117 total
Dangerous offender designation and indeterminate sentence upheld; risk of re-offending unmanageable in the community.
The appellant appealed his dangerous offender designation and indeterminate sentence, arguing for a long-term offender designation and a determinate sentence.
The Court of Appeal upheld the sentencing judge's finding that the appellant's risk of sexually re-offending and committing domestic assaults could not be managed in the community, even as he aged.
The appeal was dismissed.
Global Charter application to exclude evidence dismissed despite multiple breaches, as police acted without bad faith.
The accused brought a global application under s. 24(2) of the Charter to exclude all evidence obtained during the investigation, including chemicals and equipment seized from his home pursuant to valid search warrants.
The court found multiple Charter breaches throughout the investigation, including arbitrary detention, right to counsel violations, and search and seizure violations.
However, applying the Grant framework, the court concluded that the police conduct was not in bad faith or part of a systemic disregard for Charter rights.
The court dismissed the application, finding that the admission of the evidence would not bring the administration of justice into disrepute.
First police statement admissible despite earlier Charter breach; second statement partially inadmissible due to police inducements.
The accused, arrested in relation to the G20 summit, was interviewed by intelligence officers before being permitted to speak to counsel, resulting in a breach of his s. 10(b) Charter rights.
He subsequently gave two videotaped statements to an investigating detective.
The court held that the first videotaped statement was not tainted by the earlier Charter breach and was voluntary, despite a breach of s. 503(1)(a) of the Criminal Code for failing to bring him before a justice within 24 hours.
However, the court found that a portion of the second videotaped statement was involuntary and inadmissible because the detective offered a quid pro quo regarding bail for the accused's wife and created oppressive circumstances by suggesting the accused was being investigated by national security forces.
Application to exclude computer evidence dismissed; s. 8 breach for unauthorized seizure did not warrant exclusion.
The accused brought an application under s. 24(2) of the Charter to exclude evidence found on computers seized from his residence, arguing his s. 8 rights were infringed.
The search warrants authorized a search of computers for records relating to the production of explosives but did not expressly authorize the seizure of the computers.
The police seized the computers and searched the entire hard drives off-site.
The court found that the seizure of the computers violated s. 8, as the police could not rely on the plain view doctrine or s. 489 of the Criminal Code.
However, the court held that the cursory search of the entire hard drives was reasonable and not overbroad.
Applying the Grant framework, the court concluded that the Charter breaches were not serious, had little impact on the accused's protected interests, and the evidence was reliable and important to the Crown's case.
The application to exclude the evidence was dismissed.
Section 8 breach found, but Visa records admitted under section 24(2).
In a criminal proceeding, the defence sought exclusion under section 24(2) of Charter evidence obtained through production orders for credit-card and phone records.
After Garofoli-related excisions and limited amplification, the court held the information to obtain did not support the TD Visa production order and found a section 8 breach for those records.
Applying R. v. Grant, the court found good-faith state conduct and a moderate informational-privacy impact, while emphasizing the reliability and trial importance of the records.
Balancing the Grant factors, the court declined to exclude the Visa records.
The defence exclusion application was dismissed, subject to the broader global section 24(2) ruling.
Crown appeal of Ontario Review Board absolute discharge dismissed as disposition was reasonable.
The Crown appealed an Ontario Review Board disposition that granted the respondent an absolute discharge.
The Crown argued the Board failed to properly assess the risk of psychological harm to the public, misapprehended evidence, and exceeded its jurisdiction.
The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the Board's decision that the respondent was not a significant threat to the public was reasonable and supported by the record.
Conviction and sentence appeals for aggravated assault and assault with a weapon dismissed.
The appellant appealed his convictions for aggravated assault and assault with a weapon, as well as his 18-month sentence.
He argued the trial judge misapprehended evidence and applied an unequal standard of scrutiny to his testimony.
He also argued the sentence failed to account for his unblemished character and charitable works.
The Court of Appeal dismissed the conviction appeal, finding the record did not support the appellant's claims.
Leave to appeal the sentence was granted, but the appeal was dismissed as the sentence was within range and the trial judge had properly considered the mitigating factors.
