Padraic Ryan

This addendum to the Court of Appeal for Ontario’s decision in Hillier v. Ontario addresses the appropriate constitutional remedy for unjustified limits on peaceful assembly rights under the Charter during the COVID-19 pandemic.

The court discusses the principles of “reading in” and “reading down” as remedial tools, ultimately preferring reading down the impugned regulations to exclude peaceful outdoor protests of up to 10 people from the prohibition on gatherings.

The court’s approach is guided by Supreme Court authority and the need to respect legislative intent while vindicating Charter rights.

The Court of Appeal for Ontario allowed Randy Hillier’s appeal, finding that Ontario’s absolute ban on outdoor peaceful assembly during the COVID-19 pandemic was not demonstrably justified under section 1 of the Charter.

The court held that the government failed to consider the impact of the gathering limits on the right to peaceful assembly under section 2(c) and did not tailor the restrictions to accommodate this fundamental freedom, unlike the approach taken for religious gatherings.

The decision clarifies the independent constitutional status of peaceful assembly and the necessity for governments to justify limits on this right, especially in the context of political protest.

This is a costs endorsement following an appeal.

The parties settled the costs of the appeal, agreeing that the respondent would pay the appellants an all-inclusive amount of $75,000.

The Ontario Court of Appeal allowed an appeal by seven youth challenging the constitutionality of Ontario's greenhouse gas emission reduction target and plan.

The application judge had dismissed their claim, characterizing it as seeking positive rights.

The Court of Appeal found this was an error, clarifying that the case concerned whether Ontario's voluntarily assumed statutory obligation to combat climate change was Charter compliant under ss. 7 (life, liberty, security of the person) and 15 (equality).

The matter was remitted for a new hearing to determine if the Target and Plan violated the Charter.

The plaintiffs sued multiple defendants, including an insurer and its subcontractors, for various torts arising from the handling of a statutory accident benefits claim.

The defendants brought Rule 21 motions to strike the claims for lack of jurisdiction and disclosing no reasonable cause of action.

The court refused to strike the action for lack of jurisdiction because of an outstanding constitutional challenge to the Insurance Act.

However, the court struck all tort claims against the moving defendants, except for the claim of intentional infliction of emotional distress, finding it was plain and obvious they could not succeed.

The court also struck the plaintiff's constitutional challenges to the Statutory Accident Benefits Schedule as an abuse of process.

This appeal concerned a constitutional challenge by National Steel Car Limited to the costs of Ontario's Feed-in-Tariff (FIT) Program, arguing they constituted an unconstitutional tax disguised as a regulatory charge, primarily intended for economic stimulus.

The appellant contended that the program's true purpose was not related to electricity regulation.

The Court of Appeal upheld the application judge's decision, dismissing the appeal.

The court found that the FIT Program's primary purpose was regulatory, aimed at increasing renewable energy generation, improving air quality, planning for future supply needs, and encouraging Indigenous and community participation, with economic stimulus being an incidental, not dominant, characteristic.

The court also affirmed the sufficiency of the application judge's reasons and his assessment of expert witness bias.

Randy Hillier, a former Member of Provincial Parliament, challenged the constitutionality of Ontario's COVID-19 Gathering Restrictions (O. Reg. 82/20 and O. Reg 265/21), arguing they violated his Charter right to peaceful assembly under s. 2(c).

He faced charges for attending political protest rallies during the spring 2021 lockdown.

While Ontario conceded the s. 2(c) infringement, it argued the restrictions were justified under s. 1 of the Charter.

The court, applying the Oakes test and relying on the precedent set by Ontario (Attorney General) v. Trinity Bible Chapel, found that the restrictions served a pressing and substantial objective (reducing COVID-19 transmission and protecting the healthcare system), were rationally connected to that objective, minimally impaired Charter rights given the urgent and uncertain circumstances, and were proportionate.

The court emphasized the application of the precautionary principle in public health emergencies.

The application was dismissed, and no costs were awarded.

