Delmar Michael Doucette

The appellant was found not criminally responsible for an assault with a weapon due to a mental disorder.

The Review Board ordered his transfer to a medium security hospital with privileges, applying the 'least onerous and least restrictive' test to the conditions of his detention.

The Court of Appeal held this test only applied to the choice of disposition, not the conditions.

The Supreme Court of Canada allowed the appeal, holding that the 'least onerous and least restrictive' requirement under s. 672.54 of the Criminal Code applies to both the disposition and the particular conditions forming part of it.

The appellant was convicted of first degree murder based entirely on circumstantial evidence, including hair comparison, DNA, identification, and after-the-fact conduct.

On appeal, the appellant argued the trial judge erred in admitting prejudicial hair comparison evidence and in instructing the jury on identification and after-the-fact conduct.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, finding the trial judge erred in admitting type 2 hair comparison evidence without confirming DNA, failing to properly instruct the jury on the limitations of the hair evidence, improperly leaving worthless identification evidence to the jury, and erroneously instructing the jury that they could infer guilt from a concocted alibi and ambiguous after-the-fact conduct.

A new trial was ordered.

The appellant appealed his conviction and sentence.

The conviction appeal was abandoned and dismissed.

On the sentence appeal, the Court of Appeal found the sentencing judge erred by failing to credit the appellant for one year of pre-trial custody spent at the Toronto East Detention Centre, having mistakenly believed the time was solely due to parole revocation.

Leave to appeal sentence was granted and the sentence was reduced by one year to 12 years consecutive.

The appellant appealed his conviction for attempted murder and his nine-year sentence.

He argued the trial judge erred in the W.D. instruction to the jury and unnecessarily instructed on the distinction between attempt and mere preparation under s. 24 of the Criminal Code.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the conviction appeal, finding no reversible error in the jury charge.

The sentence appeal was also dismissed, as the sentence was within the appropriate range for attempted murder in a domestic context, where deterrence is paramount.

The appellant appealed his conviction and sentence for extortion.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the conviction appeal, finding the evidence supported the trial judge's conclusion that the appellant assaulted and threatened the complainant to obtain money owed.

However, the Court allowed the sentence appeal, finding the original sentence of three years and four months disproportionate despite the appellant's prior extortion conviction.

The sentence was varied to two years.

The applicants applied to re-open an appeal previously decided by the Court of Appeal, arguing that the court was misled by false evidence regarding the status of a police informant.

The Crown conceded that newly disclosed evidence contradicted the evidence relied upon in the original appeal, which had determined the individual was a police informer rather than a police agent.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the application, holding that while there is inherent jurisdiction to set aside a judgment based on fraud or newly discovered evidence, the proper forum to seek such relief is the court of first instance (the Superior Court), not the appellate court.

The appellant appealed his conviction, arguing that the conduct of Crown counsel resulted in a miscarriage of justice and that the trial judge erred in instructing the jury on self-defence and provocation.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that while Crown counsel's sarcastic questions reflected badly on him, they did not result in a miscarriage of justice.

The court also found no prejudice resulting from the trial judge's instructions, noting the lack of objections to the charge.

The appellants, parents of a three-month-old child who died from severe injuries, appealed the dismissal of their application for certiorari to quash their committal for trial on charges of second degree murder.

They argued that the preliminary inquiry judge found no evidence indicating which parent caused the fatal injuries or that they acted in concert, and thus they should be discharged or committed only for manslaughter.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the inquiry judge correctly concluded there was sufficient circumstantial evidence—including exclusive opportunity, motive, and awareness of the child's deteriorating health—upon which a properly instructed jury could find either or both appellants guilty of second degree murder as principals or parties.

The appellants pleaded guilty to fraud exceeding $5000 for operating an elaborate modelling agency scam that defrauded hundreds of victims of over $400,000.

They were sentenced to custodial terms of two years less a day and 15 months.

On appeal, they argued the trial judge erred by not imposing conditional sentences, citing disparity with a co-accused and the fact that they now had a young child.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeals, finding the custodial sentences were amply justified by the appellants' roles in the enterprise and the devastating effects of the fraud on the victims.

The respondent pled guilty to seven counts of robbery, dangerous driving, failing to stop for police, and possession of a stolen vehicle, receiving a total concurrent sentence of four years.

The Crown appealed the sentence.

The Court of Appeal found the total sentence manifestly inadequate given the respondent's extensive record, the number of offences, and the fact that he was on parole.

The Court varied the sentences for dangerous driving and failing to stop to be consecutive to the robbery sentences, resulting in a total sentence of six years, and imposed a 10-year weapons prohibition.

The appellant pleaded guilty to robbery and other offences and was sentenced to 30 months' imprisonment.

The Crown successfully applied for an order under s. 487.052 of the Criminal Code authorizing the taking of a bodily sample for the national DNA data bank.

