Second degree murder

The appellants, a father and stepmother, were convicted of second-degree murder in the death of their ten-year-old son following prolonged abuse.

On appeal, the father argued the trial judge erred in denying a mid-trial application for severance after late disclosure of photographs.

The stepmother argued the trial judge erred in finding her pre-arrest and post-arrest statements to police were voluntary.

The Court of Appeal dismissed both appeals, finding no injustice in the denial of severance and upholding the trial judge's application of the law on voluntariness.

The appellant was convicted of second degree murder after striking the victim with his truck during an altercation.

On appeal, the appellant argued the trial judge erred in instructing the jury on the defence of accident, the use of after-the-fact conduct, and the fault element for murder.

The Court of Appeal agreed, finding the errors compromised the jury's ability to determine the fault element.

The Court dismissed the appeal from conviction but substituted a conviction for manslaughter and imposed a sentence of time served, as jointly proposed by the parties.

The appellant appealed his conviction for second degree murder and his 15-year period of parole ineligibility.

He argued that the trial judge erred in admitting a portion of his uncautioned statement to the police, erred in his Corbett ruling regarding the admissibility of his criminal record, and imposed an excessive period of parole ineligibility.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the trial judge's conclusion on the voluntariness of the statement was reasonable, the Corbett ruling was well-reasoned, and the 15-year parole ineligibility period was within a reasonable range.

The accused was committed for trial on a charge of second degree murder following a preliminary inquiry.

On a certiorari motion, a Superior Court judge quashed the committal and substituted a committal for manslaughter, finding insufficient evidence of the requisite intent for murder.

The Crown appealed the quashing, and the accused appealed, arguing he should have been discharged entirely.

The Court of Appeal allowed the Crown's appeal and dismissed the accused's appeal, holding that the Superior Court judge exceeded her jurisdiction on a certiorari application by weighing the evidence and failing to recognize that there was some evidence upon which a reasonable jury could infer the intent for murder.

The committal for second degree murder was restored.

The appellant appealed his conviction for second degree murder following his third trial for the offence.

He argued the trial judge erred by failing to conduct an inquiry into juror bias after receiving a note expressing safety concerns, by giving inadequate instructions on eyewitness identification, and by refusing to grant a mistrial over the Crown's closing remarks.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the jury's withdrawal of the note negated the need for an inquiry, the identification instructions were adequate, and the trial judge properly exercised his discretion in addressing the Crown's remarks with an ameliorative instruction.

The appellants were convicted in relation to the death of a young man who was assaulted twice in one night—first by Manasseri inside a bar, and then by Kenny outside.

Manasseri was convicted of second-degree murder, and Kenny of assault causing bodily harm.

On appeal, both argued their charges were improperly joined.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the joinder ground.

However, the Court admitted fresh expert medical evidence regarding the cause of death, quashed Manasseri's conviction, and ordered a new trial.

For Kenny, the Court applied the newly released Jordan framework, found the 68-month delay unreasonable, and entered a stay of proceedings.

The appellants attended a house party armed with loaded handguns.

During an altercation, shots were fired, resulting in one death and two injuries.

Both were convicted of second degree murder and aggravated assault.

On appeal, the Court of Appeal found that the trial judge misdirected the jury on the mens rea for aiding and abetting murder, failed to leave manslaughter as a lesser included offence for the aider or abettor, and improperly instructed the jury on the use of post-offence conduct evidence.

The appeals were allowed, the convictions quashed, and a new trial ordered.

The appellant was convicted of second-degree murder after stabbing his neighbour in a rooming house.

On appeal, he argued the trial judge erred by admitting hearsay statements made by the deceased victim to third parties, which suggested the appellant had previously assaulted and stalked her.

The Court of Appeal found that the hearsay statements lacked sufficient indicia of reliability and should not have been admitted under the principled exception to the hearsay rule.

Because the improperly admitted evidence was central to the Crown's case on intent and animus, the appeal was allowed and a new trial ordered.

The appellants were convicted of second degree murder, attempted murder, and aggravated assault following a drive-by shooting that occurred after they were robbed at a flea market.

They appealed their convictions on multiple grounds, including the jury selection process, the trial judge's refusal to leave self-defence and provocation with the jury, jury instructions, and evidentiary rulings.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the conviction appeals, finding no reversible errors.

However, the Court allowed the sentence appeals, reducing the periods of parole ineligibility and the sentences for attempted murder and aggravated assault, as the trial judge had erred in principle by exceeding the Crown's sentencing position without notice and failing to give adequate weight to the appellants' youth and rehabilitative prospects.

The appellant was convicted of second-degree murder and using a firearm while committing an indictable offence after shooting the deceased at a party.

The appellant claimed self-defence, testifying that the deceased had threatened him and appeared to be reaching for a gun.

On appeal, the appellant argued that the trial judge made several errors in instructing the jury on self-defence.

The Court of Appeal agreed, finding that the trial judge failed to properly instruct the jury on the issue of retreat, reversed the burden of proof regarding the third element of self-defence, and failed to provide a Baxter instruction.

The appeal was allowed, the convictions were set aside, and a new trial was ordered.

The appellants appealed their convictions for second degree murder and obstruction of justice.

