Eric Granger

The accused was charged with 19 offences including sexual assault with a weapon, assault, uttering death threats, criminal harassment, unlawful confinement, and causing the complainant to take a noxious thing.

The Crown sought to admit expert evidence from Dr. Deborah Sinclair regarding the dynamics of domestic violence, traumatic bonding, coercive control, and victim behaviour.

The defence opposed admission on grounds of relevance, necessity, expert qualification, and impartiality.

The court conducted a voir dire to determine admissibility of the expert evidence.

This is a voir dire decision determining the admissibility of evidence of prior sexual activity between the complainant and the accused, led by the Crown during trial.

The court considered whether evidence of consensual sexual conduct on other occasions, including details of BDSM activities and statements made by the accused on multiple occasions, should be admitted.

The court applied the principles established in R. v. Seaboyer and the statutory framework of section 276 of the Criminal Code, balancing the probative value of the evidence against potential prejudice to the complainant's privacy rights and the interests of justice.

The court admitted the evidence, finding it relevant to issues beyond the "twin myths" and that any interference with the complainant's privacy was justified by the interests of justice.

The accused was charged with operating a motor vehicle with a blood alcohol concentration exceeding 80 milligrams per 100 millilitres of blood contrary to the Criminal Code.

The trial proceeded on a blended basis with evidence applicable to both a Charter voir dire and the trial proper.

The central issue was whether the Crown had proven the charge beyond a reasonable doubt, with particular focus on whether the breath samples were obtained "as soon as practicable" and whether the accused's Charter rights were violated.

The court found a serious breach of the accused's section 10(b) Charter rights when the officer failed to advise the accused of his rights to counsel during the period between the ASD demand and the arrival of the approved screening device.

The court excluded the breath sample evidence pursuant to section 24(2) of the Charter, finding that admission would bring the administration of justice into disrepute.

As a result, the Crown could not prove the charge and the allegations were dismissed.

The court ruled on whether a complainant implicitly waived solicitor-client privilege by testifying in cross-examination that she had sought legal advice from her lawyers before giving media interviews while subject to a witness exclusion order.

The court held that the complainant did not implicitly waive her privilege.

The court applied a principled approach considering the fundamental nature of solicitor-client privilege, the requirement of voluntary action by the privilege holder, and the significance of the evidence arising during compelled cross-examination.

The court concluded that fairness and consistency did not require waiver in these circumstances.

The accused, Mark Sealy-Ward, was charged with 11 counts related to careless storage of firearms and ammunition, possession of prohibited firearms and weapons for dangerous purposes, and possession of Schedule I and II substances for the purpose of trafficking.

The trial proceeded over five days, with the Crown presenting circumstantial evidence linking the accused to drugs, firearms, and drug trafficking paraphernalia found in his vehicle.

The defence argued lack of knowledge and control.

The court found the accused guilty on 10 of the 11 counts, concluding that the circumstantial evidence overwhelmingly pointed to guilt and that the alternative inferences proposed by the defence were mere suppositions.

The accused was found guilty of obstructing a peace officer after concealing his involvement in a fatal collision between his pickup truck and a cyclist.

The accused repaired his vehicle and hid from police for several days out of fear.

The court weighed the devastating impact on the victim's family against the accused's lack of criminal record, genuine remorse, and otherwise positive character.

The court imposed a 12-month conditional sentence, including a curfew and 100 hours of community service.

The accused was charged with 19 offences including sexual assault with a weapon, assault, uttering death threats, criminal harassment, unlawful confinement, and related offences.

During trial, the defence sought to introduce excerpts from the complainant's psychologist records under section 278.94 of the Criminal Code.

The court ruled on the admissibility of two excerpts: the first, a prior inconsistent statement regarding the timing of assaults, was admitted as it had significant probative value for impeaching credibility; the second, regarding the absence of mention of a specific assault, was excluded as the defence failed to establish a rational basis for the inference that the omission was relevant to whether the assault occurred.

The accused brought an application under s. 276(2) of the Criminal Code seeking to adduce evidence of other sexual activity of the complainant.

The complainant sought to cross-examine the accused on his affidavit in support of the application.

The court determined whether the complainant's statutory right to "appear and make submissions" under s. 278.94(2) and (3) includes the right to cross-examine the accused.

The court held that the right to appear and make submissions must be meaningful and includes the right to cross-examine the accused on issues relevant to the application.

The court considered whether section 278.92 of the Criminal Code prohibits defence counsel from putting the contents of a private record to a complainant during cross-examination without first obtaining a court order.

The accused was charged with 19 offences including sexual assault with a weapon, assault, uttering threats, criminal harassment, unlawful confinement, and public mischief.

Defence counsel sought to cross-examine the complainant regarding statements she allegedly made to a health care provider that appeared inconsistent with her trial testimony regarding the timing of alleged incidents.

The Crown objected, arguing that section 278.92 required a court order before any contents of the private record could be put to the complainant.

The court held that an order under section 278.92 is required before defence counsel may put to a witness the contents of a record in the possession of the defendant in which the complainant had a reasonable expectation of privacy.

The defendant, Mark Sealy-Ward, brought a Charter application seeking to exclude evidence obtained following a traffic stop, arrest, and subsequent searches.

The defence argued arbitrary detention, failure to advise of reasons for detention and right to counsel, and unlawful search of the vehicle and trunk.

The court found the traffic stop and initial arrest for marijuana possession lawful, and the search of the vehicle and trunk incident to arrest also lawful.

However, the court found a breach of the defendant's right to counsel under s. 10(b) of the Charter due to delay in providing the caution.

