Marie Deschamps

The respondent, a Canadian citizen detained at Guantanamo Bay, sought disclosure of records of interviews conducted by Canadian officials with him and shared with U.S. authorities.

The Supreme Court of Canada held that the Charter applied to the Canadian officials' actions because the process at Guantanamo Bay violated Canada's binding international human rights obligations.

Under section 7 of the Charter, Canada has a duty to disclose the records of the interviews and any information given to U.S. authorities as a direct consequence, subject to national security and other considerations under the Canada Evidence Act.

The parties filed several motions in the context of an appeal regarding disclosure of materials to a detainee at Guantanamo Bay.

The respondent sought a sealing order to file fresh evidence obtained from U.S. proceedings, which was granted with conditions to allow the panel hearing the appeal to determine its admissibility.

The appellants moved to strike portions of the respondent's factum and the entirety of two interveners' factums, arguing the submissions lacked factual basis, were non-justiciable, and raised new issues.

The Court dismissed the motions to strike, holding that these objections should be argued before the panel hearing the main appeal.

The appellant sued the respondent bottled water supplier for psychiatric injury after finding dead flies in an unopened replacement bottle of water.

The trial judge awarded damages, but the Court of Appeal overturned the decision.

The Supreme Court of Canada dismissed the appeal, holding that while the respondent owed a duty of care and breached it, the damage was too remote.

The Court established that for psychiatric injury to be compensable in negligence, it must be reasonably foreseeable that a person of ordinary fortitude would suffer serious injury from the breach.

The taxpayer purchased an interest in seismic data for $100,000, paying $15,000 in cash and $85,000 via a promissory note.

He deducted the full amount as a Canadian exploration expense under the Income Tax Act.

The Minister reassessed, arguing the note was a contingent liability and the transaction was not at arm's length.

The Supreme Court of Canada held that the liability under the promissory note was absolute, not contingent, because the obligation to repay came into existence immediately, even though the debt was limited recourse.

The Court also restored the trial judge's finding that the parties were dealing at arm's length.

The respondent, a 17-year-old, pleaded guilty to manslaughter, a presumptive offence under the Youth Criminal Justice Act.

The YCJA required the young person to justify why an adult sentence should not be imposed and why a publication ban should apply.

The Supreme Court of Canada held that these reverse onus provisions violate section 7 of the Charter because they are inconsistent with the principle of fundamental justice that young people are entitled to a presumption of diminished moral culpability.

The provisions were not saved by section 1, and the youth sentence imposed by the trial judge was upheld.

The appellant was convicted of sexual assault and sexual exploitation of a person with a disability.

The complainant, who had a mild mental disability, gave inconsistent testimony, including conflicting statements about inventing the allegations.

The trial judge convicted the appellant, relying on the complainant's prior consistent statements to corroborate her testimony, without explaining how he resolved the inconsistencies.

The Court of Appeal upheld the convictions.

The Supreme Court of Canada allowed the appeal and ordered a new trial, holding that the trial judge failed to provide sufficient reasons explaining how he resolved the significant credibility issues and erred in using prior consistent statements to corroborate the complainant's testimony.

The appellant, a dual Canadian-American citizen, was convicted in Canada of drug offences.

The United States subsequently sought his extradition for a related drug transaction in Detroit.

The Minister of Justice ordered his surrender, concluding that extradition would not unjustifiably infringe his mobility rights under s. 6(1) of the Charter.

The Supreme Court of Canada held that the Minister's decision to surrender a fugitive, including the assessment of Charter rights, is reviewable on a standard of reasonableness.

The Court found that the Minister provided adequate reasons and reasonably concluded that the appellant had not already been punished in Canada for the U.S. offence, and that the U.S. had a greater interest in prosecuting the conduct that occurred on its territory.

The appellants were subcontractors to a general contractor who submitted a bid for a design-build construction project.

The owner awarded the contract to a non-compliant bidder.

The general contractor settled its claim against the owner, but the subcontractors sued the owner in tort for pure economic loss.

The Supreme Court of Canada held that the owner did not owe a duty of care to the subcontractors.

The claim did not fall within a recognized category of pure economic loss, and recognizing a new duty of care was not justified because the subcontractors could have protected themselves by forming a joint venture with the general contractor.

The appellant was wrongfully dismissed from his position as a union business agent without notice.

During negotiations, the employer offered him the opportunity to return to work to serve out a 24-month working notice period.

The appellant refused to return to work unless certain conditions were met, including the rescission of his termination letter.

The Supreme Court of Canada held that a wrongfully dismissed employee may be required to mitigate their damages by returning to work for the same employer, provided the salary and working conditions are substantially the same and the personal relationships are not acrimonious.

The Court found that the appellant's refusal to return to work was objectively unreasonable and constituted a failure to mitigate his damages.

The Supreme Court of Canada considered four appeals involving offenders who had been detained for significant periods before being sentenced.

The trial judges imposed custodial sentences of less than two years and probation for three years, taking into account the pre-sentence custody.

In one case, the judge also ordered the offender to serve half his sentence before being eligible for parole.

The Court held that the term of imprisonment is the term imposed by the judge at the time of sentence, and pre-sentence custody is not part of the sentence but a factor taken into account.

Therefore, the sentences were less than two years, making the probation orders valid and the parole ineligibility order invalid.

The police accepted an invitation from a high school principal to bring sniffer dogs into the school to search for drugs.

