Patrick Francis David McCann

The Crown appealed the acquittal of Damodar Arapakota on a charge of bribing a foreign public official contrary to section 3(1)(a) of the Corruption of Foreign Public Officials Act (CFPOA).

The respondent had paid for a family vacation in Orlando, Florida for a Botswana government official in exchange for letters confirming the government's intention to award a contract to the respondent's company.

The trial judge acquitted the respondent, finding that the Crown had failed to prove that the respondent received a material business advantage in return for the trip and that there was insufficient nexus between the trip and the letters.

The majority of the Court of Appeal dismissed the Crown's appeal, finding that while the trial judge erred in requiring proof of a specific act or omission, this error did not affect the outcome because the trial judge correctly found that the respondent received no meaningful business advantage.

Justice Monahan dissented, arguing that the trial judge's interpretation of "as consideration for" was unduly narrow and that the acquittal should be set aside for a new trial.

The accused, Damodar Arapakota, was charged under s. 3(1)(a) of the Corruption of Foreign Public Officials Act (CFPOA) for allegedly providing a material benefit (a US trip valued at approximately $20,000) to a Botswanan public official, Dr. Omponye Coach Kereteletswe, as consideration for official acts to obtain a business advantage for his company, Imex Systems Inc. The Crown argued the trip was consideration for letters confirming a contract and its value.

The defence contended the trip was for convenience and partially reimbursed, and the letters did not provide a material business advantage.

The court found that while a material benefit was conferred, the Crown failed to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the benefit was "as consideration for" the letters (lacking a quid pro quo) or that the letters provided a material "advantage in business" as required by the CFPOA.

The accused was found not guilty.

Bruce Carson was convicted of fraud on the government under section 121(1)(d) of the Criminal Code, following appeals to the Ontario Court of Appeal and the Supreme Court of Canada which overturned his initial acquittal.

The sentencing hearing considered mitigating factors, including his age, admissions shortening the trial, dated criminal record, and the attempted nature of the fraud.

Aggravating factors included his prior fraud record and the potential for significant financial gain.

The court emphasized general deterrence and denunciation for offences impacting government integrity.

Considering the dramatic negative effect on Carson's life and the prior uncertainty of the law, the court imposed a suspended sentence with 12 months probation and 100 hours of community service, rejecting the Crown's request for a conditional sentence.

The Court considered whether accepting a benefit to use government contacts to promote private sales to First Nations constituted influence peddling connected to government business under s. 121(1)(d)(i) of the Criminal Code.

A majority held the phrase should be interpreted broadly and includes matters that could be facilitated by government given its mandate.

The appeal was dismissed, with a dissent that would have restored the acquittal.

During pre-trial motions for a first-degree murder trial, the court addressed the accused's refusal to participate, the role of amicus curiae, and the admissibility of a police statement.

The court expanded the role of amicus curiae beyond making legal submissions to ensure a fair trial, given the accused's complete non-participation.

The court also ruled that the accused's statement to police was voluntary.

Although the court found a technical breach of the accused's s. 10(b) Charter rights due to a five-hour delay in facilitating access to counsel, the statement was not excluded under s. 24(2) because the police acted in good faith and the accused ultimately exercised his right to counsel before giving the statement.

The accused appealed convictions for firearms and drug trafficking offences, challenging production orders used to obtain historical text messages from a telecommunications provider.

The Court held the accused had standing under s. 8 of the Charter because he had a reasonable expectation of privacy in the electronic conversation records.

The majority concluded that seizure of already sent and received messages from provider storage was lawfully authorized by the production order regime and did not require a Part VI wiretap authorization.

A dissent would have treated acquisition of those messages as requiring Part VI authorization and would have excluded the evidence under s. 24(2).

The appellant, a former designated public office holder, appealed his convictions and $50,000 fine for three counts of illegal lobbying under the Lobbying Act.

The Superior Court of Justice overturned the conviction on count three, finding that his communications regarding an existing government grant did not constitute prohibited lobbying.

