Impaired driving

The accused was stopped at a RIDE spot check and an officer made a breath demand under section 320.27(1)(b) of the Criminal Code based on reasonable suspicion.

The officer's grounds for suspicion were insufficient to meet the objective standard.

The Crown sought to rely on section 320.27(2) (mandatory alcohol screening) at trial, which does not require reasonable suspicion.

The court found that the two subsections are not mutually exclusive and that an officer need not subjectively rely on section 320.27(2) for a demand to be valid under that provision.

The court upheld the lawfulness of the breath demand and dismissed the Charter application.

The appellant was convicted of impaired operation of a motor vehicle, having a blood alcohol concentration exceeding the legal limit within two hours of operating a motor vehicle contrary to the Criminal Code, and operating a motor vehicle while licensed as a young driver with a blood alcohol concentration over zero contrary to the Highway Traffic Act.

The appellant appealed on grounds that the trial judge erred in law and misapprehended material evidence regarding: (1) his reasonable expectation of privacy in the ambulance; (2) when the officer detected an odor of alcohol; and (3) when the officer's grounds to issue a breath demand crystallized.

The appeal was dismissed.

The appellate court found no material misapprehension of evidence, no legal error, and that the trial judge's findings were reasonably available on the record.

The defendant was charged with impaired operation of a motor vehicle causing death, dangerous driving causing death, and operating a motor vehicle with a blood-alcohol concentration over 80 mg/100 mL causing death.

The charges arose from a fatal collision on Major Mackenzie Drive in Markham, Ontario on September 14, 2022, in which the defendant's vehicle crossed the centre line and struck an oncoming vehicle driven by an off-duty police officer, resulting in the officer's death.

The court found the defendant guilty on all counts.

The court rejected the defence argument that falling asleep at the wheel provides an absolute defence to dangerous driving, finding instead that the defendant's decision to drive while tired and under the influence of alcohol constituted a marked departure from the standard of care.

The court also found that the defendant's ability to drive was impaired by alcohol to any degree, satisfying the test for impaired driving.

The blood-alcohol analysis showing 80 mg/100 mL was admitted under the presumption of accuracy.

The accused was charged with operating a conveyance while impaired by alcohol after police stopped his pickup truck, which was missing a wheel and driving on three, causing sparks and fire.

The accused admitted to consuming alcohol and driving but disputed that his ability to drive was impaired.

The court found the Crown proved beyond a reasonable doubt that the accused's judgment and ability to drive were impaired by alcohol, based on evidence of slurred speech, glossy eyes, odour of alcohol, unusual demeanor at the roadside, and the manner in which he was operating a severely damaged vehicle.

The accused was found guilty.

The accused was charged with impaired driving and operating a vehicle with a blood alcohol level exceeding the legal limit of 80 mg per 100 mL of blood.

The accused challenged the admissibility of breath samples, statements, and observations, alleging violations of her Charter rights under sections 8, 9, and 10(b).

The court found that the police failed to make a formal breath demand as required by section 320.28(1) of the Criminal Code, delayed implementation of the right to counsel beyond the earliest reasonable opportunity, and that a breath technician undermined the accused's confidence in duty counsel.

Under section 24(2) of the Charter, the court excluded the breath test results, statements regarding alcohol consumption, and observations made at the police station, finding that admission would bring the administration of justice into disrepute.

The accused was charged with operation while impaired by a drug contrary to section 320.14(1)(a) of the Criminal Code and failure or refusal to comply with a demand under section 320.15(1).

The Crown conceded the first count at trial.

On the second count, the court found that the Crown failed to prove a valid demand, which is an essential element of the failure to comply offence.

The evaluating officer required an affirmative statement from the accused that she would submit to the evaluation before proceeding, which constituted an additional unlawful demand not authorized by the Criminal Code.

Furthermore, the initial demand to "submit to an evaluation" was not unequivocal as it did not clearly communicate what the accused was compelled to do.

The accused was acquitted.

The accused was charged with impaired operation and dangerous operation of a conveyance following a motor vehicle collision.

The accused rear-ended a vehicle stopped at a red light before veering into a field.

Blood analysis indicated a blood alcohol concentration between 70-110 mg/100mL at the time of driving, with toxicological evidence suggesting impairment at that level.

