Sam Scratch

The appellant appealed his sentence, arguing against the length of the probationary period.

The trial judge had imposed a lesser custodial term than the three years suggested in a joint submission, but included a three-year probationary period.

The Court of Appeal found no error in the custodial term and held that the probationary period, while high, was not unreasonable given the facts of the offence.

The sentence appeal was dismissed.

The appellant appealed his convictions and sentence for robbery and weapons offences.

He argued the trial judge erred in her jury instructions regarding surveillance video evidence, hearsay evidence of a photo line-up identification, post-offence flight, and reasonable doubt arising from an absence of evidence.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the conviction appeal, finding no reversible errors in the jury charge and noting that the identification evidence was properly handled.

The sentence appeal was also dismissed, as the trial judge did not err in imposing a consecutive sentence for the weapons offence.

The appellant appealed his convictions on the basis of unreasonable delay under s. 11(b) of the Charter and the admissibility of evidence seized pursuant to a wiretap authorization and search warrants.

The Court of Appeal found that the trial judge reasonably applied the Morin framework to find no s. 11(b) violation.

The Court also upheld the wiretap authorization, finding that jailhouse telephones are not places ordinarily used by solicitors under s. 186(2) of the Criminal Code, and that investigative necessity was established.

Finally, the Court held that the police inspection of the appellant's personal belongings held by jail authorities did not violate his reasonable expectation of privacy under s. 8 of the Charter.

The appeals from conviction were dismissed.

The appellant was convicted of second degree murder and sentenced to life imprisonment with 13 years' parole ineligibility.

He appealed both conviction and sentence, arguing the trial judge erred by delivering an improper jury exhortation, admitting out-of-court statements, failing to relate evidence to the defence theory, improperly instructing on reasonable doubt, and giving inadequate Vetrovec warnings.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no reversible errors in the trial judge's instructions or evidentiary rulings, and upholding the period of parole ineligibility as fit.

The appellant was convicted of first degree murder and sentenced to life imprisonment without parole for 25 years.

He appealed, arguing that a stay of proceedings should have been granted due to serious police misconduct, including an assault during interrogation and subsequent attempts to conceal it.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the trial judge properly remedied the Charter breaches by excluding the tainted evidence rather than granting a stay.

The Court also rejected arguments regarding constitutional exemptions for parole ineligibility, the admission of a jailhouse informant's testimony, and the jury instructions on first degree murder.

The appellant was convicted of discharging a firearm with intent to endanger the life of a police officer and related offences after firing a handgun while fleeing from an attempted stop.

He appealed his convictions on several grounds relating to jury instructions, including the elements of the offence, reasonable doubt, and jury exhortation, all of which were dismissed.

He also appealed his sentence, arguing the trial judge erred by allowing the police officer to make an improper victim impact statement at the sentencing hearing and by imposing an unduly harsh sentence.

The Court of Appeal allowed the sentence appeal, finding the victim impact statement procedurally and substantively improper, and reduced the sentence to better reflect the principle of rehabilitation.

The appellants were convicted of sexual assault involving the gang rape of a 15-year-old girl.

They appealed their convictions and sentences, arguing errors in the Crown's closing argument, jury instructions regarding the application of co-accused evidence, alleged 'Miller' errors in assessing evidence, and the trial judge's handling of a jury request to re-read the complainant's examination-in-chief without the cross-examination.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the conviction appeals, finding no prejudice in the jury instructions or the re-reading of evidence.

The sentence appeals were also dismissed, as the significant penitentiary terms were deemed appropriate for the vicious nature of the offence.

The appellant appealed his conviction for second degree murder.

He argued the trial judge erred by not leaving manslaughter or provocation with the jury, that the Crown improperly elicited prior out-of-court statements to rebut recent fabrication, and that the Crown improperly cross-examined him on the rule in Browne v. Dunn.

He also sought to adduce fresh evidence regarding a forged arrest warrant.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no evidence to support provocation, that the prior statements were admissible, that any prejudice from cross-examination was cured by instructions, and that the fresh evidence was collateral.

The appellant appealed his convictions and 8-year sentence for robbery and related offences arising from a home invasion.

He argued the Crown improperly invited the jury to draw an adverse inference from his failure to call alibi witnesses disclosed for the first time during cross-examination.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the conviction appeal, finding the trial judge's failure to instruct the jury on the undisclosed alibi actually benefitted the appellant.

The Court substituted a conviction for simple assault on one count.

The sentence appeal was allowed, reducing the sentence to 7 years, as the trial judge erred in principle by denying pre-trial custody credit to punish the appellant for advancing a perjurious defence.

The appellant appealed his conviction for robbery and his sentence of three and one-half years' imprisonment.

He argued that the trial judge's Vetrovec warning regarding an accomplice's testimony was deficient, that hearsay evidence was improperly admitted, and that the defence of intoxication should have been left to the jury.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the conviction appeal, finding the Vetrovec warning adequate, no prejudice from the hearsay evidence, and no air of reality to the intoxication defence.

The sentence appeal was also dismissed, as the trial judge properly applied the mandatory minimum for robbery with a firearm and the sentence was not excessive.

The appellant appealed his convictions for sexual assault, assault, and uttering threats, as well as his sentences.

He argued the trial judge committed a Coutts error, improperly relied on battered wife syndrome to explain delayed disclosure, and improperly used nurses' notes as corroboration.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the conviction appeals, finding no errors in the trial judge's credibility assessments or use of evidence.

However, the Court allowed the sentence appeal in part, reducing the sentence for sexual assault to three years due to an ambiguity in the trial judge's sentencing reasons.

The appellant appealed a second degree murder conviction arising from a fatal confrontation in his residence, where he asserted self-defence and the trial judge left provocation with the jury.

The Court of Appeal held that the self-defence charge was adequate, but found reversible error in the response to the jury's question on provocation and in the treatment of after-the-fact conduct because the jury was not properly instructed on innocent explanations and conduct consistent with innocence.

The court further held that Crown counsel's cross-examination was repeatedly improper, including questioning on silence, disclosure, and criminal record details, and that the curative instructions did not adequately remove the prejudice.

Considering these errors cumulatively, the court concluded the appellant did not receive a fair trial and ordered a new trial.