Joseph Romano De Luca

The appellant appealed his convictions for firearm offences and possession of crack cocaine for the purpose of trafficking, arguing the verdict was unreasonable and the trial judge erred in her treatment of his lie to police about his identity.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the trial judge's credibility findings and conclusion that guilt was the only reasonable inference were reasonable.

The court also found no error in the trial judge's treatment of the appellant's lie to police, noting it was consistent with other circumstances inferring possession.

The appellant pleaded guilty to assaulting his wife with a weapon and assaulting his adult son, and was sentenced to 25 days in jail.

He appealed his convictions, seeking to withdraw his guilty pleas on the basis that they were equivocal, involuntary, and uninformed due to stress, lack of sleep, and a misunderstanding of the appeal process.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the trial judge conducted a proper plea comprehension inquiry, the appellant made unequivocal admissions of guilt, and his ability to make a conscious choice was not impaired.

The appellant was convicted of personation and obstructing a peace officer after fleeing a traffic stop where he presented another person's expired driver's licence.

He appealed his convictions, arguing the trial judge failed to properly scrutinize the police officer's eyewitness identification and improperly shifted the burden of proof.

He also appealed his 12-month sentence.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeals, finding the trial judge's credibility and reliability assessments were sound, and the sentence was fit given the appellant's extensive criminal record and prior related convictions.

The appellant appealed her fraud conviction, arguing the trial judge misapprehended evidence.

The appellant, a bookkeeper, admitted to cashing company cheques and making electronic transfers to herself, but claimed she did so at the complainant's behest and gave him the cash.

A credible defence witness testified to seeing the appellant hand cash to the complainant after cashing a cheque.

The trial judge failed to address this critical exculpatory evidence in his reasons.

The Court of Appeal held this failure constituted a misapprehension of evidence amounting to an error in law, rendering the verdict unsafe.

The appeal was allowed, convictions quashed, and a new trial ordered.

The appellant appealed her first-degree murder convictions for the deaths of her two young daughters.

At trial, she raised the defence of not criminally responsible (NCR) due to a mental disorder, arguing she believed killing her children was an altruistic act to save them.

The jury rejected the defence.

On appeal, the appellant argued the trial judge erred in his jury instructions regarding the concept of 'moral wrongfulness' and in his treatment of the expert psychiatric evidence.

The Court of Appeal found no error in the jury charge, concluding the instructions properly focused on the appellant's capacity to know her acts were morally wrong by societal standards.

The appeal was dismissed.

The appellant appealed his convictions for trafficking in cocaine and possession of cocaine, as well as his concurrent 21-month sentences.

He argued the trial judge provided insufficient reasons and that the verdict was unreasonable because it relied on circumstantial evidence.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the trial judge's reasons sufficient and the verdict reasonable based on the evidence, including an apparent hand-to-hand transaction and the discovery of cash consistent with drug trafficking.

The sentence was also upheld as fit given the appellant's record.

The appellant brought an interlocutory appeal under s. 37.1 of the Canada Evidence Act challenging the trial judge's orders under s. 37 and s. 37.3 regarding the disclosure of information and the conduct of the trial.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, noting that evidentiary rulings are properly made by trial judges and that s. 37 orders target disclosure of specific information, often to protect the identity of a confidential informant.

The matter was remitted to the trial court for the continuation of the trial.

The appellant appealed his convictions and sentence.

He argued that he was arbitrarily detained, that identification evidence should have been excluded under s. 24(2) of the Charter, and that the trial judge erred in assessing police identification evidence.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the conviction appeal, finding no error in the trial judge's conclusion that the police had reasonable and probable grounds to arrest, and that the identification evidence was properly assessed.

However, the Court allowed the sentence appeal, increasing the pre-trial custody credit from 1.5:1 to 2:1 because the offences preceded the Criminal Code amendments limiting such credit, resulting in a reduced net sentence.

The appellant appealed his convictions and 9-year sentence for serious offences.

The conviction appeal was abandoned.

On the sentence appeal, the appellant argued the trial judge erred by granting 1:1 credit for pre-trial custody instead of 1.5:1 under s. 719(3.1) of the Criminal Code.

The Court of Appeal held that while the trial judge erred in finding loss of earned remission insufficient to trigger enhanced credit, the appellant's extensive criminal record of over 70 convictions would have justified detention under s. 515(9.1), thereby excluding him from enhanced credit.

The appeal was dismissed.

The appellant challenged rulings arising from a firearms prosecution, arguing the motion judge erred in accepting the affiant officer's evidence, in assessing the confidential informant information, and in refusing a judicial summary.

The court held the informant was not an anonymous tipster, the firsthand information and police confirmation of outstanding drug charges provided support for the warrant process, and drafting problems in the information to obtain did not undermine the result.

The court also found no error in refusing a judicial summary where the informant's identity could readily be discerned.

Deference was owed to the motion judge's findings, and the appeal was dismissed.

The appellant appealed convictions for sexual assault and choking in relation to sexual assault following a judge-alone trial.

He argued that the verdicts were inconsistent because the trial judge acquitted on one count while convicting on others, and that the judge scrutinized his evidence more strictly than the complainant's.

