Erika Chozik

The appellant, a youthful first offender, was convicted of domestic violence offences and sentenced to 8 years and 4 months.

The trial judge awarded pre-disposition custody credit at a ratio of 1.25:1.

Following the Supreme Court's decision in R. v. Summers, the appellant appealed the sentence.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal on consent, varying the pre-disposition custody credit to a ratio of 1.5:1, reducing the effective sentence from 60 months to 52 months.

The appellant appealed his convictions for sexual assault and sexual interference against his stepdaughter, as well as his seven-year sentence.

He argued that the trial was rendered unfair by the admission of discreditable conduct evidence, that the Crown improperly invited the jury to link the complainant's bad behaviour to the abuse without expert evidence, and that the trial judge gave an improper exhortation to the jury.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the conviction appeal, finding the discreditable conduct evidence was relevant to the narrative and credibility, the Crown's arguments were appropriate responses to the defence theory, and the jury instruction was proper.

The sentence appeal was also dismissed, as the trial judge appropriately considered the appellant's strict pre-trial bail conditions and the seven-year sentence was not demonstrably unfit.

The appellant appealed his conviction for second degree murder and the sentence increasing his period of parole ineligibility.

On the conviction appeal, the appellant argued the trial judge erred in instructing the jury on intoxication and the required intention for murder.

The Court of Appeal found the trial judge properly instructed the jury on the relevance of intoxication to mens rea and adequately summarized the defence's position regarding an alcohol-induced blackout.

On the sentence appeal, the Court found no error in the trial judge's exercise of discretion in weighing aggravating and mitigating factors.

Both the conviction and sentence appeals were dismissed.

The appellant appealed his conviction, arguing that he received ineffective assistance from his trial counsel.

He alleged that his counsel failed to properly cross-examine the complainant on inconsistencies, failed to comply with the rule in Browne v. Dunn, and improperly asserted alternative defences.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that trial counsel's performance was reasonable, the trial judge was aware of the evidentiary frailties, and there was no miscarriage of justice.

The appellant was convicted of two bank robberies and sentenced to 9 years' imprisonment.

The primary issue at trial was identity, with the Crown relying on DNA evidence found on a tissue in a discarded sweatshirt, video surveillance, and similar fact evidence.

On appeal, the appellant argued the trial judge failed to adequately scrutinize weaknesses in the Crown's case regarding the continuity of the tissue, rendering the verdict unreasonable and the reasons inadequate.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the conviction appeal, finding the trial judge's reasons sufficient and the verdict reasonable.

The sentence appeal was also dismissed, as the 9-year sentence was fit for a repeat offender with a lengthy record of robbery convictions.

The appellants, who were convicted of first degree murder and sentenced as adults, brought an application for directions to have their sentence appeal heard prior to and separate from their conviction appeal.

They argued that the delay in hearing the conviction appeal would negatively impact their ability to participate in an Intensive Rehabilitative Custody and Supervision program if their sentence appeal was successful.

The Court of Appeal granted the application, finding that the exceptional circumstances and potential prejudice to the appellants constituted compelling reasons to bifurcate the appeals.

The appellant was convicted of multiple counts of armed robbery and related offences based primarily on recognition evidence from a former romantic partner who identified him from a wanted poster.

The trial judge accepted this evidence while dismissing conflicting eyewitness descriptions.

On appeal, the Court of Appeal found that the trial judge erred in law by failing to critically analyze the problematic aspects of the recognition evidence and by ignoring exculpatory eyewitness testimony.

The Court concluded the verdicts were unreasonable, allowed the appeal, and entered acquittals on all counts.

The appellants were convicted of failing to provide the necessaries of life to their three-year-old child, who was found to be malnourished and suffering from untreated open wounds.

They appealed their convictions and six-month sentences, arguing that a failure to provide medical attention does not constitute 'necessitous circumstances' under s. 215(2)(a)(i) of the Criminal Code.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeals, holding that medical attention is a necessary of life and its deprivation can amount to necessitous circumstances.

The court found no material misapprehension of evidence by the trial judge and upheld the sentences as fit given the serious breach of trust.

The appellant appealed his sentence of eight years' imprisonment for firearms offences, including possession of a loaded restricted firearm, and the denial of enhanced credit for pre-trial custody.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal in part, granting 1.5:1 enhanced credit for 433 days of pre-trial custody because minor institutional misconduct did not justify an inference that the appellant would be denied statutory release.

However, the court upheld the eight-year sentence, finding it appropriate for a repeat offender whose conduct fell at the 'true crime' end of the spectrum, regardless of the trial judge's reliance on an unconstitutional mandatory minimum.

The appellant was convicted of sexual assault, sexual interference, and possession of child pornography relating to a young girl.

He appealed the convictions, arguing the trial judge erred in restricting cross-examination under s. 276 of the Criminal Code, misapprehended evidence, and improperly used child pornography evidence.

He also sought to introduce fresh evidence and appealed his six-year sentence.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the conviction appeals, finding no reversible errors in the trial judge's evidentiary rulings or factual findings.

