Joseph Romano De Luca

The appellant appealed his convictions for sexually assaulting his young son, arguing his guilty pleas should be set aside because a major depressive disorder undermined their voluntariness.

The Court of Appeal held that the 'limited cognitive capacity' standard applies to determine whether a mental disorder affects the voluntariness of a guilty plea.

Applying this standard, the court preferred the Crown's expert evidence and found the appellant understood the process and made a conscious, volitional decision.

The appeal was dismissed.

The appellant appealed his conviction for trafficking in a substance held out to be cocaine and his sentence of 38 months' imprisonment.

He argued the trial judge erred in assessing the credibility of the key Crown witness and that his sentence offended the parity principle and failed to account for time spent on house arrest while on bail.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the conviction appeal, finding the witness's evidence was uncontradicted and supported by objective records.

The sentence appeal was also dismissed; although the trial judge may have erred in not considering the bail conditions, the sentence remained fit given the appellant's extensive criminal record and the co-accused's cooperation with police.

The applicant, convicted of fraud over $5,000 and sentenced to six years' imprisonment, applied for judicial interim release pending his appeal.

The sole issue in dispute was whether the appeal was frivolous under s. 679(3)(a) of the Criminal Code.

The court found that the applicant's grounds of appeal, which included complaints about the form of the count and the prosecution's theory of liability, were arguable.

The application for release pending appeal was granted.

The appellants appealed their convictions and sentences for sexual assault.

The complainant had attended a hotel party where she became highly intoxicated and lost memory of the events.

DNA evidence later linked the appellants to the assault.

The appellants argued the trial judge erred in assessing credibility, misapprehended evidence of intoxication, and misapplied the burden of proof.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the conviction appeals, finding the trial judge's credibility assessments and conclusions on capacity to consent were supported by the evidence.

On the sentence appeals, one appellant's two-year sentence was reduced by one day on consent for immigration purposes, while the other appellant's two-year sentence was upheld despite his lack of a prior record, given the gravity of the offence.

The appellant was convicted of producing marijuana after police found a grow operation in a house.

When the appellant pulled into the driveway, an officer detained him and asked if he lived there without first informing him of the reasons for his detention or his right to counsel.

The appellant admitted he lived there.

The trial judge found a Charter breach but admitted the statement.

The Court of Appeal held that the failure to promptly inform the appellant of the reasons for his detention violated s. 10(a) of the Charter.

The admission of the conscriptive statement rendered the trial unfair.

The appeal was allowed, the conviction set aside, and a new trial ordered.

The Crown appealed a summary conviction appeal judge's decision to exclude breathalyser results under s. 24(2) of the Charter and overturn the accused's conviction for driving over 80.

The summary conviction appeal judge had found a serious breach of the accused's s. 10(b) right to counsel of choice.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, finding that any breach was minor, the officer acted in good faith, and the accused suffered no prejudice as he spoke with duty counsel and was satisfied with the advice.

The Court concluded that excluding the reliable breathalyser evidence would do more harm than good to the administration of justice, and restored the conviction.

The appellant appealed a 22-month custodial sentence.

The Court of Appeal found that the trial judge erred in principle by treating the appellant's breach of a bail condition as an aggravating factor to increase the length of the sentence.

Leave to appeal was granted and the sentence was reduced to 15 months.

The appellant appealed his dangerous offender designation.

The Crown conceded that the appeal should be allowed and a new dangerous offender proceeding ordered because the trial judge did not have the benefit of R. v. Johnson and failed to consider the Long Term Offender provisions in the Criminal Code.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal and ordered a new dangerous offender proceeding.

The appellant appealed the sentence imposed by the trial judge and sought to introduce fresh evidence.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the trial judge provided extensive reasons and imposed a fit sentence, and that the fresh evidence would not have changed the disposition.

The appellant appealed his conviction and sentence, arguing the trial judge erred in instructing the jury on the use of the complainant's videotaped statement and failed to review the evidence fairly.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the conviction appeal, finding the trial judge did not invite the jury to use the videotaped evidence impermissibly as a prior consistent statement, and the charge was balanced.

The sentence appeal was also dismissed, as the sentence fell within the recognized range and the trial judge properly treated the offences as akin to a breach of trust.

The appellant appealed his conviction for child pornography.

