Joseph Romano De Luca

The Crown moved to quash an appeal from a Not Criminally Responsible (NCR) verdict on a dual procedure offence.

The matter originally started as a fitness hearing and proceeded without an election by the Crown or the accused as to the mode of trial, and without arraignment or plea.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the motion to quash, finding that it could not be presumed the Crown proceeded summarily.

Given the procedural flaws, the Crown conceded the appeal must be allowed.

The NCR verdict was set aside and a new trial ordered.

The appellant appealed his conviction for sexual assault, arguing the trial judge erred in assessing the complainant's credibility and improperly curtailed cross-examination.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the trial judge's credibility assessment was sound and entitled to deference, and noting that defence counsel had agreed to use a written transcript instead of playing the complainant's video statement.

The sentence appeal was dismissed as moot.

The appellant was convicted of obstructing police in two separate incidents after being stopped while driving an uninsured vehicle.

In both instances, he interfered with police efforts to impound the vehicle and, in one case, to seize his licence plate.

On appeal, he argued the police lacked statutory or common law authority to impound an uninsured vehicle, meaning they were not acting in the lawful execution of their duties.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, holding that while no express statutory power exists, police have common law authority under the Waterfield/Dedman test to impound uninsured vehicles to protect public safety and control traffic.

The appellant appealed his conviction and sentence for defrauding the public of over $3 million in income tax and GST payments.

He argued that no fraud occurred because no false income tax returns were actually filed.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the appellant caused false GST returns to be filed and that his deliberate failure to file income tax returns, combined with creating false records, imperilled the public purse and constituted a risk of deprivation.

The sentence of six years' imprisonment and a $2,000,000 fine was upheld as fit.

The appellant appealed his conviction and sentence of seven months' imprisonment for sexual offences against a child.

He argued the trial judge erred by admitting hearsay statements without a voir dire, applying uneven scrutiny to the evidence, and prematurely terminating the cross-examination of the child witness.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no error in the admission of evidence, the assessment of credibility, or the trial judge's decision to stop cross-examination due to the witness's distress.

The sentence was also upheld as fit.

The appellant appealed his convictions for sexual interference involving a young girl who lived next door.

He argued the trial judge failed to consider the implausibility of the complainant's evidence and applied a harsher standard of scrutiny to the defence evidence.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the trial judge carefully reviewed the evidence, reasonably believed the complainant, and applied the same level of scrutiny to all witnesses.

The Crown appealed a sentence of 90 days' intermittent custody imposed on the respondent for two counts of sexual interference involving a young child.

The Crown argued the trial judge placed too little weight on aggravating factors and that the sentence was demonstrably unfit.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, holding that while the sentence was at the low end of the range, the trial judge did not err in principle and the sentence was not demonstrably unfit.

The young person appealed findings of guilt on two counts of sexual assault involving two child complainants.

The appellant argued the trial judge erred in assessing credibility, considering collusion, and applying the W.(D.) framework.

The Court of Appeal found the trial judge adequately scrutinized the evidence and properly rejected collusion.

Although the trial judge erred at the second step of the W.(D.) analysis by asking if the appellant's evidence 'could not reasonably be true', the Court applied the curative proviso, concluding the Crown's case was overwhelming and the rejected evidence could not have left a reasonable doubt.

The appeal was dismissed.

The appellant was convicted of robbery, unlawful confinement, and other offences arising from a home invasion.

The Crown alleged she acted as an aider or formed a common intention with the principals under s. 21(2) of the Criminal Code.

On appeal, the appellant argued the trial judge's jury instructions were confusing and failed to explain the essential elements of the offences.

The Court of Appeal agreed, finding the instructions failed to link the general principles of party liability to the specific offences charged and improperly commingled the alternative grounds of liability.

The appeal was allowed, convictions quashed, and a new trial ordered.

The appellant appealed his convictions and sentence of 10.5 years for historical sexual offences against five young female victims over a 25-year period.

The appellant argued the trial judge erred in using hearsay evidence of prior consistent statements and misapplied evidence in evaluating his credibility.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the conviction appeal, noting the appellant was bound by trial counsel's strategic concession regarding the hearsay evidence.

The sentence appeal was also dismissed, as the sentence appropriately reflected the appellant's moral blameworthiness and breach of trust.

