Eric Granger

The Crown and the accused both sought a review of the accused's bail conditions related to charges arising from the Freedom Convoy.

The Crown alleged the accused breached her conditions by agreeing to accept an award, while the accused sought to vary her conditions to allow travel to Ontario and use of social media.

The court found no breach of conditions and determined that a material change in circumstances warranted a de novo review.

The court ordered the accused's continued release with varied conditions, maintaining the social media ban but modifying the geographic restriction to allow her to visit Ottawa outside the downtown core.

The appellant appealed convictions for multiple drug and firearm offences, alleging the trial judge failed to provide adequate reasons for dismissing a Charter motion and misapprehended evidence.

The Court of Appeal found the trial judge's reasons adequate, noting no obligation to reconcile every inconsistency, only those relevant to the Charter application.

While conceding a misapprehension regarding the location of the appellant's wallet, the court determined it had no impact on the verdicts due to overwhelming evidence of possession, including a padlock code found in the appellant's wallet connecting him directly to contraband.

The appeal was dismissed.

The appellant was convicted of sexual contact and inciting sexual contact with a person under 14.

He appealed his convictions and sought leave to appeal his 30-month sentence.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal against conviction, finding no error in the trial judge's assessment of the complainant's credibility, particularly regarding inconsistent statements about childhood events.

The court also granted leave to appeal the sentence but dismissed the appeal, affirming the trial judge's consideration of the appellant's age and health, and finding no exceptional circumstances due to the COVID-19 pandemic to warrant a reduced sentence.

The appellant, a Canada Border Services Agency officer, appealed a 10-year sentence for conspiring to import cocaine and breach of trust.

The appeal challenged the sentencing range and the judge's consideration of time spent on house arrest and pre-sentence custody.

The Court of Appeal upheld the 10-year sentence but granted credit for pre-sentence custody, reduced a firearms prohibition to 10 years, and set aside a victim surcharge.

The Crown appealed a summary conviction acquittal of the accused on a charge of operating a motor vehicle with a blood alcohol concentration exceeding 80 milligrams.

The trial judge had excluded the breath readings after finding a breach of the accused's s. 10(b) Charter rights because the officer did not facilitate the right to counsel while waiting for an Approved Screening Device to arrive.

The Superior Court of Justice allowed the appeal, finding the trial judge erred in law by failing to assess whether the accused had a realistic opportunity to consult counsel and by misapplying the s. 24(2) analysis.

The acquittal was set aside and a new trial ordered.

The accused was found guilty of multiple firearms and drug trafficking offences after police located a sawed-off shotgun, ammunition, cocaine, methamphetamine, and marijuana in his vehicle.

The Crown sought a five-year sentence, while the defence sought one year.

The court considered the accused's youthful age, limited unrelated record, and strict bail conditions as mitigating factors, balanced against the aggravating factors of commercial drug trafficking and firearms possession.

The accused was sentenced to two years less a day imprisonment, minus credits for pre-sentence custody and strict bail conditions, followed by two years of probation.

A voir dire decision addressing the admissibility of evidence regarding the complainant's sexual activity during captivity.

The Crown sought to elicit evidence through cross-examination of the defendant regarding his reasons for having children with the complainant while in captivity, arguing it was relevant to his credibility.

The court found the evidence had minimal probative value and that its prejudicial effect substantially outweighed any probative value.

The court excluded the evidence and emphasized the importance of pre-trial applications and proper procedure when Crown seeks to adduce evidence of prior sexual activity.

The accused was charged with 19 offences including sexual assault with a weapon, assault, uttering death threats, criminal harassment, unlawful confinement, and causing the complainant to take a noxious thing.

The Crown sought to admit expert evidence from Dr. Deborah Sinclair regarding the dynamics of domestic violence, traumatic bonding, coercive control, and victim behaviour.

The defence opposed admission on grounds of relevance, necessity, expert qualification, and impartiality.

The court conducted a voir dire to determine admissibility of the expert evidence.

This is a voir dire decision determining the admissibility of evidence of prior sexual activity between the complainant and the accused, led by the Crown during trial.

The court considered whether evidence of consensual sexual conduct on other occasions, including details of BDSM activities and statements made by the accused on multiple occasions, should be admitted.

The court applied the principles established in R. v. Seaboyer and the statutory framework of section 276 of the Criminal Code, balancing the probative value of the evidence against potential prejudice to the complainant's privacy rights and the interests of justice.

The court admitted the evidence, finding it relevant to issues beyond the "twin myths" and that any interference with the complainant's privacy was justified by the interests of justice.

The accused was charged with operating a motor vehicle with a blood alcohol concentration exceeding 80 milligrams per 100 millilitres of blood contrary to the Criminal Code.

The trial proceeded on a blended basis with evidence applicable to both a Charter voir dire and the trial proper.

The central issue was whether the Crown had proven the charge beyond a reasonable doubt, with particular focus on whether the breath samples were obtained "as soon as practicable" and whether the accused's Charter rights were violated.

The court found a serious breach of the accused's section 10(b) Charter rights when the officer failed to advise the accused of his rights to counsel during the period between the ASD demand and the arrival of the approved screening device.

The court excluded the breath sample evidence pursuant to section 24(2) of the Charter, finding that admission would bring the administration of justice into disrepute.

As a result, the Crown could not prove the charge and the allegations were dismissed.

The court ruled on whether a complainant implicitly waived solicitor-client privilege by testifying in cross-examination that she had sought legal advice from her lawyers before giving media interviews while subject to a witness exclusion order.