The police had no specific knowledge of drugs present and conducted a random search while students were confined to classrooms.

A sniffer dog reacted to the respondent's unattended backpack in the gymnasium.

The police opened the backpack without a warrant and found illicit drugs.

The Supreme Court of Canada held that the dog sniff constituted a search under s. 8 of the Charter.

The Court found that while police possess a common law power to use sniffer dogs based on reasonable suspicion, the search in this case was random and lacked reasonable suspicion, thus violating s. 8.

The evidence was excluded under s. 24(2) of the Charter, and the acquittal was upheld.

The appellant was stopped by an RCMP officer at a bus terminal based on suspicious behaviour.

The officer called for a sniffer dog, which indicated the presence of drugs in the appellant's bag.

The appellant was arrested and a search of the bag revealed cocaine and heroin.

The Supreme Court of Canada held that a dog sniff constitutes a search under s. 8 of the Charter.

While the police have a common law power to use sniffer dogs based on a standard of reasonable suspicion, the officer in this case did not have sufficient grounds to meet that standard.

The search was therefore unreasonable, and the evidence was excluded under s. 24(2) of the Charter, resulting in the appeal being allowed and the conviction set aside.

The appellant appealed her conviction for first degree murder.

The Supreme Court of Canada allowed the appeal, finding that the trial judge's instructions on planning and deliberation, including references to capacity, may have confused the jury regarding the role of the accused's intoxication.

The Court declined to apply the curative proviso and ordered a new trial.

The appellants were charged with driving 'over 80' after failing breathalyzer tests.

At trial, they adduced expert 'straddle evidence' indicating that, based on their drinking patterns and average alcohol elimination rates, their blood alcohol concentrations could have been either above or below the legal limit at the time of driving.

The Supreme Court of Canada held that straddle evidence does not rebut the statutory presumption in s. 258(1)(d.1) of the Criminal Code, as it merely confirms the accused consumed enough alcohol to reach a level exceeding 80 mg and does not tend to show the concentration was below the legal limit.

The appeals were dismissed and the convictions/orders for new trials were upheld.

The appellants brought actions seeking a declaration that the RCMP, when acting as a provincial police force in New Brunswick under an agreement between the federal and provincial governments, is bound by the language obligations imposed on New Brunswick institutions by s. 20(2) of the Charter.

The Federal Court of Appeal held that the RCMP was only bound by federal language obligations.

The Supreme Court of Canada allowed the appeal, holding that because RCMP members are designated as provincial peace officers and perform the role of an institution of the New Brunswick government, they must comply with s. 20(2) of the Charter and provide services in both official languages.

The plaintiffs, claiming to be descendants of the Papaschase Indian Band, brought an action against the Crown for breach of fiduciary duty, fraud, and treaty breach relating to the 1889 surrender of their reserve.

The Crown applied for summary dismissal.

The Supreme Court of Canada restored the chambers judge's order dismissing the action, finding that there was no genuine issue for trial because the claims were barred by the Limitation of Actions Act.

The evidence established that the causes of action were discoverable by the plaintiffs in the 1970s, well beyond the limitation period.

The appellant entered into a contract with a mechanical inspection centre to carry out vehicle inspections.

An employee of the centre was designated as an accredited mechanic in an appendix signed by the appellant, the centre, and the employee.

The appellant subsequently revoked the employee's accreditation for failing to apply regulatory standards.

The employee sought judicial review, arguing he was denied procedural fairness.

The Supreme Court of Canada held that the employee was entitled to procedural fairness under section 5 of the Act respecting administrative justice.

The Court found that the delegation of power to conduct vehicle inspections constituted an administrative authorization governed by public law, rather than a purely private contractual matter, and therefore required procedural fairness before revocation.

The appellant telecommunications company sought an exemption from two production orders requiring it to produce call data records for criminal investigations, arguing that compliance without compensation was unreasonable.

The Supreme Court of Canada held that the Criminal Code production order scheme does not permit a judge to order compensation for compliance.

A judge can only consider the financial aspect of compliance when deciding whether to grant an exemption on the basis that the financial burden is unreasonable.

The Court found that the appellant had not established that the cost of compliance was unreasonable in this case, and dismissed the appeal.

The appellant was convicted of criminal negligence causing death and bodily harm following a single-vehicle accident.

At trial, the main issue was whether the appellant or another survivor was driving.

The trial judge admitted prior consistent statements of the other survivor to rebut allegations of recent fabrication.

The appellant appealed, arguing the trial judge improperly used these statements for the truth of their contents and to bolster general credibility.

The Supreme Court of Canada dismissed the appeal, finding that the trial judge correctly understood the limited use of prior consistent statements and did not rely on them for the truth of their contents.

The appellant, a non-unionized public employee holding office 'at pleasure', was dismissed without cause and given four months' pay in lieu of notice.

He grieved the dismissal, and an adjudicator ordered his reinstatement, finding a breach of procedural fairness and interpreting the governing legislation as requiring cause for dismissal.

The Supreme Court of Canada dismissed the appeal, holding that the adjudicator's statutory interpretation was unreasonable and that public employees governed by a contract of employment are not owed a public law duty of procedural fairness upon dismissal.

In doing so, the Court fundamentally restructured the framework for judicial review of administrative decisions, collapsing the three previous standards of review into two: correctness and reasonableness.