Manasvin Goswami

The appellant, S.T., appealed his conviction for sexual assault.

The appeal raised two grounds: the trial judge's findings regarding the appellant's sobriety were unreasonable and erroneous, and the trial judge's finding of partiality in a defence witness was not supported by evidence and led to an erroneous rejection of their testimony.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no material, reversible error.

The court held that the trial judge's assessment of the appellant's intoxication was within their purview and did not require expert evidence.

While the finding of witness partiality was problematic due to lack of opportunity for the parties to respond, it was deemed not material to the overall assessment of evidence or the trial's outcome, and did not result in a miscarriage of justice.

The appellants, Demitry Papasotiriou and Mladen Ivezic, appealed their convictions for the first-degree murder of Mr. Papasotiriou's husband.

The Crown's theory was that the appellants, who were lovers, conspired to kill the victim for financial gain, with Mr. Ivezic committing the physical act while Mr. Papasotiriou was in Greece.

Mr. Papasotiriou argued the verdict was unreasonable and that his co-accused's self-represented conduct rendered the trial unfair.

Mr. Ivezic raised issues regarding alternate suspect evidence, lifestyle evidence, DNA disclosure, jury instructions, and ineffective assistance of pretrial counsel.

The Court of Appeal dismissed both appeals, finding the verdict reasonable, the trial fair, and no reversible errors in the trial judge's rulings or jury instructions.

The appellant appealed his convictions for sexual assault causing bodily harm, unlawful confinement, choking, and uttering a death threat, primarily alleging ineffective assistance of trial counsel.

The Court of Appeal found trial counsel's representation ineffective due to eliciting highly prejudicial bad character evidence, failing to seek disclosure of an arrest warrant and criminal record for the complainant, and providing inadequate advice on challenging jurors for cause based on racial prejudice.

The court concluded that the cumulative effect of these deficiencies undermined the reliability of the jury's verdict, rendering it unreliable.

The appeal was allowed, convictions set aside, and a new trial ordered.

The appellant, J.C., appealed five convictions for assault and assault with a weapon against his former domestic partner, BOH, arguing that the trial judge's reasons were insufficient.

The Court of Appeal found the trial judge's reasons deficient but determined that for four of the five counts (assault and assault with a weapon involving a frying pan and knife), the convictions were supported by the record and the deficiencies did not preclude meaningful appellate review.

However, for the conviction of assault with a drill, the court found the reasons critically insufficient as the conviction was not supported by unambiguous, independent, and contemporaneous confirmatory evidence, making it impossible to discern the trial judge's path to the verdict.

Consequently, the appeal was allowed in part, setting aside the conviction for assault with a drill and ordering a new trial on that count, while dismissing the appeal for the other four counts.

Mark Sheldon Roberts appealed a 2020 Ontario Review Board disposition.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal as moot because the 2020 disposition had been superseded by a 2021 disposition, and new criminal charges and re-admission to a secure forensic unit at CAMH had rendered the factual record stale.

The court reiterated the principle of not deciding moot cases, especially in Review Board matters where no effective remedy can be given for a spent disposition.

The appellant, found not criminally responsible due to mental disorder, appealed a disposition of the Ontario Review Board (ORB) ordering his detention.

He sought an absolute or conditional discharge, arguing the ORB erred in finding he posed a significant public threat and in not adequately applying Gladue principles.

The Court of Appeal granted fresh evidence motions from both parties but dismissed the appeal, finding the ORB's decision reasonable.

The court affirmed that the appellant remained a significant threat due to unstable mental health, risk of medication non-compliance, and substance abuse, which could lead to re-offending.

The refusal of a conditional discharge was also deemed reasonable, as no adequate community treatment plan was in place, despite the consideration of Gladue factors.

The Crown appealed the respondent's acquittal for second-degree murder, arguing the trial judge erred in his jury instructions on self-defence and in excluding evidence of the respondent's prior disreputable conduct and criminal record.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no reversible error in the jury instructions.

