 15 and 28). To the extent that the reasons of the majority of the Quebec Court of Appeal suggest otherwise, they are wrong in law. #### (2) Interpretation of Section 91 Paragraph 4 of the YPA [ 28 ] The starting point in any interpretive exercise is the text of the provision. In the absence of statutory definitions, what should be focused on is the grammatical and ordinary meaning of the text, that is"the natural meaning" that appears when the provision is simply read through as a whole (Canadian Pacific Air Lines Ltd. v. Canadian Air Line Pilots Assn., [1993] 3 S.C.R. 724, at p. 735, quoted in R. Sullivan, The Construction of Statutes (7th ed. 2022), at § 3.02[1]; see also R. v. Audet, [1996] 2 S.C.R. 171, at para. 34). For ease of reference, I will reproduce the text of s. 91 here: > 91. Where the tribunal concludes that the security or development of the child is in danger, it may, for the period it determines, order the implementation of one or more of the following measures:

(a) that the child remain with his family or be entrusted to one of his parents and that the child's parents report periodically to the director on the measures they apply in their own regard or in their child's regard to put an end to the situation in which the security or development of the child is in danger;

(b) that the child and the child's parents take an active part in the application of any of the measures ordered by the tribunal;

(c) that certain persons designated by the tribunal not come into contact with the child;

(d) that the child not come into contact with certain persons designated by the tribunal;

(e) that the child be entrusted to other persons;

(e.1) that the child be entrusted to a kinship foster family chosen by the institution operating a child and youth protection centre;

(f) that a person working for an institution or body provide aid, counselling or assistance to the child and the child's family;

(g) that the child be entrusted to an institution operating a hospital centre or local community service centre or to another body so that he may receive the care and assistance he needs;

(h) that the child or the child's parents report in person, at regular intervals, to the director to inform him of the current situation;

(i) that the child receive specific health care and health services;

(j) that the child be entrusted to an institution operating a rehabilitation centre or to a foster family, chosen by the institution operating a child and youth protection centre;

(k) that the child attend a school or another place of learning or participates in a program geared to developing skills and autonomy;

(l) that the child attend a childcare establishment;

(l.1) that specific information not be disclosed to one or both of the parents or any other person designated by the tribunal;

(m) that a person ensure that the child and his parents comply with the conditions imposed on them and that that person periodically report to the director;

(n) that the exercise of certain attributes of parental authority be withdrawn from the parents and granted to the director or any other person designated by the tribunal;

(o) that a period over which the child will be gradually returned to his family or social environment be determined.

The tribunal may make any recommendation it considers to be in the interest of the child.

The tribunal may include several measures in the same order, provided those measures are consistent with each other and in the interest of the child. It may thus authorize that personal relations between the child and the child's parents, grandparents or another person be maintained, in the manner determined by the tribunal; it may also provide for more than one environment to which the child may be entrusted and state how long the child is to stay in each of those environments.

Where the tribunal concludes that the rights of a child in difficulty have been wronged by persons, bodies or institutions, it may order the situation to be corrected. [ 29 ] In this case, special attention should be paid to the fourth paragraph, particularly the passage stating that the tribunal may order "the situation to be corrected". ##### (a) Text ###### (i) The Verb "Correct" (" Corriger ") [ 30 ] The verb "correct" ("corriger" in the French version) is not defined in the YPA. It is an open‑ended term with a high level of generality, especially when compared with the exhaustive and detailed list of the powers that the tribunal has where it concludes that a child's security or development is in danger (s. 91 para. 1). Indeed, a comparative reading of the words used by the legislature to describe the tribunal's powers where a child's security or development is in danger (s. 91 paras. 1 to 3) and its powers where a child's rights have been encroached upon (s. 91 para. 4) suggests that the legislature has deliberately allowed the tribunal some latitude and creativity in cases of encroachment upon rights as regards the corrective measures that may be ordered (see Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration) v. Vavilov, 2019 SCC 65, [2019] 4 S.C.R. 653, at para. 110; Ricard, at p. 632). [ 31 ] When the provision is read as a whole, the verb "correct" evokes the idea of "redressing""rectifying" or "remedying" the situation. This ordinary meaning also finds support in some of the dictionary definitions of the equivalent French verb "corriger". For example, Le Grand Robert de la langue française (electronic version) states that the verb "corriger" may mean [translation] "[t]o bring back to a moral or societal norm (that which departs from it)" or "[t]o bring back into line (something excessive) through opposite action." Similarly, the Dictionnaire Larousse (online) states that "corriger" may mean [translation] "to rectify that which is deficient" or to re‑establish "what is right, proper, correct". [ 32 ] It is important to note that the ordinary meaning of the verb "correct" or "corriger" that appears when s. 91 is read is consistent with the meaning that emerges from a reading of the other two provisions that use the verb "corriger" in French with "remedy" as the English equivalent. First, s. 23(c) states that the CDPDJ "shall take the legal means it considers necessary to remedy any situation where the rights of a child are being encroached upon". Second, s. 25.2 provides that the CDPDJ "may recommend the cessation of the alleged act or the carrying out, within the time it may fix, of any measure designed to remedy the situation". In these two provisions, the verb "corriger" or "remedy" is also used in relation to "la situation" ("any situation" or "the situation" in English) in the context of encroachment upon rights. As in s. 91 para. 4, the verb "corriger" evokes the idea of bringing back into line or back to normal that which is not. ###### (ii) The Words "the Situation" (" la Situation ") [ 33 ] The word "situation" ("situation" in the French version) is not defined in the YPA and has a high level of generality as well. Moreover, when the provision is read as a whole, its ordinary meaning is ambiguous in the context. Does it refer to "the situation at the source of the encroachment upon rights""the situation of the child whose rights have been or are being encroached upon", or both? [ 34 ] On the one hand, the use of the definite determiner "la" in s. 91 para. 4 ("la situation", or "the situation" in English) rather than the possessive "sa" ("sa situation", or "his situation" in English) may suggest that it is the situation of encroachment in question, that is, the situation at the source of the encroachment upon rights. This interpretation would thus be consistent with one of the common meanings of the French word "situation", that is, [translation] "[a]ll of the circumstances" that a person or thing is in, or "all of the relations" linking a person to a social environment (Le Grand Robert de la langue française; see also Dictionnaire Larousse). Similarly, the Dictionnaire de l'Académie française (9th ed. (online)) indicates that the word "situation" may mean [translation] "all of the conditions in which [a person] finds themself". The fact that the words "la situation" or "the situation" refer to the situation of encroachment is also supported by other provisions of the YPA that deal with encroachment upon rights and refer to "la situation" in French, including s. 23(c), which in English states that the CDPDJ "shall take the legal means it considers necessary to remedy any situation where the rights of a child are being encroached upon" (see also YPA, s. 74.1 para. 2). [ 35 ] On the other hand, what is evident from reading s. 91 as a whole is that, in the case of both danger to security or development and encroachment upon rights, the tribunal has been given a series of powers to protect a vulnerable child whose situation has been referred to it. With this in mind, it therefore seems entirely plausible that the French word "situation" refers here to the state, both psychological and physical, of the child whose rights have been encroached upon. This meaning, which appears when the provision is read as a whole, also finds support in the dictionaries. Le Grand Robert de la langue française indicates that the word "situation" may refer to a person's [translation] "[m]ental disposition" or "psychological state". The Dictionnaire de l'Académie française indicates that the word "situation" may mean the [translation] "[s]tate of a person, of a thing at a particular time". Moreover, one of the definitions of the term "situation" given by the Trésor de la Langue Française informatisé (online) is also to the effect that the word "situation" can refer to the "overall state of affairs". [ 36 ] In summary, when the provision is simply read through as a whole, the ordinary meanings of both the verb "correct" and the words "the situation" are ambiguous and of little assistance in determining the legislature's intention. As a result, the text of s. 91 para. 4 is consistent with either of the two interpretations of the corrective powers at issue in this appeal. It is therefore necessary to turn to the other elements of the modern approach to statutory interpretation. ##### (b) Scheme of the YPA ###### (i) The Tribunal's Mandate Is To Render Justice in an Individualized and Particularized Manner on the Basis of the Interests and Rights of the Child Whose Situation Has Been Referred to It [ 37 ] In my view, an analysis of the scheme of the YPA supports the conclusion that the legislature did not intend the tribunal to be able to order corrective measures aimed at protecting the rights and interests of children whose situations have not been referred to it. [ 38 ] The starting point in the analysis of the scheme of the YPA is s. 3, which states: > 3. Decisions made under this Act must be in the interest of the child and respect his rights.