The plaintiffs brought a motion to certify a class action against the Government of Ontario regarding the psychiatric treatment of patients detained in the PST Unit of the St. Thomas Psychiatric Hospital between 1976 and 1992.

The plaintiffs alleged that the 'PST Program' was an experimental, abusive therapeutic community that improperly delegated treatment and punishment decisions to 'patient-teachers', resulting in physical and psychological harm.

The court granted certification, finding that the pleadings disclosed causes of action for negligence, breach of fiduciary duty, vicarious liability, and breaches of sections 7, 12, and 15 of the Charter.

However, the court narrowed the common issues, certifying questions related to systemic negligence, fiduciary duty, vicarious liability, and limitation periods, while directing that Charter breaches, causation, and damages must be determined at individual issues trials.

The court concluded that a class proceeding was the preferable procedure to advance the claims of the highly marginalized class members.

Roger Foley, the plaintiff, brought a motion under Rule 2.1.02 of the Rules of Civil Procedure to disqualify Neil Searles as counsel for the Centre for Independent Living in Toronto (CILT).

Foley alleged conflict of interest, divided loyalty, and that Searles would be a necessary witness due to a 1996 article he authored on physician-assisted suicide.

The court, on its own initiative, considered dismissing the motion as frivolous or vexatious.

The court found the motion frivolous, noting that CILT opposed the removal of its counsel, that accepting a binding Supreme Court decision (Carter) is not a basis for disqualification, and that Foley's attempt to call Searles as a witness was unlikely to be permitted at trial.

The motion was dismissed.

The applicants, seven young Ontarians, brought an application challenging Ontario's greenhouse gas reduction target (the "Target") set under the Cap and Trade Cancellation Act, 2018.

They argued that the Target, which aims to reduce emissions by 30% below 2005 levels by 2030, is unconstitutional and violates their rights under sections 7 and 15 of the Charter.

The court found that the issues were justiciable, as they involved a challenge to specific state action and legislation.

However, the court dismissed the application, concluding that while climate change poses a severe threat and disproportionately impacts youth, the Target itself does not violate the Charter.

The court held that section 7 does not impose positive obligations on the state to enact more stringent environmental policies, and the Target is not arbitrary or grossly disproportionate.

Furthermore, the court found no section 15 violation, as the disproportionate impacts are caused by climate change itself, not the impugned legislation, and the Charter does not impose a positive obligation to remedy social inequalities.

The applicants brought a Charter challenge against the public funding of Roman Catholic separate schools for non-Catholic students and high school students in Ontario.

The respondent moved to strike the application under Rule 21.01.

The court granted the motion, finding that the Supreme Court of Canada had already determined these issues in the Reference re Bill 30 decision, which held that minority education rights under section 93 of the Constitution Act, 1867 are immune from Charter scrutiny.

The court concluded there was no new legal issue or fundamental change in circumstances that would allow it to depart from binding precedent, rendering the application doomed to fail.

National Steel Car Limited challenged Ontario's Feed-In Tariff (FIT) Programs, arguing that the increased electricity costs passed to consumers via the "Global Adjustment" constituted an unlawful, unconstitutional tax.

The applicant contended that the FIT Programs' stated environmental and energy purposes were a "falsehood" and their true aim was economic stimulus, making the levy a "colourable taxation" enacted by regulation rather than statute, violating sections 53 and 54 of the Constitution Act, 1867.

The court dismissed the applications, finding that the FIT Programs were not colourable taxation and served legitimate regulatory purposes related to Ontario's electricity system, including promoting renewable energy and economic development.

The court concluded that the levy was properly characterized as an intra vires regulatory charge.

The plaintiffs brought a proposed class action on behalf of prisoners and their families, alleging that Bell Canada and Ontario charged unconscionable rates for collect calls from provincial correctional facilities.

The plaintiffs sought certification, while the defendants brought cross-motions to stay the action, arguing the Canadian Radio-television and Telecommunications Commission (CRTC) had exclusive jurisdiction.

The Superior Court of Justice struck the plaintiffs' claims for an ultra vires tax and breach of the Telecommunications Act, finding it plain and obvious they could not succeed.

