Ian Bell

The appellants, Conroy and Kharla Rose, appealed their convictions for possession of proceeds of crime and money laundering.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeals from conviction and ordered a new trial on two main grounds: the trial judge erred in dismissing an additional juror without random selection, thereby improperly constituting the jury, and erred in admitting evidence of Conroy's prior convictions in the form of judicial reasons without proper balancing of probative value against prejudicial effect and inadequate jury instructions.

Kharla Rose's separate appeal regarding unreasonable trial delay under s. 11(b) of the Charter was dismissed, as the delay was deemed reasonable under the pre-Jordan Morin framework.

The three accused, charged with conspiracy to import cocaine and breach of trust, brought applications under s. 24(2) of the Charter to exclude intercepted private communications.

They alleged their s. 8 rights were violated because the police affiant deliberately misled the authorizing judge regarding the investigative plan to establish reasonable and probable grounds for the wiretap.

The court found the affidavit was materially misleading, though not deliberately so, and that without the misleading information, the authorization lacked reasonable and probable grounds.

The court concluded the wiretap violated s. 8 of the Charter and excluded the evidence under s. 24(2), finding the serious police carelessness and subsequent false testimony by the affiant outweighed society's interest in a trial on the merits.

The accused, charged with drug importation offences, brought a pre-trial Charter application challenging five successive wiretap authorizations.

The Crown objected to his standing to challenge the first authorization, as he was not named and his communications were not intercepted under it.

The court held that the accused lacked standing to challenge the first authorization directly because he had no reasonable expectation of privacy.

However, the court ruled he had standing to challenge the subsequent authorizations that did intercept his communications, and in doing so, he could seek to excise information from their supporting ITOs that was allegedly obtained in violation of his co-accused's Charter rights under the first authorization.

The appellants were convicted of terrorism-related offences including conspiracy to commit murder for the benefit of a terrorist group and participating in terrorist activity.

On appeal, the appellants challenged the jury selection procedure used at trial.

The trial judge erroneously held that he lacked common law discretion to exclude unsworn jurors while using rotating triers to determine challenges for cause, and instead ordered the use of static triers with all jurors excluded.

The Court of Appeal held that the trial judge's error deprived the appellants of their statutory right to rotating triers with unsworn jurors excluded, resulting in an improperly constituted jury.

The curative proviso could not be applied to remedy this fundamental procedural error.

The accused pleaded guilty to possession for the purpose of trafficking marijuana (approximately 2.4 kilograms), simple possession of Psilocybin (60 grams), and simple possession of cocaine (approximately 3.4 grams).

The Crown sought a fine of $5,000 with no probation, while the defence sought a discharge with probation.

The court imposed a conditional discharge with 12 months probation and 50 hours of community service, finding the accused to be an exceptional candidate for rehabilitation despite the commercial nature of the marijuana trafficking.

The court considered the accused's youth, guilty plea, genuine remorse, substance abuse issues, and significant post-charge rehabilitation efforts.

The appellant was convicted of production of methamphetamine, possession of methamphetamine for the purpose of trafficking, and possession of the proceeds of crime following a trial before a Superior Court judge sitting without a jury.

He was sentenced to five years imprisonment.

On appeal, the appellant challenged the issuance of telewarrants used to search two properties, the trial judge's refusal to permit cross-examination of the ITO affiant, the validity of the search warrants, and the reasonableness of the verdict.

The appellant also sought leave to appeal sentence, arguing the trial judge misstated the defence position on bail credit and failed to consider rehabilitative prospects and the principle of restraint.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal from conviction and, while granting leave to appeal sentence, dismissed the appeal from sentence.

The appellant appealed his conviction on two counts of possessing heroin for the purpose of trafficking and his sentence of nine years less 48 days.

He challenged the validity of a search warrant for an apartment on the grounds that there were insufficient grounds to support it, arguing the grounds amounted only to suspicion.

The trial judge had dismissed the Charter application.