In addition to the moral, intellectual, emotional and material needs of the child, his age, health, personality and family environment and the other aspects of his situation must be taken into account. [ 39 ] This provision is significant. It establishes that every decision made under the YPA must be in the interest of the child and must take into account the "aspects of his situation". From this it can be inferred that decisions made under the YPA must be individualized and particularized. [ 40 ] This logic of individualized and particularized decision‑making that runs through the YPA is also reflected in all of the provisions of the YPA relating to social intervention (see, e.g., ss. 23 to 30.8 and 47.1; see also ss. 51 to 51.8 and Chapter V). Social intervention under the YPA is characterized by the sequential and escalating nature of the interventions aimed at protecting the interests and rights of a specific child whose security or development is in danger. At each stage, the interventions are tailored to that child's needs. [ 41 ] This logic of individualized and particularized decision‑making is no less apparent when one examines the provisions of the YPA dealing with judicial intervention (ss. 52 et seq., Chapter V). These provisions make clear that judicial intervention under the YPA is also characterized by the sequential and escalating nature of interventions aimed at protecting the interests and rights of the child whose situation has been referred to the tribunal. At each stage, the judicial interventions are also tailored to that child's needs. [ 42 ] It therefore seems clear that the tribunal's mandate is to render justice in an individualized and particularized manner on the basis of the interests and rights of the child whose situation has been referred to it. With a view to ensuring functional complementarity between social intervention and judicial intervention, the tribunal must make decisions that are in the interest of the child and that respect the child's rights, the ultimate goal being to limit any danger to the child's security and development, but also to prevent abuse. ###### (ii) Other Actors Are Responsible for Looking at the System as a Whole and Reforming It [ 43 ] The analysis of the scheme of the YPA also sheds light on the institutional design of the youth protection system. It is clear from the YPA that the proper functioning of the youth protection system depends on the actions of a range of political, social and legal actors that have been given roles, responsibilities and powers that are both distinct and complementary. [ 44 ] The CDPDJ has a broad systemic mandate. It has the power to investigate, to conduct studies, to make recommendations to institutions and the government, and to take legal action where the rights of groups of children are being encroached upon (see YPA, ss. 23 to 27 and 156.1 to 156.2; Quebec Charter, s. 80). The CDPDJ can thus take a comprehensive look at systemic issues in youth protection and take steps to address them. [ 45 ] The legislature has also assigned specific responsibilities for systemic reform to other actors, including the Government of Quebec and the National Assembly (see YPA, ss. 156.1 and 156.2). As recent history demonstrates, other actors — including commissions, task forces, and legislative committees — have also been involved in examining systemic issues in youth protection and making recommendations for reform (see, e.g., Instaurer une société bienveillante pour nos enfants et nos jeunes: rapport de la Commission spéciale sur les droits des enfants et la protection de la jeunesse (2021)). [ 46 ] Against this institutional backdrop, it would be anomalous to interpret s. 91 para. 4 as conferring on the tribunal a mandate to concern itself with the systemic issues affecting children other than the one whose situation has been referred to it. Such an interpretation would be inconsistent with the institutional design of the YPA. [ 47 ] Furthermore, I note that s. 73 para. 1 of the YPA expressly gives the tribunal jurisdiction over a case only until the child ceases to be under the care of the DYP or the court order expires, subject to renewal. This provision illustrates that the legislature saw the tribunal's jurisdiction as inherently limited to the protection of a specific child whose situation has been referred to it. [ 48 ] Similarly, under ss. 73.1 and 74.1, the tribunal must, when rendering a decision, verify that the decision is in the interest of the child and specify the measures ordered and the period they apply for. Once again, these provisions illustrate that the legislature envisioned decisions that are individualized and particularized. [ 49 ] Finally, I note that, under s. 74.2, the tribunal has the power to review any measure it has ordered at any time if the situation warrants it. This power of review is again focused on the situation of the specific child whose situation has been referred to the tribunal. ###### (iii) Conclusion on the Tribunal's Role [ 50 ] Based on the foregoing analysis, I conclude that the scheme of the YPA strongly supports the conclusion that the legislature intended the tribunal's corrective powers under s. 91 para. 4 to be exercised for the benefit of the specific child whose situation has been referred to it, and not for the benefit of children whose situations have not been referred to it. [ 51 ] I now turn to the legislative history of s. 91 para. 4, which confirms this conclusion. ##### (c) Legislative History [ 52 ] As this Court noted in Rizzo & Rizzo Shoes Ltd. (Re), the modern approach to statutory interpretation encompasses legislative history as an aid to interpretation. In this case, the legislative history of s. 91 para. 4 and other related provisions confirms that the legislature intended the tribunal's corrective powers to be limited to protecting the interests and rights of the child whose situation has been referred to it. [ 53 ] The predecessor to s. 91 para. 4, s. 23(d) of the Youth Protection Act, S.Q. 1977, c. 20, stated: "[t]he tribunal may order that the situation be corrected". Similarly, s. 23(e) stated: "[t]he tribunal may make any recommendation it considers to be in the interest of the child." [ 54 ] In 1984, as part of amendments to the YPA, the legislature enacted what is now s. 91 para. 4 of the YPA and also enacted what is now s. 23(c), which states that the CDPDJ "shall take the legal means it considers necessary to remedy any situation where the rights of a child are being encroached upon". The legislative history of these amendments is instructive: they were part of a broader reform aimed at strengthening the protection of individual children's rights during social and judicial intervention under the YPA. [ 55 ] The parliamentary debates and committee records from 1984 reveal that, when enacting these amendments, the legislature considered — and rejected — language that would have given the tribunal broad powers to order systemic changes aimed at benefiting children generally. The legislature's choice to use the language ultimately adopted in s. 91 para. 4 was a deliberate one that reflects its intention to limit the tribunal's corrective powers to the situation of the child before it. [ 56 ] The legislature's decision in 1984 to give the CDPDJ — rather than the tribunal — a broad mandate to address systemic issues also confirms the tribunal's more limited role. The parliamentary debates from 1984 reveal that the legislature was concerned about giving an individual judge or a statutory tribunal the power to order far‑reaching systemic changes. It is for this reason that the legislature assigned that mandate to the CDPDJ, a body with a broader mandate and more institutional capacity to investigate and remedy systemic issues. [ 57 ] The 2022 reform of the YPA did not change this institutional design. The legislature amended the YPA to strengthen the protection of children's rights in various ways, but there is nothing in the legislative history of the 2022 reform to suggest that the legislature intended to expand the tribunal's corrective powers beyond those available under s. 91 para. 4 before the reform. [ 58 ] In particular, the parliamentary debates and committee records from 2021 