Eric Granger

The appellant was convicted of first degree murder of his daughter-in-law.

At trial, he advanced a non-insane automatism defence, claiming he was in a dissociative state when he shot the victim.

The sole ground of appeal concerned Crown counsel's closing address to the jury.

The defence argued that the Crown violated the principle in Browne v. Dunn by failing to confront defence witnesses with inferences and arguments later urged to the jury.

The trial judge found one Browne v. Dunn violation and two material misstatements of evidence but rejected seven other defence arguments.

On appeal, the court upheld the trial judge's rulings, finding the corrective instructions adequate and the other Crown submissions not improper.

The accused, charged with first-degree murder, brought an application for a stay of proceedings alleging a breach of his s. 11(b) Charter right to be tried within a reasonable time.

The total delay was 48 months, well above the 30-month presumptive ceiling established in Jordan.

The court found that the case was not particularly complex and that the Crown's reliance on the previous state of the law was unreasonable, particularly given the accused's continuous pre-trial custody and the Crown's failure to mitigate delay caused by its own unavailability.

The application was granted and a stay of proceedings was entered.

The accused, charged with first degree murder, brought an application to bar the Crown from calling witnesses to testify about matters that the defence had already admitted or offered to admit.

The defence argued that calling such evidence was unnecessary and irrelevant given the admissions.

The court dismissed the application, holding that the Crown has broad prosecutorial discretion to determine how to present its case, including the right to reject defence-framed admissions and to call evidence to prove elements such as planning and deliberation, negate third-party suspect theories, and provide confirmatory evidence for unsavoury witnesses.

The Crown sought to admit two statements made by the accused to police during a missing person investigation that later became a first-degree murder case.

The court found the first statement inadmissible because the police officer's notes were inadequate to prove voluntariness beyond a reasonable doubt.

The second statement, which was video-recorded, was ruled admissible because the accused attended the police station voluntarily, the interaction was conversational, and the police did not yet have reasonable grounds to suspect the accused of a crime, meaning no caution was required.

The appellant appealed his conviction for aggravated assault, arguing the trial judge erred by finding he continued to beat the victim after an initial punch, a theory not put to him at trial.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, holding that the trial judge's finding that the initial punch was unprovoked was supported by the evidence and fatal to the appellant's claim of self-defence.

The findings regarding a subsequent beating were therefore irrelevant and did not infect the rejection of the self-defence claim.

The appellant police officer was found guilty of misconduct under the Police Services Act.

The hearing officer, the Ontario Civilian Police Commission, and the Divisional Court all applied a balance of probabilities standard of proof.

On appeal, the Court of Appeal held that it was bound by the Supreme Court of Canada's decision in Penner, which established that the standard of proof in PSA hearings is a higher standard of 'clear and convincing evidence', not a balance of probabilities.

The appeal was granted and the matter remitted to the Commission.

The appellant appealed his convictions for possession of child pornography, arguing the trial judge erred in admitting images found on his computer.

A computer repair technician discovered the images and called police, who viewed them without a warrant before seizing the computer.

The trial judge found breaches of section 8 of the Charter but admitted the evidence under section 24(2), noting the reduced expectation of privacy at a repair shop and the high reliability of the evidence.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no error in the trial judge's section 24(2) analysis.

The appellant was charged with impaired driving.

A police officer, certified as a Drug Recognition Expert (DRE), evaluated the appellant and concluded his ability to drive was impaired by cannabis.

The trial judge excluded the DRE's opinion evidence after a Mohan voir dire, leading to an acquittal.

The summary conviction appeal judge overturned the acquittal, finding the evidence admissible under the Criminal Code without a voir dire.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, confirming that section 254(3.1) of the Criminal Code implicitly renders DRE opinion evidence admissible to prove drug-impaired driving without the necessity of a Mohan voir dire.

The applicant police officer sought judicial review of a decision by the Ontario Civilian Police Commission (OCPC) upholding his conviction for unnecessary exercise of authority.

The applicant argued that the hearing officer erred by applying the civil standard of proof (balance of probabilities) rather than a higher standard of 'clear and convincing evidence' under s. 84(1) of the Police Services Act.

The Divisional Court dismissed the application, holding that the Supreme Court of Canada's decision in F.H. v. McDougall established that there is only one civil standard of proof, and that police discipline hearings remain civil proceedings governed by the balance of probabilities.

The accused was charged with operating a motor vehicle while impaired by alcohol and operating a motor vehicle with a blood alcohol concentration exceeding 80 milligrams per 100 millilitres of blood.

The Crown relied on observations of the accused's driving, physical signs of impairment, and breath test results showing readings of 110 and 100 milligrams.

The defence challenged both the impairment charge and the admissibility of the breath test results on the basis that the Crown failed to prove the samples were taken as soon as practicable.

The court found reasonable doubt on both counts due to inadequate police notes, vague timing evidence, and unexplained delays between arrest and breath testing.

The accused was acquitted on both charges.

The accused was convicted of two indictable offences of possessing child pornography contrary to section 163.1(4)(a) of the Criminal Code.

The first offence involved 49 accessible child pornographic images on a computer hard drive, discovered when the computer was brought in for repairs.

The second offence involved 30 hard copy photographs of preteen or young teenage females.

The court imposed a sentence of 8 months imprisonment on each count to be served concurrently, along with a 2-year probation order, a 5-year prohibition order under section 161, and a lifetime SOIRA order.

The court rejected the Crown's argument for an inflationary floor principle and the defence's argument for the minimum sentence, finding that 8 months was a fit sentence given the gravity of the offences and the offender's degree of responsibility.

