COURT FILE NO.: CR-16-1840 and CR-16-1831
DATE: 2019 11 28
ONTARIO
SUPERIOR COURT OF JUSTICE
B E T W E E N:
HER MAJESTY THE QUEEN
K. Holmes, for the Crown
- and –
RICHARD PEREIRA
S. Hebscher and D. Shulman, for Richard Pereira
HEARD: September 12, 2019
JUDGMENT ON PAROLE ELIGIBILITY
D.E HARRIS J.
INTRODUCTION
[1] Kathryn Horne was stabbed to death by Richard Pereira in the basement of his home. She was 58 years old; he was 36. In a judge alone trial, I found that Mr. Pereira was criminally responsible, and that the homicide should be classified as second-degree murder: R. v. Pereira, 2019 ONSC 2703, 155 W.C.B. (2d) 491.
[2] These reasons are for the purpose of setting parole eligibility pursuant to Section 745.4 of the Criminal Code.[^1] The general range for a murder in a domestic situation has been repeatedly stated by the Ontario Court of Appeal to be between 12 and 15 years: R. v. McKnight (1999), 1999 3717 (ON CA), 44 O.R. (3d) 263, 135 C.C.C. (3d) 41 (Ont. C.A.) at para. 48; R. v. Bajrangie-Singh, (2003) 2003 47384 (ON CA), 174 C.C.C. (3d) 351 (C.A.), [2003] O.J. No. 1166 at para. 42; R. v. Teske, (2005) 2005 31847 (ON CA), 32 C.R. (6th) 103, [2005] O.J. No. 3759 (C.A) at para. 104. In this instance, the defence requests the minimum of 10 years; the Crown requests 14 years.
[3] There are several aggravating factors in this murder: i. This was a shocking breach of trust. Ms. Horne was a friend to Mr. Pereira and a strong support both emotional and financial; ii. The murder was ruthless, savage and cruel, iii. Mr. Pereira has a correlative criminal record for offences against women.
[4] The one mitigating factor, albeit an important one, is that Mr. Pereira was severely mentally ill at the time of the murder.
A. THE AGGRAVATING FACTORS
I. BREACH OF TRUST IN A DOMESTIC CONTEXT
[5] Mr. Pereira’s act of stabbing Kathryn Horne to death was a breach of trust, a statutory aggravating factor under Section 718.2(a)(iii) of the Criminal Code. Strictly speaking, Section 718.2(a)(ii), making abuse of a spouse or common law partner an aggravating factor, does not apply. Ms. Horne was not a spouse nor a common law partner. However, the cases in the area of domestic violence leave no doubt that a spousal or common law relationship need not be present: see R. v. McLeod, 2003 4393, [2003] O.J. No. 3923 (C.A.) at para. 17. Parliament has finally caught up to this discrepancy in the “intimate partner” amendments brought in by C-75. Not all are yet in force--although they will be soon--but they are little more than a codification of the common law. Abuse of a “dating partner” is now included in Section 718.2(a)(ii) as an aggravating factor. In addition, a judge must take into account the “increased vulnerability of female persons” in the setting of domestic violence: see Section 718.201 of the Criminal Code.
[6] Breach of trust in the context of intimate partner violence requires additional weight be given to the sentencing principles of denunciation and, to a lesser extent, general deterrence. There are two essential reasons which lead to this conclusion. First, it is a notorious fact that a disproportionate number of acts of violence are committed in a domestic context. There are powerful emotional and social bonds fostered in intimate relationships. When the love, affection and interdependence go awry, emotions may turn with tragic consequences. Historically, there are also cases in which violence and abuse is common with weak and cowardly partners, almost always men.
[7] For both the affirmation of our core values and to ensure that there be no mistake about society’s abhorrence of domestic violence, the prevalence and persistence of the problem requires firm and resolute sentences.
[8] Second, it is part of our social compact that partners will support one another and nurture each other. There is a trust relationship between partners, a mutual reinforcement. Violence is a total repudiation of this trust. A breach of this trust requires sentences reflective of denunciatory objectives.
