Self-defence

The appellant appealed his conviction and sentence for assault causing bodily harm following an incident where he was shot at, chased his attackers in a vehicle, and engaged in a physical altercation with one of them.

The trial judge found the appellant acted in self-defence initially but used excessive force once the attacker was subdued, and concluded the bodily harm occurred during this latter phase.

On appeal, the court found the trial judge's conclusion regarding when the bodily harm occurred was unreasonable, as it could have happened during the car crash or the initial lawful struggle.

The court set aside the conviction for assault causing bodily harm, substituted a finding of guilt for common assault, and imposed an absolute discharge.

The accused, charged with murder, brought a pre-trial application to adduce evidence of the deceased victim's propensity for violence when intoxicated to support claims of self-defence and provocation.

The Crown conceded the evidence was admissible but sought to lead reply evidence of the accused's dated criminal record for violent offences.

The court held that the accused could lead the evidence.

If the accused limited the evidence to the period of May to August 2019, the Crown could not lead reply evidence of the accused's criminal record.

However, if the accused led evidence of the victim's propensity predating May 2019, the Crown would be permitted to lead reply evidence of the accused's record, provided the underlying facts of the convictions were also adduced to prevent undue prejudice.

The accused, a transgender woman charged with murder, sought to introduce expert sociological evidence regarding the prevalence of violence against transgender people to support her claim of self-defence.

The Crown opposed the application.

The court dismissed the application, finding that the proposed evidence lacked logical relevance to the specific facts of the case, was unnecessary as the expected reactions to violence were not outside the normal experience of a jury, and carried a potential for prejudice that significantly outweighed its minimal probative value.

The applicant, charged with the second degree murder of his son, brought a mid-trial Scopelliti application to admit evidence of the deceased's propensity for violence.

The applicant sought to introduce evidence of prior violent acts by the deceased, including incidents unknown to the applicant, to support a claim of self-defence.

The court held that evidence of the deceased's disposition for violence unknown to the accused is only admissible if there is some other appreciable evidence that the deceased was the aggressor on the occasion in question.

Finding no such appreciable evidence at the time of the stabbing, the court limited the admissible evidence to incidents known to the applicant and observations of their relationship by specific witnesses, while excluding the deceased's entire criminal record and incidents unknown to the applicant.

The accused was found guilty of manslaughter by a jury after fatally stabbing an unarmed, inebriated victim.

The jury rejected the accused's claim of self-defence.

The sentencing judge found that the accused had a safe avenue of escape and used excessive force, but noted mitigating factors including the accused's youth, lack of prior record, remorse, and an element of provocation by the victim.

The accused was sentenced to 6 years' imprisonment, less credit for pre-trial custody.

The accused, charged with the second-degree murder of his son, brought an application to have the defence of self-defence put to the jury.

The accused testified that his son threatened to kill him, prompting the accused to stab him.

The court applied the air of reality test to the new self-defence provisions under section 34 of the Criminal Code.

The court found there was an evidential foundation for the accused's reasonable belief of a threat and defensive purpose, and concluded that the reasonableness of the act must be left to the jury.

The Crown sought to introduce evidence in a pre-trial motion that the accused failed to report an altercation to the police, arguing it was relevant to rebut their anticipated claim of self-defence.

The accused argued that admitting such evidence would violate their common law and constitutional right to silence, which arises the moment events occur that could give rise to a criminal charge.

The court agreed with the accused, holding that the right to silence precedes any interaction with police and that the accused, being both suspects and victims, were entitled to remain silent.

The Crown's motion to lead the evidence was dismissed.

The appellant appealed his conviction for aggravated assault, arguing the trial judge erred by finding he continued to beat the victim after an initial punch, a theory not put to him at trial.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, holding that the trial judge's finding that the initial punch was unprovoked was supported by the evidence and fatal to the appellant's claim of self-defence.

The findings regarding a subsequent beating were therefore irrelevant and did not infect the rejection of the self-defence claim.

The appellant was acquitted of first degree murder but convicted of manslaughter for shooting his brother.

He appealed his conviction, arguing the trial judge erred in instructing the jury on self-defence and by allowing the jury to consider the lack of bruising on the deceased's wrist without expert evidence.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the self-defence instructions properly conveyed the requirement of a defensive purpose, and concluding there was no realistic possibility the jury improperly speculated about the bruising evidence.

The appellant was convicted of intentional discharge of a firearm and aggravated assault after shooting an unarmed man in his home following a drug deal gone wrong.

The appellant claimed self-defence, arguing he believed the victim was armed and part of a group that included another man carrying a shotgun.

The trial judge rejected the self-defence claim, finding the appellant's response unreasonable.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal and ordered a new trial, holding that the trial judge erred by holding the appellant to a standard of perfection, failing to consider the fast-paced and stressful context, and making unreasonable factual findings based on a blanket rejection of the appellant's credibility.

