Civil Litigation - Plaintiff - OCA

The plaintiff appealed a partial summary judgment dismissing her action against the Town of Hanover.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, finding the motion judge erred by making credibility determinations on conflicting evidence that should have been left for trial, as the issues were inextricably intertwined with those remaining for trial against other defendants, leading to a risk of inconsistent findings and substantive injustice.

The fresh evidence motion was dismissed, and costs were reserved to the trial judge.

The appellants, former truck drivers for the corporate respondent, initiated a public campaign alleging unpaid wages while their Canada Labour Code complaints were ongoing.

The respondents sued for defamation, trespass, and other torts.

The appellants moved to dismiss the action under the anti-SLAPP provisions of the Courts of Justice Act.

The motion judge dismissed the motion.

On appeal, the Court of Appeal found the motion judge erred in his s. 137.1(3) analysis by focusing on motive rather than the expression's subject matter, but ultimately upheld the dismissal under s. 137.1(4), finding the respondents' claims had substantial merit, the appellants had no valid defence, and the harm to the respondents outweighed the public interest in protecting the expression.

The appellants hired the respondents for a backyard renovation project with milestone payments.

After disputes and delays, the appellants terminated the contract and sued for breach of contract and unjust enrichment.

The trial judge dismissed the appellants' claims, finding no fundamental breach, but awarded damages to the respondents for the balance of the contract despite the lack of a valid counterclaim.

On appeal, the Court of Appeal upheld the dismissal of the unjust enrichment claim, noting the contract provided a juristic reason for the payments made.

However, the Court allowed the appeal in part to set aside the damages awarded to the respondents, as the proper party had not filed a counterclaim.

This is a costs endorsement following the dismissal of an appeal and cross-appeal in a class proceeding.

The court outlines the disposition of costs, including payments between the Law Foundation of Ontario, the Attorney General of Canada, and the Ontario Health Insurance Plan.

The original appeal by Kathryn Anne Taylor was dismissed, leading to this costs decision.

The moving party sought to lift a stay of proceedings previously granted by the Court of Appeal on the basis of forum non conveniens.

Following the stay, the moving party's attempt to pursue a class action in the United States for pre-explosion misrepresentations was dismissed on procedural grounds, and the responding party conceded the claim was governed by Ontario law.

The Court of Appeal found these new developments constituted facts arising after the order that justified lifting the stay to avoid an injustice, allowing the moving party to proceed with the claim in Ontario.

The plaintiff brought a motion to dismiss the Registrar's orders dismissing his previous motions for delay.

The defendant brought a cross-motion to refer the proceeding to a panel of the Court of Appeal for a determination under Rule 2.1 of the Rules of Civil Procedure that the proceeding is frivolous, vexatious, and an abuse of process, and to stay the plaintiff's motions pending that determination.

The court granted the cross-motion, finding that the plaintiff's repeated motions appeared to be frivolous, vexatious, and an abuse of process, and stayed the plaintiff's motions pending the panel's determination.

The appellant electrical contractor appealed trial judgments finding it breached sub-contracts for integrated security systems at two correctional facilities by refusing to perform disputed wiring and termination work.

The Court of Appeal upheld the trial judge's findings on the scope of work and mitigation of damages, dismissing the corporate appellant's appeals.

However, the Court allowed the individual appellant's appeal, setting aside his personal liability for breach of trust under s. 13(1) of the Construction Lien Act, finding insufficient evidence that he assented to or acquiesced in conduct amounting to a breach of trust.

The appellant appealed a trial judgment dismissing his claim that he was hired by the respondent municipality for a fixed three-year term as CAO.

The Court of Appeal upheld the trial judge's finding that the appellant was hired only as an 'Acting CAO/Clerk' on a temporary basis, noting that the documentary evidence, the municipality's past practice, and the appellant's own inconsistent positions supported this conclusion.

The appeal was dismissed with costs awarded to the respondent municipality.

The defendants brought a motion to quash the plaintiff's notice of appeal to the Court of Appeal on jurisdictional grounds.

The trial judge had dismissed the plaintiff's defamation claim but indicated that if the claim had been allowed, damages would have been assessed at $25,000.

The Court of Appeal held that under s. 19(1.2)(d) of the Courts of Justice Act, the Divisional Court has jurisdiction because the trial judge indicated the award would have been not more than $50,000.

The motion to quash was allowed and the appeal was transferred to the Divisional Court.

