Kevin Robert Wilson

The applicant sought to re-open an application to quash a direct indictment for first-degree murder, which had been previously abandoned by his counsel.

The original application alleged bias by the Deputy Attorney General, Patrick Monahan, due to prior interactions at Osgoode Hall Law School.

Monahan denied these interactions, claiming he was on sabbatical.

The applicant later produced information suggesting Monahan was on campus and involved in activities during the relevant times.

The court granted the request to re-open the application, finding that the interests of justice warranted a review given the serious nature of the charge and the apparent contradictions in evidence regarding the Deputy Attorney General's involvement.

The accused, a lawyer, was charged with multiple counts of money laundering, possession of proceeds of crime, fraud, and conspiracy related to an international ephedrine exportation scheme operated by Afshin Dastani.

The Crown's case relied heavily on the testimony of Dastani, who admitted to operating an illegal drug exportation business and claimed he disclosed the illicit nature of his activities to the accused.

The court found Dastani to be an unreliable and discredited witness due to numerous inconsistencies in his evidence and a pattern of deception toward family, friends, legal advisors, and government authorities.

Without credible evidence of the accused's knowledge that funds were proceeds of crime, the court acquitted the accused on all charges.

An innocent third party sought the return of $1.3 million allegedly provided to a lawyer for investment purposes and deposited into a bank account later restrained as offence-related property and proceeds of crime.

The court held that the Criminal Code permits such a third party to seek relief in the Superior Court before any conviction or forfeiture hearing, under both the offence-related property and proceeds of crime restraint provisions.

However, because the funds had been commingled in a heavily used account and the evidentiary record did not establish that no other person appeared lawfully entitled to the frozen funds, immediate release was not ordered.

The application was adjourned sine die to permit notice to possible claimants and more particularized evidence about the account transactions.

The accused brought applications to stay charges under section 11(b) of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, alleging unreasonable delay.

The charges involved possession of property obtained by crime, money laundering, fraud, and drug trafficking offences spanning from January 2009 to June 2012.

The overall delay was 33 months from arrest to trial.

The court conducted a detailed analysis of the delay, attributing it to Crown delay (216 days), defence delay (235 days), inherent delay (457 days), and institutional delay (78 days).

The court found that the Crown and institutional delay combined amounted to just under 10 months, which was not unreasonable given the exceptional complexity of the case, particularly the Lavallee proceedings required to protect solicitor-client privilege following searches of the accused lawyer's office.

The court balanced the delay against society's strong interest in a trial on the merits given the serious allegations of money laundering by a lawyer involving millions of dollars.

The applications were dismissed.

The court determined the quantum of costs to be awarded to three innocent third parties following the Crown's unsuccessful forfeiture application under the Controlled Drugs and Substances Act.

The Crown had sought forfeiture of two properties without evidence of complicity or collusion by the owners.

The court found the Crown's conduct constituted a marked and unacceptable departure from reasonable prosecution standards, including failure to conduct proper disclosure, misrepresentation to the Superior Court regarding mortgage law, and proceeding with a meritless application.

The court awarded substantial costs to FirstOntario and reduced costs to Fercan and GRVN, considering factors including proportionality, duplication of services, and the applicants' own litigation positions.

The applicants sought costs awards against the Crown following the dismissal of the Crown's forfeiture applications under the Controlled Drugs and Substances Act.

The Crown had sought forfeiture of two properties allegedly used in connection with marijuana grow operations.

The court found that the Crown's conduct in commencing restraint and forfeiture applications against innocent third parties, without evidence of complicity or collusion, constituted a marked and unacceptable departure from the reasonable standards expected of the prosecution.

The Crown failed to properly assess available evidence before proceeding and maintained an intransigent "hardball" attitude throughout the proceedings.

The court determined that costs awards were warranted.

The appellant appealed his conviction and sentence for importing and trafficking almost 112 kilograms of cocaine.

He argued the trial judge misapprehended evidence in finding reasonable and probable grounds for the search.

The Court of Appeal found no material misapprehensions of evidence and upheld the conviction.

The sentence appeal was also dismissed, as the sentence was within the proper range given the unprecedented quantity of drugs and the appellant's prior record for the same offence.

The Crown appealed the sentence imposed on the respondent.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal as moot in light of its disposition in a related appeal.

The appellant appealed his conviction on the basis that the trial judge failed to provide reasons for her decision.

The trial judge had given her decision with reasons to follow, but no reasons were delivered more than three years later.

The Court of Appeal held that the brief reasons provided did not meet the Sheppard test and did not permit appellate review.

The appeal was allowed, the conviction set aside, and a new trial ordered.

The appellant appealed his conviction entered by the Superior Court of Justice.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, agreeing with the reasons of the trial judge.