The court permanently stayed the remaining claims, concluding that the pith and substance of the dispute concerned telecommunications rates, which fall squarely within the specialized jurisdiction and remedial authority of the CRTC.

The applicants sought an order for restitution and vacating of victim fine surcharges imposed between 2013 and 2018, following the Supreme Court of Canada's decision in R. v. Boudreault which found the surcharge unconstitutional.

The court granted the order vacating the unpaid surcharges for the applicant, Serge Parent, finding it just and appropriate under s. 24(1) of the Charter, and that the limitation period had not expired.

However, the court dismissed the request for restitution of already paid surcharges and the broader class remedy, noting that s. 24(1) is for personal remedies and that government measures had ameliorated some harms.

The applicant sought costs of $15,000 previously fixed by Kimmel J. relating to an injunction granted against the respondents for breaching COVID-19 public health orders.

The respondents argued they should be excused from paying costs as public interest litigants.

The court rejected this argument, finding that by choosing to disobey the law rather than challenge it directly, the respondents engaged in conduct harmful to the public interest.

The respondents were ordered to pay $15,000 in costs.

Following the dismissal of the respondents' motion for Charter damages due to procedural errors, the applicant sought costs for the hearing and for a prior hearing.

The respondents argued they were public interest litigants and no costs should be awarded.

The court rejected this argument, finding that public interest litigants are not entitled to cause wasted costs through basic procedural errors.

The court awarded the applicant $15,000 in partial indemnity costs for the recent hearing and deferred the prior costs pending a determination on the merits.

The respondents brought an interim motion seeking Charter damages and a declaration of invalidity regarding COVID-19 public health regulations that restricted their restaurant operations.

The court dismissed the motion on threshold jurisdictional grounds, finding that the respondents failed to commence an originating process claiming such relief and that their Notice of Motion was procedurally defective.

The court held it had no jurisdiction to grant final Charter damages on an interlocutory motion.

Following the dismissal of the moving party's motion to strike, the successful responding parties sought partial indemnity costs of $36,269.19.

The moving party argued for a maximum of $15,000.

The court considered the factors under Rule 57.01, noting the public interest nature of the litigation, the complexity of the constitutional issues, and the reasonable delegation of work among counsel.

The court found the requested amount fair and reasonable and awarded costs of $36,269.19 to the responding parties.

The plaintiffs, a group of affiliated wine manufacturers and retailers, brought an action against the LCBO, the AGCO, and the Crown challenging the 'Made Policy', which regulates where wineries can sell their products.

The parties brought six competing motions, including motions to strike pleadings, motions for summary judgment, and a motion regarding the late disclosure of a tolling agreement between the defendants.

The court dismissed the plaintiffs' motion to strike the defendants' pleadings over the tolling agreement, finding it did not alter the expected adversarial landscape.

The court struck significant portions of the plaintiffs' statement of claim against the LCBO and AGCO, particularly allegations relating to pre-2001 conduct that had been settled in prior litigation, and claims for intentional interference with economic relations.

The Crown's motion for summary judgment was granted, dismissing the action against it.

The AGCO's and the plaintiffs' respective motions for summary judgment were dismissed, as the complex factual matrix and allegations of bad faith required a trial.

The applicants, seven youths residing in Ontario, brought an application challenging Ontario's cancellation of the Climate Change Act and its newly-enacted greenhouse gas reduction target under the Cap and Trade Cancellation Act, 2018.

They alleged that the target violates their rights under sections 7 and 15 of the Charter.

Ontario brought a motion to strike the application under Rule 21, arguing it disclosed no reasonable cause of action, was not justiciable, was based on unprovable speculations, depended on positive obligations, and that the applicants lacked standing for future generations.

The court dismissed the motion to strike, finding that the target and plan are reviewable by the courts, the claims are capable of scientific proof, the matter is justiciable as it challenges specific government conduct, the issue of positive obligations should be decided on a full evidentiary record, and the applicants meet the test for public interest standing at this preliminary stage.