Search warrants upheld; sufficient grounds existed for intimidation allegation and computer search.
The accused brought a Charter s. 8 application following a Garofoli review seeking to exclude evidence obtained through search warrants executed at his residence.
The court addressed two reserved issues: whether the Information to Obtain properly supported a charge of intimidation of a justice system participant by “watching” police officers, and whether computers were properly included as items to be searched in a second warrant.
The court held that public online posts concerning dismantling G20 security fencing, combined with derogatory postings of police photographs, could reasonably support an inference that the accused intended to provoke fear in the general public.
The court further held that the discovery of chemical precursors, laboratory equipment, documents, and the accused’s extensive internet use provided reasonable grounds to search computers for records relating to the production of explosives.
The warrants were therefore properly supported.
Invalid portions of search warrants severed; remaining authorization upheld.
The accused challenged the facial validity of two search warrants executed at his residence following a Garofoli ruling that some offences listed in the warrants were unsupported by the Information to Obtain.
The accused argued that the entire warrants must be quashed because the unsupported offences rendered the warrants invalid and could not be cured by severance.
The Crown submitted that the unsupported portions could be severed, leaving valid authorizations.
The court reviewed the doctrine of severability in the context of search warrants and held that where the invalid portions are clearly separable and not vital to the authorization, they may be excised without invalidating the remainder.
The court concluded that the unsupported offences and related items could be severed and that the remaining portions of the warrants constituted valid authorizations.
Appeal from convictions for dangerous driving and flight from police dismissed; jury verdicts were not inconsistent.
The appellant was convicted by a jury of dangerous driving and flight from a pursuing police officer.
She appealed, arguing the trial judge misdirected the jury on the essential elements of the offences, provided inadequate answers to jury questions, and that the guilty verdict for dangerous driving was inconsistent with her acquittal for dangerous driving causing bodily harm.
The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no errors in the jury instructions or responses to questions, and concluding that the verdicts were reasonably reconcilable on the evidence.
Appeal from conviction and sentence dismissed; trial judge properly admitted and instructed on post-offence conduct.
The appellant appealed his conviction and sentence.
He argued the trial judge erred in admitting evidence of post-offence conduct and in her instructions to the jury regarding its use.
The Court of Appeal found no error, noting the evidence was relevant and probative, and the jury charge properly alerted the jury to the limited use of the evidence.
The appeal against conviction was dismissed, and the sentence was upheld as fit.
Convictions upheld despite challenges to trial fairness, hearsay rulings, and cell phone evidence.
Multiple appellants challenged jury convictions for two first degree murders and attempted murder arising from a retaliatory gang-related shooting.
The court rejected allegations of unfair trial management, unfair jury instructions, improper admission of prior K.G.B. statements and preliminary inquiry evidence, erroneous refusal of severance, improper admission of intercepted artistic expression, and misdirection on cell phone location evidence.
Applying a threshold reliability analysis informed by Khelawon, the court upheld admission of a key unavailable witness's prior statements.
The court also dismissed a fresh evidence application concerning synchronization of 911 and carrier clocks, holding the proposed evidence would not reasonably have affected the verdict given the broader evidentiary record.
Appeal allowed and convictions for obstructing justice restored; suggesting a false doctor's note constituted obstruction.
The Crown appealed as of right to the Supreme Court of Canada from a decision of the Court of Appeal for Ontario that set aside the accused's convictions for obstructing justice.
The Supreme Court found that the appeal raised a question of law and that it had jurisdiction.
Adopting the dissenting reasons from the Court of Appeal, the Court held that suggesting a false doctor's note was an integral part of an overall attempt to dissuade a witness from giving evidence.
The appeal was allowed and the convictions restored.
Sentence appeal allowed; parole ineligibility for second degree murder reduced from 20 to 16 years.
The appellant was convicted of second degree murder for the brutal home invasion and sexual assault of an 81-year-old woman.
He was sentenced to life imprisonment with a 20-year period of parole ineligibility.
