Erika Chozik

The appellant appealed a sentence imposed for driving offences.

The trial judge had rejected a joint submission of two years, imposing a sentence 2.5 times that length due to the appellant's horrendous record of over sixty prior convictions, including twelve for driving while disqualified.

The Court of Appeal held that while rejecting the joint submission was reasonable given the public interest, the resulting sentence was manifestly excessive.

The appeal was allowed and the total sentence was reduced to four years.

The appellant appealed her conviction, arguing the verdict was unreasonable.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the trial judge carefully set out the facts and reasonably inferred that the appellant aided or abetted the principal offender with the necessary mens rea.

The appellants were convicted of kidnapping and extortion after a retrial where they were self-represented.

They appealed their convictions on several grounds, primarily arguing that the trial judge erred in refusing their request for an adjournment to retain counsel.

The majority of the Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the trial judge properly balanced the appellants' right to counsel against the need to control the trial process, given the history of delays and the appellants' lack of diligence.

The court also found that the trial judge provided adequate assistance to the self-represented appellants and made no reversible errors regarding evidentiary rulings or sentencing.

A dissenting judge would have allowed the appeal and ordered a new trial on the basis that the refusal to grant an adjournment created an appearance of unfairness.

The Crown appealed a conditional sentence of two years less a day imposed on the respondent following a two-day armed standoff with police.

The respondent pleaded guilty to possessing a weapon for a purpose dangerous to the public peace and possessing a firearm while prohibited.

The Court of Appeal found that while the sentencing judge erred and a custodial sentence was initially warranted, the respondent's successful compliance with the conditional sentence and significant rehabilitative progress over the past five and a half months meant that a custodial sentence was no longer in the interests of justice.

The appeal was dismissed.

The appellant appealed his conviction for criminal harassment.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding it was open to the trial judge to reject the appellant's evidence and that his knowledge of the complainant's fear, or recklessness thereto, was self-evident.

The court also found ample evidence to support the finding of harassment and no air of reality to the defence of honest but mistaken belief.

The appellant's appeal was dismissed as abandoned by the Court of Appeal for Ontario.

The appellant appealed his sentence of 5.5 months' imprisonment for assault causing bodily harm and failing to comply with an undertaking.

The appellant and a co-accused assaulted the victim after suspecting him of stealing money, kicking and punching him while he was on the ground.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no error in principle in the sentencing judge's failure to explicitly consider a conditional sentence, as it had not been requested by defence counsel and was inappropriate given the appellant's breaches of release conditions.

The court also held the sentence was not manifestly unfit.

The appellant appealed his conviction, arguing the trial judge misapprehended evidence regarding the timing of an incident and failed to properly assess the complainant's motive to lie.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the trial judge's conclusions were supported by the evidence and it was unnecessary to address every defence argument regarding motive.

The court also upheld the DNA order, noting the aggravating circumstances of the appellant being in a position of trust and the complainant being 13 years old.

The appellant was convicted of attempted murder after shooting the victim outside a restaurant.

At trial, the victim's prior consistent statement identifying the appellant to police at the hospital was admitted.

The defence relied on this statement in closing arguments to suggest the victim fabricated the identification under pressure.

On appeal, the appellant argued the trial judge erred by failing to give a limiting instruction regarding the prior consistent statement.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, holding that a limiting instruction was unnecessary and potentially confusing because the defence itself had relied on the statement to support its theory, and it was clear the statement was not offered for the truth of its contents.

The appellant, who was self-represented at trial, appealed her conviction and sentence for social assistance fraud.

She argued that the trial judge's excessive intervention during her testimony prevented her from presenting her case, amounted to cross-examination creating an apprehension of bias, and that he failed to provide adequate assistance.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the conviction appeal, finding no prejudice or apprehension of bias, and noting the trial judge went to great lengths to assist her.

The sentence appeal, challenging a restitution order of $25,281 at a minimum of $100 per month, was also dismissed as the appellant had full-time employment, home equity, and the quantum of loss was supported by evidence.

The appellant appealed his sexual assault conviction, arguing the trial judge erred in relying on the complainant's uncorroborated evidence, failing to consider inconsistent independent evidence, and ignoring the absence of physical injuries.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that while the trial judge sought corroboration, it is not legally required in sexual assault cases.

The trial judge's approach benefited the appellant, and there was ample corroborative evidence on the essential elements of the offences.