and 2022 reveal that the legislature was concerned about strengthening the enforcement of the tribunal's orders, about improving reporting obligations and accountability mechanisms, and about enhancing the role of the CDPDJ. However, there is nothing to suggest that the legislature intended to broaden the tribunal's mandate to allow it to concern itself with the systemic issues affecting children other than the one whose situation has been referred to it. [ 59 ] The legislature's decision to omit from the amended s. 91 para. 4 the words "encroaching upon the rights of the young person" — which had been proposed in the context of the 2022 reform — should not be interpreted as a broadening of the tribunal's power to order corrective measures to protect the interests and rights of children whose situations have not been referred to it. As I will explain, the omission of those words was not intended to expand the scope of the tribunal's corrective powers beyond the child before it. Rather, as I noted earlier, the order, to be valid, does not necessarily have to expressly name the child whose situation has been referred to the tribunal. [ 60 ] For all these reasons, I conclude that the legislative history of s. 91 para. 4 and other related provisions confirms what the scheme of the YPA already reveals: the tribunal can deal with the situation of only one child at a time. ##### (d) CRC [ 61 ] As I mentioned earlier, the CRC is an important interpretive tool in this case. The CRC requires states parties to "take all appropriate legislative, administrative, and other measures for the implementation of the rights recognized in the present Convention" (Article 4). The CRC also establishes that "[i]n all actions concerning children, whether undertaken by public or private social welfare institutions, courts of law, administrative authorities or legislative bodies, the best interests of the child shall be a primary consideration" (Article 3). [ 62 ] These provisions of the CRC weigh in favour of interpreting s. 91 para. 4 in a large and liberal manner so that the tribunal will have all the corrective powers it needs to ensure that the child whose rights have been encroached upon has the fullest and most effective protection possible. However, there is no indication that, in order to comply with the CRC, provincial and territorial legislatures must, in cases of encroachment upon rights, give courts or tribunals the mandate and powers they need to concern themselves with protecting the interests and rights of more than one child at a time. [ 63 ] States parties to the CRC possess a margin of discretion in determining what measures are appropriate to promote the best interests of the child and to protect the child's rights (see CRC, Article 4; UN Committee on the Rights of the Child, General Comment No. 5 (2003), U.N. Doc. CRC/GC/2003/5, at para. 5; J. Tobin"Article 4. A State's General Obligation of Implementation", at pp. 147‑48). In Canada, the legislature has chosen to implement its obligations under the CRC through a system of individualized and particularized interventions aimed at protecting the interests and rights of one child at a time. There is nothing in the CRC that compels a different approach, and the CRC does not require that provincial and territorial courts or tribunals be given a systemic mandate when dealing with cases involving children's rights. ##### (e) Object of the Provision [ 64 ] As I noted earlier, the object of s. 91 para. 4 is to protect the interests and rights of the child in difficulty whose situation has been referred to the tribunal. The YPA's purpose clause (s. 2) and its general direction to decision‑makers (s. 3) both confirm this object. Further, as I have noted, the broader scheme of the YPA reflects the legislature's intention that this object be attained through individualized and particularized interventions aimed at protecting the interests and rights of one child at a time. [ 65 ] With this object in mind, I turn to the interpretive consequence of the ambiguity I identified in my analysis of the text. Given the ambiguity in the text of s. 91 para. 4, the interpretive exercise must be resolved in favour of the interpretation that best ensures the attainment of the provision's object, while respecting the limits built into the text and the enabling provision. [ 66 ] In this case, I have concluded that the object of s. 91 para. 4 is to protect the interests and rights of the child in difficulty whose situation has been referred to the tribunal. The corrective powers conferred by s. 91 para. 4 must therefore be interpreted in a manner consistent with this object. This means that the tribunal may only order corrective measures that are aimed at protecting the interests and rights of the child whose situation has been referred to it, and not at protecting the interests and rights of children whose situations have not been referred to it. [ 67 ] That being said, the object of s. 91 para. 4 also requires that the tribunal's corrective powers be interpreted in a large and liberal manner, so that the tribunal has all the powers it needs to ensure the fullest possible protection for the child whose rights have been encroached upon. As I will explain, this means that the tribunal may order corrective measures that are broad in scope, provided they are aimed at protecting the interests and rights of the child before it. [ 68 ] Finally, in keeping with the object of s. 91 para. 4, the tribunal's corrective powers must be interpreted in light of the practical reality of the youth protection system. Children in the care of the youth protection system are often moved between different units, centres and institutions. As a result, the corrective measures ordered by the tribunal must sometimes be broad in scope to effectively protect the child whose rights have been encroached upon. [ 69 ] I also note that, in the case of social and judicial intervention, the legislature had in mind that this fundamental purpose of protecting the children who are the most vulnerable in society would be attained through the cumulative effect of individualized and particularized interventions aimed at protecting the interests and rights of one child at a time. It is through the cumulative effect of individualized and particularized interventions that the legislature hopes to achieve the fundamental purpose of Quebec's youth protection system, which is to protect "the children" who are the most vulnerable in society. [ 70 ] It is true that the YPA establishes a youth protection system whose fundamental mission, as the appellant states, is to protect vulnerable children in Quebec (A.F., at para. 58). That being said, the wording of s. 2, namely the YPA's purpose clause, and that of s. 3 lead to the conclusion that, in the case of social and judicial intervention, the legislature had in mind that this goal would be attained through interventions aimed at protecting the interests and rights of one child at a time. It is through the cumulative effect of individualized and particularized interventions that the legislature hopes to achieve the fundamental purpose of Quebec's youth protection system, which is to protect "the children" who are the most vulnerable in society. This observation is important given the fact that purpose statements in a statute are the "first, 'most direct and authoritative evidence' of the legislative purpose" (Canadian Council for Refugees v. Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), 2023 SCC 17, at para. 130, quoting R. v. Appulonappa, 2015 SCC 59, [2015] 3 S.C.R. 754, at para. 49) and also given the fact that, in an interpretive exercise, it is important to consider the general purpose of both the provision and the statute while bearing in mind the means chosen by the legislature to achieve these general objectives (see Breault, at para. 26, quoting MediaQMI inc., at para. 39; see also 9147‑0732 Québec inc., at para. 10; Mancini, at pp. 927‑28). ##### (f) Conclusion [ 71 ] Based on the foregoing analysis — text, scheme, legislative history, CRC, and object of the provision — I conclude that the legislature intended to confer on the tribunal the corrective powers needed to ensure the fullest protection of the interests and rights of the child whose situation has been referred to it, that is, protection that applies to both the present and the future and that takes account of the circumstances at the source of the encroachment upon rights as well as the impact of the encroachment on the child's psychological and physical state. The tribunal may order corrective measures whose purpose is to put an end to the situation of encroachment where it is still encroaching upon the child's rights, to remedy the psychological or physical consequences for the child resulting from the encroachment upon rights, and to prevent the recurrence of the situation of encroachment for the child. [ 72 ] The legislature did not intend the tribunal to be able to order corrective measures aimed in whole or in part at protecting the rights and interests of children whose situations have not been referred to it but who may find themselves in the same situation of encroachment as the child before it. [ 73 ] I disagree with the appellant's argument that the tribunal's corrective powers under s. 91 para. 4 are analogous to the remedial powers of courts or tribunals under human rights legislation. In cases involving human rights violations, courts and tribunals have been given a broad systemic mandate to address discrimination and other human rights violations affecting groups of individuals. The institutional design of the youth protection system under the YPA is fundamentally different: the tribunal's mandate is to render justice in an individualized and particularized manner on the basis of the interests and rights of the child whose situation has been referred to it. [ 74 ] In cases involving human rights violations, courts and tribunals have relied on their systemic mandate to order far‑reaching remedies aimed at eradicating discrimination and other human rights violations for the benefit of all individuals in similar situations (see, e.g., Canadian National Railway Co. v. Canada (Canadian Human Rights Commission), [1987] 1 S.C.R. 1114; Moore v. British Columbia (Education), 2012 SCC 61, [2012] 3 S.C.R. 360; Quebec (Commission des droits de la personne et des droits de la jeunesse) v. Bombardier Inc. (Bombardier Aerospace Training Center), 2015 SCC 39, [2015] 2 S.C.R. 789). However, the recourse for a declaration of encroachment upon rights under the YPA is not a human rights complaint procedure. It is a judicial remedy designed to protect the interests and rights of a specific child whose situation has been referred to the tribunal. [ 75 ] I also disagree with the argument, apparently accepted by the majority of the Quebec Court of Appeal, that the tribunal's corrective powers under s. 91 para. 4 are limited to measures that do not involve an allocation of public funds. As I noted earlier, there is no rule whereby the legislature is presumed to intend to limit the powers it confers on a statutory tribunal on the basis of the magnitude of the budgetary impact of their exercise (see Ontario v. Criminal Lawyers' Association of Ontario, 2013 SCC 43, [2013] 3 S.C.R. 3, at paras. 15 and 28). To the extent that the reasons of the majority of the Quebec Court of Appeal suggest otherwise, they are wrong in law. [ 76 ] I also note that the CDPDJ argued, at the hearing, that the protection of individual children's rights and the protection of the rights of children as a group are two sides of the same coin. In the CDPDJ's view, it is impossible to effectively protect the rights of an individual child without also addressing systemic issues that affect children generally. While I understand this argument, it cannot be accepted. The legislature's decision to entrust the correction of systemic issues to the CDPDJ — rather than to the tribunal — reflects a deliberate policy choice that must be respected. It is not for this Court to second‑guess that choice. [ 77 ] I now turn to the three validity criteria that govern the exercise of the tribunal's power to order preventive corrective measures under s. 91 para. 4. #### (3) Criteria for the Validity of Corrective Measures Ordered for Preventive Purposes [ 78 ] I have concluded that the tribunal has the power to order preventive corrective measures that are aimed at protecting the interests and rights of the child whose situation has been referred to it. I will now identify three validity criteria that govern the exercise of this power. These criteria are based on the limits built into s. 91 para. 4, as interpreted in light of the text, scheme, legislative history, CRC, and object of the YPA. ##### (a) The Child Must Be at Risk of Being Subjected to the Situation of Encroachment Again [ 79 ] First, for a preventive corrective measure to be ordered, the child whose situation has been referred to the tribunal must be at risk of being subjected to the situation of encroachment again. This criterion will generally be met where the child is still the subject of intervention under the YPA. [ 80 ] This criterion is grounded in the text and object of s. 91 para. 4. A preventive corrective measure is, by definition, aimed at preventing the recurrence of the situation of encroachment. If the child is no longer at risk of being subjected to the situation of encroachment again, there is no basis for ordering a preventive corrective measure. ##### (b) The Corrective Measures Must Be Able to Effectively Help to Prevent the Recurrence of the Situation of Encroachment [ 81 ] Second, the preventive corrective measure ordered must be able to effectively help to prevent the recurrence of the situation of encroachment. This criterion ensures that the tribunal's corrective powers are exercised in a purposeful manner. [ 82 ] Once the source of the encroachment upon rights is identified, the tribunal will be able to consider one or more corrective measures that could effectively help to prevent the recurrence of the situation of encroachment. These measures will logically focus on one or more of the circumstances shown by the evidence to be at the source of the encroachment. [ 83 ] For example, where the evidence discloses that a child's rights were encroached upon because of the inadequate training of youth workers, a corrective measure ordering that those youth workers receive appropriate training could effectively help to prevent the recurrence of the situation of encroachment. [ 84 ] Similarly, where the evidence discloses that a child's rights were encroached upon because of the inadequate design of isolation rooms, a corrective measure ordering that those rooms be made safer could effectively help to prevent the recurrence of the situation of encroachment. [ 85 ] And where the evidence discloses that a child's rights were encroached upon because of the absence of a protocol for dealing with a particular behaviour, a corrective measure ordering that such a protocol be implemented could effectively help to prevent the recurrence of the situation of encroachment. [ 86 ] In each of these examples, the corrective measure must be evaluated in light of the evidence and the context. The tribunal must be satisfied that the measure can effectively help to prevent the recurrence of the situation of encroachment. ##### (c) The Corrective Measures Ordered Must Be Related to the Protection of the Interests and Rights of the Child Whose Situation Has Been Referred to the Tribunal [ 87 ] Third, any preventive corrective measure must be related to preventing the recurrence of the situation of encroachment for the child whose situation has been referred to the tribunal. This requirement flows from the legislative intent discerned from s. 91 para. 4 of the YPA. [ 88 ] The corrective measure must therefore be primarily intended to protect the interests and rights of the child whose situation has been referred to the tribunal. The corrective measure must be related to events experienced by the child in environments where the child has spent or might spend time, on the basis of the evidence and the context. [ 89 ] The tribunal must confine itself to ordering a corrective measure that reflects the risk of harm faced by the child, as shown by the evidence. That being said, the order, to be valid, does not necessarily have to expressly name the child whose situation has been