Criminal and Quasi-Criminal Law - OCA

The appellant, Noah King, appealed his convictions for 12 serious offences and a 7-year imprisonment sentence.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal against conviction, finding no errors in the trial judge's assessment of evidence.

However, the court found the 7-year sentence to be demonstrably unfit, noting the trial judge's unclear reasoning for the sentencing range despite properly identifying Gladue principles.

The sentence was reduced to 5 years' imprisonment, with specific reductions applied to various counts.

The appellant, Sukhchain Brar, appealed his conviction for first-degree murder of his wife, Gurpreet Brar.

He admitted the killing but sought a manslaughter conviction based on lack of mens rea or provocation.

The appeal raised constitutional challenges to s. 232(2) of the Criminal Code, which defines the partial defence of provocation, arguing it infringes s. 7 of the Charter by being arbitrary and overbroad.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the constitutional challenge, finding the purpose of the amendment was to limit provocation to serious unlawful conduct, not just to address "honour killings." The court also dismissed other non-constitutional grounds of appeal related to jury instructions on provocation, cultural/religious motive, ante-mortem statements, and after-the-fact conduct.

The appellant, Brent William Diehl, appealed his conviction for sexual assault with a weapon, arguing that the trial judge relied on myths and stereotypes in assessing credibility and applied uneven scrutiny to the evidence.

The Court of Appeal for Ontario dismissed the appeal, finding no error in the trial judge's analysis, which correctly applied the principles of credibility assessment and reasonable doubt, and did not engage in stereotypical reasoning or uneven scrutiny.

The trial judge's assessment of the complainant's evidence as credible and reliable, and the appellant's account as illogical, was upheld.

The appellant, Robert Stack, appealed his convictions for internet child luring and breach offences, and sought leave to appeal his sentence.

The primary issue on appeal was whether the police operation constituted entrapment, an argument not raised at trial.

The Court of Appeal declined to entertain the entrapment argument, finding that the Crown would be procedurally prejudiced as they were deprived of the opportunity to lead evidence on the bona fide inquiry test at trial.

The court also rejected the appellant's argument regarding wilful blindness and found no error in principle or unfitness in the sentence.

The conviction appeal was dismissed, and leave to appeal sentence was granted but the sentence appeal was also dismissed.

Sharon Atkinson, found not criminally responsible on account of mental disorder (NCRMD) for arson, appealed the Ontario Review Board's conditional discharge, seeking an absolute discharge or a new hearing.

The appellant, diagnosed with Prader-Willi syndrome, intellectual disability, and personality disorder, argued the Board erred in finding her a significant threat to public safety and in assessing the sufficiency of civil mechanisms.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, upholding the Board's finding that the appellant remained a significant threat due to her persistent behavioural issues, high risk of recidivism, and lack of a viable plan for an absolute discharge, concluding that civil mechanisms would be inadequate to manage the risk.

The appellant was convicted of sexual offences and sentenced to ten years' imprisonment.

He died while on bail pending appeal.

His widow brought a motion to continue the appeal, arguing that the ground of appeal relating to expert evidence on recovered memory was of broad public importance.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the motion, finding no special circumstances to justify expending limited judicial resources on a moot appeal, as the issue of recovered memory is not evasive of appellate review and a successful appeal would only result in a new trial, which is impossible.

The Crown appealed a nine-month conditional sentence imposed on the respondent for sexual assault, sexual interference, assault with a weapon, and simple assault against his stepchildren.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, holding that a conditional sentence is rarely appropriate for sexual touching of children by adults in a position of trust, absent exceptional circumstances.

A twelve-month custodial sentence was substituted, with nine months' credit for the conditional sentence served.

The court also ordered a new hearing on the Crown's application for a Sex Offender Information Registration Act order, as the sentencing judge gave no reasons for finding it grossly disproportionate.

The appellant appealed his conviction for failing to provide a breath sample.

He was stopped for a burnt-out headlight, smelled of alcohol, and provided thirteen unsuitable breath samples into a screening device by giving short, quick puffs despite instructions.

The trial judge found he intentionally refused to provide a proper sample.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the trial judge's reasons were adequate and properly considered the evidence.