[9] The case law elaborates on the two themes of prevalence and the intrinsic breach of trust: see e.g. R. v. Lavallee, 1990 95 (SCC), [1990] 1 S.C.R. 852, [1990] S.C.J. No. 36 (S.C.C.), at para. 36, R. v. Kringuk 2012 NUCJ 20, 104 W.C.B. (2d) 359 at paras. 25-26, R. v. Roncaioli, 2011 ONCA 378, [2011] O.J. No. 2167, 271 C.C.C. (3d) 385 at para. 62, R. v. Pitkeathly 1994 222 (ON CA), [1994] O.J. No. 546, 23 W.C.B. (2d) 93, 29 C.R. (4th) 182 (C.A.)
[10] It was argued on behalf of Mr. Pereira that the breach of trust factor was diminished or eliminated in this case because of the nature of the relationship with Ms. Horne. It was said to be mainly a sexual relationship. Furthermore, there may have been some monetary compensation for the sex.
[11] I disagree with both the factual and legal premise behind this argument. On the facts, the emails between the two demonstrated considerable affection. Furthermore, Ms. Horne assisted Mr. Pereira in attempting to rid him of his demons by smudging and placing stones to “cleanse” his home. She gifted him a significant amount of money as his financial wherewithal was steadily dwindling.
[12] The evidence of sex for money came primarily from Mr. Pereira and is inherently untrustworthy. He flip-flopped continually on the issue in his testimony. Even if it were to be assumed that there may have been an element of sex for money--a proposition which I do not accept--this does not change anything in terms of the trust, mutual affection and the dependence Mr. Pereira had on Ms. Horne. The foundation for this in the evidence is incontrovertible.
[13] A criminal trial, and particularly this trial in which one of the partners was dead and the other was untrustworthy, is an exceptionally poor vehicle to explore the nature of a relationship. At the best of times, it is difficult if not impossible to know what goes on within the intimacy between two people. From what we know, however, Mr. Pereira and Kathryn Horne had been intimate for well over a year and saw each other regularly. This longevity itself establishes that there was a trust relationship between them.
[14] This case clearly falls into the domestic assault case law. The Quebec Court of Appeal in R. v. Kane 2005 QCCA 753, 202 C.C.C. (3d) 113 held that even if the domestic relationship was not “classical” because the spouses in that case were about to separate, the aggravating factor for spousal or common law partner abuse was still present. The Kane case, although on quite a different factual foundation, buttresses the importance of a broad approach to what is a domestic relationship and when a bond of trust is established.
[15] The rationale for treating violence in a domestic relationship as an aggravating factor is fully implicated in the case of Mr. Pereira. This characterization is clinched by the proximate motive for the crime--Ms. Horne’s announcement to Mr. Pereira that she did not want to see him anymore. This provides the definitive contradiction to any argument that the intimate partner violence and breach of trust factors ought to be diluted in this instance.
[16] The violation of trust and affection in this case is particularly egregious. Ms. Horne was a staunch support and friend to Mr. Pereira. He was a man who very much needed help and assistance. Ms. Horne’s devotion to him from everything heard at the trial and the sentencing hearing, was part of her generous and empathetic nature. Killing Kathryn Horne was a terrible betrayal. It was a deplorable violation of trust. This stands as the salient aggravating factor on this sentencing.
II. THE SAVAGE AND RUTHLESS NATURE OF THE KILLING
[17] The savagery of this crime was horrific and grotesque. There were 34 stab wounds, including the two fatal ones to the neck. As well there were 23 slashing wounds, some of them defensive. The scarf around Kathryn’s neck was partially stuffed into her mouth. It is impossible to understand how Mr. Pereira could stab and cut Ms. Horne over and over again in the way he did. She was a vulnerable woman. She fought hard against him, but he was much younger, bigger and stronger. He was armed with a knife; she was unarmed. While all murders are brutal, the cruelty of this murder is unfathomable.
III. MR. PEREIRA’S CRIMINAL RECORD FOR ASSAULTS AGAINST WOMEN
[18] The Crown tendered the applicant’s criminal record and the facts underlying three sets of charges at the trial. The criminal record was ruled inadmissible then but is now admissible on sentence.
[19] There were three sets of convictions for offences against women committed by Mr. Pereira. Mr. Pereira pled guilty to criminal harassment (x2), mischief, harassing phone calls and breach of bail (x2) for incidents that took place on June 21 and July 1, 2006. Mr. Pereira’s girlfriend at the time broke up with him in May of that year but Mr. Pereira continued to call her 9 to 15 times a day. He attended her workplace but was denied entry. He walked through the office in a rage looking for her. He damaged some property on his way out of the office. Soon afterwards, he was charged and released on a no-contact bail. Contrary to his conditions, he attended at the complainant’s apartment.
