Criminal and Quasi-Criminal Law - OCA

Joseph Haddad appealed a disposition of the Ontario Review Board, which ordered his detention at a forensic mental health centre subject to conditions, specifically challenging a condition prohibiting him from attending within 250 metres of his mother's home.

Haddad was found not criminally responsible for an index offence involving discharging a shotgun.

The Board's decision to impose the condition was based on concerns for public safety, psychological harm to neighbours, and the appellant's transition to community living.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, deferring to the Board's reasonable decision, noting that the condition served to address victim safety and was not a significant restraint on the appellant's liberty, especially as his physician did not recommend visits to the family home.

The appellant appealed her convictions for two counts of robbery with a firearm.

The appeal concerned the validity of "tower dump" production orders for cell phone records obtained from two cell phone towers near the site of a robbery.

The appellant challenged the production orders under section 8 of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, arguing that an Information to Obtain contained material inaccuracies regarding witness statements about cell phone use by one of the perpetrators.

The motion judge denied the appellant's request for leave to cross-examine the affiant and dismissed the Charter application, finding that even after excising the inaccuracies, sufficient grounds remained to support the production orders.

The Court of Appeal upheld the motion judge's decision, finding no error in the application of the test for leave to cross-examine and no misapprehension of the evidence regarding the inference of cell phone use during the robbery.

The applicant sought leave to appeal her convictions and sentences for driving without insurance and surrendering false evidence of insurance.

She had been convicted at an ex parte trial and fined $12,500, which she argued she could not afford.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the motion for leave to appeal the convictions, finding no viable due diligence defence.

However, the Court granted leave to appeal the sentence, noting the appeal judge failed to inquire into the applicant's financial circumstances or consider relief from the mandatory minimum fines under s. 59(2) of the Provincial Offences Act.

The Crown appealed the refusal of a trial judge to make a DNA data bank order pursuant to s. 487.05(1) of the Criminal Code against a young person.

On consent, the Court of Appeal allowed the appeal and issued the order sought by the Crown.

The appellant, a chiropractor, appealed his sexual assault conviction arising from an incident where he massaged a patient's back with a tool while surreptitiously masturbating.

The appellant argued the contact was purely therapeutic and non-sexual.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, holding that a reasonable observer would find the contact sexual in nature and that the complainant's sexual integrity had been violated without her consent.

The Crown appealed the accused's acquittal on charges of sexual assault and sexual interference, arguing the trial judge erred in excluding the accused's police statement.

The trial judge found the statement involuntary because the police offered an improper inducement, suggesting the complainant would only get psychiatric help if the accused confessed.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, holding that the trial judge applied the correct contextual test for voluntariness under Oickle and Spencer, and his factual findings were entitled to deference.

The appellant was convicted of manslaughter following a fatal barroom altercation.

He appealed on the basis that the trial judge erred in her jury instructions regarding self-defence under sections 34(2) and 35 of the Criminal Code.

The Court of Appeal found that the trial judge erred by instructing the jury to assess the lawfulness of the victim's assault from the accused's perspective rather than the victim's, and by failing to leave section 35 with the jury.

The appeal was allowed, the conviction set aside, and a new trial ordered.

The appellant was convicted of accessing and possessing child pornography after police obtained his subscriber information from his Internet Service Provider (ISP) without a warrant, using it to obtain a search warrant for his residence.

On appeal, the appellant argued that the police violated his section 8 Charter rights by obtaining his subscriber information without prior judicial authorization.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, holding that while the appellant had a subjective expectation of privacy in his internet activity, this expectation was not objectively reasonable given the ISP's terms of service and its legitimate interest in preventing the criminal misuse of its services.

The court also found that the information to obtain the search warrant contained sufficient grounds.

The appellant appealed his conviction for drug trafficking and the dismissal of his entrapment claim, arguing the trial judge's findings were unreasonable and the reasons inadequate.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the trial judge's rejection of the appellant's credibility and the evidence of an agreement to sell heroin to an undercover officer supported the conviction.

The court also held that the entrapment argument failed, as the police conduct was investigatory and followed by conduct amounting to trafficking.

The respondents were acquitted of operating a commercial motor vehicle in a dangerous or unsafe condition under s. 84(1) of the Highway Traffic Act.

The Crown appealed, arguing that a regulation defining 'critical defects' for the purpose of vehicle impoundment under s. 82.1 should also apply to the offence provision in s. 84(1.1).