The accused was charged with two counts of possession of child pornography.

The Crown's case depended on evidence obtained through a warrantless search and seizure of the accused's computer at a repair shop, followed by searches pursuant to warrants.

The defence challenged the admissibility of all evidence on Charter grounds, arguing violations of section 8 (unreasonable search and seizure).

The court found multiple Charter breaches: the warrantless search at the repair shop lacked reasonable and probable grounds and lawful authority; the warrantless seizure was tainted by the illegal search; and the police failed to file a required Report to a Justice.

However, the court admitted the evidence under section 24(2) of the Charter, finding that while the breaches were serious, their practical impact on the accused's Charter-protected interests was modest, and exclusion would not serve the long-term repute of the administration of justice.

The accused was convicted on both counts.

The Crown sought estreatment of a $5,000 recognizance bond following the accused’s breaches of bail conditions and subsequent convictions for fraud-related offences and failing to comply with recognizance.

The defence argued that the Certificate of Default (Form 33) was invalid because it was not signed by the judicial officer and inadequately described the default as “fail to comply.” The court held that the absence of a signature and the wording on the form did not invalidate the certificate where the court record and transcript clearly established a judicial finding of default and defence counsel had consented to the process.

Applying s. 771(2) of the Criminal Code, the court concluded the accused had not met the burden of demonstrating why the full pledged amount should not be forfeited.

The court ordered the full $5,000 bond estreated to the Crown.

The appellant appealed a conviction for operating a motor vehicle with a blood alcohol concentration exceeding the legal limit under s. 253(1)(b) of the Criminal Code.

The appeal challenged the trial judge’s finding that breath samples were taken “as soon as practicable” as required for the presumption of identity under s. 258(1)(c).

The appellant argued that the trial judge relied on inadmissible hearsay and improperly reversed the burden of proof.

The court held that the trial judge reasonably concluded that police acted promptly in the circumstances, including delays caused by right-to-counsel consultations and the breath technician processing another detainee.

The appeal court found no error of law and upheld the application of the presumption of identity.

The appellant appealed his conviction and sentence for importing and trafficking almost 112 kilograms of cocaine.

He argued the trial judge misapprehended evidence in finding reasonable and probable grounds for the search.

The Court of Appeal found no material misapprehensions of evidence and upheld the conviction.

The sentence appeal was also dismissed, as the sentence was within the proper range given the unprecedented quantity of drugs and the appellant's prior record for the same offence.

In this criminal appeal concerning terrorism convictions under Part II.1 of the Criminal Code, the appellant challenged the constitutionality of key terrorism provisions, the fairness of the trial after appellate restoration of the motive clause, the reasonableness of the verdicts, and the sentence imposed on appeal.

The Court held that the challenged participation provision was not overbroad under s. 7 and that the legislative scheme did not establish a breach of expressive freedom on the record before it.

It further held that re-insertion of the motive clause caused no trial unfairness, the armed conflict exception did not apply on the evidence, and the convictions were reasonable.

On sentence, the Court affirmed correction of errors in principle and upheld the substituted life term with consecutive terms and extended parole ineligibility.

The appellant appealed a summary conviction for impaired driving, arguing the trial judge erred in dismissing a Charter application challenging the arresting officer’s reasonable and probable grounds for arrest and breath demand.

The appellant contended the officer improperly relied on an unidentified bystander’s identification and that evidence obtained after the arrest should have been excluded under s. 24(2) of the Charter.

The appeal court held that the officer’s subjective belief was objectively reasonable when considering the totality of the circumstances, including dispatch information, the accident scene, the bystander identification, and the appellant’s signs of impairment.

The court found no Charter breach and concluded the trial judge properly applied governing jurisprudence.

Alternatively, even if a breach existed, exclusion of the breath samples and statements would not have been justified under the Grant framework.

The Crown appealed a summary conviction appeal judge's decision ordering a new trial for the accused, who had been convicted of driving with excess alcohol.

The appeal judge had found that the trial judge erred in interpreting 'forthwith' under s. 254(2) of the Criminal Code as 'within a reasonable time' rather than 'immediately'.

The Court of Appeal allowed the Crown's appeal and restored the conviction, holding that 'forthwith' requires a prompt demand and immediate response, but allows for a reasonably necessary delay to enable the officer to properly discharge their duty.

The 17-minute delay in this case was found to be reasonably necessary.

The accused was sentenced following conviction after trial for possession of cocaine for the purpose of trafficking involving 111.85 kilograms of cocaine.

The court considered the extraordinary quantity, high purity, and multi‑million‑dollar value of the drugs, as well as the accused’s prior conviction for a similar offence involving multi‑kilogram quantities.

Although the court found the accused’s role was limited to that of a courier, the circumstances demonstrated a high level of organization, planning, and trusted involvement in a large trafficking enterprise.

Emphasis was placed on denunciation and both general and specific deterrence.

A penitentiary sentence of 15 years was imposed with credit for pre‑trial custody and restrictive bail conditions.

The appellant challenged terrorism convictions and sentence arising from his participation in and support of a group engaged in violent jihad, including training, financing, transporting supplies, and building remote detonator devices.

The court held that the definition of "terrorist activity" in s. 83.01(1)(b) of the Criminal Code did not infringe s. 2(b) of the Charter, rejected the trial judge's "chilling effect" analysis, and upheld the convictions.

The court also held that the armed conflict exception was unavailable and that judicial notice of basic facts concerning Afghanistan was proper.

On the Crown's cross-appeal, the court found the total sentence manifestly unfit and imposed life imprisonment with ten years before eligibility for full parole.