Julia Lauren Lefebvre

The plaintiffs brought a motion for partial summary judgment seeking the release of $500,000 held in escrow following a share purchase agreement.

The defendants brought cross-motions seeking an interpleader order and a portion of the funds for uncollectible accounts receivable.

The court granted the plaintiffs leave to bring their motion after setting the action down for trial, finding it was an efficient step.

The court held that partial summary judgment was appropriate as the issue could be resolved on uncontested facts.

The court found that the defendants failed to provide the required notice under the escrow agreement, entitling the plaintiffs to the return of the full escrow amount plus interest.

The plaintiff, a rap artist, sued a radio host and broadcaster for copyright infringement, theft, and negligence after they played an 18-second clip of his song during an interview.

The defendants brought a motion for summary judgment.

The court granted the motion, finding that the defendants had complied with the Copyright Act by paying the required SOCAN royalties, precluding any claim for infringement or theft.

The court also dismissed the negligence claim for lack of evidence of damages and found that, in any event, the parties had previously reached a binding settlement agreement via email.

An appeal from a Superior Court decision dismissing an appeal from a Consent and Capacity Board decision confirming the appellant's involuntary status under the Mental Health Act.

The appellant, a dangerous offender with a lengthy history of violent and sexual crimes, challenged his detention as an involuntary psychiatric patient, arguing that the Mental Health Act was being used to extend his prison sentence indefinitely (psychiatric gating) and that his Charter rights were violated.

The Court of Appeal upheld the Board's decision, finding that the appellant suffers from mental disorders (paraphilia, antisocial personality disorder with psychopathy) that pose a serious risk to others, that the initial Form 1 was properly completed, and that the appellant's Charter claims under sections 7, 9, 11(h), and 12 all failed.

The appellant appealed from a motion judge's order enforcing a settlement agreement between the appellant and the Ontario respondents arising from the appellant's suspension from the Knights of Columbus.

The appellant argued that only an agreement in principle existed and that it was not finalized by the April 22, 2016 deadline.

The Court of Appeal upheld the motion judge's finding that a binding settlement agreement had been reached, noting that the essential terms had been agreed upon, settlement funds had been provided, and the release form had been executed by some respondents before the appellant attempted to terminate the agreement.

The accused pleaded guilty to distributing an intimate image without consent.

The Crown sought a suspended sentence and probation, while the defence sought a conditional discharge.

The court considered the sentencing principles, aggravating and mitigating factors, including the limited distribution of the images, the accused's lack of criminal record, remorse, and stringent bail conditions.

The court granted a conditional discharge with a twelve-month probation period, finding it to be in the best interests of the accused and not contrary to the public interest, emphasizing that deterrence and denunciation can be achieved without a conviction in such circumstances.

The accused was charged with impaired driving and care and control of a vehicle while having consumed an illegal amount of alcohol contrary to sections 253(1)(a) and 253(1)(b) of the Criminal Code.

The accused challenged the charges on Charter grounds, alleging violations of sections 7, 8, and 10(b).

The court found that the investigating officer had reasonable and probable grounds to believe the accused was guilty of impaired driving based on observations at the accident scene.

The court convicted the accused of impaired driving under section 253(1)(a) but dismissed the care and control charge under section 253(1)(b) because the second breath sample was taken outside the permissible two-hour period, depriving the Crown of statutory presumptions.

The court rejected all Charter breach allegations.

The plaintiff sued a fraternal organization and several of its members.

The parties negotiated a settlement, but the plaintiff unilaterally settled with the US defendants and purported to withdraw from the settlement with the Ontario defendants just before a convention, citing delays in receiving signed documents and funds.

The Ontario defendants brought a motion to enforce the settlement under Rule 49.09.

The court granted the motion, finding that the plaintiff had not made a deadline an essential term of the agreement and suffered no prejudice, as he had already achieved his primary goal of reinstatement through the US settlement.

