Kevin Robert Wilson

The plaintiff sought an emergency interlocutory injunction against the defendants, who were involved in a protest causing severe noise disturbance in downtown Ottawa.

The defendants' counsel requested an adjournment, citing insufficient time to review extensive materials and prepare a proper defense.

The court, acknowledging the national importance of the matter and the need for a complete record to craft an enforceable *in persona* injunction, granted the adjournment until February 7, 2022.

The judge emphasized the inherent difficulty of framing an enforceable injunction against a large, fluid group of unnamed parties and the equitable requirement for certainty in such orders.

The plaintiff, a resident of downtown Ottawa, brought a motion for an interlocutory injunction to restrain the defendants and other participants in the 'Freedom Convoy' protest from sounding vehicle horns.

The plaintiff alleged the constant noise constituted a private nuisance causing irreparable harm, including potential permanent hearing damage.

The court applied the RJR-MacDonald test, finding a serious issue to be tried, irreparable harm based on medical evidence, and that the balance of convenience favoured the residents' right to quiet over the protestors' right to express themselves via horn honking.

An interim injunction was granted for 10 days.

The accused was convicted of drug trafficking and possession.

He appealed, arguing unreasonable delay under s. 11(b) of the Charter.

The trial judge had applied the 30-month presumptive ceiling from *R. v. Jordan*, dismissing the stay application.

The Court of Appeal found that the trial judge erred by applying the 30-month ceiling instead of the 18-month ceiling, as the accused was tried in the Ontario Court of Justice without a preliminary inquiry.

The Court determined that the Crown failed to justify the excessive delay, as the case was not complex enough and the Crown's reliance on the prior *Morin* framework was unreasonable given its dilatory conduct.

The appeal was allowed, and a stay of proceedings was entered.

The appellant appealed his convictions for drug-related offences and his sentence.

The primary issue on appeal was whether the trial judge erred in finding the Information to Obtain (ITO) for search warrants was sufficient and whether evidence obtained from a warrantless swab of his car door handle should have been excluded under section 24(2) of the Charter.

The Court of Appeal found that the warrantless swabbing of the car door handles, followed by chemical analysis, constituted an unreasonable search under section 8 of the Charter, requiring prior judicial authorization.

However, the Court upheld the trial judge's decision to admit the evidence under section 24(2), deferring to the trial judge's assessment of the Grant factors, particularly the police's good faith and full disclosure.

The Court also dismissed the appeal against sentence, finding the six-year consecutive sentence (resulting in a total of 16 years) was not demonstrably unfit given the serious nature of the drug trafficking enterprise and the appellant's conduct while on bail.

The appellant appealed a sentence of seven years imposed for four counts of providing immigration advice without a license contrary to s. 91(1) of the Immigration and Refugee Protection Act and one count of counselling misrepresentation in an immigration application contrary to s. 126 of the IRPA.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no error in law or principle by the trial judge.

The court upheld the trial judge's decisions regarding denial of enhanced credit for pre-sentence custody due to delay caused by the appellant, reliance on victim impact statements, consideration of future risk, imposition of maximum sentences, consecutive sentencing, and failure to address bail conditions as a mitigating factor.

The appellants were convicted of terrorism-related offences including conspiracy to commit murder for the benefit of a terrorist group and participating in terrorist activity.

On appeal, the appellants challenged the jury selection procedure used at trial.

The trial judge erroneously held that he lacked common law discretion to exclude unsworn jurors while using rotating triers to determine challenges for cause, and instead ordered the use of static triers with all jurors excluded.

The Court of Appeal held that the trial judge's error deprived the appellants of their statutory right to rotating triers with unsworn jurors excluded, resulting in an improperly constituted jury.

The curative proviso could not be applied to remedy this fundamental procedural error.

The appellant was convicted of importing almost two kilograms of cocaine and sentenced to six years imprisonment, less credit for pre-trial custody on a 1.5:1 basis plus an additional 90-day credit for harsh conditions in remand custody.

The appellant appealed, arguing that sections 719(1) and 719(3.1) of the Criminal Code violated her Charter rights under sections 7 and 12 by effectively requiring her to spend significantly longer in custody before becoming eligible for parole than an offender who had received bail.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, holding that parole eligibility questions are not a component of the determination of a fit sentence, and that neither section 719(1) nor 719(3.1) delays parole eligibility or requires offenders denied bail to serve longer sentences than those granted bail.

The court also found no material misapprehension of evidence regarding the appellant's remorse.

The appellant appealed his conviction entered by the Superior Court of Justice.

The Court of Appeal upheld the conviction, finding that the police had reasonable and probable grounds to arrest the appellant, that the appellant's section 10(b) Charter right was not violated, and that the appellant's statement made en route to the cell was voluntary.

The appeal was dismissed.

The appellant appealed his convictions for multiple drug trafficking offences and sought leave to appeal his sentence.

The charges stemmed from two indictments: the first arising from a warrantless police entry into a hotel room, and the second from subsequent search warrants based on information obtained from cell phones seized during the hotel room entry.

The trial judge found the hotel room entry violated s. 8 of the Charter but admitted all evidence under s. 24(2), finding the breach was mitigated by police good faith and the appellant's reduced expectation of privacy.

The appellant was convicted of all charges and sentenced to 10 years imprisonment.

The Court of Appeal dismissed both the conviction appeal and the sentencing appeal.

The appellant appealed his sentence for large-scale, prolonged marijuana trafficking for profit.