The court held that the verdicts were not irreconcilable on any realistic view of the evidence and that there was an evidentiary basis for the choking conviction apart from the acquitted incident.

The court also found no unfairness in the trial judge's credibility analysis.

The appeal from conviction was dismissed.

Appeal under Part XX.1 of the Criminal Code from an Ontario Review Board disposition continuing the appellant's detention in hospital, while permitting community living under hospital supervision.

The sole issue was whether a conditional discharge could adequately replace the detention order for an NCR accused who required ongoing antipsychotic medication and rapid rehospitalization if non-compliant.

Relying on the treating psychiatrist's evidence, the court held that the Board reasonably found detention to be the least onerous and least restrictive disposition under s. 672.54 because a conditional discharge would not permit sufficiently prompt apprehension and return to hospital.

Appeal dismissed.

The appellant appealed his convictions and sentences for threatening death, assault, sexual assault, and breach of probation against his former intimate partner.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the conviction appeal, finding no error in the trial judge's credibility assessment.

However, the sentence appeal was allowed because the trial judge imposed a sentence substantially higher than the Crown's suggested range without providing reasons or an opportunity for submissions.

The global sentence was reduced from 6 years to 3 years and 8.5 months.

The appellants, two drug dealers, were convicted of first-degree murder after killing a customer who had ripped them off.

On appeal, they argued the trial judge erred in instructing the jury on constructive first-degree murder, the application of the W. (D.) formula, and the Vetrovec caution.

One appellant also argued the trial judge failed to instruct on the defence of accident and the evidentiary value of an unaccepted guilty plea.

The Court of Appeal found no reversible errors in the jury instructions and dismissed the appeal.

The applicants challenged the validity of a search warrant executed at an apartment where firearms and drugs were found, arguing inadequate disclosure and failure to comply with the Criminal Code requirements for a nighttime search.

The court found the warrant presumptively invalid due to the failure to request a nighttime search under s. 488 of the Criminal Code.

However, applying the Grant framework under s. 24(2) of the Charter, the court admitted the evidence, concluding the breach was technical, had no practical impact on the applicants' rights, and excluding the evidence would undermine the truth-seeking function of the trial.

The appellant appealed a disposition of the Ontario Review Board that rejected the treatment team's recommendation to allow him to live in approved community accommodation.

The Court of Appeal upheld the finding that the appellant remained a significant threat to public safety, but found the Board's rejection of the community living condition unreasonable.

The evidence showed the appellant received medication by bi-weekly injection and could be adequately monitored in the community.

The appeal was allowed and the Board's order was replaced with the hospital's recommendation.

The accused was arrested for driving with excess alcohol after failing an approved screening device.

Following arrest, he provided his lawyer's name and two phone numbers to the arresting officer.

The officer attempted to contact the lawyer but was unsuccessful, and subsequently called duty counsel instead.

The accused spoke to duty counsel for approximately four minutes.

The central issue was whether the accused's right to consult with counsel of choice under section 10(b) of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms was violated.

The court found that the officer's evidence regarding her attempts to contact the accused's lawyer was unreliable and that the accused was effectively denied the right to consult with counsel of choice.

The court excluded the breathalyzer results and acquitted the accused.

The appellant was found not criminally responsible on account of mental disorder (NCRMD) for a robbery committed at an ATM, based on a diagnosis of schizophrenia.

On appeal, he sought to introduce fresh evidence showing that his treating psychiatrists had ruled out schizophrenia and that his symptoms were likely caused by a substance-induced psychosis.

The Court of Appeal admitted the fresh evidence, finding that the NCRMD verdict amounted to a miscarriage of justice since self-induced intoxication cannot support such a verdict.

The appeal was allowed, the NCRMD verdict was set aside, and a conviction for robbery was entered with a sentence of one day's imprisonment, given the seven years the appellant had already spent in custody.

The applicant, who was found not criminally responsible (NCR), was granted an absolute discharge by the Ontario Review Board.

The Crown appealed, which automatically suspended the absolute discharge under s. 672.75 of the Criminal Code, reverting the applicant to a conditional discharge.

The applicant brought a motion challenging the constitutionality of the automatic suspension.

The Court of Appeal held that it had jurisdiction to hear the motion and found that s. 672.75 violates ss. 7 and 9 of the Charter by depriving the NCR accused of liberty without due process and arbitrarily detaining them.

The violations were not saved by s. 1.

The court declared the offending words in s. 672.75 of no force and effect, suspended for 12 months.

The accused was charged with four counts of possessing explosive substances and one count of counselling mischief not committed, arising from his activities prior to the G20 Summit in Toronto.

Police found various chemicals and laboratory equipment in his home, which the Crown alleged were intended to make explosive substances.

The accused maintained the chemicals were for innocent purposes, including amateur rocketry, gardening, and testing the security system.

The court found the Crown failed to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the accused intended to create explosive substances, accepting that his interest in rocketry and other hobbies raised a reasonable doubt.

On the counselling charge, the court found the accused's tweets about design flaws in the G20 security fence merely described how mischief could be committed but did not actively induce or advocate the commission of the offence.

The accused was acquitted of all charges.