P. Andras Schreck

The appellant appealed an extradition judge's order committing him for surrender to Hungary to face charges of fraud over $5,000.

The appellant argued there was insufficient evidence in the Records of the Case identifying him as the perpetrator who created false car leasing documents and entered into fraudulent loan agreements.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the summaries of evidence, including witness testimony and documentary evidence, when read as a whole, provided sufficient evidence to support the inference that the appellant was the perpetrator of the frauds.

The appellant was convicted of conspiracy to commit arson and second degree murder after a co-conspirator died in an explosion while setting fire to a commercial building for insurance fraud.

On appeal, the appellant argued the trial judge erred in her treatment of Vetrovec witnesses, admitted improper discreditable conduct evidence, and rendered an unreasonable verdict on the murder charge.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the evidentiary grounds but found the murder conviction unreasonable, as the evidence did not establish the appellant had subjective foresight of the likelihood of death.

The court substituted a conviction for manslaughter and reduced the sentence for conspiracy to commit arson from ten years to six years to respect the parity principle.

The appellants were convicted of first degree murder after the Crown alleged the wife hired her co-accused to kill her husband.

On appeal, the wife argued the trial judge erred by permitting the Crown to cross-examine its own witness at large after declaring her adverse under s. 9(1) of the Canada Evidence Act, without instructing the jury that the witness's lack of credibility could not be used to infer the accused were not credible or guilty.

The co-accused argued the trial judge erred in refusing to sever his trial, exposing him to highly prejudicial hearsay evidence admissible only against the wife.

The Court of Appeal allowed both appeals, finding the lack of a limiting instruction regarding the adverse witness amounted to misdirection, and the refusal to sever the trial resulted in an injustice.

Separate new trials were ordered.

The appellant appealed his conviction for criminal harassment, arguing the trial judge applied the wrong legal test for mens rea and that the evidence did not support the finding.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, holding that the trial judge stated and applied the correct legal test.

The Court found the evidence fully supported the finding of recklessness, as the appellant spent nine hours at the complainant's business without a legitimate purpose, was obsessed with the complainant, and was aware of the risk his conduct harassed her.

The appellant was convicted of dangerous driving causing bodily harm following a motorcycle accident.

In a related civil action, he was examined for discovery and testified he had no memory of the accident.

At his criminal trial, he gave a detailed account of the accident.

The trial judge allowed the Crown to cross-examine the appellant on his discovery evidence to impeach his credibility, finding that s. 13 of the Charter did not apply.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal and ordered a new trial, holding that under R. v. Henry, prior compelled evidence is inadmissible against an accused even for the purpose of challenging credibility.

The appellant appealed his conviction for trafficking in cocaine in association with a criminal organization.

The trial judge found that the appellant, a full patch member of the Hells Angels, acted as a middleman to facilitate drug transactions between a police agent and a supplier.

The Court of Appeal held that the trial judge reasonably inferred that membership in the organization assisted in the commission of the offence, satisfying the 'in association with' requirement.

The appeal from conviction was dismissed.

The appellant pleaded guilty to multiple drug trafficking charges, including possession of over one kilogram of cocaine, and was sentenced to 7 years' imprisonment.

On appeal, the appellant argued the trial judge failed to apply the gap principle, as his last conviction was 11 years prior.

The Court of Appeal agreed, finding the trial judge placed undue emphasis on the criminal record and failed to weigh rehabilitation prospects.

The appeal was allowed and the sentence reduced to 5.5 years.

The accused was denied a bail hearing for 24 days due to a lack of systemic resources in York Region.

The trial judge found a breach of the accused's section 11(e) Charter rights, stayed the proceedings, and awarded costs against the Crown.

On appeal, the Court of Appeal upheld the finding of systemic delay and the costs award for counsel's attendances in bail court.

However, the Court set aside the stay of proceedings, finding that the trial judge erred by failing to balance the interests served by granting a stay against society's interest in a trial on the merits.

The costs awarded for the Charter argument were also set aside.

The appellants appealed their convictions and sentences for conspiracy.

They argued the trial judge erred in the jury instructions regarding the elements of conspiracy, that the indictment was deficient for not explicitly invoking s. 465(3) of the Criminal Code, and that trial fairness was compromised by an RCMP officer entering the jury room to fix equipment.

They also appealed their sentences, arguing they should have received credit for time spent in immigration hold.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the conviction and sentence appeals, finding no errors in the jury charge, the indictment, or the trial judge's discretionary refusal to grant pre-trial custody credit for immigration detention.

The appellant was convicted of infanticide in 1999 based on the expert pathology evidence of Dr. Charles Smith, who opined that her four-month-old son was smothered.

Following the Goudge Inquiry, fresh expert evidence conclusively refuted Dr. Smith's findings, demonstrating that the child likely died of accidental asphyxia in an unsafe sleeping environment.

The Crown conceded that the fresh evidence should be admitted and the conviction quashed.

The Court of Appeal admitted the fresh evidence, set aside the conviction, and entered an acquittal, noting the profound miscarriage of justice.

