Impaired driving

The appellant, convicted of operating a motor vehicle while impaired by lorazepam, appealed the conviction, arguing the trial judge erred by "entering the arena" through her own questioning, misapprehending evidence, and rejecting unchallenged testimony regarding her claim of accidental ingestion due to illness, fatigue, and rushing.

The Superior Court dismissed the appeal, finding the trial judge's questions permissible for clarification, her assessment of the appellant's credibility reasonable, and her reasons for rejecting the defence sufficient.

The court affirmed that the trial judge did not misapprehend the evidence and was entitled to reject the appellant's testimony for articulated reasons, even if certain aspects were largely unchallenged in cross-examination.

This is an appeal of a conviction for operating a motor vehicle with a blood alcohol concentration exceeding 80 mg.

The appellant alleged multiple Charter breaches, including an invalid Approved Screening Device (ASD) demand due to the officer not having the device present, delays in informing and facilitating the right to counsel, and a privacy breach during washroom use at the police station.

The appeal court, applying the Supreme Court of Canada's decision in R. v. Breault, found the ASD demand invalid, leading to cascading Charter breaches (sections 8, 9, 10(b)).

Despite these breaches, which were deemed unintentional and situational, the court dismissed the appeal, concluding that the highly reliable breathalyzer evidence should not be excluded under section 24(2) of the Charter, given the strong societal interest in prosecuting impaired driving.

The Crown appealed the acquittal of the respondent on an "over 80" charge, following a trial judge's finding of a s. 10(b) Charter breach and exclusion of breath results.

The trial judge had accepted the respondent's testimony that her request to call her mother was "obvious" in its purpose to facilitate finding a lawyer.

The appeal court found that the trial judge erred by failing to make a critical factual finding: whether the police officer knew or assumed the respondent's request to call a third party was for the purpose of facilitating her right to counsel.

Precedent requires the detainee to articulate this purpose, or for the officer to have such knowledge/assumption.

Without this finding, the s. 10(b) breach could not be established.

The appeal was allowed, and a new trial was ordered for the "over 80" charge.

The applicant, Randall Devries, sought to exclude evidence obtained by police, arguing that their entry onto his property, subsequent arrest, and vehicle search violated his Charter rights under sections 8 and 9.

The court found that the police were authorized to enter the property to investigate impaired driving complaints, and the arrest and search incident to arrest were lawful.

The application to exclude evidence was dismissed.

The Crown appealed the acquittal of the respondent on a charge of impaired driving (over 80 mg) after the trial judge excluded breathalyzer evidence due to a s. 10(b) Charter violation.

The trial judge found a breach because the breathalyzer technician failed to follow up on the respondent's "equivocal" non-verbal response (shrug and nod) when asked if he was satisfied with duty counsel.

The appeal court found the trial judge erred in law and fact, holding that an equivocal response, especially when the respondent himself testified he intended to convey satisfaction, does not constitute an "objectively observable indicator" requiring further police inquiry under s. 10(b).

Consequently, the s. 24(2) Charter exclusion of evidence was also found to be in error as the breach did not seriously impact the respondent's Charter-protected interests.

The appeal was allowed, the acquittal set aside, and a verdict of guilty entered.

The appellant appealed his conviction for impaired driving, arguing a violation of his s. 11(b) Charter rights due to unreasonable delay, particularly concerning the impact of the COVID-19 pandemic, and errors in the trial judge's assessment of evidence.

The court dismissed the appeal, affirming the trial judge's finding that the net delay of 14 months and 9 days was reasonable given the exceptional circumstances of the pandemic and the local court context.

The court also upheld the trial judge's credibility findings and assessment of evidence, finding no palpable and overriding error.

This is a summary conviction appeal from convictions for over-80 impaired driving and failing to remain at the scene of an accident.

The appellant challenged the trial judge's finding of identity, arguing his post-arrest utterances were ambiguous and that the trial judge reversed the burden of proof.

The appellant also challenged the dismissal of his s. 8 Charter application, asserting a lack of reasonable and probable grounds for detention and arrest.