However, the court upheld the convictions on counts one and two, agreeing that his activities on behalf of an energy policy institute constituted prohibited consultant lobbying.

The global fine was reduced to $45,000 to reflect the overturned conviction, but the court found no error in principle in the sentencing judge's approach.

The Crown appealed the acquittal of a former senior advisor to the Prime Minister on a charge of influence peddling contrary to section 121(1)(d) of the Criminal Code.

The respondent had negotiated a contract providing commissions to his girlfriend on sales of water treatment systems to First Nations communities, with the understanding that he would use his government contacts to promote the company.

The trial judge acquitted the respondent, finding that there was no "matter of business relating to the government" because First Nations communities had autonomy in purchasing decisions and INAC was not involved in approving such purchases.

The Court of Appeal was divided: the majority allowed the appeal and entered a conviction, interpreting "any matter of business relating to the government" broadly to include the respondent's exercise of influence on government officials regarding the sale of products to First Nations.

The dissent would have dismissed the appeal, finding no error of law in the trial judge's interpretation and reasoning.

A former Designated Public Office Holder was charged with three counts of violating the Lobbying Act: (1) undertaking to communicate with public office holders on behalf of the Energy Policy Institute of Canada regarding policy development; (2) arranging a meeting between public office holders and EPIC members; and (3) undertaking to communicate with public office holders regarding the awarding of a grant to the Canada School of Energy and Environment.

The court found that the prohibition on lobbying activities by former senior government officials applies regardless of whether communications were initiated by government officials, and that an undertaking to lobby need not be express or written.

The court convicted on all three counts, finding that the accused's actions constituted lobbying under the Lobbying Act despite his arguments that the activities were informational only or that he was acting in his personal capacity.

The appellant was convicted of firearms and drug trafficking offences based largely on historical text messages obtained via a production order.

On appeal, he argued he had standing to challenge the order under section 8 of the Charter and that the police should have obtained a Part VI wiretap authorization instead of a production order.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no error in the application judge's conclusion that the appellant lacked standing.

The Court further held that a Part VI authorization is prospective and not required for the search and seizure of historical text messages already in existence.

The accused, a former senior political advisor with connections to federal officials, was charged under s. 121(1)(d) of the Criminal Code with fraud on the government for seeking a benefit for his partner in connection with promoting water treatment systems to First Nations communities.

The Crown argued that the accused used his government influence to advance a supplier in a three‑way business relationship involving the federal government and First Nations bands.

The court held that the evidence established the accused attempted to influence government officials but that any potential sales of point‑of‑use water treatment systems were decisions made autonomously by individual First Nations communities.

Because the government did not procure or approve those systems, there was no “transaction of business with or any matter of business relating to the government” within the meaning of s. 121(1)(d).

The court concluded the essential element of government business was absent.

In this criminal jury trial ruling, the accused sought to have the defence of mistake of fact put to the jury on bid-rigging charges under s. 47(2) of the Competition Act.

The court held that whether the RFPs were calls for bids or tenders was a question of fact, not law, and applied the air of reality test to determine whether the defence should be left with the jury.

On the totality of the evidence, including uncertainty in the procurement documents and witness evidence, the court found an evidentiary foundation for an honest mistaken belief.

The jury was therefore permitted to consider the mistake of fact defence in relation to the nature of the RFPs.

Accused charged with bid‑rigging and conspiracy challenged the constitutionality of s. 69(2) of the Competition Act, which deemed certain documents and records found in possession of a “participant” to constitute prima facie proof of knowledge and related facts.

The applicants argued the provision created evidentiary and legal presumptions that effectively shifted the burden of proof onto the accused, contrary to the presumption of innocence under ss. 7 and 11(d) of the Charter.

The court held that the section required the trier of fact to accept knowledge of documents as proven and could compel the accused to respond before the Crown proved guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.

The provision therefore infringed the presumption of innocence and fundamental justice and was not justified under s. 1 of the Charter.

Section 69(2) was declared of no force or effect in criminal proceedings, though its use in Competition Tribunal proceedings was unaffected.

