Civil Litigation - Plaintiff - OCA

This is an appeal from the Divisional Court, which upheld a certification judge's decision that a class action claim for breach of fiduciary duty against investment advisors did not disclose a cause of action.

The Court of Appeal for Ontario examined whether the claim adequately pleaded an ad hoc fiduciary relationship, considering factors beyond just professional rules.

The Court found that the lower courts erred by narrowly interpreting the pleading, and that the claim, taken as a whole, sufficiently pleaded vulnerability, trust, reliance, and discretion, in addition to breaches of professional standards.

The appeal was allowed, declaring that the claim did disclose a cause of action for breach of a class-wide fiduciary duty, and the matter was remitted for redetermination of other certification criteria.

The plaintiff brought a motion under Rule 2.1.01 of the Rules of Civil Procedure to quash the defendant's appeal from a timetabling endorsement in a mortgage enforcement proceeding.

A single judge of the Court of Appeal had previously ruled that the court lacked jurisdiction because the endorsement was an interlocutory order.

The Court of Appeal agreed, finding the appeal frivolous and completely devoid of merit, as the endorsement did not determine any substantive rights.

The appeal was quashed for want of jurisdiction.

The appellants appealed a summary judgment finding them liable for breaching a share purchase agreement, arguing the respondents misrepresented the condition of the equipment.

The respondents cross-appealed the dismissal of their claim for contribution and indemnity against a third-party corporation.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no error in the motion judge's conclusion that the agreement contained no misrepresentation regarding the equipment.

The cross-appeal was allowed and remitted to the motion judge because no reasons were provided for dismissing the third-party claim.

The appellant, Mr. Lotey, appealed an order striking out his statement of defence for failing to comply with documentary production obligations over a three-year period.

His law firm also sought leave to appeal an order requiring it to personally pay the costs of the motion.

The Court of Appeal dismissed Mr. Lotey's appeal, finding the motion judge properly exercised his discretion under Rule 30.08(2) given the deliberate and continuous failure to produce relevant documents.

The Court also denied the law firm leave to appeal the costs order, finding the firm was complicit in the flagrant disregard of the Rules and court orders.

The appellants appealed a motion judge's damages assessment following a failed real estate transaction.

The motion judge awarded DHMK Properties Inc. damages based on the difference between the agreed purchase price ($5.3 million) and the property's market value in August 2014 ($4.27 million), without accounting for the vendor's warranty obligations regarding net income or providing reasons for the valuation date selection.

The Court of Appeal found two critical errors: the failure to consider the effect of the vendor's warranty on damages calculation, and the unexplained selection of August 2014 as the valuation date rather than the scheduled closing date.

The court set aside the judgment and remitted the damages assessment to the Superior Court.

The parties agreed that the respondent should have its costs fixed at $66,191.27, inclusive of disbursements and relevant taxes.

The Court of Appeal ordered costs in that amount.

The appellants entered into an agreement with the respondent to build and operate a car dealership.

The respondent terminated the agreement after the appellants failed to meet construction deadlines.

The trial judge found the termination was unreasonable but held that an exclusion clause protected the respondent from liability for damages.

On appeal, the appellants argued the exclusion clause should not apply to an unreasonable termination.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the trial judge's interpretation of the broadly worded exclusion clause was reasonable and not tainted by palpable and overriding error.

The appellant appealed a trial decision that awarded him $57,566 on a $135,000 loan, arguing he was entitled to the full amount and that the trial judge erred in dismissing fraudulent conveyance claims against the respondents.

The appellant also alleged the trial was conducted unfairly.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the trial judge treated the self-represented appellant fairly, made factual findings regarding loan repayments that were amply supported by the evidence, and correctly dismissed the fraudulent conveyance claims due to a lack of evidence regarding insolvency.

The self-represented appellant appealed a judgment of the Superior Court of Justice.

The Court of Appeal found no error in the lower court's reasons and dismissed the appeal, awarding costs to the respondents in the fixed amount of $2,500.

The moving party, a self-represented litigant, sought a third extension of time to perfect his appeal from a judgment upholding a contingency fee agreement.

The Court of Appeal applied the five-factor test for extending time to appeal.

Finding that the moving party had not satisfactorily explained the lengthy delay, had not shown merit in the proposed appeal, and that the responding parties were prejudiced by the lack of finality, the court dismissed the motion.

Following an appeal where the appellants achieved divided success, the Court of Appeal determined the appropriate costs awards for both the appeal and the trial.