The accused brought a Charter application alleging arbitrary detention and unreasonable search and seizure, which was later withdrawn.

The court found the arrest and blood demand were supported by reasonable and probable grounds.

Considering the totality of evidence including witness observations of slurred speech, unsteady gait, odour of alcohol, the collision circumstances, and toxicological evidence, the court found the Crown proved beyond reasonable doubt that the accused's ability to operate a motor vehicle was impaired by alcohol or a combination of alcohol and cannabis, and that he drove dangerously by failing to observe a sustained red light and stopped vehicles ahead.

The defendant was charged with operating a conveyance while impaired by alcohol and having a blood alcohol level of 80 mg or more within two hours of operating a conveyance.

The trial proceeded as a blended voir dire.

The defendant challenged the admissibility of breath test evidence on multiple grounds: that the approved screening device demand was not made immediately; that his s. 10(b) right to counsel was breached by an eight-minute delay in informing him of that right; and that the Intoxlyzer test was not administered as soon as practicable.

The court found a breach of s. 10(b) rights and excluded the breath test evidence under s. 24(2) due to a pattern of systemic failures by the Ottawa Police Service to immediately advise detainees of their right to counsel.

However, the defendant was found guilty of impaired operation of a conveyance based on evidence of his driving pattern, physical observations, and the presence of alcohol in the vehicle.

The accused was charged with driving with a blood alcohol concentration of 80 or higher.

The sole issue at trial was the admissibility of breath results.

The accused alleged violations of s. 8 (unreasonable search and seizure) and s. 10(b) (right to counsel) of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms.

The court found no violation of s. 8 regarding the timing of breath samples ("as soon as practicable").

However, the court found a violation of s. 10(b) because the officer failed to inform the accused of his right to counsel immediately upon arrest, instead waiting eleven minutes.

Applying the s. 24(2) exclusionary analysis from R. v. Grant, the court admitted the evidence, finding the breach was of moderate severity, the impact on the accused's Charter-protected interests was limited, and society's interest in adjudication on the merits was strong.

The accused was found guilty.

The accused was charged with impaired driving and refusing to provide a breath sample.

The Crown proved both charges beyond a reasonable doubt.

The accused contested the substance of both charges and brought multiple Charter motions challenging the reasonable and probable grounds for the breath demand, alleging a change in jeopardy requiring a second consultation with counsel, and arguing the refusal was incomplete due to lack of opportunity to consult counsel.

The court rejected all Charter arguments and found the accused guilty on both counts.

The accused was found asleep in a vehicle parked on the side of Highway 400 with the engine running.

A police officer detected an odour of alcohol and conducted an Approved Screening Device (ASD) test at the roadside, which led to further testing and charges of Over 80 and Impaired care or control.

The impaired count was dismissed.

The defence challenged the ASD demand as lacking reasonable suspicion and argued the demand was not made forthwith, constituting a breach of section 8 of the Charter.

The court found the demand was based on reasonable suspicion and was made in a timely manner.

The Charter application was dismissed and the accused was found guilty of care or control with blood alcohol concentration over 80 mg.

The defendant was charged with impaired driving and operating a motor vehicle with more than 80 mg of alcohol in 100 ml of blood following a traffic stop.

The Crown conceded the impaired driving charge lacked evidentiary support.

The trial judge dismissed the over-80 charge after finding that the Crown failed to establish that breath samples were taken "as soon as practicable" as required by the Criminal Code.

Multiple unexplained delays occurred: the decision to conduct field sobriety tests at a community policing centre rather than roadside caused an 11-minute delay; a 7-minute delay occurred between arrest and reading of rights; a 5-minute delay occurred before departure to the police station; and a 16-minute delay occurred at the station before the defendant spoke to counsel.

The judge found these delays collectively breached the statutory requirement and the constitutional imperative of immediacy underlying the provision.

The defendant was charged with impaired driving and driving with excess alcohol following a traffic stop on September 24, 2015.

The defendant challenged the lawfulness of his arrest and sought to exclude breath test results on the grounds that his Charter rights under sections 8, 9, and 10(a) were infringed.

The court found that the officer lacked objective reasonable and probable grounds to arrest the defendant for impaired driving, as the observed driving infractions were minimal and the alleged signs of impairment (slurred speech, weaving) were not credibly established.

