Sam Scratch

The appellant was convicted of second degree murder after participating in the beating death of a drug dealer.

On appeal, he argued the trial judge erred by admitting a witness's videotaped out-of-court statement under the principled exception to the hearsay rule after the witness claimed no memory of the conversation at trial.

The appellant also challenged the jury instructions regarding the use of the hearsay statement, the effect of intoxication on the intent for murder, and the use of post-offence conduct.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no errors in the admission of the hearsay evidence or the jury instructions.

The accused, a recently turned eighteen-year-old student, pleaded guilty to threatening to shoot up his school and threatening damage to property.

The Crown sought detention pending a psychiatric assessment and sentencing, citing concerns about potential access to firearms and possible mental illness.

The court granted bail with conditions, finding that detention was not justified under the primary, secondary, or tertiary grounds of the Criminal Code.

The decision addresses systemic issues in the bail system, including risk-aversion among decision-makers and the divergence between statutory bail provisions and actual bail court practices.

The appellant appealed his convictions for robbery, assault, assault with a weapon, unlawful confinement, and weapons dangerous arising from an incident in a crack house.

He argued the trial judge provided insufficient reasons, misapprehended evidence, and rendered inconsistent verdicts.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the trial judge's reasons met the required threshold, adequately addressed credibility, and demonstrated a careful consideration of the evidence for each count.

The appellant appealed the dismissal of her application for certiorari to quash her committal for trial on drug trafficking charges.

The Court of Appeal upheld the reviewing judge's conclusion that circumstantial evidence, including cash, drugs, and paraphernalia found in apartments where the appellant resided, as well as drugs found in a car registered in her name, constituted sufficient evidence of knowledge and control to meet the test for committal.

The appeal was dismissed.

The appellant appealed his convictions and sentence for offences involving cocaine and a firearm found in a vehicle.

He argued the trial judge erred in upholding a police search of a black bag and in instructing the jury on constructive possession.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the conviction appeal, finding the police had reasonable grounds to open the bag for officer safety and the jury charge was appropriate given the firearm was in plain view.

The sentence appeal was also dismissed as the sentence fell within the appropriate range.

The accused applied under ss. 462.34(4) and 462.341 of the Criminal Code for the release of restrained funds derived from the sale of a matrimonial home in order to pay legal expenses.

The court considered whether the applicant established that he had no other assets or means available to meet reasonable legal expenses and that no other person appeared lawfully entitled to the funds.

The court found the applicant’s financial disclosure incomplete and unreliable, noting unexplained assets and prior access to substantial funds.

Evidence also supported the claim of an alleged fraud victim who appeared to have a lawful entitlement to the restrained property.

The statutory prerequisites for release were therefore not met.

The accused were charged with conspiracy to murder and commit aggravated assault, counselling to murder and commit aggravated assault, and assault with a weapon.

The charges arose from an overheard conversation where Abou Al-Rashta instructed Pirouzi to attack two individuals.

The court found insufficient evidence of a meeting of minds to support the conspiracy charges against both accused.

However, the court found Abou Al-Rashta guilty of counselling the offences, as he actively induced and encouraged Pirouzi.

Pirouzi was also found guilty of assault with a weapon for a separate incident involving a remote control.

The appellant appealed his sentence of 8 years (effective 6 years and 4 months) for trafficking 3 kilograms of cocaine.

He argued the sentencing judge erred in applying the parity principle by giving him a longer sentence than his co-accused, and by treating money forfeited by the co-accused as equivalent to jail time.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the appellant's greater culpability justified the longer sentence and that any error regarding the co-accused's forfeiture did not render the appellant's sentence unfit.

The appellant appealed his convictions for sexual assault, sexual interference, and invitation to sexual touching.

He argued the trial judge erred by failing to caution the jury against using the child complainant's section 715.1 videotaped statement to bolster her trial evidence, and that the Kienapple principle should stay the latter two convictions.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the jury instruction was unnecessary as the videotaped statement forms part of the trial evidence, and holding that Kienapple did not apply because the offences have different legal elements.

The appellant was convicted of second degree murder after choking the victim during consensual sexual activity.