The Court of Appeal found that the trial judge erred by relying on improper propensity reasoning related to the appellant's sexual orientation to infer knowledge.

The trial judge also erred in drawing inferences of consciousness of guilt from advice given to a witness and the location of a computer, without sufficient evidentiary basis linking them to the child pornography charge.

The appeal was allowed, the conviction set aside, and a new trial ordered.

The appellant appealed his conviction and sentence, arguing that the trial judge erred in rejecting his evidence regarding alleged assaults by a police officer and alleged inducements to provide a statement.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the conviction appeal, finding that the trial judge did not reverse the burden of proof and reasonably concluded that the appellant's version of events was improbable based on the videotape statement and testimony.

The court also upheld the trial judge's finding that no inducements were made.

The sentence appeal was dismissed as abandoned.

The appellant was convicted of first degree murder in the death of his common law partner.

He appealed the conviction, arguing the trial judge erred in failing to give a limiting instruction regarding a lay witness's testimony, gave an inadequate limiting instruction regarding a forensic pathologist's testimony, and that the verdict was unreasonable due to insufficient evidence of planning and deliberation.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no error in the jury instructions and concluding there was a substantial body of circumstantial evidence to support the jury's verdict.

The appellant appealed his conviction for robbery and his 15-month sentence.

He argued he should have been convicted of theft, as he only handed a note to a bank teller while disguised.

The Court of Appeal upheld the robbery conviction, finding an implicit threat of violence in his disguise and conduct.

However, the Court allowed the sentence appeal, finding the trial judge erred in principle by failing to consider a conditional sentence for a first-time offender with a favourable pre-sentence report, especially given a co-accused's lighter sentence.

The 15-month sentence was converted to a conditional sentence.

The appellants were convicted of fraud over $5,000 and public mischief in relation to a scheme to defraud an insurer by falsely reporting a truck as stolen.

A co-accused was acquitted.

The appellants appealed, arguing the jury's verdicts were inconsistent and their convictions unreasonable.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the evidence against the appellants was much stronger than against the acquitted co-accused, and the convictions were reasonable based on the evidence.

The Court of Appeal issued an addendum to its oral judgment released on January 20, 2006.

The court clarified that the new trial ordered for the appellant applied not only to the sexual assault conviction but also to the related counts of failing to comply with a recognizance and failing to comply with probation.

The appellant appealed his conviction for sexual assault, arguing the trial judge made several errors in the jury charge.

Specifically, the appellant contended the trial judge gave flawed instructions regarding the use of his extensive criminal record, misstated the W.(D.) instruction by telling the jury to consider only credible evidence, and erred in the reasonable doubt instruction.

The Court of Appeal agreed that the cumulative effect of these errors left it unclear whether the jury properly understood its task.

The appeal was allowed, the conviction quashed, and a new trial ordered.

The appellant appealed his convictions and sentence arising from a 'criminal swarm' assault.

The Court of Appeal applied the Kienapple principle to stay two counts on the indictment to prevent multiple convictions for the same delict.

On the sentence appeal, the Court found an unjustified disparity between the appellant's five-year sentence and the significantly shorter sentences imposed on older co-accused with more serious records who had pleaded guilty.

The appeal was allowed, and the sentence was reduced to 24 months' imprisonment, in addition to pre-trial custody credit.

The appellants appealed their convictions for conspiracy to commit extortion, extortion, and possession of bugging equipment.

The charges arose from a private investigation business where female operatives were hired to lure targets into surreptitiously recorded sexual encounters to extort money.

The Court of Appeal quashed the conspiracy convictions, finding insufficient evidence that the appellants had formed an agreement with the alleged co-conspirators to commit extortion.

However, the court upheld one appellant's conviction for extortion, ruling that threatening to have a debtor fired to collect a legitimate debt lacked reasonable justification or excuse.

The court also upheld the conviction for possessing bugging equipment, finding the devices were primarily useful for surreptitious interception.

The 10-month sentence was affirmed.

The appellant appealed her sentence for fraud over $1,000.

The trial judge had rejected a conditional sentence and imposed a custodial sentence, noting the appellant reoffended while on probation, the length of time over which the offence occurred, the amount involved, and the need for denunciation and deterrence.

The Court of Appeal found no error in principle and held the sentence was not demonstrably unfit.

Leave to appeal sentence was granted, but the appeal was dismissed.