The Court of Appeal upheld the trial judge's decision, finding that the information to obtain the warrant contained credible and reliable facts supporting reasonable grounds to believe the appellant was trafficking drugs and that evidence would be found in the apartment.

The court found no error in the trial judge's application of the legal test and dismissed both the conviction and sentence appeals.

The appellant brought a motion to reinstate his appeal from conviction and to seek an extension of time to seek leave to appeal his sentence.

The appellant's former counsel had filed a Notice of Abandonment of the appeal based on instructions allegedly from the appellant's brother, not the appellant himself.

The Crown did not oppose the motion.

The court found that the appellant intended to pursue his appeal and was unaware that a separate notice was required for leave to appeal sentence.

The conviction appeal was reinstated to include leave to appeal sentence, and the matter was adjourned for further proceedings.

The appellant appealed convictions for possession of marijuana, cocaine and MDMA for purposes of trafficking, and possession of a prohibited weapon, challenging the lawfulness of his arrest on the basis that police lacked reasonable and probable grounds.

The Court of Appeal upheld the convictions, finding that police had received a detailed tip from a confidential informant that was corroborated through vehicle registration searches, and that subsequent surveillance observations of suspicious interactions consistent with drug trafficking provided reasonable and probable grounds for arrest.

The search incident to arrest was therefore lawful.

Following conviction on charges of Attempt to Commit Mischief to Data and Unauthorized Use of a Computer, the defendant, a former Chief of Staff to the Premier of Ontario, was sentenced to four months imprisonment followed by twelve months probation with 100 hours of community service.

The defendant had directed the wiping of computer hard drives in the Office of the Premier to destroy records responsive to Freedom of Information requests and anticipated legislative committee production orders regarding the gas plant controversy.

The court found the offence struck at the heart of democratic accountability and transparency, warranting incarceration despite the defendant's otherwise exemplary character and community contributions.

The appellant was convicted of possession of a controlled substance for the purposes of trafficking and possession of the proceeds of crime following observations by an experienced drug investigator in a parking lot in Vaughan, Ontario.

The investigator observed the appellant and another man transferring cylindrical bins from one vehicle to another, followed by an exchange of cash.

The appellant appealed, challenging the lawfulness of the arrest and subsequent search, arguing that the grounds for arrest disappeared when the pills could not be immediately identified, and that the police breached section 489.1 of the Criminal Code by failing to file a report to a justice as soon as practicable.

The Court of Appeal upheld the conviction, finding that the arrest was based on reasonable grounds, the search incident to arrest was lawful, and the manner in which the police exercised their discretion did not require return of the seized property.

David Livingston, Chief of Staff to the Premier of Ontario, and Laura Miller, Deputy Chief of Staff for Communications and Strategy, were charged with Breach of Trust by a Public Official, Commit Mischief to Data, and Unauthorized Use of a Computer.

The Crown abandoned the Breach of Trust charge.

The defendants were accused of directing the wiping of twenty computers in the Office of the Premier during the transition from Premier McGuinty to Premier Wynne in early 2013, allegedly to destroy records responsive to Freedom of Information requests and potential Legislative Standing Committee Production Orders related to the controversial cancellation and relocation of the Oakville and Mississauga gas plants.

The Crown alleged the defendants obtained administrative rights through deception and hired an outside IT consultant to indiscriminately wipe hard drives.

The defendants claimed they sought only to delete personal information and Liberal Party documents from departing staff computers.

Justice Lipson found Livingston guilty on both remaining counts (Attempt to Commit Mischief to Data and Unauthorized Use of a Computer) but acquitted Miller due to insufficient evidence of her knowledge of Livingston's deceptive means in obtaining administrative rights.

The appellant appealed both his conviction for drug trafficking and his sentence of 12 months imposed by the trial judge.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the conviction appeal, finding that the evidence fully justified the conclusion that crack cocaine in the possession of a third party came from the appellant through an intermediary.

