Delmar Michael Doucette

The appellant was convicted of first degree murder, attempted murder, and manslaughter as a secondary participant in a multiple shooting committed by a principal offender.

On appeal, the appellant argued the trial judge erred in instructing the jury on the elements of secondary participation, the use of after-the-fact conduct, and bad character evidence.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, finding the jury instructions on secondary participation in first degree murder and attempted murder were seriously flawed and failed to articulate the essential elements the prosecution had to prove.

A new trial was ordered for the murder and attempted murder counts, and the sentence for the manslaughter conviction was reduced to 12 years.

The amicus curiae appointed to assist the self-represented appellant sought to have his fees taxed pursuant to section 684(3) of the Criminal Code.

The Crown argued that the fees should be paid at the standard Legal Aid rate.

The Deputy Registrar found that the case was complex and difficult, and that the requested rate of $235 per hour was reasonable given counsel's expertise.

The fees were taxed at the requested rate.

The appellant was convicted of attempted murder after shooting at an individual who had forcibly entered his home.

On appeal, the appellant argued that the trial judge's jury instructions regarding self-defence on the attempted murder charge were inadequate.

The Court of Appeal agreed, finding that the instructions conflated the distinct issues of intent to kill and self-defence, leaving the jury with the incorrect impression that self-defence was irrelevant if intent to kill was proven.

The appeal was allowed, the conviction quashed, and a new trial ordered.

The amicus curiae, appointed to assist the appellant in a complex first-degree murder appeal, submitted his accounts for taxation.

The Attorney General paid the accounts at the Legal Aid rate, while the amicus sought two-thirds of his private rate ($200-$235 per hour).

The Deputy Registrar found the requested hourly rates reasonable given the complexity of the case and the amicus's expertise, but reduced the travel time rate to $100 per hour.

The Crown appealed an order of an Ontario Court of Justice judge who purported to exercise delegated habeas corpus powers to declare the accused's detention in jail unlawful.

The accused had been ordered to undergo a mental health assessment at a hospital but was held in jail due to a lack of beds.

A Superior Court judge had remitted the accused's habeas corpus application to the lower court under s. 775 of the Criminal Code.

The Court of Appeal quashed the appeal, holding that the lower court judge's order was not a judgment issued on the return of a writ of habeas corpus, as s. 775 does not permit the delegation of superior court habeas corpus powers to a lower court.

Consequently, there was no statutory jurisdiction to hear the appeal under s. 784(5) of the Criminal Code.

The appellant appealed his convictions for robbery, forcible confinement, and use of an imitation firearm arising from a home invasion.

He argued the trial judge erred in assessing identification evidence and Vetrovec concerns regarding a co-accused's testimony.

He also claimed ineffective assistance of counsel, alleging his trial lawyer prevented him from testifying in his own defence.

The majority of the Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the trial judge made no errors and the appellant failed to establish his ineffective assistance claim on a balance of probabilities.

A dissenting judge would have allowed the appeal and ordered a new trial based on the ineffective assistance claim.

The appellant appealed his conviction for criminal harassment and breach of probation, seeking to withdraw his guilty plea on the basis that he was pressured by his trial counsel.

The Court of Appeal found that the plea was voluntary, informed, and unequivocal, noting the appellant's familiarity with the process and the time elapsed between his decision and the actual plea.

The court also declined to admit the appellant's affidavit as fresh evidence, finding it lacked credibility under the Palmer test.

The appeal was dismissed.

The appellants appealed an order refusing to quash their committal to stand trial for first degree murder.

They argued there was insufficient evidence of planning and deliberation, pointing to an intervening act where the victim's colleague opened fire on them.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that evidence of prior communication, arriving in a convoy, rushing the victim while armed, and the nature of the attack provided a sufficient basis for a properly instructed jury to infer planning and deliberation.

The applicant sought release on bail pending trial for an offence involving a fatal stabbing.

Fresh evidence was introduced suggesting the deceased was the aggressor, providing context for the applicant's conduct.

The Court of Appeal found that, given the new information, detention was not justified on the tertiary ground, and the applicant met his onus on the secondary ground due to the availability of sureties to monitor his conduct.

The application for bail was granted.

The appellant, a chronic alcoholic with a lengthy criminal record, pled guilty to impaired driving, driving while disqualified, and public mischief.

The trial judge sentenced him to 30 months in addition to 18 months of pre-trial custody credited on a 1:1 basis, resulting in a global sentence of four years.

The appellant appealed, arguing he should have received 2:1 credit for pre-trial custody.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal in part, granting 1.5:1 credit for the first eight months of pre-trial custody to account for parole considerations, reducing the penitentiary term from 30 months to 26 months.

The court upheld the 1:1 credit for the remaining 10 months and quashed an illegal probation order.

The appellant pleaded guilty to breach of probation, theft over, and possession over, receiving an effective sentence of two years and two months.

