A. J. Goodman

The offender pleaded guilty to second-degree murder, firearms offences, and possession of fentanyl for the purpose of trafficking.

The murder involved a targeted public shooting with two firearms, resulting in one death and injuries to two others.

The court considered the offender's youth, guilty plea, and social context evidence of anti-Black racism, but found the aggravating factors, including elements of planning and deliberation, required a significant period of parole ineligibility.

The offender was sentenced to life imprisonment with no eligibility for parole for 16 years, and a concurrent 13-year sentence for the firearms and drug offences.

The applicant, a Black man, was stopped by police for allegedly using a hand-held device while driving.

After smelling cannabis, the officers searched the applicant and his vehicle, discovering a loaded handgun and drugs.

The applicant brought a Charter motion alleging arbitrary detention and unreasonable search based on racial profiling.

The court found the initial traffic stop was lawful under the Highway Traffic Act and did not violate section 9.

However, the court concluded that the subsequent safety search was not objectively justified and was influenced by implicit racial bias, violating section 8.

Applying the Grant framework, the court excluded the firearm and drugs under section 24(2) of the Charter.

The applicant was charged with drug offences following a police search of an alleged commercial cannabis dispensary.

The police executed the search warrant using a dynamic, no-knock entry without justification.

Following the seizure of significant quantities of cannabis and cash, the police failed to file a Report to a Justice for over 17 months.

Additionally, the police failed to reiterate the applicant's right to counsel when she was faced with an additional, more serious charge.

The court found multiple serious breaches of the applicant's rights under ss. 8 and 10(b) of the Charter.

Applying the Grant framework, the court concluded that the cumulative effect of the police misconduct warranted the exclusion of all seized evidence under s. 24(2) of the Charter.

The plaintiff moved for summary judgment to enforce repayment of a $250,000 loan agreement.

The defendant opposed, arguing the loan was modified by oral agreements and that the plaintiff's son had diverted the wood flooring intended as security.

The defendant also issued a counterclaim against the plaintiff, his son, and related corporate entities.

The court dismissed the motion, finding that the issues were inextricably connected to the counterclaim and that a trial was required to resolve complex factual disputes and credibility issues.

The defence sought to call a forensic psychiatrist, Dr. Peter Collins, to provide expert opinion evidence on the neurobiological responses to stress and the impact of military training on decision-making.

The Crown objected, arguing the evidence was unnecessary and within the common knowledge of the jury.

The court applied the Mohan framework and the Supreme Court's guidance on self-defence from this very case, concluding that the expert evidence was necessary to help the jury assess the reasonableness of the accused's conduct and his role in the incident.

The application to admit the expert evidence was granted, subject to certain redactions.

The Crown sought to introduce expert opinion evidence from a forensic pathologist regarding the sequence of shots and the positioning of the deceased at the time of the shooting in a second degree murder trial.

The accused objected, arguing the opinion exceeded the expert's scope of expertise and would confuse the jury.

Following a voir dire, the court applied the Mohan framework and gatekeeper analysis, concluding the expert was properly qualified and the evidence was logically relevant and necessary.

The court ruled the probative value of the evidence outweighed any prejudicial effect and admitted the expert opinion.

The applicant sought specific performance of an Agreement of Purchase and Sale for a residential property.

The respondent vendor refused to close the transaction after realizing that the contract stipulated HST was 'included in' the purchase price, meaning she would net less than anticipated.

The respondent argued there was a lack of consensus ad idem and unilateral mistake.

The court rejected these arguments, finding the contract language unambiguous and the mistake to be the respondent's own error in judgment.

The court granted specific performance, holding that the property was unique in the context of a hot real estate market and damages would be inadequate.

The accused was charged with drug and firearm offences following a traffic stop where police found cocaine and fentanyl in his fanny pack, and later found a loaded firearm in the police cruiser where he had been seated.

The accused brought a Charter application alleging unlawful detention, unreasonable search, and a breach of his right to make full answer and defence due to lost sally port video evidence.

The court dismissed the Charter application, finding the investigative detention and subsequent search were lawful based on officer safety concerns, and the lost video did not cause actual prejudice.

The accused was found guilty of the drug offences but acquitted of the firearm offences, as the court found the police evidence regarding the search of the cruiser unreliable.

The offender was convicted of second-degree murder for shooting the victim and subsequently dismembering and destroying the body.

The Crown sought a 23-year period of parole ineligibility, while the defence sought 14 years with a further reduction for Charter breaches related to prolonged administrative segregation.

The court found the egregious post-offence conduct and the offender's extensive criminal record warranted a 20-year parole ineligibility period.

The court also found that the offender's prolonged administrative segregation violated ss. 7 and 12 of the Charter, granting a 3-year reduction.

The final period of parole ineligibility was fixed at 17 years.

The applicant, charged with historic sexual assault and sexual interference, sought a stay of proceedings after the Crown repudiated a resolution agreement.

The Crown had initially agreed to resolve the matter with a peace bond, acknowledging the case was 'almost unwinnable'.

However, after a recorded conversation with the complainant, who expressed a desire for a trial to confront the applicant publicly, the Crown reneged on the agreement citing 'new information'.

The court found there was no new information and that the Crown had improperly suborned its public duty to the complainant's personal agenda.

Concluding this conduct fell into the residual category of abuse of process and undermined the integrity of the justice system, the court granted the application and stayed the charges.