On appeal, the appellant argued the sentencing judge erred in principle by treating the absence of a psychiatric disorder and his failure to assist police as aggravating factors.
The Court of Appeal agreed, finding these were merely absent mitigating factors.
Balancing the egregious nature of the offence against the appellant's significant mitigating factors, including his age, lack of criminal record, and evidence that he would not present a future danger, the Court allowed the appeal and reduced the period of parole ineligibility to 16 years.
Conviction and sentence appeals dismissed; jury verdicts on firearms possession were not inconsistent.
The appellants were convicted of possession of firearms found in a vehicle but acquitted of possessing over-capacity magazines.
They appealed their convictions on multiple grounds, including inconsistent verdicts, improper jury instructions, and Charter violations.
The Court of Appeal dismissed the conviction appeals, finding the verdicts reconcilable and the jury instructions proper.
The court also dismissed one appellant's sentence appeal, upholding his nine-year sentence due to his persistent criminality and prior firearms convictions.
Appeals from second degree murder convictions and sentence dismissed; jury instructions upheld.
The appellants appealed their convictions for second degree murder, and one appellant appealed his sentence.
The victim was killed by a group of assailants who mistakenly believed he was their intended target.
The Court of Appeal dismissed the conviction appeals, finding no reversible errors in the trial judge's instructions on reasonable doubt, the right to disagree, mistaken identity, or the defence of abandonment.
The sentence appeal was also dismissed, upholding the 17-year parole ineligibility period due to the brutal nature of the murder.
Leave to appeal denied; enhanced pre-trial custody credit was an appropriate remedy for arbitrary detention.
The appellant was found guilty of domestic assault and sought a stay of proceedings under s. 24(1) of the Charter, arguing his s. 9 rights were violated by a police policy of routinely detaining those charged with domestic violence.
The trial judge found a Charter breach but refused a stay, instead granting enhanced pre-trial custody credit.
The summary conviction appeal judge dismissed the appeal.
The Court of Appeal refused leave to appeal, finding no error in the lower courts' discretionary choice of remedy and noting the police policy had been properly denounced.
Appeal allowed and acquittals entered as Crown failed to prove particularized 'corrupt means' of obstructing justice.
The appellant was convicted of attempting to obstruct justice and breach of recognizance after allegedly dissuading a witness from testifying by suggesting he obtain a false doctor's note.
The indictment was particularized to allege dissuasion 'by a threat or other corrupt means'.
The trial judge found the suggestion of a false doctor's note constituted the corrupt means.
On appeal, the majority held that the false doctor's note was not the means of dissuasion, but rather the fear of cross-examination on a prior fraud.
Because the Crown failed to prove the particularized means, and amending the indictment on appeal would prejudice the appellant, the appeal was allowed and acquittals entered.
Blair J.A. dissented, finding the false doctor's note was an integral part of the corrupt means of dissuasion.
Acquittals set aside and new trial ordered due to errors in trial judge's s. 24(2) Charter analysis.
The Crown appealed the respondent's acquittals on drug and gun charges, arguing the trial judge erred in excluding evidence under s. 24(2) of the Charter.
The trial judge had found that the police breached the respondent's s. 10(b) rights by asking an officer safety question after he requested counsel, which led to the discovery of marijuana and a gun in the trunk.
The Court of Appeal held that the trial judge committed material errors in his s. 24(2) analysis, including failing to consider the respondent's own testimony, the reason for the delay in the search, and the context of the officer safety question.
The appeal was allowed, the acquittals set aside, and a new trial ordered.
Conviction and 12-year sentence for home invasion upheld; disparity with co-accused justified by criminal record.
The appellant was convicted of robbery with a firearm and related weapons offences following a home invasion, and was sentenced to 12 years' imprisonment.
He appealed his conviction and sentence, arguing that his sentence offended the parity principle because his co-accused received a 5-year sentence.
The Court of Appeal dismissed the conviction appeal, finding no error in the trial judge's assessment of witness credibility.
The sentence appeal was also dismissed, as the disparity was justified by the co-accused's early guilty plea and the appellant's extensive criminal record for violent offences.