Three offenders were convicted following a lengthy trial of firearms trafficking offences arising from Project Lancaster, a two-year investigation into illegal firearms and drug trafficking.

All three were convicted of various firearms offences involving restricted or prohibited handguns.

Two offenders were also convicted of drug trafficking offences.

The court imposed sentences of 5 years for the firearms offences, with an additional 7 months consecutive for drug offences where applicable.

The court rejected constitutional challenges to the mandatory minimum sentence under section 99 of the Criminal Code, finding that the appropriate sentences exceeded the three-year minimum.

Enhanced credit for pre-trial custody was granted, resulting in net sentences ranging from approximately 4.7 years to 5 years and 7 months.

The accused was charged with aggravated assault contrary to section 268 of the Criminal Code following a hockey game in a non-contact senior men's league in Ottawa.

During the final 47 seconds of a game between the Pirates and Tiger-Cats, the accused delivered a deliberate blindside hit to the complainant's head, causing severe injuries including facial lacerations, missing teeth, and a concussion.

The court found that the accused intentionally delivered the hit in retaliation for a missed penalty call at the blue line moments earlier.

The court rejected the accused's claim that the contact was an unavoidable collision and found that the accused's actions fell so far outside the acceptable conduct in a non-contact league that consent could not be given.

The accused was convicted of aggravated assault.

Following a forfeiture hearing, defence counsel requested the release of additional funds from seized assets to pay legal fees.

The court had previously authorized the release of $80,000 from the seized funds.

In a supplementary order correcting an inadvertent omission in the earlier decision, the court refused the request for additional funds.

The court cited the accused’s lack of cooperation and the costs associated with the prosecution as reasons not to release further assets.

Three accused were tried on 42 counts involving firearms trafficking, drug trafficking, and related offences arising from Project Lancaster, a two-year investigation spanning January 2009 to March 2011.

The Crown relied heavily on wiretap evidence, text messages, surveillance, undercover operations, and expert testimony regarding firearms and drug terminology.

The court convicted the accused on various counts including offering to transfer firearms, conspiracy to traffic marijuana, possession of marijuana for trafficking purposes, and possession of proceeds of crime.

Key issues included the interpretation of coded language in communications, the definition of "firearm" without physical recovery, and the elements of conspiracy in buy-sell drug transactions.

The offender was convicted by a jury of manslaughter after fatally stabbing the victim during a drunken altercation in his apartment following a party.

The evidence established that the offender concealed a knife prior to a confrontation and inflicted eight stab wounds during a fight in which the victim was beating him.

The court considered aggravating factors including the use of a concealed knife in a fist fight, multiple stab wounds including a fatal heart wound, initiation of the conflict, flight from the scene, and the offender’s alcohol abuse and lack of insight.

Mitigating factors included the offender’s youth (18 years old), lack of criminal record, severe assault by the victim at the time of the stabbing, remorse, and strong rehabilitative prospects.

Balancing denunciation and deterrence with rehabilitation, the court imposed a penitentiary sentence of six years.

The appellants appealed the dismissal of their application for certiorari of a preliminary inquiry judge's decision committing them to stand trial for bid rigging and conspiracy.

They argued that the Requests for Proposals were not calls or requests for bids or tenders under s. 47 of the Competition Act because they did not result in a contractual entitlement to perform services.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding there was some evidence upon which a properly instructed trier of fact could conclude that the procurement process created a bidding contract and that the appellants had made bids in response to a call or request for bids or tenders.

The Crown appealed the dismissal of its application for certiorari and mandamus after a preliminary inquiry judge discharged the respondents on first degree murder and committed them for second degree murder.

The Court of Appeal upheld the finding that there was no evidence of planning and deliberation.

However, the Court found the preliminary inquiry judge exceeded his jurisdiction by determining whether the victim was unlawfully confined to the degree required for constructive first degree murder under s. 231(5)(e), rather than leaving that question to the jury.

The appeal was allowed and the matter remitted to the preliminary inquiry judge.