The court also found breaches of the defendant's section 10(a) and 10(b) rights due to a 14-15 minute delay in providing reasons for detention and access to counsel.

While the section 10 breach was found not to warrant exclusion of evidence, the section 8 breach was found to be serious and, combined with the lack of evidence of impairment, led to the exclusion of the breath test results.

The defendant was acquitted of both charges.

The appellant appealed his conviction and sentence for refusing to provide a breath sample contrary to s. 254(5) of the Criminal Code.

The appeal was based on three grounds: the trial judge's reliance on inadmissible evidence, an error in finding an unequivocal refusal, and an error in finding the incident was not a "single transaction." The Superior Court dismissed the appeal, finding that the entire video evidence was admissible as it was tendered without limitation, the trial judge's finding of an unequivocal refusal was supported by evidence and entitled to deference, and the appellant's late inquiry about providing a sample did not constitute an unequivocal offer or part of a "single transaction" to mitigate the initial refusal.

The Crown appealed a sentence imposed on Mr. Waisanen for impaired driving.

Mr. Waisanen had initially received a conditional discharge and no driving prohibition, despite a conviction for impaired driving, due to a trial judge's finding of a Charter breach (arbitrary detention).

A previous appeal had overturned the stay of proceedings and clarified that the police conduct, while a Charter breach, was not egregious enough to warrant such a significant sentencing reduction.

This court found the conditional discharge and lack of driving prohibition to be an unfit sentence, emphasizing the paramount sentencing objectives of general and specific deterrence, especially given the high blood alcohol readings.

The appeal was allowed, and the sentence was varied to a fine and a mandatory driving prohibition.

The appellant appealed a conviction for impaired operation of a motor vehicle.

The trial judge had rejected the appellant's evidence of consuming alcohol after driving but before breath tests, citing a lack of corroboration.

The appellate court found that this imposed an unwarranted obligation on the appellant, as there was no onus on him to prove post-driving consumption.

The appeal was allowed, and a new trial was ordered.

The accused was charged with operating a motor vehicle with an excess blood alcohol concentration.

The Crown conceded a Charter breach occurred when the constable delayed approximately twenty minutes in reading the approved instrument demand to the accused.

The court applied the s. 24(2) Charter analysis from R. v. Grant and admitted the breath sample evidence, finding that the seriousness of the breach was minimal (simple human error), the impact on the accused's Charter-protected interests was slight to moderate, and society's interest in adjudication on the merits strongly favoured admission.

The accused was found guilty.

The accused brought a Charter application under s.11(b) of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms seeking a stay of proceedings for delay in trial.

The accused was charged with impaired driving and operating a motor vehicle with a blood alcohol concentration exceeding 80 mg per 100 ml of blood.

The information was sworn on August 13, 2013, and the trial was scheduled for January 5-6, 2015, representing a delay of approximately 17 months.

The court applied the four-factor test from R. v. Morin, examining the overall length of delay, waiver by the accused, reasons for delay, and prejudice.

The court found institutional and Crown delay of 11.5 months, which while exceeding the 8-10 month guideline, did not constitute a violation of s.11(b) rights when balanced against society's interest in a trial on the merits and the absence of material prejudice to the accused.

The accused was charged with operating a motor vehicle with a blood-alcohol content over the legal limit.

The accused was stopped as part of a mobile RIDE program, failed an approved screening device test, and was arrested.

The accused was transported to a police station where breath samples were provided approximately one hour and ten minutes after the initial stop.

The accused challenged the lawfulness of the stop, the grounds for the approved screening device demand, and whether the breath tests were taken as soon as practicable.

The accused abandoned Charter arguments at the close of the Crown's case.

The court found that the stop was lawful, the grounds for the approved screening device demand were established, and the breath tests were taken as soon as practicable within the meaning of the Criminal Code.

The accused was found guilty.

The accused was charged with driving with a blood alcohol level above the legal limit.

The central issue at trial was whether the officer's reliance on an approved screening device (ASD) test result was objectively reasonable, given the defence argument that the officer should have waited 15 minutes before conducting the test to rule out mouth alcohol.

The court found that the officer had reasonable suspicion for the ASD test and reasonable grounds for the approved instrument tests.

The defence failed to prove a breach of s. 8 Charter rights.

The breath tests confirmed blood alcohol levels over 80 milligrams, and the accused was found guilty.