First degree murder

Josiph Cardle, charged with first-degree murder, applied for judicial interim release.

The court considered the primary, secondary, and tertiary grounds for detention under s. 515(10) of the Criminal Code.

While the gravity of the offence and potential sentence were significant, the court found no substantial likelihood of flight or risk to public safety.

Crucially, the court determined that the apparent strength of the Crown's case for first-degree murder was not strong, citing issues with causation and the accused's understanding of the oxygen machine's role.

The court also emphasized that poverty and homelessness should not be a basis for detention.

Cardle was released on a recognizance with conditions, without a surety or fixed residential address.

The accused, Mowafag Saboon, sought judicial interim release under s. 522 of the Criminal Code after being charged with first-degree murder and various firearm and drug trafficking offenses.

The court considered the secondary and tertiary grounds for detention, including the strength of the Crown's case, the gravity of the offenses, the circumstances of the offenses, and the impact of the COVID-19 pandemic on detention conditions.

The proposed release plan, involving a $15,000 bond with three sureties and electronic monitoring, was deemed inadequate due to the sureties' inability to supervise and the accused's history of misconduct.

The court found a substantial risk of reoffending and that release would undermine public confidence in the administration of justice, particularly given the violent nature of the charges and the strong Crown case.

The application for judicial interim release was dismissed, and detention was ordered on both secondary and tertiary grounds.

This ruling addresses the admissibility of photographic and video evidence against the accused, Raja Dosanjh, in a first-degree murder trial.

The defence objected to four photographs and one video.

The court applied the probative value versus prejudicial effect test, excluding one photograph (Exhibit 'A') due to its high prejudicial value outweighing its low probative value.

Three other photographs (Exhibit 'B') and one video (Exhibit 'C') were deemed admissible as circumstantial evidence related to identification, height, and mannerisms, with appropriate jury cautions to mitigate prejudice.

A young person, A.D., charged with first-degree murder, brought a voir dire application to determine the admissibility of two statements: a conversation with his mother and an interview with Cst.

Irwin.

The court ruled that the conversation with his mother was a privileged consultation under section 146(2)(b)(iii) of the Youth Criminal Justice Act and was inadmissible for any purpose.

The statement to Cst.

Irwin was found to be voluntary and admissible for cross-examination, with a specific portion excluded due to concerns about threats or inducements related to sentencing.

The court emphasized the enhanced procedural protections for young persons and the privacy of consultations with parents.

The applicant, Shakiyl Shaw, on trial for first-degree murder, sought a directed verdict of acquittal on the murder charge at the close of the Crown's case, requesting the jury only deliberate on manslaughter.

The court dismissed the application, finding that there was sufficient circumstantial evidence upon which a reasonable jury, properly instructed, could infer that the applicant knew his co-accused were armed and intended to shoot someone, and that the murder was planned and deliberate, thereby making him liable as a secondary party to murder.

The applicant, Lenneil Shaw, sought to redact entries from a phone download report, arguing they constituted inadmissible hearsay and lacked sufficient authentication to link certain phone calls to him.

The report associated a phone number with the contact name "Dozey," a nickname for Lenneil Shaw, and showed calls to a Crown witness's phone near the time of a homicide.

The court dismissed the application, finding that the report contained no implied assertion of who made the calls, but rather presented circumstantial facts relevant to linking the accused to the witness.

The court held that the evidence was admissible for the fact that calls were made, not their substance, and that it met the threshold for relevance, even if it admitted competing inferences.

This ruling addresses the admissibility of expert evidence in a first-degree murder trial, building upon a previous decision.

The court assessed the qualifications and proposed opinion evidence of several Crown experts: Jeremy Dupuis (forensic computer and digital analysis), Dr. Elena Bulakhtina (postmortem examination, adopting conclusions of the deceased Dr. John Fernandes), D/Cst.

Greg Kaut (phone analysis), and Mr. Beatty (functionality of BlackBerry phones).

The court found all experts qualified and their opinion evidence admissible, with counsel agreeing to redact inadmissible portions of the postmortem report for the jury.

The Crown sought to use the phrase "professional killing" in its opening and closing addresses to the jury in a first-degree murder trial, arguing it was an "umbrella term" supported by circumstantial evidence of planning and coordination.

The defence objected, arguing the phrase was prejudicial, irrelevant, and would lead to improper propensity reasoning, especially as the accused had no prior record and was not charged with criminal organization involvement.

The court found the phrase irrelevant and potentially irreparably prejudicial without an evidentiary basis at the opening stage, prohibiting its use in the Crown's opening address but allowing for reconsideration before closing arguments.

In a first-degree murder trial, the Crown sought a pre-trial ruling to admit ante-mortem hearsay statements and evidence of the deceased's past drug dealing to establish motive for a professional killing.

The defence argued the evidence was irrelevant, lacking a nexus between the deceased's background and the accused, and that motive was not a required element to prove.

The court dismissed the Crown's application, finding the proposed evidence irrelevant to the issue of identity and highly prejudicial, as it would invite the jury to speculate without a direct connection to the accused.

Michael Durant, charged with two counts of first-degree murder, applied for a change of venue for his new separate trials following a successful appeal.

The application was based on extensive and prejudicial pre-trial and post-conviction publicity in the Welland area, including media speculation about a serial killer, the Ryczak case sentencing controversy, and the fact of his previous convictions.

The Crown opposed, arguing that jury selection safeguards were sufficient.

