Manasvin Goswami

Mark Sheldon Roberts appealed a 2020 Ontario Review Board disposition.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal as moot because the 2020 disposition had been superseded by a 2021 disposition, and new criminal charges and re-admission to a secure forensic unit at CAMH had rendered the factual record stale.

The court reiterated the principle of not deciding moot cases, especially in Review Board matters where no effective remedy can be given for a spent disposition.

The appellant, found not criminally responsible due to mental disorder, appealed a disposition of the Ontario Review Board (ORB) ordering his detention.

He sought an absolute or conditional discharge, arguing the ORB erred in finding he posed a significant public threat and in not adequately applying Gladue principles.

The Court of Appeal granted fresh evidence motions from both parties but dismissed the appeal, finding the ORB's decision reasonable.

The court affirmed that the appellant remained a significant threat due to unstable mental health, risk of medication non-compliance, and substance abuse, which could lead to re-offending.

The refusal of a conditional discharge was also deemed reasonable, as no adequate community treatment plan was in place, despite the consideration of Gladue factors.

This motion concerned an application for judicial interim release pending an application for leave to appeal to the Supreme Court of Canada.

The applicant, convicted of robbery in a home invasion, sought release under s. 679(1)(c) of the Criminal Code.

The Crown opposed, arguing detention was necessary in the public interest due to the unlikelihood of leave to appeal and the seriousness of the offence.

The court found the applicant met the "not frivolous" and "surrender" criteria.

While acknowledging the seriousness of the offence, the court distinguished the "immediate enforceability" principle from R. v. Drabinsky by noting the applicant was effectively seeking a first appellate review of an unaddressed ground.

Given the applicant's consistent compliance with previous release conditions and lack of public safety risk, the court granted the release.

The Crown appealed the acquittal of the respondent on a charge of second-degree murder, raising three grounds: a breach of jury secrecy during a juror inquiry, errors in a s. 8 Charter analysis and subsequent s. 24(2) exclusion of evidence, and errors in excluding hearsay evidence.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no reversible error in the trial judge's handling of the jury inquiry, upholding the application judge's decision to exclude evidence under the Charter, and affirming the exclusion of hearsay statements due to reliability concerns.

The appellant, convicted of first-degree murder, appealed the dismissal of his "faint hope" application under s. 745.6 of the Criminal Code.

The application judge had applied the 2011 amendments, which increased the judicial screening threshold from "reasonable prospect" to "substantial likelihood." Relying on R. v. Dell, the appellant argued this retrospective application violated s. 11(i) of the Charter.

The Crown conceded the violation.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, ruling that the "reasonable prospect" threshold applies to s. 745.6 applications for offences committed between January 9, 1997, and December 2, 2011, and remitted the application for a new screening hearing.

The appellant, M.N., appealed the dismissal of his application for certiorari and mandamus by the Superior Court of Justice.

M.N. sought to quash a trial judge's decision denying a mistrial and re-election of his mode of trial in a sexual assault case, arguing jurisdictional error due to delayed disclosure.

The Court of Appeal affirmed that certiorari is an extraordinary remedy tightly limited to jurisdictional errors in criminal matters, and the trial judge's decision regarding disclosure and re-election was not a jurisdictional error but an error on the merits, properly reviewable only after trial.

The appeal was dismissed.

The appellant, Preston Darnell Scott, appealed his conviction for robbery and his sentence.

The Crown alleged he acted as the getaway driver in a home invasion.

The appeal challenged the trial judge's inference of knowledge regarding the co-accused's masks and the sufficiency of reasons, as well as the fitness of the six-and-a-half-year sentence.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the conviction appeal, finding the trial judge's inference of knowledge was reasonable despite an "unfortunate" choice of words, and that the reasons were sufficient.

The court allowed the sentence appeal only to grant credit for pre-sentence custody, reducing the sentence by 23 days.

The appellant, J.B., appealed his conviction for sexual assault against his stepdaughter and the imposed sentence.

The conviction appeal raised three grounds: improper reliance on the absence of exaggeration, improper use of prior consistent statements, and improper reliance on neutral aspects of evidence to confirm the complainant's account.

The appellant also challenged the s. 161(1)(a) prohibition order as overbroad.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the conviction appeal, finding no reversible errors in the trial judge's reasoning on credibility or confirmatory evidence.

However, the court allowed the sentence appeal in part, removing the s. 161(1)(c) order, as it was not retroactively applicable to an offence committed prior to its amendment in August 2012.

This decision addresses two appeals by an accused found not criminally responsible (NCRMD) from disposition orders of the Ontario Review Board (ORB).

The first appeal (C68888) challenged a 2020 detention order with community living privileges, which was ultimately adjourned as moot due to a subsequent disposition.

The second appeal (C69217) arose from a 2021 ORB hearing following the revocation of the accused's community living privileges and his re-detention due to new harassment incidents.

A central issue in the second appeal was the ORB's new practice of issuing general detention orders to a "Forensic Service" without specifying the security level of the unit.

The Court of Appeal expressed concern that this practice might hinder the ORB's ability to ensure the least onerous and least restrictive disposition, emphasizing the need for specificity regarding conditions and security levels.

The Court admitted fresh evidence regarding the accused's transfer to a secure unit and the withdrawal of criminal charges.

The Court maintained the 2021 disposition and dismissed the second appeal.