In a criminal trial involving human trafficking and sex work offences, the trial judge issued a preliminary ruling on jury selection procedures following the Supreme Court of Canada's decision in R. v. Chouhan.

The court held that counsel, rather than the trial judge, would pose the challenge for cause questions to prospective jurors individually, without providing the questions in advance.

The court also permitted offence-based questions regarding the victim's race and occupation as a sex trade worker, and outlined the procedure for exercising the stand-by power under section 633 of the Criminal Code to maintain public confidence in the administration of justice.

The accused was arrested for drug trafficking and subjected to a strip search at the police station.

The accused brought an application to exclude the cocaine seized from his residence, arguing the strip search violated his s. 8 Charter rights.

The court found that the police failed to follow the Golden framework and their own policies, conducting the search in a non-private area and leaving the accused completely naked.

The court concluded this was a serious breach of s. 8.

Applying the Grant framework under s. 24(2), the court excluded the evidence, finding that the deliberate and cavalier police conduct outweighed the truth-seeking function of the trial.

The applicant, charged with several offences including sexual assault, sought a stay of proceedings under s. 11(b) of the Charter for unreasonable delay.

The total delay was 41 months.

The court deducted three months for defence delay due to counsel's unavailability.

The court also deducted three months as a discrete exceptional circumstance due to the unavailability of the trial judge who was seized with a first-degree murder trial, and nine months due to the COVID-19 pandemic suspending jury trials.

The net delay of 26 months fell below the 30-month presumptive ceiling.

The court found the applicant did not demonstrate meaningful steps to expedite the proceedings, and dismissed the application.

The appellants sought leave to appeal an arbitration award that upheld a condominium rule prohibiting the retail sale of cannabis from their commercial units.

The appellants argued the arbitrator erred in law by finding the rule consistent with the condominium declaration and by validating certain proxies used to pass the rule.

The Superior Court of Justice dismissed the motion for leave, concluding the alleged errors were questions of mixed fact and law, not extricable questions of law as required under section 45 of the Arbitration Act.

However, the court exercised its equitable jurisdiction to grant a temporary extension for the appellants to wind down their business and dispose of perishable inventory.

The applicant, charged with sexual offences against his grandchildren, brought a Rowbotham application seeking state-funded counsel.

The court dismissed the application, finding that the applicant failed to provide full and frank financial disclosure to establish indigence and had not made reasonable efforts to save funds for his defence.

Furthermore, the court held that the case was not sufficiently complex to require counsel for a fair trial, noting that the trial judge could appoint counsel to cross-examine the complainants under section 486.3(2) of the Criminal Code.

In a pre-trial ruling for a second-degree murder case, the court determined the appropriate jury selection procedure following the enactment of Bill C-75, which abolished peremptory challenges.

The defence proposed combining the challenge for cause and stand-aside inquiries.

The court rejected a combined approach but permitted a limited expansion of the challenge for cause questions.

The court established a procedure where, after the challenge for cause, a specific question is asked to assess juror competence, allowing counsel to make submissions on whether the judge should exercise the enhanced stand-aside power under s. 633 of the Criminal Code to maintain public confidence in the administration of justice.

The Crown brought an application regarding the jury selection procedure for a second-degree murder trial during the COVID-19 pandemic.

The Crown proposed that the Sheriff divide the jury panels into smaller groups in the absence of the accused, arguing the proposed 'B.C. Model' violated the Criminal Code.

The court dismissed the Crown's application, finding that dividing the panels in the absence of the accused would violate their right to be present at trial under section 650(1) of the Criminal Code.

The court adopted the B.C. Model, which allows for random selection and identification of jurors in open court with the accused present, while accommodating physical distancing requirements.

The accused was charged with possession of fentanyl for the purpose of trafficking.

During a police surveillance operation targeting another individual, the accused was arrested in a gas station parking lot after allegedly attempting to flee.

A search incident to arrest revealed fentanyl patches in his pocket.

The accused brought a Charter application arguing his ss. 8 and 9 rights were violated.

The court found that the police lacked reasonable grounds to either arrest or detain the accused, as there was no nexus between him and the target of the investigation.

The court concluded the arrest was arbitrary and the subsequent search was unreasonable.

Applying the Grant framework, the court excluded the fentanyl evidence under s. 24(2) of the Charter, finding the police conduct demonstrated a deliberate disregard for Charter rights.

The plaintiffs sued their former solicitor and his law firm for professional negligence arising from his representation in three underlying actions.

The court found that the solicitor breached the standard of care in the primary underlying commercial litigation by failing to obtain relevant evidence, failing to bring a motion to strike a certificate of pending litigation, and failing to communicate with his clients and opposing counsel.

The court conducted a 'trial within a trial' and concluded that but for the solicitor's negligence, the plaintiffs would have avoided substantial legal fees.

The plaintiffs were awarded $425,987 in damages.

The applicant, charged with first degree murder, applied for a change of venue under s. 599(1) of the Criminal Code, arguing that pervasive pre-trial publicity and community hostility in Brantford made a fair trial impossible.

The court reviewed the media coverage, social media comments, and community attendance at court appearances, finding that the publicity was not overwhelmingly hostile or prejudicial.

The court concluded that procedural safeguards, including an expanded challenge for cause, would adequately protect the applicant's right to a fair trial.

The application for a change of venue was dismissed.