Mohammed M. Rahman

The applicant sought a declaration that the respondents breached an agreement of purchase and sale (APS) by failing to close a commercial property transaction and an order forfeiting the $100,000 deposit.

The respondents argued there was an agreement to extend the closing date and that the APS did not explicitly provide for deposit forfeiture.

The court found no valid extension agreement and affirmed the principle that a deposit is forfeited upon buyer default, even without explicit contractual terms.

Relief from forfeiture was denied as the deposit was not disproportionate to the damages suffered ($35,000 loss on resale) and retention was not unconscionable.

Tevin Bailey, charged with human trafficking and related offenses, applied for a stay of proceedings due to unreasonable delay under the Jordan framework.

The total delay was nearly 41 months.

The court analyzed periods of defence delay, attributing 7 months and 13 days, and subtracted 7.5 months for pandemic-related administrative delays as exceptional circumstances.

The resulting net delay of 26 months fell below the 30-month presumptive ceiling, leading to the dismissal of the application.

The applicants sought specific performance of an agreement of purchase and sale for a 14-acre property intended for their trucking business.

The respondent, Kulwant Singh, refused to close, claiming the applicants' $100,000 deposit was delivered late, voiding the contract.

The court found the contract binding, as the respondents waived strict compliance by delaying the provision of their lawyer's name and by accepting the deposit.

The court also found Mr. Singh's conduct unreasonable and in bad faith.

Given the property's uniqueness, the inadequacy of damages, and the respondent's behaviour, the court granted specific performance, ordering the respondents to transfer the property.

The plaintiffs brought a motion under Rule 7.08 of the Rules of Civil Procedure for approval of a minor's settlement following a fatal motor vehicle accident.

The court was also asked to approve the contingency fee agreement.

The court found that the motion record lacked sufficient information, such as dockets or a description of the work performed, to assess the reasonableness of the legal fees.

The motion was adjourned to allow counsel to address these evidentiary deficiencies.

The plaintiff lawyer sued the defendant client for unpaid legal fees and included privileged communications in the statement of claim.

The defendant moved to strike the privileged paragraphs, arguing he had not waived solicitor-client privilege.

The court held that a client's refusal to pay legal fees does not constitute an implied waiver of privilege.

However, the court declined to strike the pleadings, finding that the plaintiff was entitled to include privileged information necessary to advance the claim.

To protect the privilege, the court ordered the file sealed.

Matthew Salciccia was found asleep at the wheel of his truck with the engine running.

He was arrested for impaired driving and having excess blood alcohol.

He challenged the admissibility of evidence, alleging breaches of his Charter rights under s. 8 (unreasonable search/seizure) and s. 10(b) (right to counsel).

The court found that the police had reasonable grounds for arrest and that there was no breach of his s. 10(b) rights, as he had waived his right to counsel at the roadside, and the police were not obligated to facilitate counsel of choice after he declined.

The court emphasized the need for specificity in Charter applications.

Salciccia was found guilty of both charges.

The applicant, Kim Tran, sought a stay of proceedings for unreasonable delay under section 11(b) of the Charter, arguing that the total delay of 25 months and 20 days exceeded the presumptive ceiling.

The Crown attributed the delay to a discrete event (unavailability of a police witness due to health reasons) but failed to demonstrate that it took reasonable steps to mitigate the resulting delay.

The court found that the Crown did not meet its constitutional obligation to bring the accused to trial within a reasonable time, granted the application, and stayed the charge.

The defendant, Lenny Alexandre, was charged with operating a conveyance while prohibited.

The defence challenged the Crown's proof of identity, the connection of the license suspension to a criminal conviction, and argued that the Crown must prove the defendant was not registered in an ignition interlock program.

The court found that identity was proven by circumstantial evidence, the license suspension was sufficiently connected to a prior criminal conviction for driving with excess blood alcohol, and that registration in an interlock program is a defence, not an element of the offence, placing an evidentiary burden on the defendant.

The defendant was found guilty.

The applicant, charged with assault and mischief, applied for a stay of proceedings arguing his right to a timely trial under s. 11(b) of the Charter was violated.

The total delay from charge to anticipated end of trial was over 19 months, exceeding the 18-month presumptive ceiling.

The court analyzed four periods of alleged defence delay and found that three periods, totaling 103 days, were attributable to the defence due to inaction in scheduling the trial.

Subtracting this defence delay brought the net delay to just under 15.5 months, which fell below the presumptive ceiling.

The application for a stay of proceedings was dismissed.

The applicant, charged with having excess blood alcohol, applied for a stay of proceedings due to unreasonable delay under the *R. v. Jordan* framework.

The court determined the total delay by including a 28-day pre-charge period, resulting in 19 months and 4 days.

After subtracting 62 days of defence delay, the net delay was 17 months and 2 days, which is below the 18-month presumptive ceiling.

However, the court found that the applicant demonstrated meaningful steps to expedite the proceedings and that the case took "markedly longer" than it should have for a straightforward two-day trial, even considering the court's busy schedule and the pandemic's impact.

The application for a stay was granted.

The accused, charged with sexual assault, brought a pre-trial application requesting that the complainant and her mother be required to remove their masks while testifying.

The defence argued that seeing the witnesses' full faces was essential for assessing credibility and making full answer and defence.

The court dismissed the application, holding that the limited value of facial demeanour in assessing credibility was outweighed by the public health risks of transmitting COVID-19 in a courtroom.

The court noted that other aspects of demeanour, such as body language and tone, remain visible, and that the substance of a witness's evidence is a better guide to reliability.