The young person pleaded guilty to two counts of dangerous driving causing death and received a disposition including a ten-year driving prohibition.

On appeal, the young person argued the sentencing judge erred by relying on general deterrence and sought a reduction of the prohibition to five years.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the disposition fit and supported by the principles of proportionality, meaningful consequences, and protection of the public under section 38 of the Youth Criminal Justice Act.

The appellant appealed his sentence, arguing the sentencing judge failed to consider mitigating factors.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the sentencing judge's statement that there were no mitigating factors meant he had considered and rejected them.

Given the young age of the victim, the fact of penetration, and the threat of violence, the sentence was deemed fit, even having regard to the totality principle.

The conviction appeal was abandoned.

The Crown appealed an acquittal on a charge of criminal harassment.

At trial, the judge excluded evidence of six prior incidents of discreditable conduct by the respondent toward the complainant, finding the prejudicial effect outweighed the probative value under the Handy framework.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal and ordered a new trial, holding that the trial judge misapprehended the probative value of the evidence.

The prior conduct was highly relevant to establishing the context of the harassment, the reasonableness of the complainant's fear, and the respondent's knowledge or recklessness regarding that fear.

The appellant appealed his conviction for first degree murder, raising four principal grounds: unreasonableness of the verdict and inadequate jury instructions on circumstantial evidence, improper admission of his statements, inadmissibility of a jailhouse informant's testimony and inadequate Vetrovec warning, and inadequate instructions on the planning and deliberation element.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the trial judge properly instructed the jury, correctly admitted the statements, appropriately handled the informant's testimony with a sufficient Vetrovec warning, and fairly charged the jury on planning and deliberation.

The appellant appealed his conviction, arguing that the trial judge's reasons were insufficient.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that in the context of a short trial with only three witnesses, the trial judge adequately explained his credibility findings and the basis for finding the appellant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.

The appellant was convicted of criminal harassment for sending two unwanted letters to the complainant over an 18-month period.

He appealed, arguing that two communications do not meet the threshold of 'repeatedly' communicating under s. 264(2)(b) of the Criminal Code.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, holding that 'repeatedly' means more than once, and that two communications can suffice depending on the context and history between the parties.

The court also denied leave to appeal the sentence of 18 months' imprisonment, finding it manifestly fit given the appellant's extensive criminal record.

The Crown appealed the disposition of a conditional discharge imposed on a young person.

The Court of Appeal noted it did not agree with all of the trial judge's reasons or disposition, but refused leave to appeal the sentence because a year had passed and the young person had complied with all terms of the conditional discharge.

The appellant sought leave to appeal his conviction for dangerous driving, arguing the verdict was unreasonable.

The Court of Appeal found no error of law, holding that the trial judge was entitled to accept the complainant's evidence regarding how the appellant's vehicle contacted him.

Leave to appeal was refused.

The appellant appealed his assault conviction.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, holding that the trial judge's findings—that the appellant undertook to protect the complainant and that her dependence on him for necessities made her particularly vulnerable to his influence—were supported by the evidence and warranted a conviction.

The respondent was convicted by a jury of fraudulently obtaining GST refunds.

Prior to sentencing, the trial judge declared a mistrial, finding that the Crown's failure to preserve the respondent's employment records amounted to an abuse of process and a breach of section 7 of the Charter.

The Crown appealed.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, holding that the trial judge lacked jurisdiction to declare a mistrial after the jury's verdict had been recorded.

The matter was remitted to the trial judge for sentencing.

The appellant appealed the dispositions of the Ontario Review Board.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no basis to interfere as the Board did not misapprehend the evidence and its decision to override the joint submission was reasonable.

The appellant, a former lawyer, was convicted of six counts of fraud and one count of theft related to the misappropriation of client funds in a land development scheme.

He appealed his convictions and his sentence of 20 months' imprisonment and $164,000 in restitution.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no error in the trial judge's dismissal of the appellant's Charter motion for unreasonable delay, and concluding that the verdicts were reasonable and the jury instructions were adequate.

The court also upheld the sentence, finding no error in the trial judge's refusal to impose a conditional sentence.