Eric Granger

The appellant appealed a summary conviction for impaired driving, arguing the trial judge erred in dismissing a Charter application challenging the arresting officer’s reasonable and probable grounds for arrest and breath demand.

The appellant contended the officer improperly relied on an unidentified bystander’s identification and that evidence obtained after the arrest should have been excluded under s. 24(2) of the Charter.

The appeal court held that the officer’s subjective belief was objectively reasonable when considering the totality of the circumstances, including dispatch information, the accident scene, the bystander identification, and the appellant’s signs of impairment.

The court found no Charter breach and concluded the trial judge properly applied governing jurisprudence.

Alternatively, even if a breach existed, exclusion of the breath samples and statements would not have been justified under the Grant framework.

The Crown appealed a summary conviction appeal judge's decision ordering a new trial for the accused, who had been convicted of driving with excess alcohol.

The appeal judge had found that the trial judge erred in interpreting 'forthwith' under s. 254(2) of the Criminal Code as 'within a reasonable time' rather than 'immediately'.

The Court of Appeal allowed the Crown's appeal and restored the conviction, holding that 'forthwith' requires a prompt demand and immediate response, but allows for a reasonably necessary delay to enable the officer to properly discharge their duty.

The 17-minute delay in this case was found to be reasonably necessary.

The accused was sentenced following conviction after trial for possession of cocaine for the purpose of trafficking involving 111.85 kilograms of cocaine.

The court considered the extraordinary quantity, high purity, and multi‑million‑dollar value of the drugs, as well as the accused’s prior conviction for a similar offence involving multi‑kilogram quantities.

Although the court found the accused’s role was limited to that of a courier, the circumstances demonstrated a high level of organization, planning, and trusted involvement in a large trafficking enterprise.

Emphasis was placed on denunciation and both general and specific deterrence.

A penitentiary sentence of 15 years was imposed with credit for pre‑trial custody and restrictive bail conditions.

The appellant challenged terrorism convictions and sentence arising from his participation in and support of a group engaged in violent jihad, including training, financing, transporting supplies, and building remote detonator devices.

The court held that the definition of "terrorist activity" in s. 83.01(1)(b) of the Criminal Code did not infringe s. 2(b) of the Charter, rejected the trial judge's "chilling effect" analysis, and upheld the convictions.

The court also held that the armed conflict exception was unavailable and that judicial notice of basic facts concerning Afghanistan was proper.

On the Crown's cross-appeal, the court found the total sentence manifestly unfit and imposed life imprisonment with ten years before eligibility for full parole.

The appellant was convicted of mischief after placing a spray-painted, beat-up van on his property line to interfere with his neighbours' attempts to sell their home, amidst an ongoing dispute over basement flooding.

The trial judge and summary conviction appeal judge rejected his defence under s. 430(7) of the Criminal Code, which protects acts done solely for the purpose of communicating information.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal and entered an acquittal, holding that the s. 430(7) defence applies even if the communication is intended to persuade or pressure others by interfering with their property rights, provided the act itself is peaceful and solely communicative.

The appellant appealed his conviction for possession of marijuana for the purpose of trafficking, arguing the verdict was unreasonable because there was no direct evidence identifying him as the occupant of the apartment where the drugs were found.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the trial judge correctly based his conclusion on the entire body of circumstantial evidence, which included the sublease in the appellant's name, his expired identity documents found in the apartment, and his car parked in the apartment's space.

The appellants appealed an order refusing to quash their committal to stand trial for first degree murder.

They argued there was insufficient evidence of planning and deliberation, pointing to an intervening act where the victim's colleague opened fire on them.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that evidence of prior communication, arriving in a convoy, rushing the victim while armed, and the nature of the attack provided a sufficient basis for a properly instructed jury to infer planning and deliberation.

The appellant appealed his conviction for dangerous driving, arguing that his driving was the result of unexpectedly falling asleep due to sleep apnea.

The Court of Appeal upheld the trial judge's rejection of this non-blameworthy explanation, noting the weak expert evidence and the appellant's lack of history of falling asleep unexpectedly.

The court also dismissed procedural arguments regarding the trial judge's conduct.

However, based on a Crown concession, a clerical conviction for dangerous driving simpliciter was quashed.

The appellant, a professional bus driver, appealed his conviction for dangerous driving after he drove a bus too far to the right and struck a curb.

He argued that the trial judge erred in rejecting his defence of steering failure and that the reasons for judgment were inadequate.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no error in the trial judge's conclusion that the steering was functional prior to impact and that the appellant's delayed reaction constituted a marked departure from the standard of care.