Stay of proceedings

The applicant, charged with robbery using an imitation firearm, brought an application seeking a declaration that his Charter rights under sections 8 and 9 were infringed and a stay of proceedings.

The application alleged that police improperly obtained identification information and lacked reasonable and probable grounds for arrest without relying on privileged information.

The court dismissed the application, finding no breach of section 8 Charter rights due to insufficient evidentiary foundation and concluding that the police had objectively reasonable and probable grounds for arrest, considering all accumulated evidence, including privileged information.

Ms. Blake sought a stay of proceedings under sections 7 and 11(d) of the Charter, alleging pre-charge delay and lost evidence prejudiced her right to a fair trial.

The court found no evidence of egregious Crown conduct or bad faith.

It determined that Ms. Blake failed to prove actual prejudice, as the lost evidence (cell phone communications, business documentation, and an initial police statement from Mr. Ocran) did not prevent her from presenting a defence, even if it made it more difficult.

The court also noted that some evidence was never in state possession and that police are not obligated to pursue specific defence-directed investigations.

The application for a stay was dismissed.

The respondent sought a stay of the applicant's court proceeding, arguing that an Interim Parenting Agreement constituted a binding arbitration agreement requiring disputes to be resolved through mediation/arbitration.

The applicant contended the agreement did not bar her from court.

The court dismissed the respondent's motion for a stay, holding that the Interim Parenting Agreement did not comply with the mandatory formal requirements for family arbitration agreements under the Arbitration Act and its Regulation, and that such terms could not be implied.

The applicant, Wendel McLean, sought a stay of proceedings under sections 11(b) and 24(1) of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, arguing unreasonable post-conviction delay in the context of a dangerous offender application.

McLean was convicted of robbery with a firearm and break and enter, and the Crown initiated dangerous offender proceedings.

McLean argued that the 20-month delay between conviction and the scheduled dangerous offender hearing exceeded the 5-month presumptive ceiling for post-conviction delay set by R. v. Charley, after deducting delays attributable to him and the s. 752.1 assessment application.

The Crown contended that the entire dangerous offender proceeding is an exceptional circumstance to be deducted and that it acted reasonably.

The court dismissed the application, finding that the dangerous offender application as a whole is an exceptional circumstance, and the Crown had mitigated any resulting delay, thus no delay exceeding the presumptive ceiling was found.

The accused, T.B., applied for a stay of serious criminal charges, alleging a breach of their s. 7 Charter right to security of the person due to state action.

The court found that police deliberately breached T.B.'s confidential informant privilege by showing a recorded interview, where T.B. implicated other criminals, to a criminal associate (Mr./Ms. X).

This disclosure led to T.B. being severely assaulted in jail.

The court determined this police conduct constituted an abuse of process, offensive to societal notions of fair play and decency, and that no lesser remedy could adequately dissociate the justice system from the egregious conduct.

Consequently, a stay of all proceedings against T.B. was granted.

The applicant sought a stay of extradition proceedings and a declaration that s. 4 of the Extradition Act was unconstitutional, arguing abuse of process and Charter s. 7 infringement due to a second extradition request after a prior discharge.

The court dismissed the application, finding that s. 4 of the Act explicitly permits further proceedings unless they constitute an abuse of process, and that the current proceedings, based on additional evidence, did not meet the high threshold for abuse of process or violate the principles of fundamental justice under s. 7 of the Charter.

The applicant sought a stay of proceedings under s. 24(1) of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, alleging a breach of his s. 11(b) right to a trial within a reasonable time due to delays caused by a co-accused.

The total net delay was 28 months and 26 days, below the 30-month presumptive ceiling established in R. v. Jordan.

The court found that the applicant failed to demonstrate that he took meaningful steps to expedite the proceedings, specifically by not applying for severance of the charges despite knowing of the co-accused's delays and the Crown's position against severance.

The court also found that the case did not take markedly longer than it reasonably should have, considering the complexity of a multi-accused trial and the Crown's reasonable decision to pursue a joint trial due to the young victim's trauma.

The application for a stay was dismissed.

The defendant brought a motion under Rule 2.1 of the Rules of Civil Procedure to dismiss the plaintiff's action as frivolous, vexatious, or an abuse of process.

The plaintiff sought damages for mental stress due to a breach of an agreement of purchase and sale, alleging the defendant, a lawyer for the prospective purchaser, owed a duty of care to the plaintiff (vendor).

The court found no duty of care existed between the purchaser's lawyer and the vendor.

The action was deemed frivolous, vexatious, and an abuse of process, leading the court to initiate the Rule 2.1 dismissal procedure, stay the action, and direct the Registrar to issue notice and restrict further filings.

The Ontario Review Board recommended an inquiry to determine if criminal proceedings against Ms. McDonald, who was found unfit to stand trial for arson, should be stayed.

Following a joint recommendation from counsel and an assessment confirming permanent unfitness and low public threat, the court ordered a stay of proceedings.

The decision considered the seriousness of the offence, the salutary effects of the stay (focus on treatment, judicial resource savings), and public confidence in the administration of justice, concluding that reasonable, well-informed persons would not expect indefinite proceedings for a permanently unfit individual.

The applicants, charged with first-degree murder, brought an application seeking a remedy for lost telecommunications records from Freedom Mobile Inc. The police failed to preserve these potentially exculpatory records due to unacceptable negligence, specifically an erroneous belief about Freedom Mobile's affiliation with Rogers and its data retention policy.

The court found a breach of the applicants' s. 7 Charter rights but determined that a stay of proceedings was not appropriate.

Instead, the court ordered a strong jury instruction (Bero instruction) as a sufficient remedy, acknowledging the high relevance of the lost evidence but its indeterminate utility.

