Second degree murder

The offender was convicted of second-degree murder for beating his wife to death with a metal mallet.

The court considered the brutal nature of the offence and the fact that the victim was his intimate partner and caregiver as significant aggravating factors.

The offender's major depressive disorder with psychotic features, his lack of prior criminal record, and his admissions to police were considered mitigating factors.

The court sentenced the offender to life imprisonment with no eligibility for parole for 14 years.

The offender was convicted by a jury of two counts of second-degree murder, one count of aggravated assault, and one count of discharging a firearm with intent, arising from a shooting outside a Toronto nightclub.

The Crown sought 20 years of parole ineligibility, while the defence sought 15 years.

The court considered the devastating impact on the victims' families and the community, the aggravating factor of using a loaded handgun in a crowded public place, and the mitigating factors of the offender's youth and lack of a prior criminal record.

The court sentenced the offender to life imprisonment with parole ineligibility set at 20 years for the murders, and concurrent seven-year sentences for the other offences.

The offender was convicted of second-degree murder for stabbing his brother to death following a dispute over a loan.

The court considered the mandatory life sentence and determined the appropriate period of parole ineligibility.

Weighing numerous aggravating factors, including the unprovoked nature of the attack outside the home and the presence of the victim's wife, against mitigating factors such as the offender's lack of a prior record and refugee background, the court fixed the period of parole ineligibility at 13 years.

The offender was convicted of second-degree murder for shooting the victim and subsequently dismembering and destroying the body.

The Crown sought a 23-year period of parole ineligibility, while the defence sought 14 years with a further reduction for Charter breaches related to prolonged administrative segregation.

The court found the egregious post-offence conduct and the offender's extensive criminal record warranted a 20-year parole ineligibility period.

The court also found that the offender's prolonged administrative segregation violated ss. 7 and 12 of the Charter, granting a 3-year reduction.

The final period of parole ineligibility was fixed at 17 years.

The offenders, two brothers, were convicted of second degree murder for the planned and deliberate killing of an innocent 17-year-old victim, whom they mistakenly believed was associated with a group that had previously robbed one of the offenders.

The Crown sought a 22-year period of parole ineligibility, while the defence sought 13-17 years, citing systemic anti-Black racism and harsh pre-trial custody conditions.

The court found the murder to be exceptionally egregious, bordering on first degree murder, and sentenced both offenders to life imprisonment with a 20-year period of parole ineligibility, alongside mandatory weapons prohibitions and DNA orders.

The offenders were sentenced for their roles in the unprovoked shooting death of a random victim during an attempted robbery.

McDonald, convicted of second-degree murder, was sentenced to life imprisonment with 25 years of parole ineligibility, to be served consecutively to a previous life sentence for another murder.

Lako, convicted of manslaughter, was sentenced to 12 years' imprisonment.

The court denied Lako's request for enhanced pre-sentence custody credit related to the COVID-19 pandemic, finding insufficient evidence of unique personal vulnerability or measurable impact beyond that experienced by the general public.

The accused was charged with second degree murder after brutally beating a 75-year-old woman on a walking trail.

The accused admitted to causing the victim's death but argued he lacked the requisite intent due to extreme intoxication from consuming magic mushrooms and marijuana.

The court rejected the defence of non-mental disorder automatism, finding no psychiatric evidence to support it.

The court concluded that the accused's coordinated actions before, during, and after the attack, along with the targeted and severe nature of the blows, proved beyond a reasonable doubt that he intended to cause bodily harm that he knew was likely to cause death and was reckless as to whether death ensued.

The accused was found guilty of second degree murder.

The accused was charged with robbery and second-degree murder after forcefully kicking the victim during a robbery, causing the victim to fall and strike his head on the pavement, resulting in fatal brain injuries.

The trial proceeded by judge alone on an agreed statement of facts.

The sole issue was whether the accused had the requisite specific intent for second-degree murder under s. 229(a)(ii) of the Criminal Code.

The court found that while the accused had the subjective intent to cause bodily harm, the evidence did not establish beyond a reasonable doubt that he had subjective knowledge that the harm was likely to result in death.

The accused was found not guilty of second-degree murder, but guilty of manslaughter and robbery.

The applicant, charged with second degree murder, applied for a directed verdict of acquittal.

The Crown's case was wholly circumstantial, relying on evidence of animus, opportunity, means, and post-offence conduct.

The court applied the test for a directed verdict, engaging in a limited weighing of the circumstantial evidence to determine if reasonable inferences of guilt could be drawn.

The court concluded that the cumulative evidence could support a reasonable inference that the applicant was the shooter, and dismissed the application.

The offender was convicted of second-degree murder for the brutal beating of an 82-year-old woman during a home invasion.

The Crown sought 18 years of parole ineligibility, while the defence sought the minimum 10 years, citing the offender's Aboriginal background, mental illness, and the jury's recommendation.

The court found the offender posed a significant danger and set the base parole ineligibility at 18 years.

However, the court found that the 27 months the offender spent in administrative segregation constituted a gross violation of his s. 12 Charter rights against cruel and unusual treatment.

