Russell Silverstein

The appellant failed to appear for his appeal and provided no documentation to support his claim of illness.

Duty counsel had no contact with the appellant.

As the appellant failed to take any steps to move the appeal forward despite case management directions, the Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal as abandoned.

The respondents were convicted of second degree murder after shooting the victim, who died a month later from a blood clot.

The victim had ingested cocaine shortly before death, raising a causation issue.

The trial judge failed to instruct the jury on the included offence of attempted murder.

The Supreme Court of Canada held that this was an error of law and declined to apply the curative proviso under s. 686(1)(b)(iii) of the Criminal Code, as the error could not be confidently dismissed as harmless.

The Crown's appeal was dismissed, upholding the Court of Appeal's order for a new trial.

The accused was convicted at trial of sexual assault and forcible confinement.

A majority of the Court of Appeal for Ontario set aside the convictions and ordered a new trial, finding the trial judge failed to explain why certain factors did not raise a reasonable doubt regarding fabrication.

The Crown appealed to the Supreme Court of Canada.

The Supreme Court dismissed the appeal, agreeing that the trial judge erred in law by failing to give adequate consideration to whether the evidence raised a reasonable doubt.

The appellant was convicted of sexual assault and designated a long-term offender.

He was sentenced to six years' imprisonment in addition to 31 months of pre-sentence custody, followed by a 10-year supervision order.

He appealed the sentence, arguing the sentencing judge erred by crediting his pre-sentence custody on a 1-to-1 basis rather than an enhanced basis.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no error in the sentencing judge's exercise of discretion, particularly given the appellant's dangerousness and the unlikelihood of early release.

The appellant appealed the sentence imposed for her involvement in a commercial drug operation involving a wide variety of controlled substances.

The Court of Appeal found no error in principle, noting the sentencing judge appropriately balanced the appellant's guilty plea against her failure to appreciate the potential harm of distributing the substances.

The appeal was dismissed.

The respondent pleaded guilty to participating in a terrorist plot to detonate bombs at the Toronto Stock Exchange, CSIS Headquarters, and a military base.

The sentencing judge imposed a 14-year sentence (7 years after pre-trial custody credit) and declined to increase parole ineligibility, emphasizing the respondent's youth, lack of criminal record, and rehabilitative prospects.

The Crown appealed the sentence.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, holding that the sentencing judge gave inadequate weight to the enormity of the planned mass murder and the unique nature of terrorism offences.

The sentence was increased to 20 years (13 years after credit), and the respondent was ordered to serve one-half of his sentence before being eligible for parole.

The appellant appealed his convictions for sexual assault and uttering threats against his ex-wife.

The trial judge had convicted the appellant based primarily on credibility findings, rejecting the appellant's testimony.

On appeal, the Court of Appeal found that the trial judge erred by relying on inappropriate considerations to assess the appellant's credibility, including the conduct of defense counsel, evidence from a voir dire that was not part of the trial record, and the appellant's proficiency in French.

The appeal was allowed and a new trial was ordered.

The appellant appealed his manslaughter conviction arising from the shooting death of his friend.

The Crown's case at trial relied heavily on expert evidence regarding gunshot residue and bullet trajectory to prove the appellant, rather than the deceased, fired the handgun.

On appeal, the Court found that the expert opinions were significantly undermined during cross-examination, leaving no reliable evidence to exclude the reasonable possibility of a self-inflicted injury.

The Court of Appeal concluded the jury's verdict was unreasonable, allowed the appeal, and entered an acquittal.

The appellant appealed her convictions on the basis that there was no evidence identifying her as the perpetrator of the alleged offences.

The Court of Appeal agreed, finding no evidence linking the appellant to the co-accused, the mortgage applications, or the bank accounts.

The Court rejected the Crown's argument that the date of birth on the indictment could be used as evidence of identity.

The appeal was allowed, convictions set aside, and acquittals entered.

The appellants were convicted of second degree murder after the victim, whom they had shot, died a month later from a pulmonary embolism.

At trial, the defence argued that the embolism was caused by the victim's ingestion of cocaine shortly before his death, not the gunshot wounds.

The trial judge instructed the jury to acquit if they had a reasonable doubt about causation, declining to leave attempted murder as a possible verdict.

The Court of Appeal held that section 660 of the Criminal Code applies to murder charges, meaning attempted murder is an available verdict if the full offence is not proved.

The majority concluded that the failure to instruct the jury on attempted murder was a reversible error and declined to apply the curative proviso, ordering a new trial.

The appellant was convicted of conspiracy to defraud and defrauding the Government of Canada of over $3 million.

