Fraud

The appellants appealed their convictions for fraud and their sentences.

The Court of Appeal found the fraud convictions unreasonable because there was no admissible expert evidence explaining how the seized equipment operated to capture financial data.

The police officer who testified was not qualified to give such evidence.

The appeal was allowed, the fraud convictions were quashed, and acquittals were entered.

Consequently, the sentence for driving while disqualified was varied to time served.

The appellant appealed a decision upholding a receivership order, arguing his consent to the order was obtained through fraud or conditioned on a $150,000 advance.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no basis to interfere with the motion judge's conclusion that there was no evidence of fraud or conditional consent in the material before him.

The respondent filed a property claim in bankruptcy for funds it loaned to the bankrupt, alleging the loan was induced by fraud.

The trustee disallowed the claim, but the appeal judge found fraud and imposed a constructive trust over the remaining funds.

The trustee appealed, arguing the appeal judge lacked jurisdiction to determine the fraud allegations and erred in imposing a constructive trust.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the process was agreed upon and the constructive trust was a just remedy to prevent the bankrupt and its tainted creditors from being unjustly enriched by the fraud.

The appellant pleaded guilty to fraud over $5000 for his role in a massive investment scheme.

At sentencing, while unrepresented, he disputed many facts but the trial judge refused to strike the plea and sentenced him to 8 years' imprisonment and ordered $35.6 million in restitution.

On appeal, the Court of Appeal upheld the conviction, finding the guilty plea was voluntary, unequivocal, and informed, and that the undisputed facts satisfied the elements of fraud.

However, the Court allowed the sentence appeal in part, reducing the restitution order to $20 million to better reflect the appellant's degree of criminal responsibility and the funds he retained control over.

The appellants appealed a trial judgment finding them liable for fraud, conspiracy, and breach of fiduciary duty in several real estate transactions with the Ontario Realty Corporation.

The Court of Appeal upheld the trial judge's findings on most transactions, including orders for disgorgement of profits based on knowing receipt and conspiracy with a fiduciary.

However, the Court allowed the appeal regarding the King's Highway 2A property, finding no basis for disgorgement where no fiduciary breach or damages were proven.

The respondents' cross-appeal was allowed in part, holding a former employee jointly and severally liable for a $300,000 improper price abatement.

The appellant appealed his convictions for participating in three fraudulent schemes, arguing the trial judge's conclusions were unsupported by the evidence.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding substantial evidence that the appellant deliberately participated in the schemes.

The appellants, Molson and Vrozos, appealed a trial judgment finding them liable for intentional interference with economic relations, breach of contract, and fraud arising from the sale of exclusive water rights at a large concert.

Molson had sold exclusive water rights to Vrozos, who then sold them to the respondents.

Molson subsequently allowed other vendors to sell water and forced the respondents to supply free water to meet health requirements.

Vrozos also made unauthorized side deals and misappropriated funds.

The Court of Appeal upheld the findings of liability and the award of punitive damages against Vrozos, correcting only the method of calculating damages against Molson and dismissing Vrozos's crossclaim against Molson for a management fee.

The appellants appealed an order striking out portions of their statement of claim.

The struck portions alleged that the respondent bank owed a duty of care to the appellants, who were not its customers, to inquire into its customer's activities to ensure the accounts were not used for fraudulent purposes.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, agreeing with the motion judge that the facts pleaded did not give rise to a recognized duty of care, nor did they warrant recognizing a new duty of care under the Anns/Kamloops principles.

The appellant appealed his conviction for sexual assault.

The complainant had engaged in sexual activity with the appellant, mistakenly believing him to be his identical twin brother, with whom she had an ongoing consensual sexual relationship.

The Court of Appeal upheld the trial judge's finding that the complainant's mistake as to identity meant she did not subjectively consent to the sexual activity.

The Court also upheld the finding that the appellant could not rely on the defence of honest but mistaken belief in consent, as he failed to take reasonable steps to ascertain consent and was reckless or wilfully blind.

The appellant was convicted of conspiracy to defraud and defrauding the Government of Canada of over $3 million.

He appealed his conviction and sentence, arguing unreasonable delay under s. 11(b) of the Charter and that the trial judge erred by failing to instruct the jury that his silence at trial could not be used against him.

The trial judge had relied on Supreme Court of Canada obiter dicta suggesting s. 4(6) of the Canada Evidence Act prohibited such an instruction.

The Court of Appeal held that the SCC obiter was non-binding and conflicted with earlier binding SCC ratio, meaning the instruction could have been given.

However, the court found the jury instructions as a whole were adequate and the delay was reasonable given the complexity of the proceedings.

The appeal from conviction and the three-year sentence were dismissed.

