John Ramsay

The Crown sought to admit two statements made by the accused, who was charged with second-degree murder.

The first statement, made spontaneously to a first-responding officer despite cautions, was found to be voluntary.

The second statement, made to a detective during a formal interview, was excluded.

The court found that the detective's comments—suggesting the accused might not get to tell his story in court and that his integrity was highest during the interview—effectively weaponized the right to silence and constituted an inducement, rendering the statement involuntary.

The applicant, accused of fatally stabbing his son, brought a Corbett application to exclude his criminal record from being adduced at trial.

He argued the dated record would cause undue prejudice and lead to improper propensity reasoning by the jury.

The Crown opposed, noting the applicant's credibility was central and he had already introduced parts of his record and attacked the victim's character.

The court dismissed the application, finding the applicant's credibility was crucial and a properly instructed jury could use the criminal record for its limited purpose.

The applicant, charged with the second degree murder of his son, brought a mid-trial Scopelliti application to admit evidence of the deceased's propensity for violence.

The applicant sought to introduce evidence of prior violent acts by the deceased, including incidents unknown to the applicant, to support a claim of self-defence.

The court held that evidence of the deceased's disposition for violence unknown to the accused is only admissible if there is some other appreciable evidence that the deceased was the aggressor on the occasion in question.

Finding no such appreciable evidence at the time of the stabbing, the court limited the admissible evidence to incidents known to the applicant and observations of their relationship by specific witnesses, while excluding the deceased's entire criminal record and incidents unknown to the applicant.

The accused, charged with the second-degree murder of his son, brought an application to have the defence of self-defence put to the jury.

The accused testified that his son threatened to kill him, prompting the accused to stab him.

The court applied the air of reality test to the new self-defence provisions under section 34 of the Criminal Code.

The court found there was an evidential foundation for the accused's reasonable belief of a threat and defensive purpose, and concluded that the reasonableness of the act must be left to the jury.

The accused, charged with the second-degree murder of his son, sought to introduce expert psychiatric evidence to support a claim of self-defence analogous to battered spouse syndrome.

The proposed expert opined that the accused's actions fit the idea of a pre-emptive homicide as self-defence.

The court excluded this portion of the expert's opinion, finding it unnecessary, beyond the expert's qualifications, and liable to usurp the jury's function in assessing the accused's state of mind and the reasonableness of his actions under section 34(2) of the Criminal Code.

During a jury trial, the Crown brought an application under section 9(2) of the Canada Evidence Act to cross-examine its own witness on a prior inconsistent statement.

The witness claimed to have no memory of conversations and events that he had previously detailed in a police statement.

The court found the witness's claim of memory loss was not credible, noting he could recall other significant details from the same day.

The court granted the application, permitting the Crown to cross-examine the witness on the prior statement.

The accused was charged with historical sexual offences against his daughter, alleged to have occurred between 1974 and 1979 when the family lived in Ontario.

The accused had previously pled guilty to sexual assaults against the complainant occurring between 1979 and 1987 in another province.

At trial, the accused denied any sexual contact during the Ontario years.

The court rejected the accused's evidence but found the complainant's evidence regarding acts of intercourse and fellatio to be unreliable due to inconsistencies and delayed disclosure.

However, the court found the complainant's evidence regarding fondling and digital penetration to be credible and corroborated by prior consistent statements.

The accused was acquitted of rape, sexual intercourse with a female under 14, and incest, but found guilty of indecent assault and gross indecency.

The accused was charged with dangerous driving causing death and failing to remain at the scene of an accident after striking a pedestrian at an intersection in Ottawa.

The accused claimed he fled in self-defence because the pedestrian was acting erratically and touching his car.

The court rejected the accused's evidence as fabricated and found his rapid acceleration and fishtailing through a busy intersection constituted a marked departure from the standard of care.

The court also found the accused knew he had struck the pedestrian and fled to evade liability.

The accused was found guilty on both charges.

The accused was charged with dangerous driving causing death and failing to remain at the scene of an accident after striking a pedestrian who had been acting erratically in front of his vehicle.

The trial judge held a hearing to determine whether there was an "air of reality" to the accused's claims of self-defence and defence of property under the amended provisions of the Criminal Code.

The court found no evidence that the accused reasonably believed force was being used or threatened against him, nor that his actions in rapidly accelerating his vehicle were reasonable in the circumstances.

Consequently, the court ruled that neither defence had an air of reality and could not be put to the trier of fact.