Criminal and Quasi-Criminal Law - OCA

The appellant appealed his convictions for sexual assault and sexual interference involving a minor student.

He argued that the trial judge unfairly and illogically rejected the alibi evidence provided by his wife, which would have exonerated him.

The Court of Appeal found that there was a solid evidentiary basis for the trial judge's adverse credibility findings regarding the wife, noting her history of deceit and bizarre behaviour.

The court concluded that the trial judge did not subject the evidence to an unreasonably high standard of scrutiny and dismissed the appeal.

The appellant appealed his sentence of five years' imprisonment for robbery and related offences, arguing it violated the parity and jump principles.

The Court of Appeal dismissed these arguments, finding the appellant's circumstances and criminal record differed significantly from his co-accused, and the jump principle did not apply due to the dramatic increase in the seriousness of his crimes.

However, the court allowed the appeal in part to quash a restitution order, as the Crown conceded the stolen funds had been fully recovered.

The Crown appealed a summary conviction appeal court decision that overturned the accused's conviction for operating a motor vehicle with a blood alcohol concentration over 80 mg.

The summary conviction appeal judge had held there was insufficient evidence that the approved instrument analyzed the breath samples, rendering the statutory presumption under s. 258(1)(c) of the Criminal Code unavailable.

The Court of Appeal granted leave to appeal and restored the conviction, finding that the trial judge correctly relied on circumstantial evidence—specifically the instrument's readings—to infer that an analysis had occurred.

The summary conviction appeal judge erred in law by failing to apply the applicable statutory presumption and by exceeding the permitted standard of appellate review.

The appellant appealed his conviction for impaired driving causing bodily harm, arguing the jury's guilty verdict was inconsistent with his acquittals on two 'over 80' charges.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, holding that impaired driving and driving 'over 80' are separate offences.

The court found there was abundant evidence of impairment, including prior drinking, erratic driving, and unusual behaviour, to support the conviction despite the acquittals on the blood alcohol charges.

The applicant sought leave to appeal a summary conviction appeal court decision affirming his conviction for assault causing bodily harm.

The applicant argued the trial judge and appeal judge misapprehended video surveillance evidence regarding his claim of self-defence.

The Court of Appeal refused leave to appeal, finding the proposed grounds lacked significance to the general administration of criminal justice and the merits were not strong, as the trial judge's findings were based on the evidence as a whole.

The appellant appealed his convictions for sexual offences against a young complainant.

The Court of Appeal found that the trial judge erred in assessing the appellant's credibility by relying on his brief answers to specific questions, misapprehended material evidence regarding the complainant's prior inconsistent statements, and improperly asked the appellant to comment on the complainant's credibility.

The appeal was allowed and a new trial ordered.

The appellant appealed his convictions for firearm-related offences, arguing the trial judge erred in admitting evidence obtained during an illegal search of his apartment.

The police had executed a search warrant without reasonable and probable grounds.

The trial judge excluded drug-related evidence but admitted the firearms evidence under s. 24(2) of the Charter, applying the Grant framework.

The Court of Appeal upheld the trial judge's decision, finding no error in the conclusion that the police did not act in bad faith and that there is a heightened public interest in the prosecution of firearms offences.

The appellant was convicted of importing cocaine after arriving at Pearson International Airport with cocaine dissolved in wine bottles.

On appeal, she argued the trial judge erred in instructing the jury on the knowledge requirement and in admitting opinion evidence from a border services inspector regarding her ticket purchase.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the first ground but allowed the appeal on the second ground, finding the inspector's testimony about cash payments and short-notice bookings was inadmissible, highly prejudicial opinion evidence.

The court declined to apply the curative proviso and ordered a new trial.

The appellants were convicted of importing heroin and conspiring to import heroin after a controlled delivery of a package to a third party's apartment.

The Crown's case relied heavily on the evidence of the third party, who claimed the appellants orchestrated the importation.

The appellants appealed their convictions, arguing the trial judge's jury charge was fatally flawed.

The Court of Appeal agreed, finding the charge failed to properly instruct the jury on assessing credibility, gave an inadequate Vetrovec warning, improperly exhorted minority jurors to reconsider their views, and failed to separately review the evidence against each appellant.

The appeal was allowed and a new trial ordered.

The appellant was convicted of aggravated assault following an altercation at a restaurant where he placed the victim in a headlock, resulting in the victim falling and suffering a severe brain injury.

At trial, the judge refused to leave the defence of consent to the jury, instructing them that consent is not a defence to aggravated assault.