The fresh evidence application was dismissed as it lacked sufficient probative value.

The sentence appeal was also dismissed, as the six-year global sentence was fit given the serious aggravating factors.

The appellant appealed his conviction for assault causing bodily harm against his nephew.

The appellant admitted to kicking the complainant in the head and body after the complainant fell to the ground during a physical altercation.

The trial judge rejected the appellant's claim of self-defence, finding the kicks were administered out of anger and a desire to inflict punishment.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, holding that the trial judge's findings were supported by the evidence, he did not misapprehend the law of self-defence, and his reasons were adequate.

The appellant appealed his convictions for threatening death, unlawful confinement, sexual assault causing bodily harm, and assault with a weapon, as well as his sentence.

He argued the trial judge erred in the jury instructions regarding consent, failed to provide a limiting instruction on bad character evidence, and presented an unbalanced charge.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the conviction appeals, finding no reversible errors in the jury charge and no prejudice from the lack of a limiting instruction.

However, the sentence appeal was allowed in part to grant enhanced credit for pre-sentence custody at a ratio of 1.5:1, varying the sentence accordingly.

The appellant appealed his convictions for producing marihuana and possession of over 3 kilograms of marihuana.

The police obtained a telewarrant to search the appellant's apartment after the landlord discovered marihuana plants during an appraisal inspection and had his property manager contact the police.

The appellant argued that the Information to Obtain (ITO) the warrant was misleading because it implied the landlord spoke directly to the police, rather than through his employee.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no material distinction in the reliability of the information and concluding there was no breach of section 8 of the Charter.

The appellant appealed a conviction for assaulting a police officer arising from a confrontation at the doorway of his condominium during a noise complaint investigation.

The central issue was whether the officer was lawfully in the execution of his duty when he stepped into the dwelling and refused to leave after the occupant asked him to do so.

The court held that the officer lacked lawful authority to enter or remain in the residence because none of the recognized exceptions to the common law “sanctity of the home” principle applied, including hot pursuit, exigent circumstances, or a warrant.

The trial judge erred in relying on doctrines of hot pursuit, implied licence, and officer safety to justify the entry.

As the officer was a trespasser and not acting in the execution of his duty, an essential element of the offence was not proven.

The appellant appealed jury convictions for sexual offences against a child and a 10-month custodial sentence on the surviving count.

The court rejected arguments that the verdicts were unreasonable, that the jury was misdirected on the use of an alleged further disclosure to the complainant's mother, and that the jury was invited to apply a lower standard to the evidence of a child witness.

The court held that the core allegation remained intact, the impugned evidentiary instruction caused no prejudice in light of the defence position at trial, and the charge repeatedly instructed the jury not to lower the level of scrutiny because of the witness's age.

The sentence appeal also failed because the trial judge considered the appellant's personal circumstances, committed no error in principle, and imposed a fit sentence.

The appellant appealed convictions for sexual assault and sexual interference arising from allegations by a child complainant.

The Court of Appeal held that the trial judge erred in law by treating the appellant's failure to give an immediate unequivocal denial to a vague police allegation as a basis to reject his testimony, and by applying different standards of scrutiny to the complainant's evidence and the defence evidence.

While the court rejected the argument that the verdict was unreasonable, it found the credibility analysis legally flawed and capable of producing a miscarriage of justice.

The appeal was allowed and a new trial ordered.

The appellant, a non-citizen convicted of drug offences, was sentenced to two years' imprisonment pursuant to a joint submission.

Neither counsel nor the Crown had advised the sentencing judge that a two-year sentence would strip the appellant of his right to appeal a removal order under the IRPA.

The Supreme Court held that collateral immigration consequences are a relevant factor in sentencing, flowing from principles of individualization and parity, but must not be allowed to skew the sentencing process or produce artificial sentences.

Since the Crown conceded the sentence should be reduced by one day and both sentences fell within the fit range, the Court allowed the appeal and reduced the sentence to two years less a day.

The appellant appealed her conviction on the basis that the trial judge erred in finding no air of reality to the defence under section 3(2) of the regulations.

The Crown conceded the error, as there was evidence the appellant was holding prescription drugs as an agent for another person.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, set aside the conviction, and entered an acquittal.

The appellant appealed the sentence imposed for child pornography offences committed in 2004, 2005, and 2008.

The trial judge rejected the Crown's submission for a two-year sentence with probation, finding probation inappropriate and imposing a longer sentence due to the appellant's relentless determination to commit offences while on strict bail.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, holding that the total sentence was not unreasonable given the numerous aggravating circumstances and upholding the section 161 order.

The appellant appealed his custodial sentence for impaired driving causing bodily harm and failing to remain at the scene of an accident, arguing for a conditional sentence based on fresh evidence of his medical condition.

The Court of Appeal found no error in principle by the trial judge and held that the fresh evidence did not warrant a reduction in sentence.

Leave to appeal was granted, but the appeal was dismissed.