referred to the tribunal. [ 90 ] To effectively protect the child whose rights have been encroached upon, the preventive corrective measures will sometimes have to be broad in scope. At least two types of measures can be contemplated. [ 91 ] First, the tribunal may order a corrective measure specifically directed at persons, bodies or institutions that, in light of the evidence, could potentially contribute to the recurrence of the encroachment upon the child's rights. [ 92 ] Second, the tribunal may order a measure that will follow the child through the system, either as an alternative to or in addition to the first type of measure, in light of the evidence in the record, the circumstances of the case and the need to protect the child for the future. [ 93 ] Broad corrective measures will generally have the advantage of protecting the interests and rights of many other children in an indirect and incidental manner, but this is of no relevance in determining whether the measures were validly imposed. ##### (d) The Budgetary Impact of the Corrective Measure Is Not a Criterion for the Validity of the Order [ 93 ] Lastly, the magnitude of the budgetary impact of the corrective measure is not in itself a criterion for the validity of the order. Such a validity criterion has no basis in the YPA, and its application would entail considerable practical difficulties, adding another barrier to access to justice in the youth protection system. [ 94 ] There is no rule whereby the legislature is presumed to intend to limit the powers it confers on a statutory tribunal on the basis of the magnitude of the budgetary impact of their exercise. To hold otherwise would create an anomaly: the more serious the encroachment upon rights, the less able the tribunal would be to order effective corrective measures, given that more serious encroachments often require more costly corrective measures. ##### (e) Conclusion [ 95 ] A preventive corrective measure related to the interests and rights of the child whose situation has been referred to the tribunal may very well have positive indirect and incidental consequences for a large number of children. There is nothing to prevent the tribunal from ordering a corrective measure to eliminate a systemic or institutional practice, provided that the three validity criteria are met. [ 96 ] These criteria offer guidance as to what types of preventive corrective measures may be ordered. They also provide a principled basis for reviewing the measures ordered by the tribunal in this case. [ 97 ] I now turn to the review of the four impugned orders. #### (4) Review of the Orders [ 98 ] The four corrective measures challenged by the DYP were ordered to prevent abusive or inadequate restraint and isolation measures from being used again. As I noted earlier, at the time the tribunal decided the applications for a declaration of encroachment upon rights, it was established that the young person was at risk of being subjected again to the situations of encroachment identified by the tribunal. The first validity criterion — that the child must be at risk of being subjected to the situation of encroachment again — was therefore met. In reviewing the four impugned orders, I will therefore focus special attention on the other two validity criteria set out above. [ 99 ] Before turning to the review of the individual orders, I note that this Court owes deference to the tribunal's findings of fact. As this Court has repeatedly held, appellate courts should not interfere with the findings of fact of trial courts or statutory tribunals unless those findings are clearly erroneous (see Housen v. Nikolaisen, 2002 SCC 33, [2002] 2 S.C.R. 235; Canada (Transportation Safety Board) v. Carroll-Byrne, 2022 SCC 48; Hydro-Québec v. Matta, 2020 SCC 37, [2020] 3 S.C.R. 595; TELUS Communications Inc. v. Wellman, 2019 SCC 19, [2019] 2 S.C.R. 144; Barendregt v. Grebliunas, 2022 SCC 22; B.J.T. v. J.D., 2022 SCC 24). I will apply this standard in reviewing the four impugned orders. [ 100 ] At the time the tribunal decided the applications for a declaration of encroachment upon rights, it was established that the young person was at risk of being subjected again to the situations of encroachment identified by the tribunal. At that time, the tribunal declared that the young person's security and development were still in danger (at para. 330), extended the order of January 17, 2018, requiring that she be placed at an RCYPAP (at para. 331), and entrusted her situation to the DYP (para. 338). In reviewing the four impugned orders, I will therefore focus special attention on the other two validity criteria set out above. ##### (a) Orders Directed at the Individualized Treatment Units [ 101 ] The tribunal ordered that "the youth workers, educators and intervention officers who work in the individualized treatment units be able to receive specific training on mental health" (para. 340) and that these units "be able to obtain support from a healthcare professional specializing in mental health" (para. 341). Finding that these orders were not sufficiently related to the protection of the young person's interests and rights, the Superior Court judge varied their wording. He narrowed the scope of the first order by specifying that only the youth workers, educators and intervention officers [translation] "who will be responsible for X in the individualized treatment units" could receive the mental health training (paras. 65 and 76). He narrowed the second order by specifying that only the individualized treatment units [translation] "that will be responsible for X" could obtain support from a healthcare professional specializing in mental health (para. 76; see also paras. 65‑66). The judges of the Court of Appeal unanimously affirmed the Superior Court's decision. I agree with their decision, apart from endorsing the suggestion that the order, to be valid, necessarily had to name the child expressly. [ 102 ] The young person stayed in just one individualized treatment unit ("ITU"), ITU B, which is a rehabilitation unit for young people with mental health and behavioural disorders. A minimum of three educators are in the unit during the day to look after the young people. The tribunal concluded that, in that unit, the young person had not received all the supervision and support needed from the youth workers [translation] "because the unit was then very 'lively' and the various youth workers were overwhelmed" (para. 301). The tribunal also found that when restraint measures were necessary, they were implemented by security guards from a private company who had very little experience and were not trained to meet the specific needs of young people with mental health disorders. When the educators left the unit around 11:00 p.m., security guards took over for the night. Their mandate was to supervise the young people and ensure their safety. Further, the tribunal noted that the turnover of security guards was high, since most of them were police technology students who were only there on a short‑term basis. However, nothing in the judgment suggests that these findings of fact concerning ITU B could be generalized to other identifiable ITUs where the young person might spend time in the future. [ 103 ] In that context, while it was reasonable to believe that, by targeting all "individualized treatment units", the corrective measures ordered would both be able to effectively help to prevent the recurrence of the situation of encroachment, the tribunal nonetheless erred by not limiting their scope so that they were related to preventing the recurrence of the situation of encroachment for the young person. Nothing in the evidence adduced supported the conclusion that such broad orders were necessary to protect the young person's interests and rights in the future. In this sense, the orders exceeded the tribunal's powers. [ 104 ] I agree with the judges of the Court of Appeal that the Superior Court properly intervened to narrow the scope of these orders so that they were related to the protection of the young person's interests and rights. I would note, however, that there was no reason why the Superior Court could not also have achieved this objective by varying the wording of