The defendant was charged with failing or refusing to provide a breath sample using an Approved Screening Device (ASD).

He initially refused due to distrust of the device, believing he would be taken to the police station for a more reliable Intoxilyzer test.

Upon learning he would be released from the scene and not taken to the station, he offered to provide a sample into the ASD.

The court found that his subsequent offer, made approximately 10 minutes after the initial refusal and while the device was still available, effectively cancelled his prior refusal as it was part of the same transaction.

The defendant was found not guilty.

The defendant, David Seemangal, was charged with having excess blood alcohol.

He applied to exclude breath samples and Intoxilyzer results, alleging breaches of his Charter rights under ss. 8 (unreasonable search/seizure), 9 (arbitrary detention), and 10(b) (right to counsel).

The court found that the police conducted an unlawful pat-down search and made an ASD demand without reasonable suspicion, thereby breaching ss. 8 and 9.

The court also found a s. 10(b) breach when the defendant invoked his right to counsel at the roadside but was not afforded an opportunity to consult.

However, the court found no s. 10(b) breach at the police station.

Applying the R. v. Grant test, the court determined that the breaches, while present, were not serious enough to warrant exclusion of the evidence, given the collective police knowledge and the minor impact on the defendant's interests compared to the significant impact on the administration of justice if the reliable evidence were excluded.

Consequently, the application to exclude evidence was dismissed, and Mr. Seemangal was found guilty.

The applicants, charged with robbery, kidnapping, and fraud, applied for a stay of proceedings under s. 11(b) of the Charter due to unreasonable delay.

The total delay was 31 months, well above the 18-month presumptive ceiling.

The Crown argued that the defence was responsible for significant portions of the delay due to inaction in pursuing outstanding disclosure.

The court rejected this argument, finding that the Crown failed to fulfill its constitutional disclosure obligations in a timely manner and offered no explanation for the delay.

The applications were granted and all charges were stayed.

The accused were charged with robbery, pointing and discharging a firearm, and in one case, breaching bail conditions, arising from an incident at a bar in Mississauga on October 9, 2019.

The Crown's case relied heavily on the identification evidence of the victim, who gave inconsistent statements to police and at trial.

The court admitted the victim's prior police statement under the principled exception to the hearsay rule based on procedural reliability.

However, the court found that the victim's evidence contained significant inconsistencies regarding the timing and circumstances of the alleged shooting, and that video evidence did not support her account.

The court concluded that the victim's evidence could not safely carry the whole weight of the Crown's case and acquitted both accused on all charges.

The applicant was charged with assault, assault with a weapon, uttering threats, and mischief on September 1, 2018.

His trial was scheduled for September 25-26, 2019, but was adjourned when he was charged with new offences on the first day of trial.

Those charges were withdrawn approximately six weeks later.

The rescheduled trial was set for December 23-24, 2020, resulting in total delay of 27 months and 23 days.

The applicant applied for a stay of proceedings on the grounds of unreasonable delay in violation of s. 11(b) of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms.

The court found that the net delay exceeded the 18-month presumptive ceiling established in R. v. Jordan and that the Crown failed to justify the excess delay by taking reasonable steps to mitigate it.

The defendant was charged with sexual exploitation under section 153 of the Criminal Code.

The Crown alleged that the defendant invited the complainant, a 17-year-old volunteer at a nursing home, to engage in mutual masturbation while the defendant was in a position of authority over the complainant.

The defendant denied making such an invitation, claiming the complainant initiated the discussion about masturbation.

The court found that the defendant did invite sexual touching but acquitted him because the Crown failed to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant was in a position of trust or authority over the complainant.

The brief supervisory relationship during a single afternoon of volunteering was insufficient to establish the requisite position of authority.

The accused was charged with seven firearm-related offences.

The Crown withdrew three counts during closing submissions.

The remaining charges involved possession of a .40 calibre semi-automatic handgun seized from a residence and discharging that firearm at another location.

The Crown's case relied entirely on circumstantial evidence, including documents bearing the accused's name found in a bedroom, a cartridge compatible with the handgun, DNA evidence from the handgun, and ballistics evidence matching shell casings to the seized firearm.

The defence called the accused's sister, who testified that the accused did not live at the residence but visited occasionally, that he was staying in a guest bedroom on the night in question, and that he did not leave the residence during the relevant time period.

The court found that the Crown failed to prove possession of the handgun beyond a reasonable doubt and therefore acquitted on all remaining charges.

The applicant was charged with seven firearm-related offences and brought a motion to exclude evidence seized during the execution of a search warrant on a residence.

The applicant argued that the information to obtain (ITO) for the search warrant lacked sufficient grounds, contained inaccurate statements and improper generalizations, and that the affiant was not truthful about independently confirming information regarding the confidential informer's reliability.

The court applied the narrow Garofoli review standard and found that despite deficiencies in the ITO, there remained a sufficient basis on which the issuing justice could have issued the warrant.

The application was dismissed.

The applicant was charged with firearm-related offences arising from a search warrant executed by Peel Regional Police.

The applicant sought leave to cross-examine the affiant of the information to obtain the warrant to challenge its validity.

The heavily redacted ITO was reviewed in an in camera, ex parte hearing, and the Crown provided a judicial summary of redacted material.

The applicant proposed five areas of cross-examination.

The court granted limited leave to cross-examine regarding the reliability of the confidential informer's past information, but denied leave on the other four proposed areas: the overall credibility of the informer, the affiant's experience, the identification process used, and the second address mentioned in the affiant's notes.