Sexual assault

The appellant was convicted of sexual assault, sexual interference, invitation to sexual touching, and assault with a weapon against his stepdaughter and sentenced to 8 years' imprisonment.

On appeal, the Court of Appeal found that the trial judge erred by treating the appellant's silence during a police interview as a "tacit admission" of guilt on the charges he did not explicitly deny.

This error was foundational, materially affecting the trial judge's assessment of both the appellant's and the complainant's credibility.

The court held that the right to silence, protected under s. 7 of the Charter, prohibits drawing an inference of guilt from an accused's choice to remain silent on some allegations while denying others.

The convictions were quashed and a new trial was ordered.

The Crown appealed a stay of proceedings entered after a jury verdict of guilty on one count of sexual assault.

The application judge found a breach of the respondent's s. 11(b) Charter right to be tried within a reasonable time, concluding that net delay exceeded the 30-month Jordan ceiling.

On appeal, the Crown argued that the adjournment of the first trial to await the Supreme Court of Canada's decision in R. v. J.J. constituted a discrete exceptional event.

The Court of Appeal held that the application judge was not functus officio after the jury's verdict for purposes of a s. 11(b) application, distinguishing prior authorities.

The court further held that adjourning a trial to await guidance from a higher court in a different proceeding does not constitute a discrete exceptional event under the Jordan framework, but rather is a factor in assessing case complexity.

The appeal was dismissed.

The Crown brought a motion to bifurcate its sentence appeal from the respondent's conviction appeal.

The respondent had been convicted of sexual assault of a child and sentenced to a conditional sentence of two years less a day.

The Crown sought leave to appeal the sentence as demonstrably unfit and argued that if the appeals were heard together, the delay would render the sentence appeal redundant, as the respondent would have served a significant portion of the conditional sentence by the hearing date.

The motion judge accepted the Crown's submission, finding that the anticipated delay constituted a compelling reason for bifurcation and that the issues on the two appeals were discrete.

The motion was granted.

The appellant was convicted by a jury of sexual assault arising from an incident where initially consensual sexual intercourse escalated to unprotected intercourse without the complainant's consent.

On appeal, the appellant raised three grounds: errors in the W.(D.) jury instructions, improper Crown closing submissions, and that a pre-trial s. 276/278.92 ruling led to trial irregularities amounting to a miscarriage of justice.

The Court of Appeal found no merit in any ground.

The jury instructions properly conveyed each pathway to acquittal, the Crown's closing did not cross the line into oath-helping or rhetorical excess, and the pre-trial ruling did not create any irregularity or unfairness warranting appellate intervention.

The applicant, convicted of sexual assault and serving a 720-day conditional sentence order with 425 days of home confinement, applied under s. 742.4(5) of the Criminal Code for two variations: permission to travel internationally to India for a non-immediate family wedding and to extend his community service beyond the prescribed 120 hours.

The court dismissed the travel request, finding it inconsistent with the sentencing judge's express intention to eliminate the applicant's travel lifestyle as a punitive restriction, and that permitting such travel would undermine the denunciatory and deterrent purposes of the CSO.

The court granted the community service variation, allowing the applicant to volunteer two days per week at a museum, as the restorative and rehabilitative purpose of continued community service did not displace the sentencing balance.

The appellant challenged multiple convictions as unreasonable, legally flawed, and affected by ineffective assistance of counsel.

The court found the evidentiary record supported the trial findings, identified no legal error, and held no miscarriage of justice was shown.

The appeal was dismissed.

The applicant, convicted of one count of sexual assault and two counts of sexual interference against his adopted daughter and sentenced to nine years' imprisonment, sought release pending appeal pursuant to s. 679(3) of the Criminal Code.

The motion judge found the appeal was not frivolous, as there was a serious issue regarding whether the trial judge materially misapprehended the relevance of the complainant's admitted fabrication of a prior criminal allegation against her mother.

Despite the seriousness of the offences and the length of the sentence, the reviewability interest outweighed the enforceability interest given the arguable ground of appeal challenged the credibility evaluation central to the conviction.

Public safety concerns were mitigated by the applicant's three-year compliance with his bail plan.

The motion was granted and the applicant was ordered released on conditions.

The appellant appealed convictions for sexual assault and sexual interference, arguing the trial judge erred by finding a proven absence of motive to fabricate or, alternatively, by improperly using the absence of evidence of motive to fabricate to bolster the complainant's credibility.

The Court of Appeal held the trial judge did not find a proven absence of motive but rather found no single motive could explain all disclosures, and that the absence of evidence of motive to fabricate was properly considered as one factor among many in the credibility assessment without undue weight.

The defendant, Nimal Ranatunga, was charged with sexual assault.

The complainant, M.F., testified that she consented to sexual intercourse only on the condition that a condom be used.

The defendant initially complied but then removed the condom during intercourse without M.F.'s knowledge or consent.

The court applied the principles from R. v. Kirkpatrick regarding non-consensual condom removal.

The central issue was the credibility and reliability of the complainant and the defendant, and whether the defendant had an honest but mistaken belief in consent.

The court found M.F. to be a credible and reliable witness and rejected the defendant's claim that he informed M.F. or that her subsequent actions implied consent.

The court concluded that the defendant failed to take reasonable steps to ascertain consent for unprotected sex, finding him guilty of sexual assault.

The appellant, a police officer, appealed his conviction for breach of trust and his 18-month conditional sentence.

He had been acquitted of sexual assault involving the same complainant.

