Justin Safayeni

Her Majesty the Queen in right of Ontario sought to lift a stay on its $330 billion health care cost recovery action against three tobacco companies (JTI-Macdonald Corp., Imperial Tobacco, Rothmans, Benson & Hedges Inc.) and eleven co-defendants, which was imposed under CCAA proceedings.

Ontario proposed to temporarily stay the effects of any judgment.

The court dismissed the motion, emphasizing the need to preserve the status quo in CCAA proceedings to facilitate a global resolution of significant claims.

Allowing Ontario's action to proceed would alter the level playing field, distract from restructuring efforts, and impose significant costs, prejudicing other stakeholders.

The plaintiff brought a motion to compel the defendant, Luis Chibante, to answer refusals given during his examination for discovery.

The refusals concerned the use of funds borrowed from Mastronardi Produce and Luis Chibante's business ventures with individuals associated with Mastronardi Produce.

The court, applying principles of discovery scope and proportionality, ordered the defendant to provide a solicitor's trust statement confirming legal fees paid from the borrowed funds and to answer specific questions about his business interests with Mastronardi Produce associates, subject to confidentiality controls.

Luis Chibante brought a motion to strike three paragraphs from Lynne Chibante's statement of claim, alleging abuse of process, prejudice, delay, and no reasonable cause of action.

The paragraphs concerned allegations of wrongdoing related to Golden Fresh in Ohio and accessing private emails, which were deemed outside the scope of the agreed-upon trial of issues concerning Golden Acre in Ontario.

The court granted the motion, finding the paragraphs scandalous, vexatious, irrelevant, and likely to prejudice or delay the fair trial of the action.

The plaintiff brought a motion to set aside a Registrar's order dismissing his defamation action for delay.

The action was administratively dismissed after the plaintiff failed to set it down for trial by January 1, 2017, although he successfully filed his trial record on January 27, 2017.

The court found that the Registrar should not have dismissed the action after accepting the trial record.

Applying the four-part test for setting aside a dismissal order, the court found the plaintiff provided an adequate explanation for the delay, his failure to meet the deadline was inadvertent, the motion was brought promptly, and the defendants suffered no actual prejudice.

The motion was granted, but the plaintiff was ordered to pay costs to the defendants for seeking the indulgence.

The Court allowed the appeal and quashed the National Energy Board authorization for offshore seismic testing in Baffin Bay and Davis Strait.

It held that the Board’s approval process triggered the Crown’s duty to consult, and that the Crown may rely on a regulatory process to fulfill consultation obligations where that process is adequate.

On these facts, consultation was inadequate given the significance of Inuit treaty harvesting rights, the potential impacts of testing, limited participation opportunities, and insufficient accommodation.

This endorsement addresses the approval of class counsel fees, plaintiffs' costs, defendants' costs, and the Law Foundation of Ontario's levy following a decade-long class action concerning the legality of Par account transactions (PATs) by London Life and Great-West Life.

The court approved class counsel fees of $16.4 million, found the plaintiffs entitled to $4 million in partial indemnity costs from the defendants, and denied the defendants' claim for costs.

It also determined that the Law Foundation of Ontario was entitled to a levy of $1,520,346.50 (repayment of disbursements) plus 10% of the net monetary award ($4,030,000), totaling $5,550,346.50, to be paid from the participating accounts.

The court clarified that a "monetary award" for the purposes of the Class Proceedings Act and the Law Society Act includes funds paid to the benefit of class members through participating accounts, even if not directly distributed to individuals.

The media applicants brought an application for a declaration that the police practice of impersonating journalists for criminal investigation and surveillance of public protests violates s. 2(b) of the Charter.

The court found no evidence that plainclothes officers engaging in surveillance held themselves out as journalists.

The court held that the evidentiary record did not support a finding that the practice of plainclothes surveillance in the presence of media had a chilling effect on news gathering.

The application was dismissed.

Media organizations sought certiorari to quash a provincial court judge’s order imposing a partial publication ban and denying access to a video exhibit tendered during a guilty plea for obstruction of justice arising from a detention-centre death.