the two orders in another way. I will provide two examples that illustrate the range of preventive corrective measures available. First, the Superior Court judge could have transformed the order for mental health training into a hybrid corrective measure directed specifically at the youth workers, educators and intervention officers from ITU B, as well as any other youth worker, educator and intervention officer from any other ITU that would be responsible for the young person in the future. Second, the judge could also have ordered that, in the event of a transfer to another ITU (other than ITU B), the young person could be taken charge of only by an ITU (1) where the youth workers, educators and intervention officers responsible for the young person would have mental health training, and (2) that would have support from a health professional specializing in mental health. ##### (b) Orders Directed at the CISSS A [ 105 ] The tribunal ordered the CISSS A to implement a protocol within a reasonable time period to set out the steps to be taken when a child spits during an intervention. The tribunal also ordered the CISSS A to adapt all isolation rooms so that they were safer and their walls were covered with a material that prevented injury. Finding that these orders were also not sufficiently related to the protection of the young person's interests and rights, the Superior Court judge varied them to make them relate specifically to the young person. The majority of the Court of Appeal upheld the Superior Court judge's decision to expressly limit the orders to the young person's situation. The concurring judge of the Court of Appeal held that the Superior Court judge should not have intervened to narrow in this way the scope of the order to implement a protocol setting out the steps to be taken when a child spits. He also held, with regard to the order requiring that the isolation rooms be made safer, that it should have been limited to the isolation rooms in units A and B. For my part, I cannot agree with the reasons of either the majority or the concurring judge of the Court of Appeal. [ 106 ] With regard to the order to implement a protocol establishing the steps to be taken when a child spits during an intervention, this is a corrective measure that was ordered in connection with an incident experienced by the young person when she resided in an intensive supervision unit ("ISU"), ISU A. While she was in a state of personality disorganization, restraint measures were used to take her to the withdrawal block. While being moved, the young person refused to cooperate and spat in the face of one of the officers. The educator on site then used an article of clothing to completely cover the young person's head and thus prevent her from spitting on the officers. The tribunal noted that, at the time, the head of ISU A believed that the officers had [translation] "the right to cover a young person's head during transport to avoid being spit on" (para. 215). The tribunal found that none of the intervention units of the RCYPAPs of the CISSS A — including the RCYPAPs where the young person had spent time in the past and those where she might spend time in the future — had a protocol establishing the steps to be taken when a child spits. In this case, the young person spent time in four different RCYPAP units over a period of about 14 months (one ISU, one ITU, one regular rehabilitation unit and one intensive supervision rehabilitation unit) (para. 2); she exhibited self‑destructive and difficult behaviour at each of those RCYPAPs (paras. 23, 26, 89, 95 and 110); and there may have been obstacles to her spending time at certain RCYPAPs (paras. 52 and 99). There was therefore a real risk that she would spend time at one or more of those RCYPAPs. However, certain variables undermined the foreseeability and consistency of such stays. The tribunal also found that the internal memos that prohibited covering a child's head were not complied with by everyone. Moreover, similar incidents had occurred in other RCYPAP units of the CISSS A where the young person had spent time in the past and/or might spend time in the future. The DYP testified that this was an unacceptable practice that should not be used again (para. 223). The tribunal noted that, months after the incident, alternative measures to protect the security guards were still not in place. [ 107 ] In that context, the tribunal exceeded its powers by ordering the CISSS A to implement a protocol that set out the steps to be taken when a child spits during an intervention. It is certainly possible that such a corrective measure would effectively help to prevent the recurrence of the situation of encroachment. However, the order as worded was not related to preventing the recurrence of the situation of encroachment for the young person. The measure should have been more specific and circumscribed by reference to the evidence and the context. The tribunal did not confine itself to ordering a measure that reflected the risk of harm faced by the young person, because that measure would apply to all CISSS A service centres, including: local community service centres; hospital centres; child and youth protection centres; residential and long‑term care centres; and rehabilitation centres (see An Act to modify the organization and governance of the health and social services network, in particular by abolishing the regional agencies, CQLR, c. O‑7.2, Sch. I). Yet it is clear from the tribunal's findings of fact that only the RCYPAPs where the young person had spent time and where she might spend time in the future could potentially contribute to the recurrence of the encroachment upon her rights. As an appellate court, the Superior Court owed deference to those findings of fact made by the tribunal (Québec (Protection de la jeunesse) v. C.P.). It was not out of the question that the young person might spit when receiving services from a local community service centre or a hospital centre. However, there was nothing to indicate that the young person was at risk of having her rights encroached upon again in those other service centres. Consequently, in light of the evidence and the context, the scope of the order made by the tribunal went beyond protecting the interests and rights of the young person whose situation had been referred to it. [ 108 ] It was therefore appropriate to vary the order made by the tribunal. As the judges of the Court of Appeal wrote, the Superior Court judge was clearly correct in intervening to narrow the scope of the order. However, the proposed variation missed the mark. The order made by the Superior Court judge had the same problem as the one made by the tribunal: it was overbroad. Even with the more specific words [translation] "when X spits", the order failed to recognize that, according to the findings of fact, the situation of encroachment and its recurrence were tied — and limited — to the RCYPAPs where the young person had spent time and might spend time in the future. In light of the findings of fact, the order should have been directed at the RCYPAPs of the CISSS A and at any other RCYPAP that would be responsible for the young person. It would have been a hybrid order. By being directed at "any other RCYPAP that would be responsible for the young person", the order would have followed the young person through the system if she spent time at other RCYPAPs that were part of other CISSSs (other than the CISSS A). Of course, the evidence and the context did not provide a basis for ordering all Quebec CISSSs outright to implement a protocol. However, an RCYPAP would have had to implement a protocol if two conditions were met: (1) the young person had to spend time at that RCYPAP, and (2) the RCYPAP did not already have a protocol in place. Alternatively, I note that, among the range of available measures, it would also have been acceptable for the tribunal to order that, in the event of a transfer, the young person could be transferred only to an RCYPAP where a protocol was already in place. [ 109 ] With regard to the order requiring that the isolation rooms be made safer, this corrective measure was ordered in response to the injuries suffered by the young person during periods