The appellate court dismissed the appeal, affirming the trial judge's common-sense interpretation of the utterances as an admission of driving and upholding the finding of reasonable and probable grounds for arrest based on the totality of evidence.

The accused, Craig Willoughby, charged with impaired and dangerous driving causing bodily harm, brought a Charter application to exclude a blood sample.

The court found violations of Willoughby's s. 8 (unreasonable search or seizure) and s. 9 (arbitrary detention) Charter rights, as the police officer lacked subjective and objective reasonable and probable grounds for arrest and the subsequent blood demand.

While the s. 10(b) right to counsel was not violated, the court determined that the seriousness of the police misconduct and the profound impact on the accused's bodily integrity outweighed society's interest in admitting the evidence.

Consequently, the blood sample was excluded under s. 24(2) of the Charter.

The appellant appealed convictions for impaired operation and having a blood alcohol concentration over the legal limit, arguing police lacked reasonable grounds for arrest (sections 8 and 9 Charter) and that delayed advice of the right to counsel (sections 10(a) and 10(b) Charter) warranted exclusion of evidence under section 24(2).

The court found police had reasonable grounds for arrest.

While acknowledging Charter breaches due to interpreter delay, the court re-evaluated the section 24(2) analysis, finding the trial judge erred in underestimating the breach's impact but ultimately concluding that admission of evidence would not bring the administration of justice into disrepute.

The appeal was dismissed.

The Crown appealed the respondent's acquittal on an impaired driving charge, which resulted from the trial judge's exclusion of breath test evidence.

The trial judge found two Charter breaches: arbitrary detention (s. 9) when the respondent was placed in a police vehicle for an ASD test without reasonable necessity, and unreasonable search/seizure (s. 7 and s. 8) due to video monitoring and recording of the respondent using the toilet in her cell, where the provided privacy gown was ineffective.

The appeal court upheld the trial judge's findings of Charter violations, affirming that the increased restriction on liberty required reasonable necessity and that a reasonable expectation of privacy exists even in police cell toilets.

The court also upheld the exclusion of the breath test evidence under s. 24(2) of the Charter, finding a sufficient connection between the breaches and the evidence, and that the seriousness of the s. 8 breach warranted exclusion.

The Crown's appeal was dismissed.

The Crown appealed a trial judge's decision to stay impaired driving and over 80 charges against the respondent.

The trial judge found a s. 8 Charter breach due to intrusive cell camera monitoring of the respondent using the toilet, despite prior judicial commentary on the issue.

The appeal court upheld the trial judge's finding of a s. 8 breach and the decision to exclude evidence and stay the charges, emphasizing the seriousness of the state misconduct and the lack of remedial action by the police detachment.

The Appellant, Jacques Dansereau, appealed his conviction for operating a conveyance with a blood alcohol concentration exceeding 80 mg, arguing a miscarriage of justice.

He contended that the trial judge accepted an uninformed guilty plea without a proper plea inquiry and sought to admit fresh evidence regarding his state of mind and lack of memory due to a head injury.

The court admitted the fresh evidence but dismissed the appeal, finding that the trial judge's finding of guilt was based on the evidence presented during the trial, not an uninformed guilty plea.

The court concluded that the trial process was not "rife with errors" or "deeply flawed" to constitute a miscarriage of justice.

The appellant appealed his conviction for an "over 80" offence, alleging a s. 9 Charter violation (arbitrary detention/overholding) and a s. 11(b) Charter violation (unreasonable delay).

The court found a s. 9 breach due to police "benign neglect" in assessing continued detention but determined that breath samples should not be excluded under s. 24(2) as the breach was too remote from the evidence gathering.

However, the court found a s. 11(b) breach, concluding that judicial deliberation time for interlocutory motions counts towards the Jordan ceiling, and the net delay of 20.5 months exceeded the 18-month presumptive ceiling without exceptional circumstances.

A stay of proceedings was granted.