The appellant trustee in bankruptcy appealed the dismissal of its motions for summary judgment and to strike portions of the respondent's claim.

The respondent, an interim receiver, sued the appellant for breach of fiduciary duty.

The appellant argued the claim was statute-barred and an abuse of process.

The Court of Appeal upheld the motion judge's finding that the limitation period did not begin until the respondent received withheld reports containing material facts, and found no error in the dismissal of the abuse of process motion.

The appeal was dismissed.

The accused, H.B., aged 80, pleaded guilty to three counts of sexual offences against his daughter, D.B., committed between 1964 and 1980, starting when she was four years old.

The offences included indecent assault, gross indecency, and incest (sexual intercourse).

The defence sought a conditional sentence or a short period of incarceration due to the dated nature of the offences, the accused's age, severe medical conditions (including early onset dementia and PTSD from childhood sexual abuse), lack of prior record, and role as caregiver for his wife with Alzheimer's.

The Crown sought a five-year term of incarceration, emphasizing denunciation and deterrence for child sexual abuse, the breach of trust, the young age of the victim, the lengthy period of abuse, and the accused's lack of insight and remorse.

The court rejected a conditional sentence, finding the accused's actions egregious and that denunciation and deterrence required a custodial sentence.

The court sentenced H.B. to five years imprisonment for incest, with two years concurrent for indecent assault and gross indecency, along with a DNA order, SOIRA registration for life, and a 10-year weapons prohibition.

The accused was tried on charges arising from text and internet communications in which he solicited assistance from a sex worker to abduct and sexually assault a child, and later engaged in sexually explicit online discussions with an undercover officer posing as a mother.

The central issue was whether the communications were mere fantasy and role play or reflected the subjective intent required for counselling offences and for making arrangements under s. 172.2(1)(b) of the Criminal Code.

The court rejected the role-playing explanation as not credible, relied in part on similar fact evidence from other sex workers, and found that the communications with the sex worker were specific, repeated, and grounded in price, place, and timing.

Findings of guilt were entered on counselling, making arrangements, child pornography, and recognizance breach counts, but the accused was acquitted on the undercover-officer arrangement count because the communications remained too preliminary.

A media organization applied under s. 487.0193 of the Criminal Code to revoke or vary a production order requiring it to produce unedited recordings of interviews with an accused person broadcast by television and radio.

The applicant argued that compliance was unreasonable and that the court should review the validity of the production order, particularly considering the media’s role under s. 2(b) of the Charter.

The court held that the statutory review under s. 487.0193 concerns whether compliance with the order is unreasonable, not whether the issuing justice properly granted the order, which remains the domain of certiorari review.

Applying the principles governing production orders and the special considerations for media searches articulated in CBC v. Lessard, the court found the order reasonable.

The requested material was already prepared and publicly broadcast, making compliance neither onerous nor intrusive on press freedom.

Following guilty pleas to sexual assault, sexual interference, and breach of a prohibition order, the Crown applied to have the offender designated a dangerous offender under s. 753 of the Criminal Code.

The offender had a history of sexual offences against children, including prior convictions and repeated conduct demonstrating a pattern of sexual violence against minors.

Expert psychiatric evidence diagnosed pedophilia and antisocial personality traits, with actuarial assessments indicating a moderate‑high to high risk of sexual recidivism.

The court concluded there was no reasonable expectation that a determinate sentence followed by long‑term supervision would adequately protect the public.

An indeterminate sentence was imposed after the offender was declared a dangerous offender.

The accused applied to exclude evidence seized pursuant to a search warrant executed at his residence in a child pornography investigation.

He argued the Information to Obtain contained stale information, lacked full, frank and fair disclosure, and failed to provide sufficient technical evidence supporting reasonable grounds.

The court reviewed the authorization under the Garofoli framework and concluded the issuing justice had sufficient grounds to issue the warrant, relying on the officer’s observations of child pornography files associated with the IP address and explanatory evidence regarding file sharing networks and forensic recovery.