The appellant appealed the dismissal of his motion to set aside a consent order that had dismissed his action.

The original action sought the return of funds paid pursuant to a promise of marriage.

The parties had settled, but the appellant alleged the respondent failed to fulfill her obligations and committed fraud in entering the settlement.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, noting that the respondent had commenced a new action against the appellant, and all relief sought regarding the alleged breach of the settlement could be asserted in the appellant's counterclaim in that new action.

The respondents, a father and son, were convicted of arson and fraud after intentionally causing an explosion and fire at their family business to defraud an insurance company of $200,000.

The trial judge imposed conditional sentences of two years less a day.

The Crown appealed the sentences.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, finding that conditional sentences are generally inappropriate for serious arson offences, especially given the planning, use of accelerants, and danger posed to adjoining occupants and firefighters.

The court substituted sentences of 12 months in custody.

The moving party brought a motion for security for costs of an appeal under rule 61.06(1).

The responding party, who had made a consumer proposal in bankruptcy, was appealing a decision that refused to set aside a consent order converting a default judgment into a judgment in fraud.

The responding party argued he consented to the order due to his former solicitor's misunderstanding and failure to explain the consequences.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the motion, finding that although the responding party was impecunious, his appeal was not plainly devoid of merit and he should not be deprived of the opportunity to have his claim adjudicated.

The appellant appealed his convictions for fraud, unauthorized use of credit card data, and possession of stolen traveler's cheques, arguing he was denied a trial in French, his guilty pleas were invalid due to ineffective assistance of counsel, and the trial judge failed to properly inquire into the pleas.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the appellant had not requested a French trial, failed to establish ineffective assistance of counsel, and that the trial judge's inquiry into the negotiated guilty pleas was sufficient.

The respondents were charged with multiple counts of fraud and conspiracy relating to an investment scam.

The trial judge granted a stay of proceedings under s. 11(b) of the Charter, finding unreasonable delay.

The Crown appealed.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, finding that the trial judge erred in his allocation of the delay, his determination of prejudice, and his balancing of the accused's rights against the societal interest in having serious charges tried.

The stay was set aside and the matter was ordered to proceed to trial.

The appellants were convicted of conspiracy to defraud the Government of Canada and multiple counts of fraud over $5,000 relating to a scheme involving sham vehicle sales to exploit aboriginal tax exemptions and fraudulently claim GST refunds.

On appeal, the appellants argued that the trial judge provided insufficient reasons for the convictions.

The Court of Appeal agreed, finding that the trial judge made conclusory findings of guilt without identifying the specific evidence establishing the appellants' participation in the illegitimate transactions or addressing the individual fraud counts.

The appeals were allowed, the convictions set aside, and a new trial ordered.

The appellant pleaded guilty to eighteen offences, including ten for fraud under $5,000, and was sentenced to 18 months' imprisonment plus 161 days of pre-trial custody.

She appealed the custodial portion of her sentence, arguing the sentencing judge erred in granting only 1:1 credit for pre-trial custody without providing an ascertainable rationale.

The Court of Appeal found this to be an error in principle, allowed the appeal, and reduced the sentence to time served based on a 2:1 credit for pre-trial custody.

The appellant and his companies were convicted of wilfully obtaining and attempting to obtain GST refunds by submitting false invoices for condominium development work.

He was sentenced to 30 months' imprisonment and fined over $700,000.

On appeal, the appellant argued that the Crown failed to prove the exact fraud amounts, raised the defence of officially induced error, and sought to introduce fresh evidence of undisclosed CRA documents.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the conviction appeal, finding the exact amount was not an essential element, the officially induced error defence was inapplicable, and the undisclosed documents would not have affected the trial's outcome.

The sentence appeal was also dismissed, as the substantial fraud justified the penalty.

The appellant appealed his convictions for fraud and encouraging others to act on a forged document, for which he received a four-year sentence and a restitution order.

He argued he was entitled to use investors' funds as he chose and raised procedural fairness issues regarding his self-representation at trial.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding overwhelming evidence that the appellant misrepresented how funds would be held and used them for operational expenses.

The court also found the trial judge provided appropriate assistance to the self-represented appellant and did not unfairly restrict his cross-examination.

The defendants appealed an order striking out certain paragraphs of their statement of defence.

The Court of Appeal found that the motion judge erred by failing to consider the plaintiff's cause of action in fraud, which has a different measure of damages than breach of fiduciary duty.

As a result, the motion judge wrongly struck out relevant allegations.

The appeal was allowed, the motion judge's order was set aside, and only the portions of the defence relating to the plaintiff's profits were struck out, with leave to amend.

The appellants were awarded $3,000 in costs.