The appellant, an Indigenous man, sought to withdraw his guilty pleas, arguing that the trial judge erred by not inquiring into the impact of his Indigenous experiences on the voluntariness of his plea, even though he had not raised this issue.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, holding that while judges have a duty to inquire into the validity of a plea if there are apparent indications of an issue, there is no general affirmative obligation to inquire into an Indigenous person's experiences affecting plea voluntariness unless specific circumstances trigger such a duty.

The court found no such circumstances in this case, and the evidence suggested the plea was voluntary.

The applicant sought bail pending appeal after being convicted of sexual assault, uttering death threats, and breaching a release order, resulting in a three-and-a-half-year imprisonment sentence.

The application for bail pending appeal was dismissed.

The court found that while the appeal was not frivolous and the applicant would likely surrender, detention was necessary in the public interest due to an extensive criminal history, including prior sexual assault and harassment convictions, and a significant track record of breaching court orders, which outweighed the proposed surety's assurances.

The appellant, Roger Bristol, sought leave to appeal a total sentence of ten years imposed following convictions for 32 counts of break and enter, 34 counts of failure to comply with probation, and two counts of attempted break and enter.

The Court of Appeal for Ontario granted leave and reduced the sentence to seven years.

The appellate court found that the sentencing judge erred by mischaracterizing the offences as "home invasion robberies," failing to properly weigh the appellant's mental health challenges and their impact on moral blameworthiness, and failing to give proper effect to the "jump principle." The court also considered a "Duncan credit" for time spent in lockdown during pre-sentence custody.

The appellant appealed two dispositions of the Ontario Review Board.

The first disposition, which transferred him to the Centre for Addiction and Mental Health (CAMH), was dismissed as moot by the Court of Appeal as it had been superseded.

The second disposition, which ordered his detention at the highly secure Waypoint Centre for Mental Health Care due to worsening behaviour and significant threat to public safety, was upheld.

The court found the Board's decision reasonable, emphasizing that public safety, including the safety of hospital staff and co-patients, is the paramount consideration under s. 672.54 of the Criminal Code, and deferred to the Board's expertise in managing the risk posed by the individual.

Helen Tolias, found not criminally responsible (NCR) due to mental disorder, appealed an Ontario Review Board disposition that ordered her detention.

The Board had conducted the disposition review hearing by videoconference without her consent and in her absence.

The Court of Appeal found this to be a jurisdictional error, rendering the Board's disposition null and void, and rejected the Crown's argument that no substantial wrong or miscarriage of justice occurred.

The appeal was allowed, the Board's disposition was set aside, and a new hearing was ordered.

The court also varied a previous disposition to allow the appellant to remain at a facility closer to her family.

The appellant, C.K., appealed his sentence of six years concurrent for assault, assault causing bodily harm, sexual assault, and unlawful confinement.

The appeal raised two issues: an alleged miscalculation of pre-sentence custody credit and an unreasonable delay between conviction and sentence.

The Court of Appeal found no error in the pre-sentence custody calculation.

Regarding the delay, the court noted that a significant portion was attributable to the appellant's own application and other factors, and thus the total delay was not unreasonable.

Leave to appeal sentence was granted, but the appeal itself was dismissed.

The appellant sought an order for the production of lockdown records from the Toronto South Detention Centre for use in his sentence appeal.

The respondent consented to the order under s. 683(1)(a) of the Criminal Code, reserving the right to challenge the admissibility of the records as fresh evidence.

The Court of Appeal for Ontario found that the interests of justice warranted the order and directed the production of the specified records.

The appellant, who pleaded guilty to bank robbery, appealed the four-year sentence imposed by the trial judge, seeking a three-year sentence.

The appellant argued the sentencing hearing was fundamentally unfair due to the lack of an adjournment for a presentence report, despite his strong objection to any delay.

The Court of Appeal found no unfairness, noting the appellant's desire for immediate sentencing, his criminal record including prior bank robberies, and the trial judge's consideration of mitigating factors such as an early guilty plea and mental health issues.

The court concluded the four-year sentence was fit and dismissed the appeal.

The Crown appealed an acquittal in a child pornography case where the trial judge excluded evidence obtained through a search warrant.

The trial judge found the warrant was invalid because police failed to verify information from the National Center for Missing and Exploited Children (NCMEC) report for accuracy, failed to include a disclaimer from the NCMEC report, failed to confirm Microsoft's use of PhotoDNA software, and found the information stale despite only seven to eight months having elapsed.

The Court of Appeal allowed the Crown's appeal and entered a conviction, finding the trial judge applied an incorrect legal standard by requiring verification for accuracy rather than assessing reasonableness, and erred in substituting her own views for those of the issuing justice.

The appellant appealed his conviction for aggravated assault and his 40-month sentence.

He was self-represented at trial and argued that the verdict was unreasonable and that the trial judge failed to provide adequate assistance, rendering the trial unfair.

The Court of Appeal upheld the conviction, finding the circumstantial evidence overwhelming and that the trial judge provided extensive assistance to the self-represented appellant.

The sentence appeal was dismissed as the 40-month sentence fell within the appropriate range for aggravated assault given the appellant's criminal record.

The appellant was convicted of aggravated assault and assault with a weapon following an incident on July 23, 2014, where she stabbed and bit the complainant with scissors.

The appellant was acquitted on the count of unlawful entry.

On appeal, the appellant raised three grounds: (1) that the trial judge failed to consider her defence of lawful ejection of trespassers under s. 35 of the Criminal Code; (2) that the trial judge erred in admitting evidence of her discreditable conduct; and (3) that her assault convictions conflicted with her acquittal on the unlawful entry count.

The Court of Appeal dismissed all grounds of appeal and upheld the convictions.