Joseph Romano De Luca

The appellant appealed his convictions for three robbery-related offences, arguing the trial judge failed to provide adequate reasons.

The trial judge made only passing reference to the appellant's testimony and did not explain why it was rejected or failed to raise a reasonable doubt.

The Court of Appeal found this omission constituted an error of law, as the reasons did not meet the appellant's entitlement to know why he was convicted and precluded meaningful appellate review.

The appeal was allowed, convictions quashed, and a new trial ordered.

The Crown appealed an acquittal on a charge of possession of child pornography based on written stories depicting sexual activity between adults and children.

The court held that written material may advocate or counsel sexual activity with children implicitly as well as explicitly under the governing interpretation of s. 163.1(1)(b) of the Criminal Code.

The trial judge erred in law by focusing on the absence of overt exhortation and by failing to assess whether the stories' combined messages — that children want and enjoy sex with adults, and that trusted adults routinely engage in it because it is good for children — implicitly conveyed that sex with children can and should be pursued.

The acquittal was set aside and a new trial ordered.

The Crown appealed a summary conviction appeal judge's decision that overturned a conviction.

The summary conviction appeal judge had found that the trial judge applied a higher level of scrutiny to the defence evidence than to the Crown evidence.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal and restored the conviction, holding that the trial judge made no reversible error in her credibility assessment and that there were no irreconcilable findings to suggest an unequal level of scrutiny.

The Crown appealed a trial judge's decision to stay charges of attempted murder and aggravated assault against the respondents due to a 51-month delay from arrest to trial.

The Court of Appeal found that the trial judge erred in his assessment of the inherent time requirements of the case, particularly regarding a recanting witness and inaccurate time estimates for the preliminary inquiry.

The Court concluded that the delay, while lengthy, did not violate the respondents' s. 11(b) Charter rights given the minimal prejudice suffered and society's interest in a trial on the merits.

The stay was set aside and a trial ordered.

The appellant appealed his conviction, arguing the trial judge erred in assessing the scope and effect of an officer's contact with the jury and in failing to conduct an inquiry of the affected jurors.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the trial judge properly considered the requirement to dispel a reasonable apprehension of bias and made no error in principle in exercising his discretion not to examine the jurors, especially given defence counsel's position at trial that nothing untoward had occurred.

The appellant, a bank employee, was convicted of fraud after using confidential passwords to redeem $20 million in customers' mutual funds.

He appealed his conviction, arguing the trial judge misdirected the jury on circumstantial evidence and erred in admitting notes seized from his desk without a warrant.

The Crown appealed the sentence of two years less a day served conditionally.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the conviction appeal, finding the jury instructions adequate and the admission of the notes reasonable under s. 24(2) of the Charter.

However, the Court allowed the Crown's sentence appeal, holding that a large-scale fraud by an employee in a position of trust required a penitentiary sentence for general deterrence.

Giving credit for the conditional sentence served, the Court imposed an additional one-year custodial sentence.

The appellant appealed from an order and judgment of the Superior Court of Justice.

The Court of Appeal held that the trial court had jurisdiction over the charges and that there was no basis for certiorari.

The court also dismissed the application for habeas corpus, finding it was an attempt to review the denial of bail, for which there was no basis to interfere.

The appeal was dismissed.

The appellant pleaded guilty to cultivation of marihuana.

The trial judge rejected a joint submission for 90 days' imprisonment and imposed an 8-month sentence.

On appeal, the Court of Appeal found that the trial judge erred in concluding the joint submission would bring the administration of justice into disrepute.

The appeal was allowed and the sentence reduced to 90 days' imprisonment followed by 12 months of probation.

The appellant appealed his sentence, arguing the sentencing judge erred in principle by assuming a conditional sentence was unavailable for the offence.

The majority of the Court of Appeal found no such error in the sentencing judge's reasons and, deferring to the sentencing judge's disposition, dismissed the appeal.

The dissenting judge would have found an error in principle and imposed a conditional sentence based on the appellant's positive pre-sentence report.

The appellant appealed the dispositions of the Ontario Review Board and the verdict of unfit to stand trial made by the trial judge.

The Crown conceded that the fitness hearing should have been conducted by a judge and jury under s. 672.26 of the Criminal Code.

The Court of Appeal set aside the verdict of unfit to stand trial, declaring the proceeding a nullity, and referred the matter back to the trial court for a fitness hearing before a judge and jury.

The Ontario Review Board's determination was also set aside.

The 15-year-old first offender appealed his sentence.

The Court of Appeal found that the trial judge failed to give apparent weight to the appellant's prospects for rehabilitation.

Noting that the appellant had completed the secure custody portion of his disposition and done well, the Court granted leave to appeal, struck out the open custody portion, and maintained the probation term.

The appellant was charged with aggravated assault and failure to provide necessaries of life to a child.

The trial judge granted a stay of proceedings due to a 21-month delay between the appellant's arrest and the trial date.

The Court of Appeal allowed the Crown's appeal and set aside the stay.

The Supreme Court of Canada dismissed the appeal as of right, agreeing with the majority of the Court of Appeal that the delay did not infringe the appellant's right to be tried within a reasonable time.

The appellant appealed his conviction for second degree murder, arguing that the trial judge's pre-Lifchus charge to the jury on reasonable doubt was defective.

The Supreme Court of Canada applied its decision in R. v. Rhee and found no reason to interfere with the majority of the Court of Appeal's conclusion that the charge was in substantial compliance with the principles articulated in Lifchus.

The appeal was dismissed.

The young person appealed his conviction for robbery, arguing that the trial judge's interventions created the appearance of an unfair trial.

The Crown conceded the appeal.

The Court of Appeal found that the trial judge's interventions during the cross-examination of the complainant and the investigating officer impaired defence counsel's full testing of the evidence and gave the appearance of having pre-judged the credibility of the police officer.

The appeal was allowed, the conviction was set aside, and a new trial was ordered.

The appellant appealed the imposition of a lifetime weapons prohibition order following his conviction for arson.

He argued the trial judge erred by imposing the ban under s. 109 rather than s. 100(1) of the Criminal Code, and that the arson did not meet the criteria for a lifetime ban.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no jurisdictional error in the technical form of the order.

The majority held that the arson offence fell within s. 100(1) due to the appellant's animus, threats, and possession of firearms and explosives, constituting a threat of violence.

A dissenting judge would have allowed the appeal and imposed a 10-year ban.

The Crown appealed a stay of proceedings granted to the respondent on the basis of a 21-month delay violating her s. 11(b) Charter right to be tried within a reasonable time.

The respondent was charged with aggravated assault and failing to provide the necessaries of life after her infant child suffered multiple fractures.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, finding the trial judge erred in calculating the delay attributable to the Crown and overemphasized the prejudice suffered by the respondent.

The stay was set aside and the matter remitted for trial, with Feldman J.A. dissenting.

The appellant appealed his conviction for selling cocaine to an undercover officer, arguing the verdict was unreasonable due to frailties in the identification evidence.

The officer identified the appellant from a photo array eight months after the transaction.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the trial judge was alive to the frailties of identification evidence and reasonably concluded the photo array was fair and the officer's identification was reliable.

The applicant sought review of an order granting judicial interim release to a person sought for extradition on drug-related charges.

The court held that the proper standard of review under s. 18(2) of the Extradition Act, by analogy to bail review jurisprudence, required the applicant to demonstrate an error in principle.

The court found no such error, concluding that the reverse onus provisions had been applied and that the extradition request did not justify detention in light of the respondent’s existing Canadian charges, prior releases on substantial sureties, imminent trial dates, and strict bail conditions.

The application for review was dismissed.