The court held that the complainant did not implicitly waive her privilege.

The court applied a principled approach considering the fundamental nature of solicitor-client privilege, the requirement of voluntary action by the privilege holder, and the significance of the evidence arising during compelled cross-examination.

The court concluded that fairness and consistency did not require waiver in these circumstances.

The accused, Mark Sealy-Ward, was charged with 11 counts related to careless storage of firearms and ammunition, possession of prohibited firearms and weapons for dangerous purposes, and possession of Schedule I and II substances for the purpose of trafficking.

The trial proceeded over five days, with the Crown presenting circumstantial evidence linking the accused to drugs, firearms, and drug trafficking paraphernalia found in his vehicle.

The defence argued lack of knowledge and control.

The court found the accused guilty on 10 of the 11 counts, concluding that the circumstantial evidence overwhelmingly pointed to guilt and that the alternative inferences proposed by the defence were mere suppositions.

The accused was found guilty of obstructing a peace officer after concealing his involvement in a fatal collision between his pickup truck and a cyclist.

The accused repaired his vehicle and hid from police for several days out of fear.

The court weighed the devastating impact on the victim's family against the accused's lack of criminal record, genuine remorse, and otherwise positive character.

The court imposed a 12-month conditional sentence, including a curfew and 100 hours of community service.

The accused was charged with 19 offences including sexual assault with a weapon, assault, uttering death threats, criminal harassment, unlawful confinement, and related offences.

During trial, the defence sought to introduce excerpts from the complainant's psychologist records under section 278.94 of the Criminal Code.

The court ruled on the admissibility of two excerpts: the first, a prior inconsistent statement regarding the timing of assaults, was admitted as it had significant probative value for impeaching credibility; the second, regarding the absence of mention of a specific assault, was excluded as the defence failed to establish a rational basis for the inference that the omission was relevant to whether the assault occurred.

The accused brought an application under s. 276(2) of the Criminal Code seeking to adduce evidence of other sexual activity of the complainant.

The complainant sought to cross-examine the accused on his affidavit in support of the application.

The court determined whether the complainant's statutory right to "appear and make submissions" under s. 278.94(2) and (3) includes the right to cross-examine the accused.

The court held that the right to appear and make submissions must be meaningful and includes the right to cross-examine the accused on issues relevant to the application.

The court considered whether section 278.92 of the Criminal Code prohibits defence counsel from putting the contents of a private record to a complainant during cross-examination without first obtaining a court order.

The accused was charged with 19 offences including sexual assault with a weapon, assault, uttering threats, criminal harassment, unlawful confinement, and public mischief.

Defence counsel sought to cross-examine the complainant regarding statements she allegedly made to a health care provider that appeared inconsistent with her trial testimony regarding the timing of alleged incidents.

The Crown objected, arguing that section 278.92 required a court order before any contents of the private record could be put to the complainant.

The court held that an order under section 278.92 is required before defence counsel may put to a witness the contents of a record in the possession of the defendant in which the complainant had a reasonable expectation of privacy.

The defendant, Mark Sealy-Ward, brought a Charter application seeking to exclude evidence obtained following a traffic stop, arrest, and subsequent searches.

The defence argued arbitrary detention, failure to advise of reasons for detention and right to counsel, and unlawful search of the vehicle and trunk.

The court found the traffic stop and initial arrest for marijuana possession lawful, and the search of the vehicle and trunk incident to arrest also lawful.

However, the court found a breach of the defendant's right to counsel under s. 10(b) of the Charter due to delay in providing the caution.

Applying the Grant analysis, the court determined that the breach was not serious, the impact on the defendant's Charter interests was not severe, and society's interest in the adjudication on the merits of reliable evidence (drugs, shotgun, ammunition) outweighed the breach.

The motion to exclude evidence was dismissed.

The accused brought an application under s. 278.93 (formerly s. 276.1) for a hearing under s. 278.94 (formerly s. 276.2) to determine whether evidence of the complainant's sexual activity other than that forming the subject matter of the sexual assault charges would be admissible under s. 276(2) of the Criminal Code.

The central issue was whether the accused's application record must be provided to the complainant before the s. 278.94 hearing.

The court held that the complainant is entitled to receive the application record sufficiently in advance of the hearing to allow her to prepare and make meaningful submissions.

The accused, Deinsberg St. Hilaire, was charged with dangerous driving causing death, failure to stop at the scene of an accident causing death, and obstruction of a peace officer.

He pleaded guilty to obstruction but not guilty to the other two.

The charges arose from a collision where his pickup truck struck and killed a cyclist on the paved shoulder of Leitrim Road.

The court found the Crown failed to prove beyond a reasonable doubt the *actus reus* and *mens rea* for dangerous driving, specifically that the driving constituted a 'marked departure' from the standard of care or that the accused knew or ought to have known he was too tired to drive.

For the failure to stop charge, the court found reasonable doubt as to whether the accused knew or was wilfully blind to having struck a person.

Consequently, St. Hilaire was found not guilty of dangerous driving causing death and failure to stop, but guilty of obstruction of a peace officer.

The defendant applied under section 276.1 of the Criminal Code to determine the admissibility of evidence regarding prior sexual activity with the complainant in a sexual assault case.

The defendant sought to introduce evidence of an ongoing consensual sexual relationship with the complainant before and after the alleged assault, as well as evidence regarding the lack of explicit verbal consent in their prior encounters.

The court granted the application in part, permitting evidence of the nature and duration of the relationship but prohibiting evidence of specific sexual acts and the absence of explicit verbal consent in prior encounters.