However, the court allowed the sentence appeal, finding that the trial judge erred in law by failing to consider that this was a one-off transaction for a minimal amount of crack cocaine with no profit motive, and by failing to adequately weigh the appellant's rehabilitation efforts and significant immigration consequences.

The sentence was reduced to 160 days, which the appellant had already served through pre-sentence custody.

The defendants, David Livingston and Laura Miller, pleaded not guilty to charges of breach of trust by a public official, mischief to data, and unauthorized use of a computer.

The Crown withdrew the breach of trust count at the close of its case.

The defendants brought a motion for a directed verdict of acquittal on the remaining two counts.

The court found that while the Crown failed to establish that actual data was destroyed, there was sufficient evidence that the defendants attempted to commit mischief to data without legal justification or colour of right.

The motion was allowed in part on the mischief to data count, which was reduced to attempt to commit mischief to data.

The motion was dismissed on the unauthorized use of a computer count.

The Crown sought to qualify Robert Gagnon, a retired OPP officer, as an expert in computer systems operation and forensic recovery of computer data.

The defence opposed qualification, arguing that Gagnon's extensive involvement in the police investigation and his expressed bias regarding the defendants' guilt disqualified him from providing independent and impartial expert evidence.

The court excluded Gagnon's evidence, finding that he had conflated the roles of expert and investigator, participated extensively in investigative strategy and team meetings, and demonstrated lack of independence and impartiality through his communications recommending charges and providing strategic legal advice to investigators.

The appellant was convicted of 40 counts including drug trafficking, criminal organization offences, weapons offences, proceeds of crime, extortion, and criminal interest rate offences.

He was sentenced to 19 years imprisonment with a 9.5-year parole ineligibility period.

On appeal, the Court of Appeal upheld most convictions but allowed the appeal in part.

The court found no Charter violations regarding search and seizure or trial delay.

However, the court quashed convictions for entering into criminal interest rate agreements, finding the trial judge erred in applying a presumption of knowledge without requiring proof of mens rea.

The court also reduced the sentence from 19 to 15 years and set aside the parole ineligibility order except for criminal organization convictions.

The Crown brought a pre-trial motion to qualify three police officers as expert witnesses in a prosecution for cocaine importation and money laundering.

The court applied the Mohan and Abbey tests for admissibility.

The court admitted the general opinion evidence of the money laundering expert, excluding portions relating to methods not alleged against the accused.

The court fully admitted the evidence of the cocaine trafficking expert, including opinions on pricing and cell phone use.

However, the court excluded the proposed evidence regarding Mexican drug cartels, finding it irrelevant to the charges and highly prejudicial as bad character evidence.

The accused brought a pretrial motion for a stay of proceedings, alleging a breach of their s. 11(b) Charter right to be tried within a reasonable time.

The total delay from the date of the charge to the anticipated end of the trial was 35 months, exceeding the 30-month presumptive ceiling established in Jordan.

The court found that the Crown successfully rebutted the presumption of unreasonableness by demonstrating that the matter was a "particularly complex case" involving extensive wiretap evidence, multiple accused, and voluminous disclosure.

The court concluded that the Crown had a reasonable plan to manage the complexity and dismissed the application for a stay.

The appellant was convicted of possession of fentanyl for the purpose of trafficking and sentenced to two and a half years in prison.

He appealed, arguing the trial judge misconstrued the law on agency and made factual errors.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the conviction appeal, finding the trial judge properly concluded the appellant intended to traffic the drugs regardless of whether he initially held them as an agent for his mother.

The sentence appeal was also dismissed, emphasizing that general deterrence and denunciation are paramount for fentanyl offences.

The appellant was convicted of importing cocaine after a sniffer-dog alerted on her at an international airport and a subsequent search revealed four kilograms of cocaine in her luggage.

She appealed her conviction and sentence, arguing that the dog sniff and a subsequent strip search violated her Charter rights, and that the trial judge made evidentiary and jury charge errors.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that a dog sniff during a routine border crossing does not violate section 8 of the Charter, the appellant was not detained at the time of the alert, and the sentence imposed was fit.