The Court also upheld the trial judge's discretionary rulings on the evidentiary issues, notably confirming for the first time that Gladue principles are relevant to a Corbett application when assessing the probative value and prejudicial effect of an Indigenous accused's prior convictions.

This motion concerned an application for judicial interim release pending an application for leave to appeal to the Supreme Court of Canada.

The applicant, convicted of robbery in a home invasion, sought release under s. 679(1)(c) of the Criminal Code.

The Crown opposed, arguing detention was necessary in the public interest due to the unlikelihood of leave to appeal and the seriousness of the offence.

The court found the applicant met the "not frivolous" and "surrender" criteria.

While acknowledging the seriousness of the offence, the court distinguished the "immediate enforceability" principle from R. v. Drabinsky by noting the applicant was effectively seeking a first appellate review of an unaddressed ground.

Given the applicant's consistent compliance with previous release conditions and lack of public safety risk, the court granted the release.

The Crown appealed the acquittal of the respondent on a charge of second-degree murder, raising three grounds: a breach of jury secrecy during a juror inquiry, errors in a s. 8 Charter analysis and subsequent s. 24(2) exclusion of evidence, and errors in excluding hearsay evidence.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no reversible error in the trial judge's handling of the jury inquiry, upholding the application judge's decision to exclude evidence under the Charter, and affirming the exclusion of hearsay statements due to reliability concerns.

The appellant, convicted of first-degree murder, appealed the dismissal of his "faint hope" application under s. 745.6 of the Criminal Code.

The application judge had applied the 2011 amendments, which increased the judicial screening threshold from "reasonable prospect" to "substantial likelihood." Relying on R. v. Dell, the appellant argued this retrospective application violated s. 11(i) of the Charter.

The Crown conceded the violation.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, ruling that the "reasonable prospect" threshold applies to s. 745.6 applications for offences committed between January 9, 1997, and December 2, 2011, and remitted the application for a new screening hearing.

The appellant, M.N., appealed the dismissal of his application for certiorari and mandamus by the Superior Court of Justice.

M.N. sought to quash a trial judge's decision denying a mistrial and re-election of his mode of trial in a sexual assault case, arguing jurisdictional error due to delayed disclosure.

The Court of Appeal affirmed that certiorari is an extraordinary remedy tightly limited to jurisdictional errors in criminal matters, and the trial judge's decision regarding disclosure and re-election was not a jurisdictional error but an error on the merits, properly reviewable only after trial.

The appeal was dismissed.

The appellant, Preston Darnell Scott, appealed his conviction for robbery and his sentence.

The Crown alleged he acted as the getaway driver in a home invasion.

The appeal challenged the trial judge's inference of knowledge regarding the co-accused's masks and the sufficiency of reasons, as well as the fitness of the six-and-a-half-year sentence.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the conviction appeal, finding the trial judge's inference of knowledge was reasonable despite an "unfortunate" choice of words, and that the reasons were sufficient.

The court allowed the sentence appeal only to grant credit for pre-sentence custody, reducing the sentence by 23 days.

The appellant, J.B., appealed his conviction for sexual assault against his stepdaughter and the imposed sentence.

The conviction appeal raised three grounds: improper reliance on the absence of exaggeration, improper use of prior consistent statements, and improper reliance on neutral aspects of evidence to confirm the complainant's account.

The appellant also challenged the s. 161(1)(a) prohibition order as overbroad.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the conviction appeal, finding no reversible errors in the trial judge's reasoning on credibility or confirmatory evidence.

However, the court allowed the sentence appeal in part, removing the s. 161(1)(c) order, as it was not retroactively applicable to an offence committed prior to its amendment in August 2012.

This decision addresses two appeals by an accused found not criminally responsible (NCRMD) from disposition orders of the Ontario Review Board (ORB).