The appellant appealed, arguing that the standard of 'the best interests of the administration of justice' in s. 487.052 is unconstitutionally vague and overbroad unless interpreted to require reasonable and probable grounds to believe the offender will commit a future offence.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, holding that the search warrant standard of reasonable and probable grounds is not required for DNA data bank orders, as the context, purposes, and privacy expectations differ significantly.

The court found the trial judge did not err in balancing the appellant's privacy interests against his criminal record and the circumstances of the offence.

The administrators of two mental health centres appealed a decision of the Ontario Review Board transferring a patient, found not criminally responsible on account of mental disorder, from a maximum security facility to a medium security facility.

The Court of Appeal held that the Board applied the wrong legal test by using the 'least onerous and least restrictive' standard to determine the conditions of the patient's hospital detention under s. 672.54(c) of the Criminal Code.

The appeal was allowed and the matter was remitted to the Board for a rehearing with directions to apply the correct legal test and obtain further information regarding the patient's previous transfer and the suitability of the medium security facility.

The accused was convicted of first degree murder.

Years later, he applied to the Minister of Justice for a review based on fresh evidence.

The Minister referred the matter to the Court of Appeal under s. 690 of the Criminal Code for an opinion on whether the evidence was admissible, and if so, to determine the appeal.

The Court of Appeal concluded the evidence was inadmissible and did not proceed to determine the appeal.

The accused sought leave to appeal to the Supreme Court of Canada.

The Crown brought a motion to quash the application for leave.

The Supreme Court granted the motion, holding that the Court of Appeal had only provided an advisory opinion under s. 690(c), which is not a final judgment from which an appeal lies.

The Crown appealed a decision of the Ontario Review Board granting an absolute discharge to the respondent, who had previously been found not criminally responsible on account of mental disorder.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal and directed a new hearing, finding that while the Board reasonably determined the scope of its inquisitorial function, it erred by failing to consider all factors under s. 672.54 of the Criminal Code.

Specifically, the Board focused almost exclusively on the respondent's previous conduct and failed to consider the danger posed by his immediate, unsupervised re-entry into the community given his severe mental illness, lack of insight, and likelihood of non-compliance with medication.

The applicant hospital administrators moved under s. 672.76 of the Criminal Code to suspend a disposition of the Ontario Review Board ordering the transfer of the respondent accused from a maximum to a medium secure hospital facility, pending their appeal.

The court dismissed the motion, noting that the accused was fourth on the waiting list for the medium secure facility and it was highly unlikely he would be transferred before the appeal was heard in 13 days, making the suspension order unnecessary.

The appellant appealed his sentence of 18 months' imprisonment for domestic violence.

The Court of Appeal noted that while the sentence would be high for a first offence, the appellant had an horrific criminal record for violence against women and non-compliance with court orders.

Given the pre-sentence report indicating a very high risk to re-offend, the court found the sentence merited and dismissed the appeal.

The accused appealed convictions for multiple sexual assaults and sexual exploitation, arguing improper Crown cross-examination and inadequacy in the jury charge.

The court held that one line of cross-examination was unfair but caused no prejudice, and that the impugned cross-examination cumulatively did not deprive the accused of a fair trial.

The Crown separately appealed a conditional sentence as unfit for repeated sexual assaults against a vulnerable young complainant in a relationship of trust.

Although the court found an error in principle and concluded a conditional sentence should not have been imposed, it dismissed the sentence appeal after granting leave because the sentence had largely been served under strict conditions and incarceration at that stage would not be in the interests of justice.

The Supreme Court of Canada issued additional reasons regarding the proper procedure for directed verdicts of acquittal.

The Court modified the common law rule, holding that where a trial judge determines there is no evidence upon which a properly instructed jury could convict, the judge should withdraw the case from the jury and enter an acquittal directly, rather than directing the jury to return a verdict of not guilty.

This change avoids unnecessary delay, reduces jury frustration, and preserves the division of responsibilities between judge and jury.

The appellants were charged with conspiracy to traffic in narcotics.

The trial judge directed a verdict of acquittal, which was set aside by the Court of Appeal.

On appeal to the Supreme Court of Canada, the Court held that section 465(3) of the Criminal Code does not preclude the application of the Libman real and substantial connection test.

Finding evidence that the alleged trafficking offences had a real and substantial connection to Canada, the Court dismissed the appeals and upheld the order for a new trial.

The respondent attacked his parents-in-law while sleepwalking, killing his mother-in-law and seriously injuring his father-in-law.

At trial, he presented a defence of non-insane automatism, supported by uncontradicted expert medical evidence that sleepwalking is a sleep disorder, not a neurological or psychiatric illness.

The trial judge left only the defence of non-insane automatism with the jury, which acquitted the respondent.

The Court of Appeal upheld the acquittal.

The Supreme Court of Canada dismissed the Crown's appeal, holding that on the evidence and policy considerations, sleepwalking in this case did not stem from a 'disease of the mind' and was properly classified as non-insane automatism, entitling the accused to an absolute acquittal.