The court held the information was adequate and not misleading, and that reasonable grounds existed to believe evidence would be found.

In the alternative, the court found the evidence would not be excluded under s. 24(2) of the Charter because the police acted in good faith and the evidence was reliable and crucial to the prosecution.

The moving parties sought an order restraining a private investigator from disclosing or assisting others in disclosing documents and information obtained through the discovery process in related civil litigation.

The investigator, who was not a party to the action, had obtained thousands of documents produced on discovery and had disseminated some of them to third parties, including media outlets, and moved the documents outside the jurisdiction.

The court considered the scope and purpose of the deemed undertaking rule under Rule 30.1.01 of the Rules of Civil Procedure and authorities recognizing that the rule protects discovery material from collateral use.

It held that the court has jurisdiction to restrain third parties who knowingly obtain and use discovery documents contrary to the rule.

Given the investigator’s deliberate conduct in soliciting and disseminating the documents and attempting to evade court authority, a restraining order was warranted.

The accused brought a Charter application seeking exclusion of evidence seized under a search warrant for computers and storage devices allegedly containing child pornography.

He argued the information to obtain the warrant lacked full, frank, and fair disclosure, that the warrant lacked reasonable and probable grounds, and that the search was overly broad.

The court found that certain information in the information to obtain should be excised or amplified, including surveillance obtained through an unlawful entry onto private property and references to prior charges that had not resulted in conviction.

However, even after excision and amplification, sufficient grounds remained to support the issuance of the warrant.

Applying the section 24(2) framework, the court held the Charter breaches were not sufficiently serious to justify excluding the evidence.

A physician plaintiff sued another physician and related institutions for negligence and false imprisonment after being involuntarily detained for psychiatric assessment under a Form 1 pursuant to the Mental Health Act.

The court held that the defendant physician breached the standard of care by failing to conduct a proper personal examination and by relying on unreliable third‑party information before completing the Form 1.

The improper completion of the Form 1 meant the resulting detention was unauthorized and constituted false imprisonment.

The plaintiff established compensable psychiatric injury and economic loss caused by the negligent and unlawful detention.

The court awarded general damages and reduced income loss but denied punitive damages and prevented double recovery between the negligence and false imprisonment claims.

Following the granting of a summary judgment motion in favour of the defendants in a medical negligence action, the court considered the defendants’ request for costs against the remaining plaintiffs.

The defendants sought modest costs despite incurring substantially higher legal fees and disbursements, largely related to expert reports.

The plaintiffs made no submissions on the costs issue despite having the opportunity to do so.

The court found the defendants’ request reasonable, particularly given conduct by the responding party that had unnecessarily prolonged the proceedings.

Costs of $5,000 were awarded to each of the two defendants seeking costs.

A bail hearing concerning a reverse onus matter where the accused was charged with 26 offences including kidnapping, unlawful confinement, uttering threats, dangerous driving, firearms offences, and possession of explosives.

The accused, facing serious personal and financial difficulties, allegedly kidnapped a city lawyer at gunpoint and held him in an industrial facility while demanding financial compensation.

The Crown sought detention on primary, secondary, and tertiary grounds.

The court found the Crown's case strong and determined that the proposed sureties and plan of release were inadequate to address concerns regarding the accused's obsession with the complainant and weapons.

Detention was ordered on secondary grounds.

The offender pleaded guilty to two counts of possession of child pornography.

He had a lengthy criminal record including sexual assaults on children and a prior conviction for possession of child pornography.

The Crown sought a Long Term Offender declaration.

The court accepted a joint submission for a two-year penitentiary sentence to allow the offender to participate in an intensive sex offender treatment program.

The court also declared the offender a Long Term Offender and imposed an eight-year long-term supervision order with stringent conditions, including psychiatric treatment and restrictions on internet access.