Justin Safayeni

A law firm sought partial summary judgment seeking a declaration that it was entitled to invoice a bank for commissions relating to debtor payments received after the termination of a debt collection services agreement.

The bank brought a cross‑motion for summary judgment asserting that all amounts owed had already been paid under the agreement’s contingency‑based compensation structure.

The dispute turned on the interpretation of a termination clause allowing the firm to invoice for services performed up to the date of termination.

Applying established principles of contractual interpretation and considering the commercial context and factual matrix, the court held that compensation was limited to commissions on payments actually received before the termination date.

The plaintiff’s interpretation would have radically altered the agreed compensation methodology and was inconsistent with the contractual language and commercial sense.

The court considered an application for a publication ban following the guilty plea of David Cake to obstructing justice.

The applicant Anthony George, charged separately in connection with the same incident, sought a complete publication ban to protect his right to a fair trial.

The Crown supported a limited ban, while media intervenors opposed any restrictions.

The court granted a partial, temporary publication ban, permitting publication of certain facts regarding Cake's plea and conduct while restricting publication of evidence concerning the cause of death and any references to George or co-accused Mielke.

The court considered the Dagenais test, the importance of open court principles, and systemic discrimination affecting aboriginal accused persons.

The appellant challenged an order arising from misleading comparative advertising directed at the respondent's water heater and rental services business.

The Court of Appeal upheld findings of liability under ss. 7(a) and 22(1) of the Trade-marks Act and rejected the argument that damages had not been proven, holding that unchallenged affidavit evidence and evidence of unusual contract cancellations supported a prima facie case.

The court also upheld liability under s. 52(1) of the Competition Act, finding that the motion judge's conclusion that the brochure was directed at misleading consumers implicitly established the required mental element of knowledge or recklessness.

A separate appeal was dismissed as abandoned, and costs were awarded to the respondent.

The Ontario Securities Commission held a sanctions and costs hearing following a merits decision that found the respondents engaged in unregistered trading and illegal distribution of securities related to land and solar panel agreements.

The Commission imposed market participation bans of 10 years for the corporate respondents and their directing mind, Chaddock, and 5 years for the subordinate sales employees, Baum and Strumos.

The Commission ordered significant administrative penalties and disgorgement, finding that the respondents obtained over $3 million from investors through their non-compliance with Ontario securities law.

Costs were also awarded against the respondents.

The moving party sought an order appointing a computer forensic expert to inspect the responding party’s computer systems to determine the authenticity of certain emails allegedly exchanged between employees.

The motion alleged a lack of transparency in the responding party’s investigation and requested inspection of servers and archived email systems.

The court accepted the responding party’s evidence that no trace of the emails existed in its live exchange system or archival vault and that prior internal and forensic reviews found no record of the communications.

Applying a threshold requirement that there be a real likelihood the emails once existed and were deleted, the court held the moving party’s request was based on speculation.

Given the intrusive nature of inspecting a competitor’s computer systems and the principle of proportionality in discovery, the court refused the requested order.

The appellant intended to bring a class action for secondary market misrepresentation under the Securities Act against confidential sources quoted in a newspaper article about a leveraged buyout.

The appellant sought a Norwich order to compel the journalist and newspaper to disclose the sources' identities.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, holding that while the appellant met the threshold for a Norwich order, the respondents satisfied the Wigmore test for journalist-source privilege.

The public interest in protecting the confidential sources outweighed the public interest in the appellant's weak proposed action.

A jockey brought a civil action alleging malicious prosecution against racing stewards and the provincial racing regulator after his one‑year suspension for failing to persevere with his mount was overturned on appeal by the regulator.

The defendants moved for summary judgment.

The court held that issue estoppel and abuse of process barred the action because the propriety of the stewards’ investigation and their alleged malice had already been addressed in a full de novo hearing before the regulatory tribunal.

In any event, the plaintiff failed to establish essential elements of the tort of malicious prosecution, including absence of reasonable and probable cause and malice.

Summary judgment was granted dismissing the action.

Following the dismissal of an environmental class action on appeal, the successful defendant sought costs for the period from certification to the trial decision, payable from the Class Proceedings Fund administered by the Law Foundation of Ontario.

The court held that the defendant was prima facie entitled to costs on a partial indemnity basis under the general rule that costs follow the event.

However, under s.31(1) of the Class Proceedings Act, the court considered that the proceeding raised novel legal issues concerning environmental mass torts and class proceedings and involved significant public interest, including access to justice and environmental concerns.

Balancing these factors with the defendant’s entitlement to compensation for substantial litigation expenses, the court reduced the costs award.

The defendant was awarded 50% of the otherwise assessed costs, payable from the Fund.