He appealed his conviction and sentence, arguing unreasonable delay under s. 11(b) of the Charter and that the trial judge erred by failing to instruct the jury that his silence at trial could not be used against him.

The trial judge had relied on Supreme Court of Canada obiter dicta suggesting s. 4(6) of the Canada Evidence Act prohibited such an instruction.

The Court of Appeal held that the SCC obiter was non-binding and conflicted with earlier binding SCC ratio, meaning the instruction could have been given.

However, the court found the jury instructions as a whole were adequate and the delay was reasonable given the complexity of the proceedings.

The appeal from conviction and the three-year sentence were dismissed.

The appellant appealed his robbery conviction, arguing that the trial judge erred in assessing the credibility of three Crown witnesses and that he received ineffective assistance from his trial counsel.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no error in the trial judge's assessment of the unsavoury witnesses.

The Court also rejected the ineffective assistance claim, concluding that the fresh evidence regarding a doctor's appointment would not have altered the verdict or raised a reasonable doubt, and that trial counsel was not incompetent in following the appellant's instructions to proceed without subpoenaing the doctor.

The appellants were convicted of conspiracy to defraud the Government of Canada and multiple counts of fraud over $5,000 relating to a scheme involving sham vehicle sales to exploit aboriginal tax exemptions and fraudulently claim GST refunds.

On appeal, the appellants argued that the trial judge provided insufficient reasons for the convictions.

The Court of Appeal agreed, finding that the trial judge made conclusory findings of guilt without identifying the specific evidence establishing the appellants' participation in the illegitimate transactions or addressing the individual fraud counts.

The appeals were allowed, the convictions set aside, and a new trial ordered.

The appellant appealed his conviction and sentence for fraud over $5,000.

He argued the criminal proceedings were an abuse of process because they were allegedly used solely to collect a civil debt owed to the complainants.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the conviction appeal, finding no improper purpose behind the prosecution despite some ill-advised emails from Crown counsel.

The sentence appeal was also dismissed, as the 18-month imprisonment and $22,500 restitution order were within the appropriate range and revealed no error in principle.

The appellant was convicted of importing 5.9 kilograms of opium into Canada and sentenced to five-and-a-half years' incarceration.

He appealed the conviction, arguing the trial judge erred in admitting opinion evidence from RCMP officers, misdirected the jury on wilful blindness, and failed to adequately explain the knowledge requirement.

He also appealed the sentence.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the conviction appeal, finding no prejudice from the officers' testimony and concluding the jury instructions on wilful blindness and knowledge were sufficient.

The sentence appeal was also dismissed, as the sentence was fit given the large quantity of drugs involved.

The applicant brought a motion to compel a proposed witness, a former Crown attorney who had since been appointed to the bench, to be examined orally before a special examiner regarding his affidavit.

The Crown and the proposed witness argued for written interrogatories.

The Court of Appeal granted the motion, holding that oral examination was in the interests of justice to effectively test the reliability of the witness's memory without impairing his current judicial role.

The appellant appealed his convictions and sentence for historical sexual and physical abuse against family members.

He argued that a 30-month delay violated his s. 11(b) Charter rights, that the verdicts were unreasonable, and that the jury was improperly instructed.

The Court of Appeal upheld the motion judge's finding that the delay was not unreasonable given the case's complexity.

The Court quashed one assault conviction as unreasonable but upheld the remaining convictions and the global 12-month sentence.

The appellant appealed convictions arising from sexual offences against a child, arguing the trial judge improperly treated the case as a credibility contest, misused the child's complaint to her mother, gave unreasonable reasons for rejecting the defence evidence, and applied different credibility standards to the parties.

The Court of Appeal held that the trial judge properly instructed himself under the W.(D.) framework, did not merely choose between competing versions, and gave adequate reasons grounded in the evidence.

The court further held that the complaint to the mother was admissible under the narrative exception and was used only for a limited, permissible purpose in assessing truthfulness.

The appeal was dismissed.

The appellant abandoned his appeal against conviction.

On the appeal against the four-year sentence, the Court of Appeal found no error by the trial judge, considering the offences and the appellant's criminal record.

The sentence appeal was dismissed.

The appellant appealed a 3-year sentence imposed for sexual offences, arguing the trial judge erred in applying the totality principle given his existing nine-year sentence for other sexual offences from the same time frame.

The Court of Appeal agreed, finding the additional three-year sentence infringed the totality principle.

Leave to appeal was granted, and the sentence was reduced to an additional one year of imprisonment to be served consecutively to the sentence the appellant was already serving.