The appeal was allowed on consent regarding one summary conviction count, which was quashed.

The appellant appealed his convictions for sexual assault and sexual interference involving his nieces.

He argued the trial judge erred by failing to consider evidence of collusion and by applying a higher standard of scrutiny to his evidence.

The Court of Appeal found no error regarding the collusion issue but held that the trial judge erred in relying on the appellant's evasive answers to ambiguous and irrelevant questions about whether he found his nieces attractive to reject his testimony.

The appeal was allowed and a new trial ordered.

The appellant appealed his robbery conviction, arguing his s. 10(b) Charter right to counsel was violated when police questioned him after he asked to speak to a specific lawyer.

The trial judge found the appellant was eager to tell his story and only wanted to ensure his lawyer was available for his bail hearing the next day.

The Court of Appeal upheld the trial judge's findings, concluding the appellant was not interested in consulting counsel before speaking to the police and therefore his rights were not violated.

The appeal was dismissed.

The appellants appealed their convictions and sentences for commercial-level marijuana trafficking.

They argued that a police stop violated their s. 9 Charter rights and that the resulting evidence should be excluded under s. 24(2).

The Court of Appeal assumed a s. 9 breach but declined to exclude the evidence, finding the breach was not serious, the privacy expectation was minimal, and the police did not act in bad faith.

The court also upheld the six-month custodial sentences, rejecting the appellants' argument for conditional sentences.

The appeals against conviction and sentence were dismissed.

The Crown sought leave to appeal a motion judge's decision regarding a Legal Aid Plan policy that restricted an accused's choice of counsel to major centres.

The Court of Appeal denied leave to appeal, finding that the issue was moot between the parties and not evasive of review.

The court noted that the motion judge's decision was based on the unique circumstances of the case and did not open the floodgates for accused persons to choose counsel outside their trial centres.

The Crown appealed the respondent's acquittals for attempted murder and endangering, as well as the sentence imposed for several serious gun-related offences arising from a shooting in a restaurant.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the acquittal appeals, finding no error of law regarding the attempted murder charge and noting the Crown's refusal to seek a new trial on the endangering counts despite a misdirection.

However, the Court allowed the sentence appeal, finding the effective sentence of 8.5 years manifestly inadequate given the paramount importance of general deterrence and denunciation.

The sentence was varied to an effective term of 10 years.

The appellant appealed his convictions for three counts of sexual assault and his sentence of three years' imprisonment.

The Court of Appeal found that the trial judge erred in her credibility assessment by transferring findings from an admitted assault charge to the disputed sexual assault charges without explanation, ignoring key evidence such as a letter written by the complainant, and failing to properly apply the W.(D.) test.

The appeal was allowed, a new trial was ordered for the sexual assault charges, and the sentence for the remaining assault and criminal harassment convictions was reduced to time served.

The Crown appealed a summary conviction appeal judge's decision that overturned the accused's four sexual assault convictions.

The summary conviction appeal judge had found that the trial judge erred by failing to consider the exculpatory value of acquittals on four other counts and by limiting the cross-examination of a Crown witness.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal and restored the convictions, holding that the acquittals had no exculpatory value on the other counts and that the trial judge properly limited cross-examination that lacked relevance and probative value.

The appellant was convicted of fraud over $5000 after taking $90,000 from an elderly complainant under the guise of real estate investments.

On appeal, the appellant argued the trial judge failed to properly caution the jury about the dangers of relying on the complainant's testimony, given her prior inconsistent statements at the preliminary hearing.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the trial judge's instructions on credibility and prior inconsistent statements were adequate and a Vetrovec warning was not required.

The appellant appealed his conviction for second degree murder, arguing the trial judge erred in admitting a videotaped police station statement that was allegedly tainted by earlier inadmissible statements made in a police cruiser, and in instructing the jury on the defence of accident and intent.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the station statement was a 'fresh start' separated by time, location, and consultation with counsel, and that the jury was properly instructed on the requisite intent for murder.

The appellant appealed his conviction for two counts of sexual assault, arguing the trial judge misapprehended his evidence and failed to address weaknesses in the complainant's evidence.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding it was open to the trial judge to find the appellant's version of events incredible and the complainant's testimony credible and compelling.

The complainant's evidence was corroborated by physical bruising and another employee.