On appeal, the Court of Appeal held that the trial judge erred, as consent is only vitiated if the accused both intended to cause serious bodily harm and actually caused it.

The appeal was allowed and a new trial ordered.

The appellant appealed her convictions for break and enter and being unlawfully in a dwelling.

The police investigated a burglary where the suspect tracked dog feces into the apartment.

An officer attended the appellant's home, entered her enclosed verandah without a warrant, and observed and smelled dog feces on her shoes.

The Court of Appeal found that the officer's actions constituted an unreasonable search in violation of s. 8 of the Charter.

However, applying the Grant framework, the Court upheld the trial judge's decision to admit the evidence under s. 24(2), concluding that the breach was minimal and admitting the evidence would not bring the administration of justice into disrepute.

The appeal was dismissed.

The appellant was convicted of first degree murder on the basis that she aided or abetted the principal offender in fatally stabbing the deceased.

On appeal, the appellant argued that the trial judge made three errors in the jury charge: omitting the requirement of the principal's subjective foresight of death, failing to focus the jury on when the principal's intention was formed, and improperly instructing the jury on post-offence conduct.

The Court of Appeal agreed that these errors amounted to errors of law that could have had a significant impact on the verdict.

The conviction was set aside and a new trial ordered.

The accused was found unfit to stand trial and the hearing judge issued a treatment order under s. 672.58 of the Criminal Code, directing that he be taken forthwith to a designated hospital.

The hospital appealed, arguing that it had not consented to the order as required by s. 672.62 because no bed was immediately available.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, finding that the hospital's consent is a mandatory precondition that includes having the capacity to safely admit the patient.

The Court also held that the consent requirement does not violate s. 7 of the Charter, as it accords with the principles of fundamental justice by ensuring treatment orders are executed safely and balancing the needs of the accused with broader societal and medical realities.

The appellant was convicted of manslaughter following a second trial for a 1985 shooting outside an after-hours club.

He appealed his conviction, arguing the trial judge erred by failing to correct Crown counsel's closing submissions regarding his failure to retreat and his alleged lack of fear.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the trial judge's instructions on self-defence were adequate and that the jury was not misled by the Crown's submissions.

The appellant appealed a disposition of the Ontario Review Board finding that he presented a significant risk to the public and ordering his detention.

The amicus curiae argued the finding of risk was unreasonable given the appellant's history of living in the community without incident, and that a conditional discharge was the least onerous disposition.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, holding that the Board's findings regarding risk and the necessity of a detention order to facilitate treatment and protect the public were reasonable and did not constitute an error of law.

The appellant appealed his conviction for a home invasion, arguing that the trial judge failed to consider exculpatory evidence, improperly considered inadmissible statements, misapprehended footprint evidence, and failed to properly assess credibility.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no errors in the trial judge's assessment of the evidence, credibility findings, or treatment of the statements.

The appellant appealed his convictions for break and enter, assault with a weapon, and mischief.

The Court of Appeal set aside the break and enter conviction because the trial judge failed to find that an indictable offence was committed or intended.

The assault with a weapon conviction was also set aside because the trial judge failed to address important exculpatory evidence from the investigating officer.

The court set aside all convictions and ordered a new trial, noting the appellant had already served his sentence.

The appellant was convicted of attempted murder after shooting the victim outside a restaurant.

At trial, the victim's prior consistent statement identifying the appellant to police at the hospital was admitted.

The defence relied on this statement in closing arguments to suggest the victim fabricated the identification under pressure.

On appeal, the appellant argued the trial judge erred by failing to give a limiting instruction regarding the prior consistent statement.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, holding that a limiting instruction was unnecessary and potentially confusing because the defence itself had relied on the statement to support its theory, and it was clear the statement was not offered for the truth of its contents.

The appellant was convicted of weapons trafficking and transferring a prohibited firearm, but acquitted of possession for the purpose of transferring and possession for a purpose dangerous to the public peace.

He appealed, arguing the verdicts were inconsistent.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the possession charges required an additional element of purpose, which the jury may have had a reasonable doubt about, thus explaining the different verdicts.

The appellant appealed both conviction for attempted murder and an eight-year penitentiary sentence arising from a stabbing of his wife.

The Court of Appeal rejected arguments that the trial judge ignored a reasonable doubt, reversed the burden of proof, improperly treated psychiatric evidence concerning specific intent, or wrongly relied on post-offence statements.

On sentence, the court held that protection of the spouse was the dominant consideration and that the appellant’s mental illness did not necessarily reduce the otherwise fit sentence where the illness created future risk.

Fresh evidence concerning day parole and psychiatric conditions of release did not justify appellate intervention.