The applicants argued that the provincial court judge lacked jurisdiction and that the order failed the Dagenais/Mentuck test.

The Superior Court held that the judge presiding over the guilty plea had jurisdiction to consider and grant a publication ban related to the proceeding before him.

The court found that the partial ban appropriately balanced open court principles with the fair trial rights of co‑accused facing related charges.

The court concluded that the order was necessary to prevent a real and substantial risk to the proper administration of justice and that no error of law appeared on the face of the record.

The court considered an application for a publication ban following the guilty plea of David Cake to obstructing justice.

The applicant Anthony George, charged separately in connection with the same incident, sought a complete publication ban to protect his right to a fair trial.

The Crown supported a limited ban, while media intervenors opposed any restrictions.

The court granted a partial, temporary publication ban, permitting publication of certain facts regarding Cake's plea and conduct while restricting publication of evidence concerning the cause of death and any references to George or co-accused Mielke.

The court considered the Dagenais test, the importance of open court principles, and systemic discrimination affecting aboriginal accused persons.

The moving party sought an order appointing a computer forensic expert to inspect the responding party’s computer systems to determine the authenticity of certain emails allegedly exchanged between employees.

The motion alleged a lack of transparency in the responding party’s investigation and requested inspection of servers and archived email systems.

The court accepted the responding party’s evidence that no trace of the emails existed in its live exchange system or archival vault and that prior internal and forensic reviews found no record of the communications.

Applying a threshold requirement that there be a real likelihood the emails once existed and were deleted, the court held the moving party’s request was based on speculation.

Given the intrusive nature of inspecting a competitor’s computer systems and the principle of proportionality in discovery, the court refused the requested order.

A jockey brought a civil action alleging malicious prosecution against racing stewards and the provincial racing regulator after his one‑year suspension for failing to persevere with his mount was overturned on appeal by the regulator.

The defendants moved for summary judgment.

The court held that issue estoppel and abuse of process barred the action because the propriety of the stewards’ investigation and their alleged malice had already been addressed in a full de novo hearing before the regulatory tribunal.

In any event, the plaintiff failed to establish essential elements of the tort of malicious prosecution, including absence of reasonable and probable cause and malice.

Summary judgment was granted dismissing the action.

After dismissing an application for a Norwich order compelling a newspaper to reveal confidential sources related to a business news story, the court addressed the issue of costs.

The unsuccessful applicant argued that no costs should be awarded because the proceeding raised novel and public interest issues linked to a proposed securities class action.

The court held that although the litigation had some public interest elements, it was fundamentally a private claim seeking recovery of trading losses.

Applying the factors in Rule 57.01 and considering the access to justice concerns noted by the Court of Appeal in class action jurisprudence, the court reduced the respondents’ claimed costs but fixed a substantial award.

Costs were ordered against the applicant on a partial indemnity basis.

The applicant sought a Norwich order compelling a journalist and newspaper to disclose the identities of confidential sources quoted in an article concerning the BCE leveraged buy-out negotiations.

The applicant alleged the sources’ statements were misleading or unlawful under the Securities Act and caused trading losses, and intended to pursue a proposed securities class action against them.

The court applied the Norwich test together with the Wigmore framework for journalist‑source privilege.

It found that any alleged breach of securities law was speculative and minimal, and that the public interest in protecting confidential journalistic sources outweighed the limited interest in disclosure for a civil claim.

The journalist‑source privilege was therefore upheld and disclosure refused.

The appellant appealed a master's order granting the plaintiff leave to amend her notice of action and statement of claim to add a private clinic as a defendant in a medical malpractice action despite the expiry of the presumptive two‑year limitation period.

The court considered whether pleadings and correspondence from the hospital constituted a triggering event under the discoverability provisions of s. 5 of the Limitations Act, 2002.

The court held that the hospital’s defence and cross‑claim, which alleged that treatment occurred in a private clinic, clearly pointed to another potential defendant and triggered the limitation period.

The plaintiff failed to demonstrate reasonable diligence in identifying the clinic despite available information and prolonged inaction by counsel.

The master erred in law by allowing the amendment while leaving the limitation issue to be determined later.