Her Majesty the Queen in right of Ontario sought to lift a stay on its $330 billion health care cost recovery action against three tobacco companies (JTI-Macdonald Corp., Imperial Tobacco, Rothmans, Benson & Hedges Inc.) and eleven co-defendants, which was imposed under CCAA proceedings.

Ontario proposed to temporarily stay the effects of any judgment.

The court dismissed the motion, emphasizing the need to preserve the status quo in CCAA proceedings to facilitate a global resolution of significant claims.

Allowing Ontario's action to proceed would alter the level playing field, distract from restructuring efforts, and impose significant costs, prejudicing other stakeholders.

The applicant commenced an application concerning a Shared Facilities Agreement (SFA) and the appointment of a property manager.

The respondents moved to dismiss or stay the application, arguing that the dispute fell under the SFA's alternative dispute resolution (ADR) provisions and was duplicative of existing litigation.

The court granted a stay of the application, finding that the core issues between the applicant and the primary respondent were arbitrable under the SFA.

The decision emphasized the strong policy favouring arbitration, noting that the mere invocation of an oppression remedy or the involvement of non-parties to the SFA should not automatically circumvent an agreed-upon arbitration clause if the pith and substance of the dispute is arbitrable.

The plaintiffs, Iris Technologies Inc. and ICE Wireless Inc., commenced an action against TELUS Communications Company for breach of contract and unlawful interference with economic relations.

TELUS brought a motion to temporarily stay the action, arguing that the court lacked jurisdiction or was not the appropriate forum, as the core dispute fell within the exclusive jurisdiction of the Canadian Radio-Television and Telecommunications Commission (CRTC).

The court granted a temporary stay, finding that the factual and legal underpinnings of the civil action and the CRTC proceedings were the same, and the predicate misconduct concerned matters within the CRTC's specialized expertise.

The moving party, Peter Grivogiannis, sought a permanent stay of a third-party claim brought by Pamela Downward, or in the alternative, an order for discovery from Rajan Kaushal.

The motion was based on the alleged non-disclosure of a settlement between Pamela Downward and Rajan Kaushal in the third-party claim.

The court dismissed the motion, finding that the settlement did not significantly alter the litigation landscape and that the non-disclosure was due to inadvertence rather than a deliberate attempt to mislead.

This is a costs endorsement following a motion and cross-motion where the court stayed assessment orders pending a negligence action.

The applicant argued the granted relief was not sought, but the court clarified that a stay was requested by the respondent and affirmed its inherent power to stay proceedings under s. 106 of the Courts of Justice Act.

The court determined that costs for the interlocutory motions should be "in the cause" and reserved for the trial judge, citing the intertwined nature of the issues with the negligence action and the many possible outcomes.

JTI-Macdonald Corp. (JTIM) sought an Initial Order under the Companies’ Creditors Arrangement Act (CCAA) following a $13.5 billion judgment from the Quebec Court of Appeal and other significant health care costs recovery actions.

The court granted the Initial Order, including a stay of proceedings against JTIM and other defendants, appointment of Deloitte Restructuring Inc. as Monitor, approval of administrative, directors', and tax charges, authorization to pay pre-filing and post-filing obligations, appointment of Blue Tree Advisors Inc. as Chief Restructuring Officer, and authorization to appeal the Quebec Judgment to the Supreme Court of Canada.

The court found JTIM to be an insolvent company to which the CCAA applies, and that a stay of proceedings was appropriate to facilitate a collective solution for all stakeholders.

The applicant, Lachlan MacGregor, sought a stay of proceedings under s. 24(1) of the Charter, alleging a breach of his s. 7 and s. 12 Charter rights.

The breach arose from police administering a taser in drive stun mode to his thigh after he was arrested, handcuffed, and not demonstrating violence, while exhibiting signs of impairment.

The court found that the force used was unreasonable and excessive, constituting a breach of s. 7 and s. 12 of the Charter.

However, the court declined to grant a stay of proceedings, determining that the case did not meet the 'clearest of cases' threshold required for such a drastic remedy, as there was no prejudice to the accused's right to a fair trial and alternative remedies existed.

The applicant sought further penalties against the respondent for continued non-compliance with court-ordered access, following a prior contempt finding.

The court rejected the respondent's arguments that an appeal automatically stayed the orders or rendered the judge functus officio.

The court emphasized the respondent's obligation to comply with existing access orders, expedited the respondent's motion to vary, granted the applicant leave to amend his application for sole custody, and awarded costs to the applicant for the respondent's inappropriate conduct.

The father brought a motion seeking a temporary order to stay the mother's application to change their son's name from William Jr. Ndze Fuhgeh to William Benjamin Ndze Fuhgeh Bernard.

The father's main application sought to prohibit the mother from changing the child's name without his consent.

The court granted the temporary stay, finding it was not in the child's best interests for the name change application to proceed immediately, as ongoing case-managed matters and the father's main application might clarify relevant issues.

Costs were reserved to the judge overseeing the father's main application.

This motion endorsement addresses two motions: one by 1746878 Ontario Inc. to stay a finding of contempt against it, and an oral cross-motion by Pollard Windows Inc. alleging continued contempt by Andrew Ferri.

The court applied the RJR-MacDonald test for a stay, finding no serious issue to be tried as 1746878 Ontario Inc. had previously admitted contempt.

The court also found no irreparable harm.

Consequently, the motion to stay the contempt finding was dismissed.

The court further dismissed Pollard Windows Inc.'s oral motion, clarifying that the prior order against Andrew Ferri precluded him from participating in proceedings but not from acting as a director of 1746878 Ontario Inc.