The first appeal (C68888) challenged a 2020 detention order with community living privileges, which was ultimately adjourned as moot due to a subsequent disposition.

The second appeal (C69217) arose from a 2021 ORB hearing following the revocation of the accused's community living privileges and his re-detention due to new harassment incidents.

A central issue in the second appeal was the ORB's new practice of issuing general detention orders to a "Forensic Service" without specifying the security level of the unit.

The Court of Appeal expressed concern that this practice might hinder the ORB's ability to ensure the least onerous and least restrictive disposition, emphasizing the need for specificity regarding conditions and security levels.

The Court admitted fresh evidence regarding the accused's transfer to a secure unit and the withdrawal of criminal charges.

The Court maintained the 2021 disposition and dismissed the second appeal.

The appellant, an Indigenous man, sought to withdraw his guilty pleas, arguing that the trial judge erred by not inquiring into the impact of his Indigenous experiences on the voluntariness of his plea, even though he had not raised this issue.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, holding that while judges have a duty to inquire into the validity of a plea if there are apparent indications of an issue, there is no general affirmative obligation to inquire into an Indigenous person's experiences affecting plea voluntariness unless specific circumstances trigger such a duty.

The court found no such circumstances in this case, and the evidence suggested the plea was voluntary.

The applicant sought bail pending appeal after being convicted of sexual assault, uttering death threats, and breaching a release order, resulting in a three-and-a-half-year imprisonment sentence.

The application for bail pending appeal was dismissed.

The court found that while the appeal was not frivolous and the applicant would likely surrender, detention was necessary in the public interest due to an extensive criminal history, including prior sexual assault and harassment convictions, and a significant track record of breaching court orders, which outweighed the proposed surety's assurances.

The appellant, Roger Bristol, sought leave to appeal a total sentence of ten years imposed following convictions for 32 counts of break and enter, 34 counts of failure to comply with probation, and two counts of attempted break and enter.

The Court of Appeal for Ontario granted leave and reduced the sentence to seven years.

The appellate court found that the sentencing judge erred by mischaracterizing the offences as "home invasion robberies" failing to properly weigh the appellant's mental health challenges and their impact on moral blameworthiness, and failing to give proper effect to the "jump principle." The court also considered a "Duncan credit" for time spent in lockdown during pre-sentence custody.

The appellant appealed two dispositions of the Ontario Review Board.

The first disposition, which transferred him to the Centre for Addiction and Mental Health (CAMH), was dismissed as moot by the Court of Appeal as it had been superseded.

The second disposition, which ordered his detention at the highly secure Waypoint Centre for Mental Health Care due to worsening behaviour and significant threat to public safety, was upheld.

The court found the Board's decision reasonable, emphasizing that public safety, including the safety of hospital staff and co-patients, is the paramount consideration under s. 672.54 of the Criminal Code, and deferred to the Board's expertise in managing the risk posed by the individual.

Helen Tolias, found not criminally responsible (NCR) due to mental disorder, appealed an Ontario Review Board disposition that ordered her detention.

The Board had conducted the disposition review hearing by videoconference without her consent and in her absence.

The Court of Appeal found this to be a jurisdictional error, rendering the Board's disposition null and void, and rejected the Crown's argument that no substantial wrong or miscarriage of justice occurred.

The appeal was allowed, the Board's disposition was set aside, and a new hearing was ordered.

The court also varied a previous disposition to allow the appellant to remain at a facility closer to her family.

The appellant, C.K., appealed his sentence of six years concurrent for assault, assault causing bodily harm, sexual assault, and unlawful confinement.

The appeal raised two issues: an alleged miscalculation of pre-sentence custody credit and an unreasonable delay between conviction and sentence.

The Court of Appeal found no error in the pre-sentence custody calculation.

Regarding the delay, the court noted that a significant portion was attributable to the appellant's own application and other factors, and thus the total delay was not unreasonable.

Leave to appeal sentence was granted, but the appeal itself was dismissed.