[20] The second guilty plea proceeding involved an offence committed December 6, 2007. Mr. Pereira committed a forcible entry with respect to another girlfriend. During the relationship, he made many unwanted phone calls to her. There had been two prior verbal domestic incidents between them. The complainant had just had a shower when she heard a knock on the backdoor of her home, followed by a loud noise. She went to see what was going on and saw Mr. Pereira on the stairs. He had broken the door frame to get in. She feared for her safety and called 911. She said she would scream if he did not leave immediately and he did.
[21] The last incident occurred on September 3, 2010. He assaulted another girlfriend. He had been living with her for approximately one month. The relationship had been deteriorating. He picked her up at work and they had an argument about his jealousy. She tried to get out of the car, and he grabbed her arm, preventing her from leaving. She bit him and he released her. She was able to get away.
[22] Dr. Iosif, who testified for the Crown was of the opinion that Mr. Pereira has a “maladaptive” attitude towards women. The pattern of violence against women including the murder of Ms. Horne confirms this conclusion. Mr. Pereira is a danger to women. His criminal record against women is a substantial aggravating factor.
B. THE MITIGATING FACTOR: MR. PEREIRA’S MENTAL ILLNESS
[23] In mitigation is Mr. Pereira’s mental illness. It was first observed more than 15 years ago by his brothers who testified at the trial. The many episodes since that time were thoroughly explored in this proceeding. The pertinent hospital records were produced and friends and family testified. To distill down the evidence for sentencing, the evidence from family members establishes that from about age 20, Mr. Pereira suffered from serious paranoia and obstinately believed he was being followed. He could not be persuaded otherwise.
[24] His long sporadic history of hospitalization for psychosis and paranoia began in his mid-20’s. The recurrent theme was of people following him, often people connected to an old girlfriend in Montreal who he had not seen for many years. There was no doubt that this was elevated to a full-blown psychosis when it reared its head. Dr. Iosif referred to these incidents in her reports as “micro-psychotic episodes.” It is true that they were intermittent but when they occurred, there was nothing micro about them.
[25] The incidents multiplied in frequency and seriousness in 2014, the year before the murder. The people after him were real. There were numerous 911 calls to report the threat they posed to his safety. He hired a private investigator to flush out the phantoms relentlessly pursuing him. The situation peaked in early 2015 when he was civilly committed twice within several weeks under the Mental Health Act. It is a tragic fact that his mental illness was not easier to identity and to treat during those committals.
[26] As alluded to in the reasons for judgment, no one could have predicted that Mr. Pereira was capable of such terrific violence. The entries on his criminal record were not minor. They suggested that he had a problem with women. However, he had never committed a crime in which he had seriously hurt anyone physically. No one should be faulted for what happened in this case, except of course Mr. Pereira himself.
[27] In the two weeks leading to the murder, Mr. Pereira’s mental illness escalated still further. He saw a bomb with a blue flame in his basement and called 911 to report it. It burned his finger he said. The bomb was a figment of his psychosis. It did not exist. He was charged with public mischief for making a false complaint of criminal conduct.
[28] Mr. Pereira was housed at Maplehurst Correctional Complex for the public mischief charge and did not get bail for a week. He continued to express paranoid thoughts in jail. He was released with conditions requiring mental illness treatment. Mr. Pereira would not have been released if there had been any evidence of a threat of violence. But there was not.
[29] The paranoia which enveloped him peaked on the day of the homicide, March 28, 2015. Mr. Pereira told Ms. D’Angelo that there was going to be a big explosion which had been predicted by a woman who was a psychic and whom he used to train. That appeared to be a reference to Kathryn Horne.
[30] Mr. Pereira and Ms. D’Angelo went to a veterinarian appointment to have one of his dogs fixed. During that time, Mr. Pereira felt that he was being watched and was constantly looking over his shoulder. When they got back to his house, Mr. Pereira said that he wanted to do a will. A very simple and basic homemade will was written and Ms. D’Angelo signed it.
[31] Mr. Pereira’s uncle, Luis Pereira, also saw him the day of the homicide. According to Uncle Luis, Mr. Pereira had previously said that a psychic had told him about a bomb and that there would be an explosion. He was constantly paranoid. Mr. Pereira went with his uncle to buy him a tank of gas for his car. Mr. Pereira was looking out the window at people who were supposedly following him. He did not want to be alone in the house because of the bomb.