In a class proceeding costs dispute following the dismissal of environmental contamination claims, the defendant brought a motion to strike portions of affidavits filed by a third-party fund administrator opposing payment of costs from the Class Proceedings Fund.

The challenged affidavits contained opinion evidence from non‑expert witnesses asserting that the litigation raised issues of public interest.

The court applied the principles governing admissibility of lay opinion evidence from R. v. Graat, distinguishing between admissible opinion grounded in factual observations and inadmissible speculation or legal opinion.

While the court permitted most of the opinion evidence as permissible lay opinion supporting observations about the public interest and access to justice, it struck limited portions that lacked factual foundation or amounted to speculation.

The Divisional Court issued an addendum to its initial endorsement to correct factual errors in paragraph 4 regarding bypass compensation and stranded transmission connection facilities.

The appellants appealed a procedural decision of the Ontario Energy Board regarding their application to declare bypass compensation provisions of the Transmission System Code ultra vires.

The Board had determined the application was not a standalone application but was linked to an earlier Leave to Construct decision, and gave the appellants three procedural options to proceed.

The Divisional Court dismissed the appeal, finding the Board's decision was interlocutory and discretionary, and raised no true question of law or jurisdiction.

The applicant sought judicial review of the Ontario Energy Board's Demand Side Management guidelines, arguing they were improperly adopted without a hearing and were binding on parties.

The Board, supported by intervenors, brought a motion to quash the application as moot.

The Divisional Court granted the motion to quash, finding that the guidelines were not binding, as evidenced by subsequent rate hearings where the Board departed from them and an affidavit from Board counsel.

The court declined to exercise its discretion to hear the moot application, noting the applicant could challenge the guidelines in future rate proceedings.

After dismissing an application for a Norwich order compelling a newspaper to reveal confidential sources related to a business news story, the court addressed the issue of costs.

The unsuccessful applicant argued that no costs should be awarded because the proceeding raised novel and public interest issues linked to a proposed securities class action.

The court held that although the litigation had some public interest elements, it was fundamentally a private claim seeking recovery of trading losses.

Applying the factors in Rule 57.01 and considering the access to justice concerns noted by the Court of Appeal in class action jurisprudence, the court reduced the respondents’ claimed costs but fixed a substantial award.

Costs were ordered against the applicant on a partial indemnity basis.

The applicant sought a Norwich order compelling a journalist and newspaper to disclose the identities of confidential sources quoted in an article concerning the BCE leveraged buy-out negotiations.

The applicant alleged the sources’ statements were misleading or unlawful under the Securities Act and caused trading losses, and intended to pursue a proposed securities class action against them.

The court applied the Norwich test together with the Wigmore framework for journalist‑source privilege.

It found that any alleged breach of securities law was speculative and minimal, and that the public interest in protecting confidential journalistic sources outweighed the limited interest in disclosure for a civil claim.

The journalist‑source privilege was therefore upheld and disclosure refused.

The appellant appealed a master's order granting the plaintiff leave to amend her notice of action and statement of claim to add a private clinic as a defendant in a medical malpractice action despite the expiry of the presumptive two‑year limitation period.

The court considered whether pleadings and correspondence from the hospital constituted a triggering event under the discoverability provisions of s. 5 of the Limitations Act, 2002.

The court held that the hospital’s defence and cross‑claim, which alleged that treatment occurred in a private clinic, clearly pointed to another potential defendant and triggered the limitation period.

The plaintiff failed to demonstrate reasonable diligence in identifying the clinic despite available information and prolonged inaction by counsel.

The master erred in law by allowing the amendment while leaving the limitation issue to be determined later.

The appellant, a former executive and minority shareholder, sued the respondents in Ontario for wrongful dismissal, unpaid wages, and oppression.

The motions judge denied the appellant's motion for partial summary judgment and granted the respondents' motion to stay the action based on an exclusive forum selection clause in a Shareholders' Agreement favouring England.

On appeal, the Court of Appeal upheld the denial of summary judgment but set aside the stay.

The Court found that the motions judge erred by ignoring a non-exclusive Ontario forum selection clause in the appellant's Service Agreement and by failing to consider that the respondents had attorned to Ontario's jurisdiction by defending the action on the merits and counterclaiming before invoking the English forum selection clause.

The appellant appealed a decision declaring that a partnership did not exist between the parties under the Partnerships Act.

The parties had collaborated to develop and deliver continuing professional development programs.

The Court of Appeal found that the application judge erred in law by failing to analyze the provisions of the agreements and the circumstances in relation to the legal elements of the test for partnership.

Applying the correct test, the Court concluded that the parties were carrying on a business in common with a view to profit, and declared that a partnership existed.

The matter was remitted to the Superior Court to determine the value of partnership assets.