The primary grounds of appeal related to the reasonableness of the verdict, the trial judge's refusal to admit third-party suspect evidence, jury instructions on out-of-court statements and identification evidence, and alleged Crown misconduct during cross-examination and closing addresses.

The Court of Appeal found that while the Crown's conduct fell below the expected standard of propriety, the trial judge's strong corrective instructions were sufficient to cure the damage and preserve the right to a fair trial.

The appeal was dismissed.

The appellant was convicted of second-degree murder of his 81-year-old neighbour and sentenced to life imprisonment with a 15-year parole ineligibility period.

On appeal, he argued the trial judge erred in his instructions regarding bad character evidence and post-offence conduct, including the appellant's failure to call the police and his use of the victim's credit card.

The Court of Appeal found no errors in the jury instructions, noting the trial judge carefully reviewed competing inferences.

The sentence appeal was also dismissed, with the court finding the parole ineligibility period appropriate given the brutality of the murder.

The appellant appealed his conviction for second degree murder and the sentence increasing his period of parole ineligibility.

On the conviction appeal, the appellant argued the trial judge erred in instructing the jury on intoxication and the required intention for murder.

The Court of Appeal found the trial judge properly instructed the jury on the relevance of intoxication to mens rea and adequately summarized the defence's position regarding an alcohol-induced blackout.

On the sentence appeal, the Court found no error in the trial judge's exercise of discretion in weighing aggravating and mitigating factors.

Both the conviction and sentence appeals were dismissed.

The appellant was convicted of second degree murder and possession of a weapon dangerous to the public peace following the stabbing death of his girlfriend.

At trial, the Crown relied heavily on an eyewitness who was highly intoxicated at the time of the offence.

The appellant was also found in a near-comatose state of alcohol intoxication at the scene.

On appeal, the appellant argued the trial judge failed to adequately instruct the jury on how the eyewitness's reliability and the appellant's extreme intoxication related to reasonable doubt and the requisite intent for murder.

The appellant also argued the verdict was unreasonable.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the jury instructions were adequate and the verdict was one a properly instructed jury could reasonably render.

The appellant was convicted of second degree murder after strangling the victim.

He appealed, arguing the trial judge erred in jury instructions regarding intent and the partial defence of provocation, and that the Crown improperly cross-examined him on his right to silence.

The Court of Appeal found no error in the cross-examination but held that the trial judge erred by instructing the jury that the appellant's after-the-fact conduct (hiding the body and lying) could be used to infer the requisite intent for murder without proper qualification.

The trial judge also erred in the provocation instruction by attributing the appellant's size and athletic ability to the 'ordinary person' test.

The curative proviso could not be applied, and a new trial was ordered.

The appellant was convicted of second-degree murder after shooting a man during a drug transaction.

At trial, the judge charged the jury on self-defence under s. 34(2) of the Criminal Code but not under s. 35.

On appeal, the appellant argued the trial judge misdirected the jury on the unlawful assault requirement of s. 34(2) and erred by failing to leave s. 35 with the jury.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no error in the jury instructions on s. 34(2) when read as a whole, and concluding there was no air of reality to a s. 35 defence because the appellant, as the initial aggressor drawing a loaded handgun, could not claim he commenced the assault without intent to cause death or grievous bodily harm.

The appellant was convicted of second degree murder and sentenced to life imprisonment with 15 years of parole ineligibility after shooting the victim outside a bar.

He appealed the conviction, arguing the trial judge misdirected the jury on self-defence, failed to leave the defence of provocation, and misstated witness evidence.

He also appealed the sentence.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the trial judge properly tailored the self-defence instruction to the key factual issue of whether the victim drew a gun first, correctly concluded there was no air of reality to provocation, and made no material errors regarding witness testimony.

The sentence was upheld as fit given the aggravating factors, including the use of an illegal handgun in a public place.

The appellant was convicted of second-degree murder for stabbing his wife and sentenced to life imprisonment with 15 years of parole ineligibility.

He appealed the conviction on grounds including an inflammatory Crown opening, failure to repeat a W.D. instruction for a jury question, misstating expert psychiatric evidence, and errors in the provocation charge.

He also appealed the sentence.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the conviction appeal, finding the trial judge's instructions adequately addressed the Crown's opening and the jury's questions, and that the charge on provocation and expert evidence was fair.

The sentence appeal was also dismissed, as the trial judge's balancing of aggravating and mitigating factors was entitled to deference.

The appellant was convicted of second degree murder following a stabbing at a nightclub.

At trial, he claimed he acted in self-defence.

On appeal, he argued the trial judge erred by reversing a ruling that excluded prejudicial portions of his police statements, and by improperly instructing the jury on post-offence conduct and exculpatory statements.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the trial judge properly reweighed the probative value of the police statements after the defence put the officer's conduct in issue, and that the jury instructions on post-offence conduct and reasonable doubt were sufficient.

The appellant was convicted of second-degree murder and sentenced to life imprisonment without parole eligibility for 15 years after shooting a bystander outside a tavern.

He appealed his conviction, arguing improper Crown cross-examination and errors in the trial judge's instructions on intent and provocation.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the conviction appeal, finding no reversible errors in the trial judge's charge or the Crown's conduct.

However, the sentence appeal was allowed, and the period of parole ineligibility was reduced to 12 years, as the trial judge failed to give adequate weight to the appellant's lack of criminal record and potential for rehabilitation.