The appellant appealed his conviction for impaired driving, arguing a breach of his s. 10(b) Charter rights due to the police's failure to provide a Tamil interpreter.

The trial judge found no "special circumstances" requiring an interpreter, a decision upheld on appeal.

The Superior Court found no palpable and overriding error in the trial judge's assessment of the evidence, which considered the appellant's 30 years of residency in Canada, employment, ability to converse in English, and his actions indicating understanding of his rights, including attempting to contact duty counsel.

The appeal was dismissed.

The Crown appealed an acquittal for impaired driving by drugs.

The trial judge had excluded the accused's urine sample, finding insufficient grounds for the demand as a 'non-Charter' issue, leading to acquittal.

The accused cross-appealed the finding of reasonable and probable grounds for arrest and drug evaluation.

The Superior Court found the trial judge erred by treating the urine sample exclusion as a non-Charter issue, misapplying principles of reasonable and probable grounds, and improperly excluding the accused's statement from the Charter analysis.

The court concluded that the officer had reasonable and probable grounds for the demand and that, even if there was a Charter breach, the evidence would be admissible under s. 24(2).

The court dismissed the cross-appeal, finding sufficient grounds for the initial arrest.

The Crown's appeal was allowed, and a new trial was ordered.

The accused was charged with multiple offences under the Controlled Drugs and Substances Act (CDSA) for possession of various drugs for the purpose of trafficking, and under the Criminal Code for impaired driving by drug and several firearm-related offences.

A voir dire was conducted to address Charter breaches (s. 8, 9, 10(b)) concerning the Standardized Field Sobriety Test (SFST) demand, arrest, drug evaluation, and vehicle inventory search.

The court found no Charter breaches, ruling the evidence admissible.

Subsequently, the accused was convicted on all CDSA counts and most Criminal Code counts, including impaired driving, possession of a restricted firearm, and various careless transportation and prohibited device charges.

Acquittals were entered for two ammunition-related counts due to the ammunition being non-functional.

Paul Molinari appealed his convictions for impaired driving and "over 80" following a collision.

He argued the trial judge misapprehended evidence and made palpable and overriding factual errors regarding his post-collision alcohol consumption, knowledge of police attendance, and the nature of the collision.

The appeal court found no material misapprehension of evidence or palpable and overriding errors, concluding that the trial judge's findings were open to her on the evidence.

The appeal was dismissed.

The appellant appealed his conviction for impaired driving, arguing the trial judge erred in finding impairment beyond a reasonable doubt, particularly given observations of non-impairment at the police station.

The appellate court dismissed the appeal, affirming the trial judge's holistic assessment of the arresting officer's observations of erratic driving and physical indicia of impairment at the scene, which were made under different circumstances than the later observations at the station.

The court reiterated that appellate courts do not re-weigh credibility findings or re-try cases.

The appellant, Leigh McQuat, appealed his conviction for impaired driving.

The trial judge had found him guilty despite excluding evidence related to a breath sample due to a Charter s. 10(b) infringement.

The appeal raised issues regarding the application of the R. v. W.(D.) test, the trial judge's adoption of the breathalyzer technician's opinion on impairment, palpable errors in assessing witness evidence, and the weight given to the appellant's medical issues.

The appellate court dismissed the appeal, finding no reversible error in the trial judge's application of the W.(D.) test, his independent assessment of impairment based on all evidence, his credibility findings, or the weight given to medical issues.

The court reiterated that any degree of impairment, however slight, is sufficient for a conviction.

The appellant appealed his conviction for operating a motor vehicle with a blood alcohol level exceeding the legal limit.

The appeal raised two grounds: the trial judge's assessment of evidence and the failure to find a violation of the appellant's s. 8 Charter right against unreasonable search or seizure.

The court dismissed the appeal, affirming the trial judge's factual findings regarding the officer's actions at a RIDE check-stop and concluding that a minor incursion into the vehicle by an officer to detect alcohol odour is a reasonable and lawful screening measure, not constituting an unreasonable search under s. 8 of the Charter.