The appellant appealed his convictions for robbery, possession of a weapon for a dangerous purpose, and breach of probation arising from a drug transaction.

The trial judge had stayed an aggravated assault charge under the Kienapple principle.

The Court of Appeal quashed the robbery conviction but applied section 686(1)(b)(i) of the Criminal Code to dismiss the appeal by lifting the stay and entering a conviction for aggravated assault.

The court upheld the trial judge's rejection of the appellant's self-defence claim, finding that stabbing the victim eight times was disproportionate to the threat.

The weapons dangerous conviction was stayed, and the matter was remitted for sentencing on the aggravated assault conviction.

The appellant appealed his conviction for aggravated assault following a stabbing, arguing the trial judge misapprehended evidence regarding residue on a gate and erred in finding certain evidence confirmatory of the victim's testimony.

The Court of Appeal held that the trial judge reasonably relied on a police officer's opinion that the residue was blood.

Furthermore, the court found that the trial judge, who treated the victim as a Vetrovec witness, was justified in concluding that multiple independent items of evidence cumulatively confirmed the victim's testimony.

The appeal was dismissed.

The appellants appealed their convictions for robbery, attempted robbery, and assault arising from three separate incidents that occurred over a 30-minute period.

They argued the verdicts were unreasonable, challenging the trial judge's findings on self-defence, identity, and common intention.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeals, finding that the trial judge's conclusions were amply supported by the evidence, which established that the appellants acted together as common participants in all three incidents.

Leave to appeal sentence was also denied.

The appellant, a pub co-owner, appealed his summary conviction for assault causing bodily harm after pushing a patron off a barstool.

The appellant argued the trial judge reversed the burden of proof, misapplied the law of self-defence, applied an uneven standard of scrutiny to witnesses, and engaged in speculative reasoning.

The Superior Court of Justice dismissed the appeal, finding the trial judge properly applied the W.(D.) framework for assessing credibility, correctly analyzed self-defence, and based his findings of force on the evidence.

The offender was convicted of manslaughter following the stabbing death of his friend during a physical altercation over a television.

The court found that the offender did not intend to cause death but used excessive force in self-defence by arming himself with a knife.

After weighing aggravating factors, including the use of a weapon and fleeing the scene, against mitigating factors such as his youth, employment history, and strict bail conditions, the court imposed a sentence of 5 years.

With credit for pre-sentence custody and bail conditions, the net sentence was 3 years and 10 months.

The appellant was convicted of second degree murder and sentenced to life imprisonment with 15 years of parole ineligibility after shooting the victim outside a bar.

He appealed the conviction, arguing the trial judge misdirected the jury on self-defence, failed to leave the defence of provocation, and misstated witness evidence.

He also appealed the sentence.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the trial judge properly tailored the self-defence instruction to the key factual issue of whether the victim drew a gun first, correctly concluded there was no air of reality to provocation, and made no material errors regarding witness testimony.

The sentence was upheld as fit given the aggravating factors, including the use of an illegal handgun in a public place.

The appellant appealed his convictions for manslaughter and aggravated assault arising from a gunfight on Yonge Street that resulted in the death of Jane Creba by a stray bullet.

The appellant argued the trial judge erred by admitting expert evidence on how armed persons conceal firearms, by inadequately instructing the jury on the mutual gunfight theory of causation, and by refusing to leave self-defence to the jury.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no error in the trial judge's evidentiary rulings, jury instructions, or conclusion that self-defence lacked an air of reality.

The accused was charged with assaulting a peace officer after fleeing from an arrest and placing the pursuing officer in a choke-hold.

Due to prior Charter breaches, the Crown conceded the officer was not in the lawful execution of his duty and sought a conviction for the lesser included offence of assault simpliciter.

The accused argued self-defence.

The court rejected the self-defence claim, finding the accused's response of punching and choking the officer was grossly disproportionate and unreasonable in the circumstances.

The accused was found guilty of assault.

The appellant was convicted of assault with a weapon and possessing a dangerous weapon following a street fight.

His summary conviction appeal was dismissed.

He sought leave to appeal to the Court of Appeal.

The Court of Appeal refused leave, finding that the proposed grounds of appeal either did not raise questions of law alone, lacked general significance to the administration of justice, or did not reflect a clear error amounting to a miscarriage of justice.

The appellant appealed his conviction for assault, arguing the trial judge erred in rejecting his self-defence claim and that he received ineffective assistance of counsel at trial.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the trial judge's conclusion that the force used was unreasonable was supported by the accepted evidence of an independent witness.

The court also rejected the ineffective assistance claim, concluding that trial counsel's approach was reasonable and the appellant failed to demonstrate prejudice or professional incompetence.