The appellant was approached by a police officer investigating the use of a stolen credit card at a liquor store.

The officer told the appellant to 'wait a minute' while he asked preliminary questions.

After receiving further information over the radio, the officer arrested the appellant and informed him of his right to counsel.

The appellant argued he was detained from the moment the officer told him to wait, and that his right to counsel was violated.

The Supreme Court held that while the right to counsel must be provided immediately upon detention, the appellant was not detained during the initial exploratory questioning.

The appeal was dismissed.

The appellant was convicted of first degree murder and arson after his wife died in a deliberately set house fire.

The appellant appealed, arguing the trial judge misdirected the jury on after-the-fact conduct regarding his fabricated statements to an insurance adjuster, and on the burden of proof concerning his defence that the deceased committed suicide.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the circumstances of the fabricated statements could constitute independent evidence of concoction, and that the jury was properly instructed on the burden of proof and reasonable doubt.

The appellant was convicted of first-degree murder based in part on DNA evidence and a statement he made to police.

On appeal, he argued his s. 10(b) Charter right to counsel was breached when police questioned him before he had a reasonable opportunity to consult his counsel of choice.

The Court of Appeal agreed, finding the police failed to hold off questioning after the appellant indicated he was still trying to reach his lawyer.

The court concluded the statement was conscriptive evidence that should have been excluded under s. 24(2) of the Charter.

The appeal was allowed and a new trial ordered.

The appellant was convicted of second degree murder after choking the victim during consensual sexual activity.

At trial, the appellant admitted culpability for manslaughter but argued he lacked the requisite intent for murder.

The trial judge instructed the jury that the only possible verdicts were second degree murder or manslaughter, removing the option of an acquittal.

On appeal, the appellant argued this violated his right to a jury trial, and that the trial judge misdirected the jury on the meaning of 'reckless' under s. 229(a)(ii) of the Criminal Code.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the trial judge properly respected the appellant's tactical decision to admit manslaughter, and that the jury instructions on intent, read as a whole, did not constitute reversible error.

The appellant was convicted of conspiracy to import cocaine and importing 270 kilograms of cocaine, and was sentenced to life imprisonment.

He appealed both the conviction and the sentence.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the conviction appeal, finding that despite the trial judge's problematic 'pit of the stomach' instruction on reasonable doubt, the jury charge as a whole was adequate.

However, the sentence appeal was allowed.

The Court found that a life sentence was manifestly unfit for a youthful first offender, especially given that a more culpable co-accused received a 19-year sentence.

The sentence was reduced to 19 years' imprisonment.

The appellants were convicted of sexual assault by a judge and jury.

They appealed their convictions, arguing the trial judge erred in his W.(D.) instruction to the jury and by restricting cross-examination of the complainant regarding an incorrect in-court identification.

One appellant also argued the trial judge erred by revoking his bail mid-trial without hearing submissions.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeals, finding the jury instructions were appropriate in context, the cross-examination was properly restricted as collateral, and the bail revocation, while procedurally flawed initially, was corrected without prejudicing the fair trial.

The appellant appealed his conviction and sentence for a large-scale commercial fraud.

On the conviction appeal, the appellant argued that his counsel's waiver of the election caused a miscarriage of justice because the effect of the waiver was not explained to him.

The Court of Appeal rejected this argument, finding that counsel had explained the effect of the waiver and the appellant had specifically agreed to give up the right to a preliminary hearing.

On the sentence appeal, the appellant argued the sentencing judge erred by finding a breach of trust as an aggravating factor.

The Court of Appeal found no error, noting the trial judge's reference to breach of trust related to the nature of the fraudulent enterprise, which called for general deterrence and denunciation.

Both appeals were dismissed.

The appellant appealed his conviction for second-degree murder.

The trial judge erred by instructing the jury on the unconstitutional objective intent language in section 229(c) of the Criminal Code and by providing the jury with unedited written copies of the provision.

The Court of Appeal found the error fatal to the murder conviction.

On consent of both parties, the Court substituted a conviction for manslaughter and imposed a sentence of eight years' imprisonment.

The appellants were convicted of various weapons offences and crimes of violence related to the collection of drug debts.

They appealed their convictions on several grounds, primarily arguing that the trial judge erred in his instructions to the jury regarding reasonable doubt, the segregation of evidence, the adequacy of the Vetrovec warning for unsavoury witnesses, and the position of the defence.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the conviction appeals, finding no reversible errors in the jury charge.

However, the sentence appeals for three of the appellants were allowed, as the trial judge failed to adequately consider the principle of rehabilitation and mitigating factors, resulting in reduced sentences.

The Crown appealed an acquittal entered by the trial judge.

The trial judge found that the search warrant was based on information obtained from a prior unreasonable search, rendering the subsequent search warrantless and in violation of section 8 of the Charter.

The trial judge excluded the evidence under section 24(2) of the Charter, emphasizing the seriousness of the breach.

The Court of Appeal found no error in the trial judge's analysis and dismissed the appeal.