[32] Mr. Pereira’s neighbour Claude Verra, at about 12 or 1 p.m. on the day of the homicide, saw Mr. Pereira outside his house with his dogs. He was agitated. Mr. Pereira said repeatedly that something was going to happen to him. When Verra said that he needed a vacation, Mr. Pereira pointed up at the sky as though his only vacation would be his own death.
[33] Lastly, there was the call by Mr. Pereira to the Canadian Mental Health Association crisis line at about 9:26 p.m. on the night of the homicide. There was no overt evidence of paranoia or psychosis in the call but it was quite literally a cry for help.
[34] In conclusion, when Mr. Pereira murdered Ms. Horne he was in the throes of psychosis and paranoia. However, it must be remembered that the proximate cause of the murder was not psychotic delusions but rather Ms. Horne’s announcement that she no longer wished to see him. Mr. Pereira was criminally responsible for his actions. He was capable of knowing and did know that killing Ms. Horne was morally wrong. Ms. Horne’s announcement led to a sudden combustion of rage.
[35] For mental illness to constitute a mitigating circumstance on sentence, it must be a significant contributing cause: R. v. Rytel, 2019 ONSC 5541, 158 W.C.B. (2d) 424 at paras. 37-38. That test is easily met here. Mr. Pereira was seriously mentally ill when he murdered Kathryn Horne. Although the specifics will never be known for sure, Mr. Pereira’s agitation, his extreme paranoia and the visualization of his own death resulted in a disordered and precarious mental state.
[36] As he was mentally ill at the time and the mental illness had a causal relationship to the offence, Mr. Pereira’s moral blameworthiness for the murder he committed is lowered from what it would otherwise be: R. v. Batisse, 2009 ONCA 11, 93 O.R. (3d) 643, 241 C.C.C. (3d) 491; R. v. Ellis (2013), 2013 ONCA 739, 303 C.C.C. (3d) 228, leave refused 474 N.R. 389 (note) (S.C.C.), R. v. Levy, 1997 4462 (ON CA), [1997] O.J. No. 3505, 103 O.A.C. 135 (C.A.), R. v. Chen, 2015 ONSC 3759, [2015] O.J. No. 3134 at paras. 26-30. So too is the need for general deterrence to dissuade other members of the community from committing a similar offence. The appellate authorities explicitly recognize that mentally ill individuals will not generally be deterred by sentences imposed. Nor is it logical or sound policy to attempt to send a societal message by a sentence imposed on a mentally ill person: see Rytel, at paras. 73-74.
C. OTHER CONSIDERATIONS
I. REHABILITATION
[37] Richard Pereira, following the murder, has been receiving top notch psychiatric treatment at the Maplehurst Correctional Complex. He is on a very high dose of anti-psychotics and is on other drugs as well. Dr. Graham Glancy a psychiatrist at Maplehurst, has been attending to him. Mr. Pereira has been doing well.
[38] Dr. Glancy is one of the unsung heroes of our correctional system. He testified at the trial. It was his evidence that there are about 160 inmates at Maplehurst with identified mental illnesses. That is about 10% of the total population. He treats them with help from others but there is not nearly enough staff to do the kind of job he would like to do. This appears to be a growing problem, one that needs immediate and sustained attention.
[39] It was heartening to hear from Dr. Glancy that in the penitentiary, treatment for mental health illness is much better. Mr. Pereira will be well attended to there.
[40] It is quite difficult to say with any precision what the prospects are for Mr. Pereira’s rehabilitation. Given the major mental illness he suffers from, and the importance of medication, that is best left to the professionals in the field. But on what we know now, his prospects for rehabilitation are reasonably good.
II. MS. KATHRYN HORNE AND HER FAMILY
[41] Ms. Horne was a deeply loved sister and friend. She was the oldest of 8 siblings. Out of their love for her and their anguish over her death, her siblings regularly attended the trial. The victim impact statements from the family admitted and read on the sentencing hearing were very sad and moving. Their hearts are broken.
[42] Ms. Horne was murdered just two weeks after the family buried their father. In Kathryn’s death, they have said that they lost something of themselves too. She was a very major presence in all their lives. She was their big sister. Victim impact statements were submitted by Heather Horne, Jill Horne, Gary Horne, Susan Lambert and Julie Watson. Kathryn Horne was ripped from them, irreparably tearing the fabric of the family and of the community. The family will forever suffer the profound pain of her loss in such violent circumstances.