The appellant argued that changed societal attitudes toward marijuana use warranted a reduction in the established sentencing range.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, holding that the trial judge's discretionary decisions regarding the parity principle and police misconduct were reasonable, and that societal perception of marijuana use does not justify reducing sentences for serious trafficking offences.

Parliament has not significantly altered applicable penalties, and large-scale trafficking remains serious criminal misconduct regardless of legislative changes regarding personal possession and use.

The appellant appealed a three-year sentence imposed after a guilty plea to production of marijuana and a concurrent six-month sentence for possession for the purpose of trafficking.

The trial judge had rejected a constitutional challenge to the minimum punishment provisions under s. 7(2)(b) of the Controlled Drugs and Substances Act.

The Court of Appeal found that subsequent decisions in R. v. Vu and R. v. Tran rendered the trial judge's constitutional ruling incorrect.

The court reduced the sentence to two years, considering the appellant's pre-sentence custody, guilty plea, significant pre-trial release period including house arrest, and the sizable nature of the grow operation.

The appellant appealed a certiorari decision that refused to quash an Ontario Court of Justice decision denying the return of marijuana seized from the appellant after charges of possession and possession for the purpose of trafficking were withdrawn.

The Court of Appeal upheld the lower court's decision, finding that the appellant failed to establish he was lawfully entitled to possession of the cannabis and did not have a licence authorizing possession at the time of seizure.

The certiorari judge did not err in concluding that no error or excess of jurisdiction occurred.

The appellant challenged a conviction for importing cocaine under s. 6(1) of the Controlled Drugs and Substances Act after the intermediate appellate court affirmed the conviction over a dissent.

The central issue was whether the trial reasons adequately disclosed the factual basis for finding the required mental element beyond a reasonable doubt.

The Court held that, read in context and as a whole, the trial reasons did not permit effective appellate review of the mens rea finding.

The appeal was allowed and a new trial was ordered.

The Crown appealed a 90-day intermittent sentence imposed following a guilty plea to production of marijuana and fraudulent consumption of electricity.

The sentencing judge imposed the minimal sentence based on personal views regarding the impending legalization of marijuana, without addressing proper sentencing principles.

The appellate court found the sentencing judge erred in principle by failing to provide adequate reasons and imposed an unfit sentence.

The court allowed the appeal and imposed an 18-month sentence with execution stayed, finding that specific deterrence and rehabilitation had been met and that re-incarceration would not be in the interests of justice.

The appellant appealed her convictions on four offences relating to marijuana grow-operations and one count of breach of recognizance, as well as seeking leave to appeal her sentence.

She argued that her guilty pleas were invalid because she was uninformed of immigration consequences, that the facts did not support her pleas, that her counsel was in a conflict of interest, and that she was deprived of effective assistance of counsel.

She also challenged the sentence as unfit due to failure to consider immigration consequences and claimed the forfeiture orders were grossly disproportionate.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the conviction appeal and denied leave to appeal sentence, finding the guilty pleas were informed, no conflict of interest existed, the appellant received effective assistance of counsel, and the forfeiture orders were part of the accepted plea offer.

The Crown appealed the acquittal of the respondent on a charge of possession for the purpose of trafficking cocaine.

The respondent was convicted only of simple possession.

The Crown argued that the trial judge erred in excluding expert evidence regarding cocaine trafficking and in finding that the respondent was a heavy cocaine user without evidentiary basis.

The Court of Appeal upheld the acquittal, finding no error in the trial judge's exclusion of the expert evidence or his findings regarding the respondent's cocaine use.

The Crown appealed an acquittal on a question of law alone, arguing that the trial judge applied a categorical rather than contextual approach to assessing whether a Charter section 8 breach had been established.

The Court of Appeal found that the trial judge did apply a contextual approach and therefore no question of law arose on the appeal.

The appeal was dismissed.

The appellant was convicted of importing marijuana into Canada following a judge-alone trial.

On appeal, the appellant challenged the conviction on the grounds that the guilty verdict was unreasonable and that the trial judge erred in finding that the appellant's exculpatory statement to police was deliberately concocted.

The Court of Appeal found that the trial judge erred in law by making a finding of concoction based solely on evidence that proved the statement false, without independent evidence of fabrication as required by R. v. O'Connor.

Although the court found sufficient evidence to support a conviction on other grounds, the error in law regarding the treatment of the exculpatory statement warranted a new trial.

Five appellants convicted of drug-related offences appealed their convictions, challenging the application judge's admission of evidence obtained pursuant to wiretap authorizations under s. 24(2) of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms.

The appellants argued that the application judge erred in his s. 24(2) analysis by failing to adequately recognize the impact of prior police misconduct and by not giving appropriate effect to findings of serious carelessness in the affidavits.

Ba Tuan Tran also appealed his sentence of 15 months imprisonment.

The Court of Appeal dismissed all conviction appeals and the sentence appeal, finding the application judge's analysis fair, balanced, and correct.

The appellant appealed his conviction for possession of fentanyl for the purpose of trafficking and sought leave to appeal his sentence of 48 months' imprisonment.

Following a search warrant execution, police found five 100 microgram fentanyl patches and other drugs.

The appellant pleaded guilty to simple possession but the Crown rejected this plea.

He was convicted after trial of possession for the purpose of trafficking based primarily on expert police opinion regarding the quantity.

The Court of Appeal found that the trial judge improperly abdicated his role by deferring entirely to the expert's opinion on the ultimate issue.

The conviction was set aside and substituted with a conviction for simple possession.

The sentence was reduced to one day of imprisonment in addition to time already served, as the appellant had already served over three years.