The appellants were awarded reduced partial indemnity costs for the appeal to reflect their divided success.

For the trial costs, the respondents were awarded their agreed costs against the unsuccessful appellant, and a Sanderson order was made allowing the respondents to recover the trial costs they owed to the successful co-appellants from the unsuccessful appellant.

The appellant was substantially successful on an appeal regarding the court-ordered sale of properties.

The Court of Appeal awarded the appellant costs of the appeal on a partial indemnity basis, fixed at $15,000 inclusive of disbursements and taxes.

The court directed that the costs be paid by the respondent personally rather than by the Estate, and declined to make any costs order regarding the Receiver or a prior consent motion.

The appellants defaulted on a commercial mortgage, prompting the respondent mortgagee to issue a Notice of Sale and accept an offer to purchase the property.

The appellants subsequently obtained a higher offer and sought to enjoin the sale, arguing the Notice of Sale was defective and the accepted offer was improvident.

The application judge declined to enjoin the sale, and the sale closed before the appeal was heard.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the Notice of Sale was reasonable and the mortgagee could not be restrained from exercising its power of sale after entering into a binding agreement in good faith.

The appellants appealed an order excising references to a Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) from their statement of claim.

The parties had entered into the MOU for a wind energy project, which the respondent later purported to terminate while under CCAA protection.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, finding that the motion judge erred in determining the validity of the termination notice on a Rule 21 motion and in concluding that the appellants were precluded from pleading a good faith obligation arising from the MOU.

The appellants, police officers and a police services board, were wholly successful on appeal in an action brought by the respondent regarding her treatment in police custody.

The appellants sought costs of $150,000 for all levels of court.

The Court of Appeal declined to award costs to the successful appellants, finding that the case raised complex issues of general public importance regarding police duties to detainees.

Given the public interest nature of the litigation and the respondent's severe financial hardship, the court ordered that the parties bear their own costs.

The plaintiff sued the defendant law firm for negligence after the expiry of the statutory limitation period, pursuant to a tolling agreement.

The defendant then commenced third party proceedings for contribution and indemnity against the third party accountants.

The third parties successfully moved for summary judgment dismissing the claim against them because the statutory limitation period between the plaintiff and the third parties had expired.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the defendant's appeal, holding that section 8 of the Negligence Act applies to all contribution claims and requires the main action to be commenced within the applicable statutory limitation period, which was not done here.

The appellants appealed a summary judgment ordering them to pay the respondent for the redemption of preference shares.

The appellants argued that an oral collateral agreement delayed the payment obligations until the completion of a separate share sale, and that the respondent's interference in that sale justified equitable set-off.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, holding that the alleged collateral agreement contradicted the clear terms of the written redemption agreement and guarantee, which included an entire agreement clause.

The court also found that equitable set-off was expressly precluded by the guarantee and that the motions judge did not exceed her jurisdiction in granting summary judgment.

The appellant, a jewellery consultant, entered into consignment agreements with a retailer, requiring proceeds to be held in a separate trust account.

The retailer opened an account with the respondent bank, but the bank incorporated it into a consolidated off-set balance system, using the funds to offset the retailer's debts.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, finding the funds were impressed with a trust and the bank had constructive knowledge of the trust because it failed to follow its own account agreement requiring two signatures before transferring funds.

The appellant inventory financier appealed a conversion judgment arising from the seizure and sale of a boat delivered to a dealer for resale.

Assuming without deciding that the dealer held the boat on consignment and lacked title, the court held that the financier could rely on s. 2(1) of the Factors Act because it took its chattel mortgage in good faith and without notice of any lack of authority.

The court rejected the trial judge's conclusion that good faith under s. 2(1) includes a due diligence requirement, holding instead that good faith means honesty, even if conduct is negligent.

The action was dismissed and the appellant received trial and appeal costs.

The appellant appealed an order dismissing the wrongful dismissal portion of her action at the opening of trial on the basis that the claim was frivolous, vexatious, and an abuse of process.

The Court of Appeal held that the motion record and pleadings did not properly set up reliance on the prior human rights proceeding, and in any event the prior decision did not determine the same question for issue estoppel purposes.

The prior tribunal may have addressed disability-related dismissal, but it did not adjudicate the pleaded allegation that the employer acted precipitously and in bad faith in terminating employment.

The appeal was allowed, the dismissal order was set aside, and no costs were ordered.