On the same day, he pleaded guilty to unrelated charges of breach of probation and robbery, receiving a consecutive three-year sentence.

The appellant appealed the three-year sentence, arguing it should be reduced to two years.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, finding the sentencing judge erred by failing to consider the totality principle and the appellant's aboriginal status.

The sentence for the robbery and breach of probation was reduced from three years to two years.

The appellants appealed jury convictions for two murders arising from a drug-debt execution theory advanced through accomplice and jailhouse informer evidence.

The Court of Appeal held that the trial judge failed to provide an adequate Vetrovec caution regarding key unsavoury witnesses and also committed several additional reversible errors, including admitting highly prejudicial investigative hearsay, admitting evidence of a co-accused’s manslaughter conviction, excluding exculpatory portions of a recorded statement under the whole statement rule, permitting inadmissible hearsay concerning one appellant’s alleged admission to his girlfriend, and failing to control prejudicial Crown cross-examination and oath-helping evidence.

The court rejected the reasonable apprehension of bias claim and declined to intervene on several discrete evidentiary rulings, but found the cumulative and individual errors too serious for the curative proviso.

The convictions were set aside and a new trial ordered.

The appellant appealed a finding of Not Criminally Responsible (NCR), arguing that the evidence on the record was insufficient to support the finding.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, noting that the expert opinion of Dr. Ramshaw, which concluded the appellant was psychotic and incapable of knowing his actions were morally or legally wrong, was tendered as part of a joint application and was not challenged at trial.

The court found the NCR finding was correct based on the record.

The appellant appealed his conviction on the basis of ineffective assistance of counsel and fresh evidence.

The Crown conceded that a new trial was necessary but argued against an acquittal.

The Court of Appeal found that the fresh evidence, which included recantations and false allegations by the key witness, rendered the witness's testimony unbelievable.

Given the time elapsed, the time already served by the appellant, and his health condition, the Court set aside the conviction and directed an acquittal.

The appellant appealed his convictions for criminal harassment, making harassing telephone calls, and breaching probation, arguing that the trial judge was biased and pre-judged the merits of the offences during the complainant's examination-in-chief.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the trial judge's remarks, while unfortunate in timing and language, did not meet the high threshold for actual bias.

The majority concluded the remarks were an inquiry into the complainant's expected outcome and noted the lack of objection from defence counsel.

A dissenting judge would have ordered a new trial, finding the trial judge had made up his mind before the completion of the examination-in-chief.

The appellant pleaded guilty to sexual exploitation, sexual assault, and criminal harassment against his stepdaughter.

The abuse began when the complainant was a young child and continued for fourteen years.

The trial judge imposed a total sentence of 5 years and 1.5 months, including a consecutive sentence for criminal harassment, and a section 161 prohibition order.

On appeal, the appellant argued the sentences should be concurrent, the total sentence was excessive, and the prohibition order was overbroad.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the consecutive sentence appropriate, the total sentence fit given the egregious breach of trust, and the prohibition order within the trial judge's discretion.

The appellant was convicted of multiple offences including forcible confinement, assault, and criminal harassment against a former girlfriend, and was sentenced to 21 months' imprisonment.

He appealed the sentence on the basis that the trial judge failed to give him credit for 18 months spent on bail under strict house arrest conditions.

The Court of Appeal held that time spent under stringent bail conditions is a relevant mitigating factor that must be considered, and the failure to do so is an error in principle.

The appeal was allowed and the sentence was reduced to 16 months' imprisonment.

The appellant appealed her conviction and sentence, arguing the trial judge improperly used similar fact evidence to bolster the complainants' credibility and erred in departing from the 2:1 guideline for pre-trial custody credit.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the conviction appeal, finding the trial judge properly used the similar fact evidence to confirm the representations were made.

The sentence appeal was also dismissed, as the trial judge provided reasons for departing from the pre-trial custody credit guideline, and the lengthy penitentiary sentence was fit given the appellant's record and commission of offences while serving a previous sentence.

The appellant appealed his convictions for unlawful confinement and sexual assault, as well as his dangerous offender designation.

He argued the trial judge failed to adequately instruct the jury on potential collusion between the complainant and her son, and on prior inconsistent statements.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the conviction appeal, finding the jury instructions adequate and noting the lack of objection at trial.

The sentence appeal was also dismissed, as the trial judge had properly considered and rejected a long-term offender designation.

The appellant appealed his convictions and sentences for sexual assault and aggravated assault.

The Court of Appeal found that trial counsel provided ineffective assistance by failing to interview a nurse and cross-examine the complainant on a statement that supported the defence of consent.

The court quashed the sexual assault conviction and ordered a new trial.

The court also reviewed the five-year concurrent sentence for aggravated assault, reducing it to four years in light of fresh evidence showing the appellant's progress with rehabilitation, while noting the serious domestic context of the offence.