The appeal challenged the conviction on grounds of insufficient reasons, unreasonable verdict, and inconsistent verdicts, and the sentence on grounds of erroneous "double counting" of aggravating factors and insufficient reasons for rejecting a suspended sentence.

The Court of Appeal dismissed both the conviction and sentence appeals, finding the trial judge's reasons sufficient, the verdict reasonable and reconcilable, and the sentence appropriate.

The defendant, charged with sexual assault, brought a motion for directions regarding the admissibility of text messages exchanged with the complainant.

The defence argued these messages, which depicted a different relationship dynamic, did not engage the Criminal Code's record screening regime (sections 278.92-94) as they lacked a reasonable expectation of privacy.

The Crown argued for caution regarding the complainant's privacy rights.

The court granted the defence motion, finding the text messages contained "mundane information" and thus did not meet the threshold for privacy under the record screening regime, allowing their potential introduction at trial without a formal application.

Appeal from conviction on five counts of sexual assault under s. 271 of the Criminal Code and one count of sexual exploitation under s. 153.

The appellant, a modeling agent, was convicted of sexual offences against three male models.

The jury was unable to reach a verdict on one count.

The appellant raised multiple grounds of appeal including failure to grant severance, failure to declare a mistrial, directed verdict applications, prior consistent statements, and Crown closing address issues.

The Court of Appeal dismissed all grounds of appeal and upheld the convictions.

The appellant appealed his conviction for sexual touching of a minor.

The trial proceeded on the basis of an acknowledged emotional intimacy between the appellant and the complainant, with the central issue being whether that intimacy extended to physical contact.

The appellant raised four grounds of appeal challenging the trial judge's jury instructions regarding the use of certain evidence, including out-of-court statements by the appellant, prior consistent statements by the complainant, and evidence of an uncharged incident.

The Court of Appeal dismissed all grounds of appeal, finding that while some instructions could have been more complete, the charge as a whole adequately conveyed the burden of proof and credibility issues to the jury, and no substantial wrong or miscarriage of justice resulted from the omissions.

The appellant was convicted of administering a noxious substance on April 17, 2014, and acquitted of administering a stupefying substance for the purpose of sexual assault and sexual assault.

He was sentenced to nine months in custody plus two years' probation.

On appeal, the appellant challenged both the conviction and sentence.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the conviction appeal, finding no inconsistency between the conviction and acquittals, and rejected arguments based on circumstantial evidence principles.

The court also dismissed the sentence appeal, finding no error in principle in the trial judge's rejection of a conditional sentence and no basis to interfere with the nine-month custodial sentence imposed.

The appellant was convicted of sexual assault by Justice G. King of the Superior Court of Justice on May 4, 2015.

On appeal, the Crown conceded that the trial judge committed reversible error in his application of the rule in Browne v. Dunn.

The Court of Appeal agreed with this concession and found reversible error.

The appeal was allowed and a new trial was ordered on the sexual assault charge.

The appellant's application to introduce fresh evidence regarding ineffective assistance of counsel was dismissed as moot.

The appellant appealed his conviction for sexual assault entered by the Ontario Court of Justice.

The Court of Appeal found that the trial judge erred by reversing the onus of proof, requiring the appellant to explain bruises on the complainant when he had no such obligation.

The court also found that fresh evidence in the form of a CFS report on a penile swab, which showed no female DNA present, was of sufficient cogency to affect the verdict.

The conviction was set aside and a new trial was ordered.

The appellant appealed an indeterminate sentence imposed for convictions of aggravated assault, sexual assault, forcible confinement, and uttering threats.

The sentencing judge had found the appellant to be a dangerous offender under the Criminal Code.

The appellant argued that a determinate sentence of 10 years imprisonment followed by a 10-year long-term supervision order would adequately protect the public.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no error in the sentencing judge's analysis and conclusion that the appellant's proposed release and treatment plans could not adequately protect the public.

The appellant applied for an order assigning counsel to act on his behalf on appeal under s. 684 of the Criminal Code.

The Crown acknowledged he lacked sufficient means to retain legal assistance.

The court considered whether it appeared desirable in the interests of justice that the appellant should have legal assistance.

The appellant faced a conviction appeal on a multi-count sexual assault indictment.

The court found merit in the argument that the trial judge failed to provide adequate assistance to the jury in assessing credibility, which was central to the case.

The court rejected arguments regarding propensity reasoning and the defence of honest but mistaken belief.

The court also found no merit in the sentence appeal ground.

The court ordered that counsel be assigned to advance the credibility ground only.

The appellant appealed his sentence of 15 months plus two years' probation for sexual assault.

He argued that the sentencing judge applied the wrong sentencing range, contending that the appropriate range for intercourse with an unconscious complainant was 12 to 14 months to three years, rather than the 21 months to four years range for forced intercourse with a spouse.

The appellant submitted that a sentence of six to ten months was fit.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the sentencing judge properly applied the sentencing range and that the sentence imposed was fit in the circumstances.

The accused was charged with sexual assault, unlawful confinement, and assault with weapons arising from an incident involving a former spouse following the breakdown of their marriage.

The Crown alleged that the accused lured the complainant upstairs under the pretext of reviewing financial information, restrained her with rope, whipped her with a belt, shaved her pubic hair, and engaged in non-consensual intercourse.

The accused argued that the encounter formed part of consensual sexual role‑playing and that he honestly believed the complainant consented.

The court rejected the defence, finding no evidence that the accused took reasonable steps to ascertain consent as required under s. 273.2 of the Criminal Code and concluding that the complainant did not consent to any aspect of the encounter.

The accused was found guilty of sexual assault, unlawful confinement, and assault with weapons.