The young person appellants appealed their findings of guilt and dispositions for assault with a weapon involving a machete.

They argued the trial judge intervened excessively, failed to properly apply the W.(D.) framework, and reached unreasonable verdicts.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the conviction appeals, finding the trial judge's interventions did not render the trial unfair and his credibility findings were sound.

The disposition appeals were also dismissed, as the sentences were fit given the unprovoked nature of the violent assault and the appellants' status on bail at the time.

The young person appealed his conviction for robbery, arguing that the trial judge's interventions created the appearance of an unfair trial.

The Crown conceded the appeal.

The Court of Appeal found that the trial judge's interventions during the cross-examination of the complainant and the investigating officer impaired defence counsel's full testing of the evidence and gave the appearance of having pre-judged the credibility of the police officer.

The appeal was allowed, the conviction was set aside, and a new trial was ordered.

The appellant, a young person, fled from police and knocked on the door of an acquaintance's residence.

A child let him in, and the appellant asked him to pretend he lived there before going upstairs, where he was subsequently arrested.

He was convicted of forcible entry under s. 72(1) of the Criminal Code.

On appeal, the Court of Appeal held that the offence of forcible entry requires a taking of possession that interferes with the peaceable possession of the occupant, and that the manner of entry itself must be likely to cause a breach of the peace.

As the appellant entered peacefully with permission and did not interfere with the occupants' possession, the elements of the offence were not met.

The appeal was allowed and an acquittal entered.

The appellant appealed his conviction and the finding that he was a dangerous offender.

On the conviction appeal, he argued the trial judge erred in instructing the jury on evidence of his assault on police officers at the time of arrest and failed to properly summarize the defence's position.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the conviction appeal, finding no misdirection and noting the overwhelming evidence of guilt.

On the sentence appeal, the appellant argued the trial judge gave undue weight to an expert's opinion that relied on other experts not called as witnesses.

The Court dismissed the sentence appeal, finding the expert was entitled to rely on the material and the dangerous offender finding was fully supported by the evidence.

The appellant appealed her convictions for criminal negligence causing death and bodily harm, and impaired driving causing death and bodily harm, arising from a fatal high-speed car crash.

She also appealed her sentence of four years' imprisonment and a 15-year driving prohibition.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no error in the issuance of search warrants for blood samples, concluding the verdict was reasonable, and holding that the failure to preserve a blood sample did not violate section 7 of the Charter.

The sentence was upheld as emphasizing general deterrence.

The appellant pleaded guilty to three counts of fraud and was sentenced to three years in the penitentiary.

He appealed his convictions, seeking to set aside his guilty pleas on the basis of procedural irregularities and a miscarriage of justice.

The Court of Appeal found that the pleas were informed, voluntary, and intended, and that the trial judge's failure to comply with s. 726 of the Criminal Code resulted in no prejudice.

The appeal from conviction was dismissed, and the appeal from sentence was dismissed as abandoned.

The appellant, a police officer, was convicted of forgery, attempt to obstruct justice, and breach of trust for issuing false traffic tickets.

On appeal, he argued the trial judge erred in his reasons, improperly admitted reply evidence, and that the offence of breach of trust required proof of personal benefit.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no error in the trial judge's reasons or admission of reply evidence.

The Court declined to resolve whether personal benefit is required for breach of trust, instead lifting the stay on the forgery convictions and staying the breach of trust conviction.

The Crown applied to revoke the respondent's bail pending his appeal of a fraud conviction, alleging he breached a condition prohibiting him from engaging in non-personal financial transactions.

The respondent argued the application was procedurally flawed because no arrest warrant was issued under s. 679(6) of the Criminal Code.

The Court of Appeal held that an arrest warrant is unnecessary when the appellant is already in custody.

Finding reasonable grounds to believe the respondent breached his bail conditions by soliciting investments for a business, the court revoked his bail.

The Crown's application for a certificate of default was dismissed as premature pending the trial on the breach of recognizance charges.

The Crown appealed an Ontario Review Board disposition granting the respondent an absolute discharge.

The respondent had previously been found not criminally responsible for offences related to harassing a former girlfriend.

The Crown argued the Board failed to obtain evidence from a staff psychiatrist and misapplied the test for determining if the respondent posed a significant threat to public safety.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the Board had sufficient evidence to conclude the respondent did not pose a significant threat and that its decision was reasonable.