of isolation. The tribunal judge visited the withdrawal blocks in ISU A and ITU B. Further to that visit, she noted that the rooms in both units were [translation] "small" and that there were "bare floors and bare walls", which were "made of concrete" (para. 184). She noted that in ITU B, the walls were [translation] "in a sorry state" and the paint on them was "dingy" (para. 184). She observed that the isolation rooms were so small that [translation] "[a] child who is in there can only sit or lie on the floor" (para. 184). Moreover, the tribunal found that during the young person's many periods of isolation in ISU A and ITU B, she had injured herself by banging her head against the concrete walls or hitting them with her hands hard enough to require medical care. However, nothing in the judgment supports the conclusion that these findings of fact could be generalized to all rehabilitation units at all RCYPAPs of the CISSS A — which the concurring judge of the Court of Appeal properly noted. [ 110 ] In that context, while the corrective measure ordering the CISSS A to make all of the isolation rooms safer would undoubtedly have helped to prevent the recurrence of the situation of encroachment, it nevertheless exceeded the tribunal's powers because it was not sufficiently anchored in the evidence and the context. As regards the order that should have been made, the one proposed by the Superior Court judge and affirmed by the majority of the Court of Appeal cannot be upheld, because it is imprecise. As for the order suggested by the concurring judge of the Court of Appeal, it is not sufficiently anchored in the tribunal's findings of fact. While in the abstract there was nothing to prevent the tribunal from ordering the CISSS A to make all of the isolation rooms in units A and B safer, here the findings of fact do not indicate that all of the isolation rooms in those units had to be made safer to ensure that the young person had access to a safe isolation room at all times. Indeed, the tribunal made no finding of fact concerning the number of isolation rooms per unit or their occupancy level. Similarly, there is no finding of fact from which inferences on this point can be drawn. I am therefore of the view that the tribunal's order should have been varied to direct the CISSS A to have at least one isolation room, covered with a material that prevented injury, available for the young person at all times in units A and B and in the other units that would become responsible for her. The DYP and the CISSS A would then have had to assess whether, to comply with that order, it was necessary to make more than one, or even all, of the isolation rooms in the units in question safer. Alternatively, I note that, among the range of available measures, it would also have been acceptable for the tribunal to order that, in the event of a transfer, the young person could be transferred only to an RCYPAP where at least one safe isolation room — whose walls were covered with a material that prevented injury — was available. #### (5) Tribunal's Power To Make Recommendations [ 111 ] Where the tribunal concludes that the rights of a child in difficulty have been encroached upon by persons, bodies or institutions, it may intervene to prevent the recurrence of the situation of encroachment (see Protection de la jeunesse – 123979, at para. 22). In such circumstances, it may be appropriate for the tribunal to make a non‑binding recommendation if it considers this to be warranted in light of the evidence. I will explain. [ 112 ] It is true that the Court of Québec is a statutory tribunal and that, in cases involving encroachment upon rights, it can make only decisions or orders that are provided for by statute (see YPA, ss. 90 et seq.). It cannot, of course, exceed that jurisdiction. However, its power to make recommendations is anchored in the YPA: it flows from the text, scheme and object of that statute. Its existence is expressly contemplated by s. 91 para. 2 of the YPA. While a power of this kind is not referred to in s. 91 para. 4, which deals specifically with encroachment upon rights, a large and liberal interpretation of the provision, in keeping with the proper approach to remedial legislation, leads me to conclude that the power nevertheless applies in circumstances where rights have been encroached upon. Support for the existence of this power can also be found in a practice that is well established in the Quebec jurisprudence on encroachment upon rights (see, e.g., Protection de la jeunesse – 236587, 2023 QCCQ 12263, at paras. 8 et seq.; Protection de la jeunesse – 211624, 2021 QCCQ 2868, at para. 96; see also Protection de la jeunesse – 123979, at para. 26). Indeed, in this case, the Superior Court judge expressed the view that [translation] "the conclusions of a general nature" arrived at by the tribunal "could be stated as recommendations" (para. 8). Moreover, although this Court is not bound by a party's admissions on a question of law, I take note of two admissions. First, counsel for the respondent admits that the tribunal [translation] "can make recommendations" in a case involving encroachment upon rights (transcript, at pp. 94‑95). Before the Superior Court, the respondent had herself asked that recommendations be substituted for the impugned orders, that is, the ones set out at paras. 340‑41 and 345‑46 of the tribunal's judgment (Sup. Ct. reasons, at para. 11). Second, the intervener the Attorney General of Quebec admits that the tribunal is not precluded from [translation] "making recommendations" in a case involving encroachment upon rights (I.F., at para. 60). These two admissions corroborate what the jurisprudence already tells us: where rights have been encroached upon, the tribunal has a power to make recommendations that it derives from the text, scheme and object of the YPA. [ 113 ] The tribunal's power to make recommendations is particularly useful where the circumstances do not lend themselves to stating a conclusion in the form of an order under s. 91 para. 4 of the YPA. According to author Mario Provost, [translation] "the validity of orders that are broader in scope is open to question. . . . Since the Act has not expanded the power of this statutory tribunal, some argue that conclusions of a general nature should be 'recommended' rather than 'ordered'" (Droit de la protection de la jeunesse (3rd ed. 2022), at p. 289; M. Provost"La protection de la jeunesse", in T. Gagné‑Dubé et al., eds., Droit de la famille québécois (loose‑leaf), at ¶54‑310). This is correct. Where the three criteria for the validity of a corrective measure ordered for preventive purposes are not all met, the tribunal still has the power to make a recommendation anchored in the evidence concerning the encroachment upon rights. This power to make a recommendation thus allows the tribunal to point out the existence of a problem relating to an encroachment upon the child's rights and to encourage the authorities to address it. [ 114 ] It is obviously preferable for the tribunal to be cautious in exercising its power to make recommendations. As author Jean‑François Boulais correctly observes, [translation] "if the recommendation is not followed, it is the judge's moral authority that is undermined" (Loi sur la protection de la jeunesse, texte annoté (5th ed. 2003), at p. 445). Indeed, when the authority named in the recommendation [translation] "disregards the recommendation[,] . . . the Court's credibility is affected" (Protection de la jeunesse, [1985] AZ‑50942189 (Que. Y.C.), at p. 2). That being said, the tribunal has all the discretion it needs to develop a recommendation based on the situation of encroachment experienced by the child whose situation has been referred to it, as shown by the evidence. Because the Youth Division of the Court of Québec is the judicial tribunal that has the most intimate knowledge of the youth protection system and that participates in its implementation on a daily basis, it is particularly well placed to exercise this power to make recommendations (see Costanzo and Paré, at pp. 151 and 153‑54). [ 115 ] It is therefore true, in this case, that the tribunal's concerns as reflected at paras. 