As a remedy, the court reduced the parole ineligibility period by 27 months, resulting in a final period of 15 years and 9 months.

The offender was convicted of second-degree murder for stabbing his female friend to death.

The Crown sought a 14-year parole ineligibility period, while the defence sought the statutory minimum of 10 years.

The court found significant aggravating factors, including intimate partner violence, breach of trust, the savage nature of the killing, and the offender's prior record for domestic violence.

However, the offender's severe mental illness at the time of the offence significantly reduced his moral blameworthiness.

Balancing these factors, the court set the period of parole ineligibility at 12 years.

The accused, charged with second degree murder, challenged the validity of a telewarrant to search his home and the admissibility of his statement to police.

The court found the Information to Obtain contained sufficient reliable evidence for the issuing justice to grant the warrant.

The court also held that the accused's statement was voluntary, as he possessed an operating mind despite his references to demons and curses, and that his rights to silence and counsel under ss. 7 and 10(b) of the Charter were not breached.

Both applications to exclude evidence were dismissed.

The offender was convicted of second degree murder after brutally stabbing the victim following a day of drinking.

The Crown sought 15 years of parole ineligibility, while the defence sought the mandatory minimum of 10 years.

The court weighed the offender's difficult background as a refugee and his efforts at self-improvement against the brutal nature of the prolonged attack and his failure to seek medical help for the victim.

The offender was sentenced to life imprisonment with no eligibility for parole for 13 years, along with DNA and firearms prohibition orders.

The applicants, jointly charged with first degree murder, applied for directed verdicts of acquittal on first and second degree murder at the close of the Crown's case.

The Crown relied on circumstantial evidence, including gunshot residue and the applicants' presence near the scene, to prove identity and intent.

The court found sufficient evidence for a properly instructed jury to infer that both applicants were involved in an intentional killing as either principal or aider/abettor.

However, the court concluded there was no evidence upon which a jury could reasonably infer that the killing was planned and deliberate.

The applications were allowed in part, with the court directing verdicts of acquittal on first degree murder and ordering the trial to proceed on second degree murder.

The accused was charged with first-degree murder after stabbing the victim 34 times in his basement.

The defence conceded the accused killed the victim but argued he was not criminally responsible (NCR) under s. 16 of the Criminal Code due to severe paranoid delusions and schizophrenia.

The court found the accused suffered from a disease of the mind but rejected the NCR defence, concluding the defence failed to prove the delusions caused the killing or rendered the accused incapable of knowing the act was morally wrong.

The court also excluded similar fact evidence of the accused's prior violence against women.

Finding a reasonable doubt on the element of forcible confinement required for first-degree murder, the court convicted the accused of second-degree murder.

The accused was charged with second-degree murder after bludgeoning his father to death with a hammer.

The accused had a long history of severe, poorly controlled schizophrenia and substance abuse.

At trial, the sole issue was whether the accused was not criminally responsible (NCR) under s. 16(1) of the Criminal Code.

Relying on unchallenged expert psychiatric evidence, the court found that while the accused understood the physical consequences of his actions, his severe delusions and command hallucinations rendered him incapable of knowing that the killing was morally wrong.

The court found the accused not criminally responsible and remanded him to a secure psychiatric facility for a Review Board disposition hearing.

The offenders were sentenced for their roles in an unprovoked and fatal beating of a stranger.

Patrick Smith was convicted of second degree murder and assault, and was sentenced to life imprisonment with a 12-year parole ineligibility period.

Matthew Moreira was convicted of manslaughter and robbery, and was sentenced to a total of 13 years imprisonment, less credit for pre-sentence custody.

The court considered the brutal nature of the attack, the offenders' backgrounds, and the principles of denunciation and deterrence.

The offender was convicted of second degree murder for killing his mother.

The jury rejected his claim that he was not criminally responsible (NCR) but recommended no increase in parole ineligibility.

The court found that the offender's mental illness played a central causal role in the murder, substantially diminishing his moral blameworthiness and reducing the importance of deterrence and denunciation.

The court set the period of parole ineligibility at the statutory minimum of 10 years.

During a trial for second-degree murder, the accused applied to introduce character evidence of the deceased to support a claim of self-defence.

The accused had shot the deceased, who was attempting to steal his truck, and claimed the deceased made a threatening gesture as if holding a gun.

The proposed evidence included the deceased's prior convictions for fleeing police, outstanding property charges, a withdrawn assault charge, and photographs of the deceased with weapons.

The court dismissed the application, finding that the evidence did not demonstrate a propensity for violence or the use of weapons, and its admission would not legitimately assist the jury while risking prejudice.

The accused, charged with the second-degree murder of his son, brought an application to have the defence of self-defence put to the jury.

The accused testified that his son threatened to kill him, prompting the accused to stab him.

The court applied the air of reality test to the new self-defence provisions under section 34 of the Criminal Code.

The court found there was an evidential foundation for the accused's reasonable belief of a threat and defensive purpose, and concluded that the reasonableness of the act must be left to the jury.