Sean Doyle

The accused was charged with robbery and second-degree murder after forcefully kicking the victim during a robbery, causing the victim to fall and strike his head on the pavement, resulting in fatal brain injuries.

The trial proceeded by judge alone on an agreed statement of facts.

The sole issue was whether the accused had the requisite specific intent for second-degree murder under s. 229(a)(ii) of the Criminal Code.

The court found that while the accused had the subjective intent to cause bodily harm, the evidence did not establish beyond a reasonable doubt that he had subjective knowledge that the harm was likely to result in death.

The accused was found not guilty of second-degree murder, but guilty of manslaughter and robbery.

The accused, a 23-year-old first offender, was convicted by a jury of criminal negligence causing death and bodily harm after a high-speed motor vehicle collision that killed his best friend and injured another passenger.

The court balanced the principles of general deterrence and denunciation with the accused's youth, remorse, and rehabilitative prospects.

The accused was sentenced to two years less a day in custody, followed by three years of probation and 240 hours of community service.

The court also imposed a 10-year driving prohibition, finding that the recent Criminal Code amendments did not remove the power to impose such a ban for criminal negligence causing death, as dangerous driving is an included offence.

The accused, charged with fraud and theft relating to real estate investments, brought an application to stay the proceedings as an abuse of process and subpoenaed Crown counsel and civil litigators.

The Crown brought a motion to summarily dismiss the abuse of process application on the basis that it had no reasonable prospect of success, and applications were brought to quash the subpoenas.

The court analyzed the six grounds of alleged abuse of process, including claims of compelled self-incrimination, improper coordination between civil and criminal proceedings, and lack of independent police investigation.

The court found all grounds to be speculative, factually misconceived, or legally unfounded.

Applying the Cody and Babos tests, the court summarily dismissed the abuse of process application and quashed the subpoenas.

The Crown appealed a conditional discharge granted to the respondent following a conviction for assault causing bodily harm.

The respondent had repeatedly punched the complainant in the face outside a bar, causing severe injuries including broken orbital bones and a broken nose.

The Superior Court of Justice allowed the appeal, finding the trial judge erred by minimizing the long-lasting effects of the injuries and placing insufficient weight on denunciation and general deterrence.

The court held that a conditional discharge was contrary to the public interest given the brutality of the assault.

The conditional discharge was set aside and a three-month conditional sentence was imposed.

Following a jury trial where the accused was found guilty of robbery and related offences, defence counsel received anonymous letters purportedly from a juror raising concerns about the deliberation process and alleged bias.

The accused applied for an inquiry into the jury or a mistrial.

The court dismissed the application, applying the common law rule of jury secrecy and finding that the delay and anonymous nature of the letters made them too unreliable to warrant an inquiry or mistrial.

The offender, a habitual criminal with 62 prior convictions, drove a stolen truck through a red light while evading police, striking and killing another driver before fleeing the scene.

He was convicted of criminal negligence causing death, failing to remain, possession of stolen property, and driving while disqualified.

The court considered his Aboriginal heritage as a mitigating factor under the Gladue framework but emphasized the paramount need for denunciation and protection of the public.

A global sentence of 15 years' incarceration was imposed, along with a lifetime driving prohibition and delayed parole eligibility.

The accused was charged with criminal negligence causing death, failing to remain at the scene, possession of stolen property, and driving while disqualified, following a fatal collision.

The accused, driving a stolen truck, fled from police at high speeds, ran a red light, and struck another vehicle, killing its driver.

The accused then fled on foot but was apprehended shortly after.

The primary issue at trial was identity.

The court accepted the police officer's eyewitness testimony and the accused's post-offence conduct as proof beyond a reasonable doubt that the accused was the driver.

The accused was found guilty on all counts.

The appellant appealed his assault conviction, arguing the trial judge misapprehended evidence and rendered an unreasonable verdict.

At trial, a civilian witness testified to seeing the appellant assault the driver of a vehicle.

The appellant claimed he was the victim and that the driver's injuries, including blood, resulted from her breaking her fingernails while punching him.

The trial judge rejected the appellant's evidence, erroneously finding that the police officer never mentioned broken nails, when the officer had actually testified to seeing cracked nails with blood under them.

The Superior Court of Justice held that this misapprehension of evidence played an essential role in the trial judge's reasoning process for rejecting the appellant's defence.

The appeal was allowed, the conviction quashed, and a new trial ordered.

The appellant appealed convictions for two counts of assault arising from incidents involving his spouse.

He argued that the trial judge reversed the burden of proof and that his trial counsel provided ineffective assistance.

The summary conviction appeal court held that the trial judge’s reasons, read contextually, correctly articulated and applied the burden of proof and properly applied the W.D. framework when assessing credibility.

The court further held that the appellant failed to demonstrate a miscarriage of justice resulting from alleged deficiencies in trial counsel’s preparation, cross-examination strategy, or courtroom performance.

The appeal was dismissed.

The appellant appealed a summary conviction for driving with a blood alcohol concentration over 80 mg contrary to s. 253(1)(b) of the Criminal Code, challenging the dismissal of his s. 8 Charter application and arguing that the trial judge misapprehended evidence and failed to give adequate reasons.

The appeal focused on whether the arresting officer had reasonable and probable grounds to arrest and make a breath demand under s. 254(3).

The court reviewed the trial record and applicable authorities regarding sufficiency of reasons and the standard of review for findings of fact and legal conclusions.

It held that the trial judge’s reasons were adequate and that the officer’s observations of driving behaviour, odour of alcohol, demeanour, and physical appearance supported both subjective and objective grounds for arrest.

The court found no error in the trial judge’s reasoning or application of the law.

The accused was sentenced following conviction for robbery and being masked with intent to commit robbery arising from a home invasion.

The offenders entered an occupied dwelling at night while masked and armed with knives, confronted the occupant in his bedroom, and stole multiple valuables.

The court held the offence constituted a home invasion and emphasized denunciation and general deterrence as primary sentencing objectives.

While the offender’s youth, difficult upbringing, employment history, and family support were mitigating factors, his significant prior record and commission of the offence while under community supervision were aggravating factors.

A penitentiary sentence of four years was imposed, less credit for pre‑sentence custody.

The accused was charged with robbery and being masked with intent to commit robbery following a home invasion by three masked men.

The Crown's primary evidence was the testimony of the accused's former girlfriend, who stated he confessed to the crime hours after it occurred.

The court found the girlfriend's testimony credible and corroborated by circumstantial evidence, including stolen property found at a co-perpetrator's residence and a prior minor altercation with the victim's friend.

The accused was found guilty on both counts.

The applicants, charged with offences related to an armoured car robbery, applied for a stay of proceedings under s. 24(1) of the Charter, alleging a violation of their s. 11(b) right to be tried within a reasonable time.

The total delay from the laying of charges to the scheduled trial was approximately 49 months.

The court applied the Morin framework and found that the majority of the delay was attributable to the inherent time requirements of the case and defence actions, particularly during a protracted preliminary inquiry.

The total Crown and institutional delay was calculated at just under 13 months, which fell within the Morin guidelines.

Finding no unreasonable delay and no evidence of actual prejudice, the court dismissed the application.