Michael Crystal

The applicant, convicted of first degree murder in 2007 and sentenced to life with 25 years of parole ineligibility, applied for a reduction in his parole ineligibility period under the 'faint hope' clause (s. 745.6(1) of the Criminal Code).

The screening judge, who was also the trial judge, found that despite the brutality of the crime, the applicant demonstrated significant rehabilitative progress, maturity, and community support.

Applying the 'reasonable prospect of success' standard, the court directed that a jury be empanelled to consider the application.

The Crown appealed a Court of Appeal decision that had set aside a jury's convictions of the respondent for indecent assault and gross indecency on the ground that the verdict was unreasonable.

The sole issue was whether inconsistencies in the complainant's testimony — as between his police statement, preliminary inquiry evidence, and trial evidence — were so significant that a conviction based on his evidence was unreasonable as a matter of law.

The majority held that the inconsistencies, while troubling, did not render the jury's verdict unreasonable, as the complainant offered an explanation (that counselling had improved his memory) and the jury was entitled to accept it after thorough cross-examination and a comprehensive, unchallenged jury charge.

The majority further held that the Crown was not required to adduce further evidence or expert evidence regarding the role of counselling in refining memory.

The convictions were restored; Brown and Rowe JJ. dissented, substantially for the reasons of Justice White below.

The accused was convicted of operating a motor vehicle while impaired by drugs (fentanyl and xanax) causing the deaths of two people, and criminal negligence causing death.

The accused crossed the center line at high speed and struck the victims' vehicle head-on.

The court weighed the gravity of the offence and the need for general deterrence against the accused's significant mitigating factors, including his youth, lack of criminal record, severe childhood trauma that led to his opioid addiction, and his extensive rehabilitation efforts.

The court sentenced the accused to 5 years' imprisonment and imposed a 7-year driving prohibition.

The appellant was charged with child luring after sending sexually explicit online communications to an undercover police officer posing as a 14-year-old girl.

The police used screen capture software to record the communications without prior judicial authorization.

The Supreme Court unanimously dismissed the appeal, though for different reasons: the majority (Brown J., Abella and Gascon JJ. concurring) held that the appellant had no objectively reasonable expectation of privacy because he communicated with someone he believed to be a child who was a stranger; Karakatsanis J. (Wagner C.J. concurring) held there was no search or seizure because the police simply received messages directed to them; Moldaver J. concurred in the result; and Martin J. dissented in part, finding a s. 8 breach but agreeing that exclusion of the evidence under s. 24(2) was not warranted.

A police officer was acquitted by jury of sexual assault.

The Court of Appeal set aside the acquittal and ordered a new trial, finding the trial judge erred by refusing to instruct the jury on s. 273.1(2)(c) of the Criminal Code, which provides that no consent is obtained where an accused, by abusing a position of trust, power, or authority, induces a complainant to engage in sexual activity.

The Supreme Court dismissed the appeal, holding that an instruction under s. 273.1(2)(c) was warranted on the facts, as it was open to the jury to conclude the accused used his position of trust and the complainant's intoxicated and vulnerable state to secure her apparent consent to sexual activity.

The accused was involved in a fatal motor vehicle collision while driving a rental car.

Police seized the vehicle and conducted a warrantless search, locating drug paraphernalia in a knapsack and downloading the vehicle's Crash Data Recovery (CDR) data.

Police subsequently obtained a search warrant for the accused's blood and medical records.

The accused brought a motion to quash the warrant and exclude evidence under s. 8 of the Charter.

The Superior Court of Justice held that while the Information to Obtain (ITO) contained misleading information regarding the knapsack search, the warrant could still have issued on the remaining evidence.

The court further held that the accused had no reasonable expectation of privacy in the CDR data of the rental vehicle.

However, the court found that the warrantless search of the accused's knapsack for the vehicle's keys violated his s. 8 Charter rights.

Arguments regarding the exclusion of evidence under s. 24(2) were deferred.

The Court allowed an accused’s appeal and restored a stay of proceedings for breach of the right to be tried within a reasonable time under s. 11(b) of the Charter.

Applying Jordan, it held that net delay remained above the 30‑month ceiling after proper deductions for defence delay and certain discrete events.

The case was not particularly complex despite voluminous disclosure, and transitional exceptional circumstances did not justify the remaining delay.

The Court emphasized that all justice system actors must proactively prevent and minimize delay and that Jordan must be followed as governing law.

The accused was charged with dangerous driving causing death and failing to remain at the scene of an accident after striking a pedestrian at an intersection in Ottawa.

The accused claimed he fled in self-defence because the pedestrian was acting erratically and touching his car.

The court rejected the accused's evidence as fabricated and found his rapid acceleration and fishtailing through a busy intersection constituted a marked departure from the standard of care.

The court also found the accused knew he had struck the pedestrian and fled to evade liability.

The accused was found guilty on both charges.

The accused was charged with dangerous driving causing death and failing to remain at the scene of an accident after striking a pedestrian who had been acting erratically in front of his vehicle.

The trial judge held a hearing to determine whether there was an "air of reality" to the accused's claims of self-defence and defence of property under the amended provisions of the Criminal Code.

The court found no evidence that the accused reasonably believed force was being used or threatened against him, nor that his actions in rapidly accelerating his vehicle were reasonable in the circumstances.

Consequently, the court ruled that neither defence had an air of reality and could not be put to the trier of fact.

The Crown appealed from the Court of Appeal for Newfoundland and Labrador's decision setting aside a jury conviction for sexual assault and entering an acquittal.

The Court of Appeal had concluded the verdict was unreasonable, applying a test of whether an experienced trial judge could have provided adequate reasons for conviction.

The Supreme Court held that the Court of Appeal applied the wrong legal test and failed to give sufficient deference to the jury's assessment of witness credibility.

The proper test requires asking whether the verdict is supportable on any reasonable view of the evidence, not whether an imaginary trial judge could articulate reasons for conviction.

The appeal was allowed and the conviction restored.

During a jury trial for criminal negligence causing bodily harm and failing to stop, the defence brought a motion requesting that the jury be permitted to conduct a view of the scene depicted in surveillance footage.

Both parties agreed that the wide-angle lens used in the video distorted distances and perspectives, potentially affecting the jury’s understanding of the evidence.

The court considered the authority under s. 652 of the Criminal Code and determined that a view may be ordered where it assists the jury in understanding the evidence, though it is not itself evidence.

The judge concluded that a view of the gas bar where the incident occurred would assist the jury and ordered it with detailed logistical and non‑communication safeguards.

A request to include a nearby gas station related to a different offence was denied.