David Steinberg

The three accused were charged with various offences related to the human trafficking and sexual exploitation of an 18-year-old complainant.

The Crown alleged that one accused recruited the complainant into the sex trade, acted as her pimp, and exploited her while she suffered from a severe cocaine addiction.

The other two accused were alleged to have participated in her exploitation, sexual assault, and procuring.

The court carefully assessed the complainant's credibility, noting her memory was affected by trauma and heavy drug use, but found her core allegations against the primary accused were corroborated by digital evidence and the recovery of firearms she disposed of on his behalf.

The primary accused was found guilty of human trafficking, procuring, receiving material benefits, advertising sexual services, unauthorized possession of a firearm, and uttering threats.

The second accused was found guilty only of receiving a material benefit from sexual services (selling her cocaine), and acquitted of the other charges due to reasonable doubt.

The third accused was acquitted of all charges due to the unreliability of the complainant's evidence against him.

A defence application for a stay of proceedings based on lost police cruiser video and unrecorded interviews was dismissed.

The defendant brought a motion under Rule 57.07 seeking an order that the plaintiffs' former lawyer personally pay the costs he incurred in defending the action.

The action had previously been settled and dismissed without costs on consent.

The court dismissed the motion, finding that the issue of costs was res judicata due to the consent dismissal order.

Furthermore, the court held that even if the motion was not barred, the evidence did not meet the high threshold required to award costs against a lawyer personally.

The accused was charged with sexual services offences and uttering threats.

After the Crown withdrew a sexual assault charge, the accused argued that the rape shield provisions under s. 276 of the Criminal Code no longer applied to his proposed cross-examination of the complainant regarding her prior sex trade work.

The Crown and the complainant argued that s. 276 or the common law Seaboyer regime should apply.

The court held that s. 276 does not apply to sexual services offences unless there is a connection to a listed offence, which was absent here.

The court also declined to extend the Seaboyer common law regime, ruling that the trial judge is best suited to exercise a gatekeeping role over the proposed cross-examination.

Following the dismissal of three related proceedings as an abuse of process, the successful defendants sought costs.

The court found that the plaintiffs' unfounded allegations of fraud and intentional wrongdoing, combined with their attempt to relitigate matters barred by prior releases, justified an elevated costs award.

The court awarded costs on a substantial indemnity basis, fixing the total amount at $227,532.72, apportioned among the plaintiffs and the various defendants to ensure proportionality and reasonableness.

The defendants brought motions for summary judgment to dismiss three proceedings commenced by the plaintiffs regarding a long-standing family business dispute.

The plaintiffs alleged fraud, conspiracy, and misappropriation of funds dating back to the late 1990s and early 2000s.

The court granted the motions, finding that the actions were an abuse of process as they attempted to relitigate issues that had been resolved in prior litigation and settlements.

The court also held that the claims were barred by broad releases signed by the plaintiffs in 2005, 2012, and 2015, and were statute-barred under the Limitations Act, 2002 and the Trustee Act.

The offender was convicted of second-degree murder for the brutal beating of an 82-year-old woman during a home invasion.

The Crown sought 18 years of parole ineligibility, while the defence sought the minimum 10 years, citing the offender's Aboriginal background, mental illness, and the jury's recommendation.

The court found the offender posed a significant danger and set the base parole ineligibility at 18 years.

However, the court found that the 27 months the offender spent in administrative segregation constituted a gross violation of his s. 12 Charter rights against cruel and unusual treatment.

As a remedy, the court reduced the parole ineligibility period by 27 months, resulting in a final period of 15 years and 9 months.

The accused, charged with first-degree murder, brought a pre-trial motion seeking a ruling that the recent amendments to the Criminal Code under Bill C-75 eliminating peremptory challenges operated retrospectively.

The accused argued that the right to challenge jurors is a substantive right.

The court dismissed the application, finding that the right to a jury trial is substantive, but the right to peremptorily challenge jurors is procedural.

Following recent jurisprudence, the court held that the elimination of peremptory challenges does not breach the right to a fair trial and applies prospectively to the accused's jury selection.