[43] Kathryn was a loving, caring person who never said a bad word about anyone. She only found good in people. Her sisters and brother attest to what a force of life she was and what a joy she was to be around. She was always positive.
[44] Kathryn worked at Ernest and Young in downtown Toronto and was very successful in her career. She was well liked by everyone. Heather Horne worked with her there for 17 years. After Kathryn’s death, she could not endure working in the office without her and ultimately resigned. Heather is constantly reminded of her sister when she sees the office tower they worked in together and the condo building where Kathryn lived. The two were extremely close. They would shop for dresses together. Kathryn would choose books for both of them to read.
[45] Several of her sisters attest to having dreams of Kathryn. Jill Horne attests to nightmares in which Kathryn is screaming out for help but Jill is helpless to do anything for her. The fear and the suffering of her death will always haunt Jill.
[46] Gary’s statement was full of pain. There was a lot of anger against Richard Pereira too. Gary says his sadness is unbearable.
[47] Her sister, Susan Lambert, recounted how Kathryn saved her life when they were both young. Susan was just learning how to swim when she was pushed off a raft. She went down beneath the surface 3 times. Kathryn leaped into the water. Susan kept pulling her down under the water until Kathryn was able to coax her to try to swim on her own. Kathryn stayed with her until she was safe. Kathryn risked her own life to save her sister. This selflessness and sense of sacrifice was a mainstay of Kathryn’s character.
[48] I have no doubt that this strong desire to help others was very much a part of her relationship with Mr. Pereira. A cruel irony of Kathryn’s death was how a kind, peaceful woman--a generous woman--was killed in such a violent and brutal manner. Her death was everything she was not.
[49] Many people were traumatised by Kathryn’s death. Kathryn Horne’s family, of course, her work colleagues, friends like Sue Follinsbee who testified at trial, even those who did not know her personally. Those wounds can never be fully healed but it is hoped that those most directly affected, her siblings, can make some peace with what is ultimately incomprehensible.
[50] Julie Watson in her victim impact statement spoke about how the trial ripped open her hidden wounds. Kathryn’s death once again became very raw. The “wishful thinking” that Kathryn was just on vacation and was coming back soon has now disappeared for good. Her other siblings had similar feelings that Kathryn was still present with them. That is a sign of how intensely loved she was and how powerfully her presence is and always will be felt.
D. CONCLUSION
[51] The leading case on parole ineligibility for second degree murder is the Supreme Court’s judgment in R. v. Shropshire, 1995 47 (SCC), [1995] 4 S.C.R. 227, [1995] S.C.J. No. 52. Shropshire holds that there exists an easily displaced presumption for the minimum of 10 years in a second-degree murder sentencing (at para. 29).
[52] The fundamental rule of sentencing is proportionality. A sentence must be proportional to the gravity of the offence and the responsibility of the offender: Section 718.1 of the Criminal Code. In a laypersons’ sense, there really is no punishment truly equivalent or proportionate to murder, the most serious criminal offence known to our law.
[53] The mandatory sentence for murder is life in prison. It is up to the judge to set eligibility for parole from between 10 and 25 years: Section 745(b) of the Code. The case law gives guidance on the fit and appropriate ineligibility period in a myriad of different circumstances. At the same time, out of necessity, there is considerable subjectivity involved.
[54] Section 745.4 of the Criminal Code requires that account be taken of the character of the offender, the nature of the offence, and the circumstances surrounding its commission. Dealing first with the gravity of the offence, the aggravating features of intimate partner violence, breach of trust, a cruel and savage killing, and Mr. Pereira’s prior record for domestic violence against women militate against the minimum sentence. If it were not for Mr. Pereira’s mental illness, a sentence towards the top of the range for an intimate second-degree murder would be appropriate.
[55] The Crown argues that this case is like McKnight. In McKnight, the majority of the Court of Appeal substituted a sentence of 14 years ineligibility for the 17 years handed out by the trial judge. Justice Laskin writing for himself and Justice O’Connor (as he then was) held that 17 years was demonstrably unfit. Chief Justice McMurtry would have deferred to the trial judge’s sentence of 17 years.
[56] There were aggravating factors in McKnight that do not exist in this case. McKnight had previously attempted to kill his wife, he had carried on clandestine affairs with three other women, he faked a suicide attempt rather than getting help for his wife, and there were elements of planning and deliberation (see para. 46). In Mr. Pereira’s case, the killing was almost certainly spontaneous after hearing that Kathryn did not wish to see him anymore.
