P. Andras Schreck

The appellant was convicted of armed robbery and related offences following a jewellery store heist.

On appeal, he challenged the trial judge's jury instructions on eyewitness identification, the Crown's use of his pre-trial silence to prove joint possession of stolen watches, and the admission of hearsay evidence.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, finding that the jury instructions on the frailties of photographic and video identification were inadequate.

Furthermore, the Crown improperly used the appellant's refusal to provide an explanation or sign a waiver form as evidence of guilt, violating his right to silence.

A new trial was ordered.

The appellants appealed their convictions, arguing that the common law rule of jury secrecy and section 649 of the Criminal Code infringed their Charter rights by preventing them from adducing evidence of jury deliberations to impeach their verdicts.

The Supreme Court of Canada dismissed the appeals, holding that the common law rule of jury secrecy, which prohibits the admission of evidence concerning the intrinsic deliberation process but allows evidence of extrinsic influences, is consistent with the principles of fundamental justice.

The Court also found that section 649 of the Criminal Code is constitutional and that the trial judge in the appellant Pan's case did not err in declaring a mistrial.

The seven appellants were convicted of trafficking in heroin following an undercover police operation.

They appealed their convictions on several grounds, primarily arguing that the 44.5-month delay between their charges and trial violated their right to be tried within a reasonable time under s. 11(b) of the Charter.

The Court of Appeal agreed with respect to six of the appellants, finding the delay was largely systemic and caused prejudice, and ordered a stay of proceedings for those six.

The appeal of the seventh appellant, who was arrested much later, was dismissed on all grounds, including arguments regarding the destruction of police notes, jury instructions, and sentence fitness.

The appellants appealed their convictions, arguing the trial judge erred in his treatment of alibi evidence and by admitting hearsay evidence.

The Court of Appeal found that the trial judge reversed the burden of proof by stating he was 'not satisfied' the alibi witnesses were reliable, without considering if their evidence raised a reasonable doubt.

Additionally, the trial judge erred in admitting hearsay evidence regarding cell phone records through a police officer without meeting the principled exception to the hearsay rule.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeals, set aside the convictions, and ordered a new trial for both appellants, declining to apply the curative proviso.

The appellant appealed his conviction for sexual interference.

The Court of Appeal found that the trial judge misdirected the jury by instructing them that prior consistent statements could be used to bolster the complainant's credibility, despite there being no allegation of recent fabrication.

The Court declined to apply the curative proviso under s. 686(1)(b)(iii) of the Criminal Code because the jury clearly had concerns about the complainant's credibility.

The appeal was allowed and a new trial was ordered on the charge of sexual interference, restricted to the allegations of digital penetration.

The Crown appealed a conditional sentence imposed after convictions for four counts of trafficking in a substantial quantity of heroin.

The majority held that the sentencing judge gave excessive weight to the respondent's psychological condition and erred by treating treatment of that condition as central to rehabilitation absent evidence connecting it to the offences.

While the respondent's history of torture and resulting post-traumatic stress disorder justified some reduction from the usual range, a community-based sentence was held unavailable for this level of heroin trafficking.

The court allowed the appeal, set aside the conditional sentence and probation order, and substituted a six-year penitentiary sentence.

The intervenor's motion to introduce fresh evidence on electronic monitoring was dismissed.

The accused was charged with sexually assaulting a young child.

At trial, the defence cross-examined the complainant on her two-and-a-half-year delay in reporting the abuse, suggesting fabrication.

The Crown called a child psychologist to testify that delayed disclosure is common and does not indicate falsehood.

The trial judge admitted the expert evidence, and the accused was convicted.

The Court of Appeal ordered a new trial, holding the expert evidence was inadmissible.

The Crown appealed to the Supreme Court of Canada solely on the admissibility of the expert evidence.

The Supreme Court dismissed the appeal, holding that the expert evidence was not necessary because the principle that delay does not equate to falsehood is not outside the normal experience of a jury and could be addressed through a proper jury instruction.

The appellant appealed convictions for sexual assault and threatening serious bodily harm arising from an encounter in which consent was the central issue.

The court held that similar fact evidence from a former partner should not have been admitted because its probative value was limited, the possibility of collusion or tainting materially weakened it, and its prejudicial effect was grave.

The court further held that the jury should have received a limiting instruction on other discreditable conduct evidence, and it identified error in the charge on prior consistent statements.

The conviction appeal was allowed, the convictions were set aside, and a new trial was ordered.

Joint criminal appeal from murder and attempted murder convictions arising out of a multiple-victim shooting in which both appellants admitted firing guns but relied principally on self-defence.

The court held that the trial judge committed multiple evidentiary and jury-charge errors, including admitting weak and highly prejudicial peaceful-disposition evidence from parents of deceased victims, admitting one witness's unsworn videotaped statement for its truth under the principled hearsay exception despite insufficient reliability safeguards, and improperly limiting the jury's use of translation evidence concerning another witness's adopted prior words.

The court further found errors in the treatment of after-the-fact conduct, co-accused bad character evidence, provocation, and the reopening issue.

Considering the cumulative effect of the errors, the curative proviso could not be applied.

A new trial was ordered on all charges.

The appellant appealed convictions arising from a violent kidnapping and assault connected to collection of a drug debt.

The court held that the trial judge erred by telling the jury that if it found the accused's testimony to be a fabrication, that finding could be added as positive circumstantial evidence of guilt absent independent evidence of concoction.

The court also found prejudicial Crown misconduct and related charge errors concerning the right to remain silent, improper cross-examination tied to defence counsel's failure to confront a witness under s. 11 of the Canada Evidence Act, and improper closing submissions suggesting a key Crown witness had been believed in another proceeding.

Given the credibility-driven record and the non-overwhelming Crown case, the proviso could not be applied.

A new trial was ordered.

The Crown appealed an acquittal, narrowing its argument to whether the trial judge unreasonably found that the respondent might have acted differently absent admitted breaches of the right to counsel.

The Court of Appeal held that the trial judge's finding under s. 24(2) was open on the record, particularly given the prolonged custodial detention, language barrier, and delayed meaningful access to counsel information.

Applying the governing approach to uncertainty in causation following a s. 10(b) breach, the court held that the Crown had not displaced the inference that timely compliance could have changed the respondent's conduct.

The appeal was dismissed.

The appellant appealed a second degree murder conviction arising from the shooting death of his former partner after the end of their relationship.

He argued that the trial judge lacked jurisdiction under s. 633 of the Criminal Code to stand aside prospective jurors for potential partiality, and further alleged errors in the jury charge relating to motive evidence and the treatment of potentially confirmatory evidence for a suspect witness.

The Court of Appeal held that s. 633 permits a trial judge to stand aside jurors for suspected partiality as part of the flexibility built into the jury selection process, although the timing of the stand-asides before names were drawn was erroneous but cured without prejudice.

The court also held that no limiting instruction was required for threat evidence admitted as motive evidence and that the charge on supporting evidence for the impugned witness was consistent with the common-sense approach mandated by Vetrovec.

The appeal was dismissed.

The appellant appealed conviction and sentence arising from substantially the same factual matrix as that of his wife, whose conviction had previously been found unreasonable by the same court.

The court held that the two features relied on by the trial judge to distinguish the appellant's case — the scale of monies connected to him and an alleged retreat when police entered — were not valid distinguishing factors.

The alleged retreat did not reasonably support an inference of consciousness of guilt.

The verdict was therefore unreasonable, the appeal was allowed, the convictions were quashed, and acquittals were entered.