The accused was charged with first-degree murder following a home invasion where an 82-year-old woman was beaten to death.

At the close of the Crown's case, the defence moved for a directed verdict of acquittal on first-degree murder, arguing the jury should only be left with second-degree murder or manslaughter.

The Crown argued first-degree murder could be established through planning and deliberation or constructive murder based on forcible confinement.

The court granted the directed verdict application, finding no evidence to support planning and deliberation, nor evidence of a discrete act of forcible confinement separate from the killing itself.

The jury was directed to return a verdict of acquittal on first-degree murder and subsequently convicted the accused of second-degree murder.

The Crown brought an application to admit a video statement made by the accused to police following his arrest for second-degree murder.

The accused argued the statement was involuntary, alleging his will was overborne by persistent questioning, inducements, and delayed cautions.

The court found the Crown proved beyond a reasonable doubt that the statement was voluntary, noting the police did not offer inducements, the questioning was not oppressive, and the accused understood his rights.

The statement was ruled admissible subject to editing out specific prejudicial references.

The defendants in multiple related actions brought motions for summary judgment against the Pichelli plaintiffs, who were investors in a real estate development project.

The plaintiffs alleged that the developers (the Vuletics), a title holder (Kegalj), and the developers' lawyers (the Adairs) engaged in fraudulent and improper conduct.

The court granted summary judgment dismissing the claims against the Adair defendants, finding that the lawyers owed no duty of care to the non-client investors.

The court also granted summary judgment dismissing the claims against Kegalj, finding no relationship or duty owed to the plaintiffs.

However, the court dismissed the Vuletics' motion for summary judgment, finding that genuine issues of credibility and conflicting versions of the lot purchase agreements required a trial.

Following the dismissal of the plaintiff's action, the successful defendants sought costs.

The defendants had made offers to settle that the plaintiff did not accept, and the judgment reflected that the defendants achieved what they offered.

The court awarded costs on a substantial indemnity scale pursuant to Rule 49 and section 131 of the Courts of Justice Act, noting that the plaintiff's claim was specious and an inappropriate use of the litigation process.

The plaintiff was ordered to pay costs of $33,362.34 to one defendant and $24,712.82 to the others.

The plaintiffs in a construction deficiency action brought a motion to compel the defendant Monterey Park to provide a further and better affidavit of documents, specifically seeking income tax returns, financial statements, general ledgers, and working papers for a three-year period.

The plaintiffs alleged Monterey Park was the alter ego of the defendant Ridgevale.

The court dismissed the motion, finding that the requested documents were not relevant to the pleaded allegations, as existing productions already demonstrated the financial relationship between the corporate parties.

The court also held that the broad request for three years of financial records offended the principle of proportionality.

The accused were charged with conspiracy to commit robbery based primarily on intercepted wiretap communications over a three‑day period.

The defence argued the conversations amounted only to discussion or negotiation about a robbery and did not constitute an agreement.

The court reviewed the elements of conspiracy under s. 465 of the Criminal Code, emphasizing that the actus reus requires a true agreement or meeting of the minds to commit an indictable offence, though not all operational details must be settled.

Interpreting the wiretaps in context, the court found the accused had reached an agreement to rob a man seen counting money, conditional on obtaining a weapon and locating the target.

The subsequent failure to obtain the weapon merely frustrated the plan and did not negate the existence of the agreement.

The accused applicants brought a Garofoli application seeking to exclude wiretap evidence obtained pursuant to a Part VI intercept authorization, alleging a violation of their s. 8 Charter rights.

The investigation stemmed from an armed robbery at a pawn shop where the owner was shot.

The applicants argued the information to obtain (ITO) relied on unreliable confidential informant information and that police failed to exhaust alternative investigative methods.

The court reviewed the redacted ITO and found that, even excluding the contested informant information, the remaining evidence—including DNA matches and association evidence—provided reasonable grounds for the authorization.

A supplementary application regarding police obtaining contact information from Ontario Works without a warrant was also dismissed.

The application to exclude evidence was dismissed.