[57] Furthermore, unlike in this case, McKnight and his wife had been together for 20 years. The long relationship made the breach of trust even more severe. McKnight was both a doctor and a lawyer while Mr. Pereira could not make it through high school and suffers from significant intellectual deficiencies. Finally, McKnight suffered from major depression but, in totality, his mental illness was neither as longstanding nor nearly as severe as Mr. Pereira’s.
[58] No two cases are the same. This case is sufficiently distinct from McKnight that the 14 years ineligibility in that case is only of the most general assistance in setting the parole ineligibility for Mr. Pereira. The two cases are not comparables.
[59] The defence, for their part, relies on the decision in R. v. Salifu, 2019 ONSC 483 a case in which the sentence was the minimum of 10 years ineligibility. It too was quite a different situation. It was a case of great sadness. Mr. Salifu killed his mother in a fit of rage aggravated by serious mental illness. He loved her intensely and she loved him too. They were all each other had in the world. There was no real motive for Mr. Salifu to kill his mother other than the mental illness which had descended upon him. The same cannot be said in this case.
[60] The Salifu case involved a breach of trust but no where near the scale as in Mr. Pereira’s case. Matricide is not a major societal problem; intimate partner abuse unquestionably is. Mr. Pereira has shown some remorse in this case. But the outpouring of remorse that swept over Mr. Salifu immediately after killing his mother was overwhelming. His agonized cries began from the point when he called 911 to announce that he had killed his mother right through his evidence at trial and his interlocution before being sentenced.
[61] Sentencing is a subtle exercise. Nuances, sometimes difficult to fully articulate, play an important role with respect to the character of the offender and the nature of the offence. The Supreme Court has emphasized that sentencing is a “profoundly subjective” process: Shropshire at para. 46. The trial judge has the advantage of hearing and seeing the witnesses as opposed to an appellate court which reads the proceedings from the transcript.
[62] Appellant deference towards a trial sentence is to promote finality but it also is a bow to the trial judge’s preferred position. The emphasis in the cases on a trial judge seeing the drama of a trial first-hand as opposed to merely reading the spoken words from a transcript recognizes that there is visual and auditory information and shading which is absent from the printed page.
[63] Mr. Pereira’s mental illness must assume a central position in this sentencing. It reduces his moral blameworthiness substantially. However, having heard and seen him testify at length and listened to the statements he made to the mental health professionals, in my view, there remains considerable moral responsibility. This is particularly true in light of the motivation for this murder. The other aggravating factors cannot be ignored either.
[64] While I do not think for this reason that this is an appropriate case for the minimum, the 14 years advocated by the Crown lies near the top of the usual range. With the substantial contribution of mental illness to this offence, such a sentence would be excessive. Even with the significant aggravating features and Mr. Pereira’s poor character, a sentence in the lower part of the range for murders in a domestic context is dictated by virtue of the mental illness.
[65] Balancing the aggravating factors against the mental illness, in my opinion the correct parole ineligibility for Mr. Pereira is 12 years.
[66] In conclusion, the sentence to be pronounced on Mr. Pereira upon his conviction for the second-degree murder of Kathryn Horne will be life in prison with no eligibility of parole for 12 years. Orders will be made for a lifetime weapons prohibition under Section 109 of the Code and for a DNA databank order.
[67] Mr. Pereira’s family makes a compelling case for him to serve his sentence near Montreal so he can be near them. I have no power to order the correctional authorities to implement that suggestion. I am also reluctant to recommend it. The correctional authorities are in a much better position to weigh the various objectives and options. I am sure, in attempting to maximize rehabilitation, they will consider Mr. Pereira’s and his family’s wishes in making their decision.
D.E HARRIS J.
Released: November 28, 2019
COURT FILE NO.: CR-16-1840 and CR-16-1831
DATE: 2019 11 28
ONTARIO
SUPERIOR COURT OF JUSTICE
B E T W E E N:
HER MAJESTY THE QUEEN
- and –
RICHARD PEREIRA
JUDGMENT ON PAROLE ELIGIBILITY
D.E HARRIS J.
Released: November 28, 2019
[^1]: For a detailed history of Mr. Pereira and his mental illness, these reasons should be read in conjunction with the reasons for judgment.