The court granted the change of venue, finding a fair and reasonable likelihood of partiality or prejudice that could not be overcome by traditional safeguards, particularly given the difficulty in formulating effective challenge-for-cause questions without contaminating the jury pool.

The applicant, convicted of first-degree murder, sought a reduction in his parole ineligibility period under the "faint hope" clause (s. 745.6 of the Criminal Code).

The screening judge applied the less stringent "reasonable prospect of success" test from the 1997 amendments, as the murder occurred in 2003.

Despite some positive institutional conduct, the applicant's abysmal overall conduct, lack of genuine remorse and accountability, and persistent moderate risk for violent recidivism led the court to conclude he failed to meet the test.

The application was dismissed, but a further application was permitted after six years.

James Anthony Scordino was found guilty of first-degree murder in the death of Angela Skorulski.

The court imposed a mandatory life sentence without parole eligibility for 25 years, along with a lifetime firearms prohibition, firearm forfeiture, and primary DNA order.

The victim fine surcharge was waived.

The court acknowledged the brutal nature of the killing and the devastating impact on the victim's family.

This ruling addresses the admissibility of foot impression evidence in a first-degree murder trial.

The Crown sought to introduce expert testimony and circumstantial evidence linking the accused's shoes to an impression found at the crime scene.

The defence objected, challenging the expert's qualifications and the relevance of the evidence due to perceived weaknesses in the chain of reasoning and lack of uniqueness of the shoe tread.

The court found the forensic identification officer qualified as an expert in foot impression analysis and deemed the evidence sufficiently necessary and relevant, ruling it admissible.

During a first-degree murder trial, the Crown sought to introduce an alternative theory of constructive first-degree murder based on criminal harassment under section 231(6) of the Criminal Code, arguing that the defendant's act of pointing a handgun at the victim with intent to scare constituted criminal harassment.

The defence challenged this, citing insufficient evidence and the late introduction of the theory after the evidentiary portion of the trial.

The court ruled against putting the alternative theory to the jury, finding that the facts did not meet the legal definition of criminal harassment, which requires a state of ongoing torment, and that the late introduction of the theory would prejudice the defendant's right to a fair trial.

Ian Ohab, charged with first-degree murder, brought a motion for a directed verdict of acquittal on the first-degree murder count.

The Crown argued that evidence of sexual assault and forcible confinement provided the basis for first-degree murder under s. 231(5) of the Criminal Code.

The court, applying the test for a directed verdict, found no evidence capable of supporting an inference of sexual assault or unlawful confinement.

Consequently, the motion was granted, and the accused will stand trial for second-degree murder only.

Jordan Osborne was charged with first-degree murder.

The Crown sought to admit his video-recorded confession into evidence.

Defence counsel argued the confession was involuntary due to police misrepresentations, implicit threats or promises regarding a reduced charge, and oppressive conditions (a thin jumpsuit).

The court, applying the common law confessions rule from *R. v. Oickle*, found that the police conduct, including statements about the seriousness of the charge and the potential for a lesser charge based on intent, did not constitute an explicit or implicit threat or promise strong enough to overbear the accused's will.

The court also found the jumpsuit did not create oppressive conditions.

The confession was deemed voluntary and admissible.

This decision addresses the judge's proposed opening comments and jury selection procedures for a first-degree murder trial.

The judge adopted several suggestions from counsel, including referring to the accused as "defendant" and strongly emphasizing that jurors must not conduct external research.

The judge also accepted defence counsel's request to defer their opening statement and for potential jurors with knowledge of the case to submit written notes.

The judge declined to remove all references to the elements of the offence from the opening comments, affirming their general inclusion.

The applicants, William Cummins and Matthew Moreira, charged with first-degree murder and robbery alongside Patrick Smith, sought severance from Mr. Smith for their joint trial.

The motion was based on the potential impact of Mr. Smith's statement to undercover officers, which they argued was exculpatory for them and necessary for their full answer and defence.

The court dismissed the application, emphasizing the legal presumption in favour of joint trials for co-accused acting in concert, the risk of inconsistent verdicts, and the truth-seeking function of a single trial.

The court found that antagonistic defences were likely to arise, and that carefully crafted jury instructions could mitigate any prejudice.

The applicant, charged with first-degree murder, sought judicial interim release under s. 522(2) of the Criminal Code.

The Crown opposed on secondary and tertiary grounds, arguing an overwhelming case and public safety risk.

The court found the Crown's case for first-degree murder was not overwhelming, and the applicant posed a low flight risk (primary ground).

While acknowledging the gravity of the offense and the group attack circumstances, the court determined that a stringent release plan, including house arrest with supervision and electronic monitoring, would sufficiently mitigate public safety concerns (secondary ground) and maintain confidence in the administration of justice (tertiary ground).

The applicant was granted bail on a substantial recognizance with specific conditions.

Dellen Millard, charged with first-degree murder of his father, Wayne Millard, elected trial by judge alone.

The Crown sought to introduce a photograph from the accused's online gaming profile, depicting him with a bloody eye wound, posted two weeks before his father's death by a gunshot wound to the eye.

The Crown argued its relevance to whether the death was suicide or homicide, suggesting it indicated a contemplation of murder or an improbable reaction if it were suicide.

The defence opposed, arguing irrelevance or excessive prejudice.

The court ruled the evidence inadmissible, finding it not relevant and material, as the Crown's reasoning was speculative propensity reasoning rather than logical inference.

Even if relevant, its minimal probative value was outweighed by its prejudicial effect.