340‑41 and 345‑46 of its judgment could have been expressed as recommendations. At the time it rendered its judgment, the tribunal did have the power to make non‑binding recommendations based on those concerns, provided that these recommendations were anchored in the evidence. This was an available and acceptable option at the time. [ 116 ] I add that the tribunal was clearly concerned about the situation experienced by the young person during her time in various CISSS A units. After having an opportunity to hear the parties, various professionals from the rehabilitation, security and psychosocial services sectors, as well as the DYP, the tribunal concluded that some of the encroachments upon the young person's rights resulted from institutional or systemic problems that affected other children in Quebec's youth protection system. The authorities concerned — in keeping with the mission assigned to them by the YPA of protecting children whose security or development is or may be in danger — would be well advised to take note of the tribunal's conclusions and to consider what action they can take to ensure that the encroachments upon rights experienced by the young person are not experienced by others. --- ### B. Right of the CISSS A To Be Heard or Duly Called [ 117 ] A secondary question arises with respect to art. 17 C.C.P., which gives the CISSS A the right to be heard or duly called. Like its predecessor, art. 5 of the former Code of Civil Procedure, CQLR, c. C‑25, art. 17 C.C.P. codifies a fundamental principle of natural justice: the maxim audi alteram partem. The first paragraph states that "[t]he court cannot rule on an application, or take a measure on its own initiative, which affects the rights of a party unless the party has been heard or duly called." [ 118 ] After raising the question themselves while the case was under advisement and requesting submissions from the parties, the judges of the Court of Appeal all expressed the view that the orders could not be made against the CISSS A because it was not [translation] "formally party to the proceedings" at first instance (para. 50; see also para. 82). In their opinion, to hold otherwise would violate the [translation] "principle that courts make orders against properly summoned parties" and would be an error of law (para. 52; see also para. 82). The Court of Appeal therefore found that the guiding principle of art. 17 para. 1 C.C.P. had been violated. On that basis, it varied the two orders so that they were made against the DYP rather than the CISSS A (paras. 54 and 83). [ 119 ] The CDPDJ does not agree. It asks this Court to restore the orders against the CISSS A. According to it, even if the Court were to find that the CISSS A should have been joined to the proceedings as a party or impleaded party, the Court of Appeal still erred in intervening because, it says, the CISSS A was not significantly prejudiced by that omission. The intervener X agrees with the CDPDJ's argument. As for the interveners A and B, they also maintain that the Court of Appeal erred in intervening, but for different reasons: they take the view that the CISSS A was a party to the proceedings through the DYP and that the expression "director of youth protection" was sufficient to clearly identify and designate the CISSS A. [ 120 ] The DYP has not made any argument on this question. That being said, she asks that we dismiss the appeal and thus that we not vary the Court of Appeal's disposition. It should be noted, however, that before the Court of Appeal, the DYP, like the CDPDJ, requested that the orders be maintained against the CISSS A (C.A. reasons, at para. 51: [translation] "All the parties requested that the orders be maintained against the [CISSS A]" (emphasis added)). [ 121 ] I cannot accept the position put forward by the CDPDJ. Even if it is assumed that a breach of the right to be heard or duly called (and therefore of art. 17 para. 1 C.C.P.) can be remedied by showing an absence of prejudice — a question that should be left for another day — I am unable to infer that the CISSS A was not prejudiced. The appeal record as it stands is rather scanty on this point. First, it does not allow us to address the legal question of whether absence of prejudice may be a relevant consideration where a court of law is determining whether there has been a breach of the audi alteram partem rule and, if so, what remedy it should grant (if any). Second, the appeal record also does not allow us to address the question of whether the CISSS A was prejudiced. The Court does not have full submissions on these questions or even a complete picture of the proceedings at first instance. In the circumstances, it is enough to say that the CDPDJ has not satisfied me that the CISSS A was not prejudiced. I would therefore affirm the Court of Appeal's choice to intervene so that the orders were made against the DYP (paras. 54 and 83). That being said, while I agree with the result reached by the Court of Appeal, I do not fully endorse its reasons. According to that court, [translation] "[i]t is an error of law to make orders against a person who is not [formally] party to the matter" (para. 52; see also paras. 50 and 82). In my view, it should instead have been found that it is an error of law to make orders against a person "unless the party has been heard or duly called" (art. 17 para. 1 C.C.P.). Finally, because this was a case in which a young person's interests were at stake and because the decision rendered would affect the interests of the CISSS A, the tribunal could have required the attendance of the CISSS A and heard it after it was called (art. 50 C.C.P.). --- ## VI. Disposition [ 122 ] I would allow the appeal in part. If not for the fact that the young person reached the age of majority during the appeal proceedings, I would have restored the order made at para. 345 of the tribunal's judgment, with two exceptions: first, the order would have been directed at the DYP rather than the CISSS A, and second, the scope of the order would have been limited to the RCYPAPs of the CISSS A and the other RCYPAPs to which the young person would be entrusted. I would also have varied the wording of the order made at para. 346 to direct the DYP, and not the CISSS A, to have at least one isolation room, covered with a material that prevented injury, available for the young person at all times in units A and B of the CISSS A and in the other RCYPAP units to which she would be entrusted. These are the orders "that the tribunal should have made" at paras. 345‑46 of its judgment, although I recognize that other alternative orders were available and acceptable and could therefore have been made (YPA, s. 112; see also ss. 128 and 129; Supreme Court Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. S‑26, s. 45; Protection de la jeunesse – 123979, at para. 27). However, since the young person is no longer the subject of social intervention under the YPA and never will be again given that she is now an adult, no order will be made (Protection de la jeunesse – 10174, 2010 QCCA 1912, [2010] R.J.Q. 2291, at para. 94 in limine; Protection de la jeunesse – 18935, 2018 QCCQ 10532, at paras. 22‑23; Protection de la jeunesse – 211323, 2021 QCCQ 2238, at para. 24; Protection de la jeunesse – 211624, at para. 79). No recommendation will be made either. Given the circumstances of this appeal, no costs should be awarded. --- Appeal allowed in part, without costs. --- ## Solicitors Solicitors for the appellant: Bitzakidis, Clément‑Major, Fournier, Montréal. Solicitors for the respondent: IMK, Montréal; Étude légale du CISSS A. Solicitors for the intervener the Attorney General of Quebec: Bernard, Roy (Justice‑Québec), Direction du contentieux, Montréal. Solicitors for the interveners A and B: Pringle & Associés, Laval. Solicitor for the intervener X: Centre communautaire juridique de la Rive-Sud, Longueuil. Solicitors for the intervener the Canadian Civil Liberties Association: McCarthy Tétrault, Montréal. Solicitor for the intervener the British Columbia Civil Liberties Association: Larochelle Law, Whitehorse. --- [^1]: Unless otherwise indicated, any reference to the statute is a reference to the version in force on the date the Court of Québec's judgment was rendered, July 2, 2019.