Applying the Grant analysis, the court determined that the breach was not serious, the impact on the defendant's Charter interests was not severe, and society's interest in the adjudication on the merits of reliable evidence (drugs, shotgun, ammunition) outweighed the breach.

The motion to exclude evidence was dismissed.

The accused brought an application under s. 278.93 (formerly s. 276.1) for a hearing under s. 278.94 (formerly s. 276.2) to determine whether evidence of the complainant's sexual activity other than that forming the subject matter of the sexual assault charges would be admissible under s. 276(2) of the Criminal Code.

The central issue was whether the accused's application record must be provided to the complainant before the s. 278.94 hearing.

The court held that the complainant is entitled to receive the application record sufficiently in advance of the hearing to allow her to prepare and make meaningful submissions.

The accused, Deinsberg St. Hilaire, was charged with dangerous driving causing death, failure to stop at the scene of an accident causing death, and obstruction of a peace officer.

He pleaded guilty to obstruction but not guilty to the other two.

The charges arose from a collision where his pickup truck struck and killed a cyclist on the paved shoulder of Leitrim Road.

The court found the Crown failed to prove beyond a reasonable doubt the *actus reus* and *mens rea* for dangerous driving, specifically that the driving constituted a 'marked departure' from the standard of care or that the accused knew or ought to have known he was too tired to drive.

For the failure to stop charge, the court found reasonable doubt as to whether the accused knew or was wilfully blind to having struck a person.

Consequently, St. Hilaire was found not guilty of dangerous driving causing death and failure to stop, but guilty of obstruction of a peace officer.

The defendant applied under section 276.1 of the Criminal Code to determine the admissibility of evidence regarding prior sexual activity with the complainant in a sexual assault case.

The defendant sought to introduce evidence of an ongoing consensual sexual relationship with the complainant before and after the alleged assault, as well as evidence regarding the lack of explicit verbal consent in their prior encounters.

The court granted the application in part, permitting evidence of the nature and duration of the relationship but prohibiting evidence of specific sexual acts and the absence of explicit verbal consent in prior encounters.

The appellant was convicted of criminal harassment under s. 264(1) and (2)(d) of the Criminal Code for creating a private Yahoo!

Group website that portrayed the complainant in a false and sexually degrading manner.

The sole ground of appeal was whether the trial judge erred in finding that the actus reus of the offence had been established.

The appellant argued that establishing the actus reus requires proof of subjective intent to engage in threatening conduct.

The Court of Appeal upheld the conviction, holding that the actus reus of threatening conduct under s. 264(2)(d) is assessed objectively, not subjectively, and does not require proof of the accused's specific intent to instil fear.

The Crown appealed a Summary Conviction Appeal Court decision that had set aside a conviction for operating a motor vehicle with a blood-alcohol concentration exceeding 80 mg per 100 ml of blood.

The Summary Conviction Appeal Court Judge had found that the respondent raised a doubt regarding the reliability of the breath-testing instrument based on a low calibration check.

The Court of Appeal allowed the Crown's appeal, finding that the Summary Conviction Appeal Court Judge erred by failing to apply the proper standard of appellate review and by substituting his own view of the evidence for that of the trial judge.

The Court restored the conviction and sentence.

The appeal concerned whether a drug recognition expert’s opinion under s. 254(3.1) of the Criminal Code is automatically admissible at trial or remains governed by common law expert-evidence rules.

The majority held the provision does not create automatic admissibility, but found the statutory and regulatory framework conclusively establishes the expert’s specialized expertise for administering the 12-step evaluation.

On that basis, and with the other Mohan factors not in dispute, the opinion evidence was admissible without an additional voir dire in this case.

The dissent would have required proof of threshold reliability of the underlying science before admitting the opinion on impairment.

The appeal was dismissed and the new trial order was confirmed.

The appellant was convicted of first degree murder of his daughter-in-law.

At trial, he advanced a non-insane automatism defence, claiming he was in a dissociative state when he shot the victim.

The sole ground of appeal concerned Crown counsel's closing address to the jury.

The defence argued that the Crown violated the principle in Browne v. Dunn by failing to confront defence witnesses with inferences and arguments later urged to the jury.

The trial judge found one Browne v. Dunn violation and two material misstatements of evidence but rejected seven other defence arguments.

On appeal, the court upheld the trial judge's rulings, finding the corrective instructions adequate and the other Crown submissions not improper.

The accused, charged with first-degree murder, brought an application for a stay of proceedings alleging a breach of his s. 11(b) Charter right to be tried within a reasonable time.

The total delay was 48 months, well above the 30-month presumptive ceiling established in Jordan.

The court found that the case was not particularly complex and that the Crown's reliance on the previous state of the law was unreasonable, particularly given the accused's continuous pre-trial custody and the Crown's failure to mitigate delay caused by its own unavailability.

The application was granted and a stay of proceedings was entered.

The accused, charged with first degree murder, brought an application to bar the Crown from calling witnesses to testify about matters that the defence had already admitted or offered to admit.

The defence argued that calling such evidence was unnecessary and irrelevant given the admissions.

The court dismissed the application, holding that the Crown has broad prosecutorial discretion to determine how to present its case, including the right to reject defence-framed admissions and to call evidence to prove elements such as planning and deliberation, negate third-party suspect theories, and provide confirmatory evidence for unsavoury witnesses.

The Crown sought to admit two statements made by the accused to police during a missing person investigation that later became a first-degree murder case.

The court found the first statement inadmissible because the police officer's notes were inadequate to prove voluntariness beyond a reasonable doubt.

The second statement, which was video-recorded, was ruled admissible because the accused attended the police station voluntarily, the interaction was conversational, and the police did not yet have reasonable grounds to suspect the accused of a crime, meaning no caution was required.