Patrick Francis David McCann

Multiple applicants charged with bid‑rigging under s. 47(2) of the Competition Act and conspiracy under s. 465(1)(c) of the Criminal Code sought certiorari to quash their committal for trial following a preliminary inquiry.

They argued that the government Requests for Proposals used to procure information technology services merely created standing offers or pre‑qualification lists and therefore could not constitute “calls for bids or tenders” within the meaning of the Competition Act.

The court reviewed the Contract A/Contract B tendering framework and relevant procurement jurisprudence, emphasizing that the existence of a bidding contract depends on the parties’ intention to create binding rights and obligations.

It held that there was some evidence from which a trier of fact could conclude that the RFP process created contractual relations sufficient to constitute bids or tenders, even though the government retained discretion not to award work.

The application to quash the committal was therefore dismissed.

The Crown brought an application for certiorari and mandamus to overturn a preliminary inquiry judge's decision to discharge the respondents on charges of first degree murder and commit them on second degree murder.

The Crown argued the judge committed jurisdictional error by weighing competing inferences, usurping the role of the trier of fact, and failing to consider the whole of the evidence regarding planning and deliberation and unlawful confinement.

The Superior Court dismissed the application, finding the preliminary inquiry judge correctly applied the test for committal and did not commit any jurisdictional error in concluding there was insufficient evidence for a properly instructed jury to return a verdict of first degree murder.

In a first-degree murder prosecution involving the deaths of four female family members, the Crown sought to call expert evidence concerning the sociological phenomenon of so‑called honour killings.

The defence challenged the admissibility of the proposed expert opinion evidence.

Applying the framework in R. v. Mohan and R. v. Abbey, the court considered whether the proposed evidence related to a proper subject of expert opinion, whether the witness was qualified, whether the evidence was logically relevant to motive, and whether it survived a cost‑benefit analysis balancing probative value against potential prejudice.

The court found the proposed expert highly qualified and concluded that cultural evidence about honour killings could assist the jury in understanding the alleged motive without usurping the jury’s fact‑finding role.

The evidence was therefore ruled admissible.

The appellant, a long-time member of the criminal underworld, appealed his sentence for refusing to testify at a murder trial.

He had been sentenced to three years' imprisonment, with one year of credit for other incarceration.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, emphasizing that the justice system depends on witnesses testifying as required.

The court held that significant jail terms must be imposed on those who choose to remain aligned with criminal cohorts rather than fulfill their civic duties, affirming that the sentence was entirely fit.

The appellants appealed their convictions for conspiracy to commit extortion, extortion, and possession of bugging equipment.

The charges arose from a private investigation business where female operatives were hired to lure targets into surreptitiously recorded sexual encounters to extort money.

The Court of Appeal quashed the conspiracy convictions, finding insufficient evidence that the appellants had formed an agreement with the alleged co-conspirators to commit extortion.

However, the court upheld one appellant's conviction for extortion, ruling that threatening to have a debtor fired to collect a legitimate debt lacked reasonable justification or excuse.

The court also upheld the conviction for possessing bugging equipment, finding the devices were primarily useful for surreptitious interception.

The 10-month sentence was affirmed.

The appellant appealed his conviction for second-degree murder and his sentence of life imprisonment with 16 years of parole ineligibility.

He argued that his statements to police, which led to the discovery of his wife's cremated remains and forensic evidence in his home, were obtained in violation of his Charter rights under s. 10(b) and s. 7.

He also challenged the trial judge's use of his after-the-fact conduct to infer murderous intent and the assessment of expert bloodstain evidence.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the conviction appeal, finding no Charter breaches and no errors in the trial judge's reasoning.

However, the sentence appeal was allowed, and the parole ineligibility period was reduced to 13 years to accord with the parity principle for domestic murders.

The appellant appealed his conviction for drug-related offences, arguing the trial judge misapprehended evidence, reversed the burden of proof, and reached an unreasonable verdict.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the trial judge's conclusions regarding the appellant's occupancy of the bedroom and control over the drugs were well-supported by the evidence, including drug paraphernalia in plain view and the appellant's personal identification found in the bedroom.

The appellants were convicted of second-degree murder and manslaughter in a gang-related shooting.

At trial, the francophone co-accused requested trials in different official languages, leading the trial judge to conduct a bilingual trial.

The trial judge also admitted out-of-court statements made by the deceased victim before his death under the principled exception to the hearsay rule.

On appeal, the Court of Appeal held that the bilingual trial was permissible under the Criminal Code and did not violate the appellants' language rights.

However, the Court found that the trial judge erred in admitting the deceased's statements by improperly relying on extrinsic evidence and mere consistencies to establish threshold reliability.

The Court also found a significant error in the jury instructions regarding reasonable doubt and the absence of evidence (the 'Miller' error).

The appeal was allowed and a new trial ordered.

The appellant appealed his conviction for second degree murder arising from a random drive-by shooting.

He argued the trial judge erred in dismissing his application for a change of venue or trial by judge alone due to extensive pre-trial publicity.

He also raised several grounds regarding the jury charge, including alleged errors in instructions on the fact-finding process, reasonable doubt, and the use of discreditable conduct evidence.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no reversible errors in the trial judge's rulings or instructions to the jury.