The appellants appealed a summary judgment permitting the respondent to enforce a Delaware judgment, including an order for a constructive trust, against the corporate appellants in Ontario.

The appellants argued the motion judge failed to consider the impact of the constructive trust on third parties, thereby misapplying the Pro Swing factors.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the motion judge was alive to potential third-party impacts and that any unfairness was entirely speculative on the record.

The appellant law firm appealed a decision regarding the interpretation of s. 39(6) of the General Regulation under the Health Insurance Act, which dictates how the Ontario Health Insurance Plan shares the legal costs of an insured person who recovers damages including a subrogated claim for the Plan.

The Court of Appeal held that 'the total recovery of the insured person' includes the amount recovered on behalf of the Plan.

Furthermore, the Court clarified that when an insured person recovers costs, those costs must first be deducted from the total legal costs payable to their lawyer before calculating the Plan's proportionate share of the net costs.

The appellant and respondent entered into a business arrangement to acquire a property, incorporating a company to hold it.

The respondent provided financing, secured by promissory notes and share pledging agreements.

When a third partner defaulted, the appellant acquired his shares but failed to pay the outstanding debt associated with them.

The trial judge found the respondent was entitled to forfeit the unpaid shares, resulting in a 55% ownership stake for the respondent.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, holding that the trial judge reasonably interpreted the interconnected agreements and correctly found that the statement of claim served as sufficient written notice of forfeiture.

The appellants appealed a decision dismissing their application regarding alleged voting irregularities in a Hindu temple's By-Law vote.

The Court of Appeal upheld the application judge's finding that the appellants failed to establish an irregularity, meaning the burden of proof never shifted to the respondents.

However, the Court allowed the appeal on costs, finding the application judge misapprehended evidence when awarding substantial indemnity costs.

The costs award was reduced to partial indemnity.

The appellant appealed a trial judge's refusal to award augmented costs under s. 258.6(2) of the Insurance Act following a successful motor vehicle accident claim.

The trial judge had concluded the provision did not apply because the respondent municipality was not an insurer.

The Court of Appeal admitted fresh evidence demonstrating that the municipality's legal department was acting on behalf of its insurer, who had received notice of the claim and failed to respond to repeated requests to mediate.

The appeal was allowed, and the trial costs award was increased by $20,000 to reflect the insurer's failure to mediate.

The appellants appealed an order striking their plea of equitable fraud.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, finding that it was not 'plain and obvious' that a claim in equitable fraud could not succeed, citing relevant jurisprudence.

The order striking the plea was set aside, the defendants' motion was dismissed, and the appellants were permitted to amend their statement of claim.

The appellant sought to alter the costs award made by the trial judge.

The Court of Appeal reviewed the parties' submissions and found no basis to alter the trial judge's costs award.

The appellant appealed a trial judgment dismissing his claims for breach of contract regarding the renovation of 118 bathrooms and for slander.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no palpable or overriding error in the trial judge's conclusions that no contract existed and that the appellant failed to prove slander.

The parties brought a joint motion to implement a settlement of an appeal.

They sought to amend the lower court's judgment, which had declared a mortgage fraudulent and void, so that the mortgage would only be void as between the appellant and respondent.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the motion, finding that the proposed amendment could compromise the rights of other secured creditors, such as Legal Aid, who were not parties to the settlement.

The appellants appealed a judgment confirming a Master's report on an accounting of music royalties for the song 'When I Am With You'.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the corporate publisher's appeal regarding the calculation of co-publishing revenues and prejudgment interest.

However, the Court allowed the appeal of the corporation's directing mind, finding no basis to pierce the corporate veil and hold him personally liable.

The Court also allowed the respondents' cross-appeal, finding that performing rights royalties should be included in the calculation of co-publishing revenues based on the plain meaning of the agreement and the parties' prior conduct.

The appellant parents appealed the dismissal of their summary judgment motion seeking a declaration that their tenant's liability insurer owed them a defence and indemnity in an action arising from an assault committed by their sons.

Although the sons' intentional assault claims fell within the bodily injury exclusion, the court held the parents were separately insured under the policy and the negligence claim against them for failing to supervise and properly raise their children was a distinct, non-excluded claim.

The court distinguished the Supreme Court of Canada's duty-to-defend analysis in sexual assault pleadings because the negligence allegations here constituted a separate tort against different parties rather than a relabelling of intentional wrongdoing.

The insurer was therefore required to defend the parents and indemnify them for any covered judgment, costs and interest.