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, holding that the regulation explicitly applies only to s. 82.1 and that the legislature intended a higher threshold of danger for a conviction under s. 84(1.1) than for an impoundment under s. 82.1.

The applicant, facing extradition to the United States on terrorism-related charges, sought judicial interim release pending the release of the court's reserved judgment on his appeal from a committal order.

The applicant had been on bail without incident for over two years.

The respondent opposed release, citing the public interest and the proximity of a potential surrender.

The court granted the application, finding no enhanced risk of flight and concluding that the public interest did not warrant detention given the applicant's compliance with previous release terms.

The appellant appealed his committal for extradition to the United States on charges of conspiracy to traffic marijuana and sought judicial review of the Minister of Justice's surrender order.

He sought to introduce fresh evidence of inconsistent witness statements, argued the Minister failed to consider prosecuting him in Canada under the Extradition Treaty, and challenged the Minister's refusal to seek return assurances or delay surrender pending Ontario civil forfeiture proceedings.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal and judicial review, finding the fresh evidence would not have altered the committal and the Minister's discretionary decisions were reasonable.

The appellant appealed his convictions and sentence for sexual assault and sexual interference involving a boy left in his care.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the conviction appeal regarding credibility assessments but applied the Kienapple principle to enter a conditional stay on the sexual assault conviction, as both charges shared the same factual and legal nexus.

The sentence appeal was dismissed, with the court finding that the fresh evidence of the appellant's spouse's health issues did not justify a conditional sentence for such a serious breach of trust.

The appellant appealed his convictions for impaired driving and driving with a blood alcohol level over the legal limit.

He argued that the trial judge demonstrated a reasonable apprehension of bias, improperly rejected family members' evidence, improperly took judicial notice of the effects of alcohol, and failed to give adequate reasons for accepting the police officer's evidence.

The Court of Appeal agreed with the Summary Conviction Appeal Court judge that while some of the trial judge's conduct was inappropriate, it did not compromise the appearance of fairness.

The Court of Appeal found no errors in the lower court's assessment and dismissed the appeal.

The appellant appealed a disposition of the Ontario Review Board that found he continued to suffer from a serious mental disorder and remained dangerous, ordering his detention in a minimum secure unit.

The appellant argued the Board erred in finding him dangerous and sought an absolute discharge.

The Court of Appeal held that the Board's disposition was reasonable, supported by medical evidence of the appellant's lack of insight, illicit drug use, and risk of decompensation.

The appeal was dismissed.

The appellant municipality appealed the acquittal of the respondents on a charge of breaching a zoning by-law by storing used tires on their agricultural property.

The lower courts acquitted the respondents on the basis that the tires were intended to be used as building material for fences.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, finding that the accumulation of thousands of tires over a three-month period constituted 'storage' in contravention of the by-law, regardless of the eventual intended use.

The acquittals were set aside, convictions entered, and nominal fines imposed.

The appellant appealed a custodial sentence.

The Court of Appeal found that the trial judge erred in principle by mechanically applying a two-stage process, which led to a failure to consider the appellant's extraordinary cooperation with police and significant rehabilitation.

The appeal was allowed, and the custodial sentence was varied to a 20-month conditional sentence, with the three-year probation term remaining.

The appellant appealed his convictions for attempted murder and assault with a weapon, arguing the trial judge erred in handling jury selection and failing to hold a fitness hearing.

The Court of Appeal agreed, finding the trial judge improperly denied the appellant's right to challenge jurors for cause regarding pre-trial publicity by instead asking a general question to the panel.

Furthermore, the trial judge erred by not directing a fitness hearing when the self-represented appellant exhibited clear signs of mental illness and an inability to understand the proceedings.

The convictions were set aside, and the appellant was declared unfit to stand trial.

The applicant sought leave to appeal sentence.

Having regard to the Supreme Court of Canada's decision in Wust, the court granted leave, allowed the sentence appeal, and reduced the sentence on count no. 2 to 3 years and on count no. 6 to 3 years consecutive.

All other sentences were left unchanged.

The appellant sought leave to appeal sentence.

The court held that the 15-year starting point used by the trial judge may have been at the upper end of the range, but it was not outside the range and no error in principle was established.

Leave to appeal was granted, but the appeal was dismissed.

The sentence was nonetheless varied to reduce a lifetime firearms prohibition to a 10-year prohibition because no notice had been given.