At trial, the appellant admitted culpability for manslaughter but argued he lacked the requisite intent for murder.

The trial judge instructed the jury that the only possible verdicts were second degree murder or manslaughter, removing the option of an acquittal.

On appeal, the appellant argued this violated his right to a jury trial, and that the trial judge misdirected the jury on the meaning of 'reckless' under s. 229(a)(ii) of the Criminal Code.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the trial judge properly respected the appellant's tactical decision to admit manslaughter, and that the jury instructions on intent, read as a whole, did not constitute reversible error.

The appellants were convicted of first-degree murder in a contract killing.

At trial, the judge instructed the jury that lies told by one of the appellants to the police could be used to infer his participation in a murder scheme, rather than merely a carjacking scheme as the defence argued.

The Court of Appeal held this was a misdirection, as the post-offence conduct had no probative value in determining the level of culpability between manslaughter and murder.

The error tainted the convictions of all three appellants.

The appeals were allowed, convictions quashed, and a new trial ordered.

The appellant appealed his convictions, including criminal harassment, and his sentence.

He argued the trial judge improperly based the harassment conviction solely on conduct from other counts and erred in addressing the Crown's failure to call a witness.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the conviction appeal, finding the trial judge properly considered prior threatening phone calls and correctly addressed the absent witness given the ample confirmatory evidence.

The sentence appeal was dismissed as moot.

The respondents were convicted of extortion with a firearm and other offences, which carry mandatory minimum sentences.

The trial judge gave the respondents credit for time spent on strict pre-trial bail (house arrest), reducing their sentences below the statutory minimums.

The Crown appealed.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, holding that while time spent in pre-sentence custody can be credited against a mandatory minimum sentence, time spent on strict bail does not constitute a 'punishment of imprisonment' under the Criminal Code and cannot be used to reduce a mandatory minimum sentence.

The appellants, who were 16 years old at the time of the offences, pleaded guilty to six violent convenience store robberies.

The Crown successfully applied to have them sentenced as adults under the Youth Criminal Justice Act.

The sentencing judge imposed five-year sentences in addition to three years' credit for pre-sentence custody, and ordered both to serve their sentences in adult penitentiaries.

On appeal, the Court of Appeal upheld the adult sentences and the quantum of the sentences, finding no error in the judge's approach to accountability, rehabilitation, or pre-sentence custody credit.

However, the Court allowed the appeal in part regarding the placement of one appellant, finding the sentencing judge failed to properly evaluate expert evidence recommending he remain in a youth facility, and ordered a new placement hearing for that appellant.

The appellant appealed his conviction and sentence.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal only in respect of the sentence, reducing it to time served, and ordered the section 110 order to remain.

The appellant appealed his sentence, arguing that the trial judge reversed the burden of proof when assessing the risk of eventual control in the community under s. 753.1(1)(c) of the Criminal Code.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the case did not turn on the burden of proof and that the trial judge had carefully weighed all the evidence.

The appellant, a bookkeeper, stole over $300,000 from her employer over three years to fund a gambling addiction linked to post-traumatic stress disorder.

She appealed her 16-month custodial sentence, arguing the trial judge failed to give adequate weight to her mental health diagnoses and erred in not imposing a conditional sentence.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the trial judge appropriately balanced the appellant's rehabilitation and mental health with the need for denunciation.

The applicant, a young person, sought a stay of a placement decision transferring him to the federal adult system pending his appeal.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the application, finding that while there was a serious issue to be tried, the applicant failed to demonstrate irreparable harm.

Furthermore, the balance of convenience weighed against a stay, as the trial judge's concerns for the safety of others in the youth system outweighed any potential prejudice to the applicant.

The appellant appealed the sentence imposed by the trial judge, arguing that the judge erred in departing from a joint submission.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the trial judge articulated the proper test for departing from a joint submission and correctly concluded that the proposed sentence was wholly inadequate given the appellant's two prior recent convictions for the same offence.

The appellant appealed a sentence imposed after the trial judge rejected a joint submission.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the trial judge did not err in principle in concluding the proposed sentence would bring the administration of justice into disrepute.

The court also found no procedural unfairness and held the total sentence imposed was within the appropriate range.