In an application for certification where the BACU sought to displace the IUBAC as the bargaining agent for bricklayers employed by Kvaerner Jaddco, the Board addressed several preliminary issues.

The Board determined the appropriate bargaining unit, permitted the withdrawal of a related grievance, and dismissed allegations regarding the order of names on the ballot and forced membership card signing.

However, the Board found that due to a series of administrative and logistical errors by the Board and the parties, employees did not receive adequate notice of the initial representation vote.

Consequently, the Board ordered a second representation vote to be held.

The applicant filed an application alleging that the union breached its duty of fair representation under section 74 of the Labour Relations Act by failing to process his grievance regarding a surplus/layoff notice to arbitration.

The union had grouped his grievance with others and ultimately withdrew it as part of a larger settlement.

The applicant complained about the union's failure to adequately explain his bumping rights and its failure to communicate the withdrawal of his grievance in a timely manner.

The Board dismissed the application, finding that the union had honestly assessed the merits of the grievance and that the delay in communication, while regrettable, did not amount to arbitrary conduct.

The Crown appealed a trial judgment staying marijuana cultivation and possession charges against an accused who used marijuana to control severe epilepsy.

The court held that criminally prohibiting possession and cultivation of marijuana for necessary medical use deprived the respondent of liberty and security of the person, and that the deprivation did not accord with the principles of fundamental justice because the statutory scheme provided only illusory or unfettered access to lawful medical use.

The court found the ministerial exemption power in s. 56 of the Controlled Drugs and Substances Act constitutionally insufficient to save the blanket prohibition.

The trial stay was upheld, but the reading-in remedy was set aside and the possession prohibition in s. 4 was declared invalid, with the declaration suspended for one year and a personal exemption granted during the suspension.

The appellant challenged marijuana possession and trafficking convictions by arguing that the former statutory prohibition violated s. 7 of the Charter, exceeded federal jurisdiction, and was not proven on the evidence.

The court held that recreational marijuana use, even in the privacy of the home, did not engage protected liberty or security interests as a matter of fundamental personal importance.

Assuming a harm principle formed part of fundamental justice, the court found a reasoned apprehension of non-trivial harm associated with marijuana use and upheld the prohibition except insofar as it failed to include a medical-use exemption.

Because the appellant was not within the class requiring that exemption and the repealed statute could still support prosecution, no stay of proceedings was warranted.

The appeal was dismissed.

The applicant union applied for certification to displace the incumbent International Union.

The incumbent union and the General Presidents' Maintenance Committee for Canada (GPMC) intervened, arguing that a valid collective agreement already covered the employees.

The Board examined several documents and agreements to determine if a valid collective agreement existed between the responding party employer and the International Union.

The Board found that while the GPMC lacked actual authority to sign the adherence agreement on behalf of the International Union, it possessed ostensible authority to do so.

Furthermore, the Board determined that recent amendments to section 44 of the Labour Relations Act applied retroactively, meaning employee ratification was not required.

Consequently, a valid collective agreement existed, giving the intervenors status, and the Board directed the counting of the displacement ballots.

The employer filed a jurisdictional dispute complaint with the Board after referring the dispute to the Plan for the Settlement of Jurisdictional Disputes in the Construction Industry and receiving a favourable decision.

Bricklayers' Local 1 did not participate in the Plan proceedings and argued it was not bound by the Plan.

The Board found that Local 1 was not bound by the Plan, as it had not agreed to it and the International Union had no authority to bind it.

The Board declined to inquire into the jurisdictional dispute complaint, finding that the employer and Cement Masons had abused the Board's processes by circumventing an agreement to have the Board determine the dispute.

The Ontario Provincial Conference of the International Union of Bricklayers and Allied Craftsmen applied under section 154 of the Labour Relations Act, 1995 to be certified as the exclusive employee bargaining agency for the provincial unit, seeking to oust the International Union from the designated agency.

The Board found that the applicant met the statutory definition of an 'employee bargaining agency' and had standing to apply.

The Board further found that a majority of the affiliated bargaining agents supported the application, and conditionally concluded that they held bargaining rights for a majority of employees, subject to any final representations from the opposing parties.

The Ontario Public Service Employees Union and the Crown applied to the Ontario Labour Relations Board to determine five unresolved matters in their negotiation of an essential services agreement under the Crown Employees Collective Bargaining Act, 1993.

The Board provided directions on the definition of essential versus emergency services, the arrangement of work hours, and the timing for selecting employees to provide essential services.

The Board declined to make determinations on the extension of non-classified contracts and the cessation of benefits during a strike, finding these issues lacked a sufficient connection to the statutory mandate for essential services agreements.